[Global NK Commentary] North Korea's Discourse on a Multipolar International Order and Its Strategic Ambiguity

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I. The Shifting Liberal International Order and North Korea's Response Discourse

The Trump administration has placed at the forefront the notion that the liberal international order, maintained for the past 80-odd years, has constrained U.S. national interests, and is seeking to construct a new international order. In this process, it is posing fundamental challenges to existing international norms, but a clear vision for an alternative order has not been sufficiently presented. Simultaneously, strategic choices that risk conflict with allies are causing considerable confusion and uncertainty throughout the international community. This U.S. approach, which prioritizes its own interests and shakes the foundations of the existing order, is not solely a U.S. issue but has significant implications for other countries as well. As common norms and agreements regarding the international order weaken, a situation arises where each country competitively proposes different discourses on the international order to justify its own interests.

For the past 30-odd years since the end of the Cold War, North Korea has intermittently raised discourse opposing the unipolar system led by the United States. However, in recent times, amidst a visible relative decline of the U.S. and intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition, coupled with a series of international political events such as the war in Ukraine, it has been developing a more comprehensive discourse on the international order.

The core concepts presented by North Korea are multipolarization and a new Cold War. It has already revealed perceptions of the possibility of international order multipolarization in the 21st century, and around the 2020s, it has attempted to define the current international situation using the term "new Cold War." Recently, discussions on multipolarization have been appearing more frequently and systematically.[1]

In this context, North Korea's discourse on multipolarization can be understood not merely as rhetoric, but as an attempt to redefine its own position and strategy within a changing international order. Analyzing the nature of the multipolar international order as perceived by North Korea and the political and strategic implications of that discourse provides important insights for understanding the future situation on the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asian international politics, and furthermore, the shifts in the global order.

II. Evolution of North Korea's Perception of the International Order: Formation of Multipolarization and New Cold War Discourse

In recent years, North Korea has redefined the international order in terms of "the collapse of the unipolar system and the advent of multipolarization." This concept, which repeatedly appears in the Rodong Sinmun and official discourse of the party and state, goes beyond a simple perception of world affairs. It is closer to an order discourse constructed to justify North Korea's diplomatic and military lines within a changing international environment and to institutionalize and solidify them.

This perception is clearly revealed in documentary form in the comprehensive treaty on partnership signed between North Korea and Russia. The preamble of the treaty criticizes hegemonic ambitions and attempts to impose a unipolar world order, while emphasizing the need to establish a multipolar international system based on the primacy of international law in international relations. This can be interpreted as an attempt to explicitly declare rejection of the existing U.S.-centric order while simultaneously presenting normative principles for an alternative order.

Article 6, through the expression "establishment of a just and multipolar new world order," demonstrates that the discourse of multipolarization is being codified and institutionalized through a legal document, a treaty between states. Multipolarization has become not merely a prospect or hope in North Korean discourse, but a strategic concept for defining and actively intervening in the ongoing transformation of the international order.

The concept of multipolarization began to appear intermittently in North Korea's official discourse in the early 21st century. In the early 2000s, North Korea perceived the international order as a confrontation between a unipolar system led by the U.S. and forces oriented towards multipolarization resisting it. It specifically pointed to the U.S. missile defense system and its strategy of global domination as key examples of unipolarization, arguing that cooperation among major powers centered on China and Russia, along with the solidarity of regional states, was forming an objective trend towards multipolarization. At this time, multipolarization was presented as an "unstoppable demand of the era" and a historical trend foreshadowing changes in the future global strategic structure.[2]

From the mid-2000s onwards, North Korea's discourse on multipolarization evolved to focus more on specific actors and institutions. The strengthening cooperation among China, Russia, and India, the growth of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the European Union's pursuit of independent security capabilities, and the collective solidarity of developing countries were all presented as examples actively driving the world's multipolarization. North Korea assessed that these trends were working to check the unilateralism and high-handedness of the U.S. and promote the democratization of international relations, defining multipolarization as the key path to realizing a just international order and a world of self-determination.[3]

Since 2008, the discourse on multipolarization has moved beyond criticism of the international order to increasingly take on the character of an alternative order theory. North Korea has defined multipolarization as a historical trend accelerating the weakening of the U.S.-centric order and its international isolation, while also arguing that regional integration and interstate cooperation are transforming the global strategic structure itself. In particular, the movements of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BRICS, and solidarity among African and Latin American nations are presented as key driving forces constituting a new international order, and multipolarization is explained not as a prospect or possibility, but as an ongoing structural transformation of the international order.[4]

Along with the discourse on multipolarization, North Korea has also presented the concept of a "new Cold War" relatively actively since the late 2000s. While assuming that the international community does not desire a repetition of the Cold War, North Korea attributes the spread of concerns about a "new Cold War" to the conflicts and contradictions between forces of multipolarization and unipolarization. Specifically, it formulated the logic that in a situation where the balance of power collapsed after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has continued its high-handedness and arbitrary actions, and as resistance and checks against this have intensified, the structure where the maintenance of unipolarization clashes with multipolarization trends has triggered discussions of a "new Cold War."[5]

Subsequently, North Korea has linked the possibility of a new Cold War in Northeast Asia more directly to military configurations. It argues that the U.S. move to strengthen military cooperation and alliance structures and maintain long-term military systems, under the guise of cooperation with Japan and South Korea, is operating to maintain and reinforce Cold War structures in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, it defines the trilateral military cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea as the formation of a new military bloc, and has fully advocated for the need to liquidate the legacies of the Cold War for regional peace and security. In this context, the "new Cold War" functions not merely as a diagnosis of the international situation, but as a concept to justify vigilance and response to alliance realignments and military deployments.[6]

Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un has explicitly used the term "new Cold War," formalizing North Korea's perception of the international order at the highest leadership level. The term "new Cold War" became firmly established through his policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in September 2021. He defined the core of the changing international relations structure as a transition to a "new Cold War" system, and at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in December 2022, he diagnosed that the structure of international relations "has clearly shifted to a new Cold War system, and the trend of multipolarization is accelerating."[7]

III. An Undefined Multipolar World: The Structural Ambiguity of North Korean Discourse

North Korea currently uses the concept of a "multipolar world" more frequently than the concept of a "new Cold War." The term "new Cold War" presupposes clear bloc confrontation and implies the inevitability of U.S.-China confrontation. Since China and Russia also use the concept of a multipolar order but do not pursue hostile confrontation or bloc formation with the U.S., it appears difficult for North Korea alone to use the term "new Cold War."[8]

The problem lies in the concept of "multipolarity" used by North Korea. North Korea uses the term "multipolarization" most frequently and also frequently uses the concept of a "multipolar world." It also uses the adjective "multipolar." However, it does not use related international political concepts such as "multipolar system," "great power cooperation system," or "sphere of influence." Multipolarization, rather than being a clear state concept, has a strong transitional aspect of change from a unipolar system. It is interesting that the concept of what kind of world will emerge after this transitional phase of multipolarization remains unclear. Whether multipolarization will lead to a cooperative system among multiple great powers, or a system of confrontation, or a competition among multiple spheres of influence, or whether a multipolar relationship structure similar to a multipolar system is possible, is unclear in North Korea's discourse regarding the state that will emerge after the transition.

The multipolar world presented by North Korea is not simply a state of balance of power, but a new normative order that replaces the Western-led international order. Multipolarization is not merely a phenomenon of increasing great powers, but appears to signify a transformation of the international order where the self-determination and sovereignty of each nation are substantially restored. In North Korean discourse, multipolarization means the dismantling of the "rules-based international order" led by the U.S. and the West, and it advocates for the establishment of a world order based on international law, respect for sovereignty, and political equality as an alternative. Here, multipolarization is defined not as an end in itself, but as a transitional mechanism for ending imperialism and domination.

The order that North Korea ultimately aims for is the "self-determination of the entire world," which signifies a de-imperialized international system where all countries and peoples choose their own paths of development without external coercion or subjugation. North Korea emphasizes that such multipolarization is a historical inevitability. North Korea expresses the belief that "no matter how desperately the imperialists may struggle, they can never obliterate the aspirations and struggles of progressive humanity to establish a self-determined new world, a multipolarized world order," and that "the destruction of the old and the victory of the new is an unstoppable law of historical development."[9]

North Korea's discourse on the international order begins with a fundamental rejection of the existing order. North Korea combines the 'decline of the West' and the 'rise of multipolarization' as a single historical law, thereby justifying its own strategic choices. The multipolar world presented by North Korea is not merely a state of power dispersion, but is positioned as a transitional phase of a new normative order formed amidst a historical turning point where the Western-centric unipolar order is collapsing. The collapse of Western imperialism leads to multipolarization, as it states, "As long as humanity aspires to anti-imperialism and self-determination, a fair and just new world will surely be built," and "anti-imperialism and self-determination exert a strong force in weakening the imperialist system of domination and transforming the world order."[10]

Here, the concept of multipolarization is constructed in a significantly different way from the balance of power among great powers or the competition among multiple poles in international relations theory. The core line of confrontation in multipolarization is set not as U.S. versus China/Russia, but as the West versus the non-West, or more precisely, as hegemonic powers versus the world's numerous sovereign states.

In this narrative, China and Russia clearly emerge as important actors. China is depicted as an emerging power shifting the center of the world economy, and Russia as a strong resisting force neutralizing Western military and strategic superiority. However, in North Korean discourse, there are not many instances where these countries are explicitly described as poles equivalent to the U.S. China and Russia are presented as drivers and facilitators of multipolarization, but they are not positioned as the central axis organizing and managing a multipolar world.

North Korea's concept of multipolarization rarely includes precise comparisons of national power or analyses of power distribution structures. Distinctions between poles based on objective indicators such as China's GDP, Russia's military power, or the U.S.'s technological capabilities are marginalized in North Korean discourse. Instead, moral language such as "the world's majority," "justice," "historical trends," and "the decline of imperialism" is used as the primary basis for justifying multipolarization. Multipolarization is constructed not as a result of scientific power distribution analysis, but as the sum total of moral and political rejection of Western hegemony.

If North Korea understands the multipolar order as a tripolar system of the U.S., China, and Russia, it would naturally place itself as a subordinate unit within that system, i.e., within the sphere of influence of China or Russia. However, North Korean discourse explicitly rejects such a great-power-centric reorganization of the order. Instead, North Korea redefines multipolarization as the collective emergence of sovereign states, depicting it as a loose coalition of various non-Western countries, including China and Russia.

Of course, North Korea's concept of a multipolar world shares discourse with China and Russia to some extent. All three countries criticize the Western-centric normative order, particularly the "rules-based international order," as a tool of hegemony applied hypocritically and selectively. However, China views multipolarization as a matter of orderly management rather than disorder, approaching it as a project to expand its influence by redesigning and institutionalizing rules. Russia uses multipolarization as a strategic language to justify resistance to Western norms and the redistribution of geopolitical power, seeking to realize it through military conflict and non-Western solidarity. While using the same term "multipolarization," North Korea centers its logic on ideology and survival, China on the logic of institutions and management, and Russia on the logic of power and conflict. These differences in perception are likely to deepen the instability and complexity of the multipolar order itself.

In this context, North Korea's discourse on multipolarization inherently contains structural uncertainty. If China and Russia are clear poles, North Korea's pursuit of self-determination directly conflicts with the issue of great power dependence. North Korea resolves this contradiction by redefining the agents of multipolarization not as great powers, but as a collective of sovereign states. This discourse structure is also linked to North Korea's fundamental distrust of great power cooperation systems or sphere of influence orders.

North Korea has historically perceived systems where a few great powers manage the world as imperialist collusion. Therefore, a structure where the U.S., China, and Russia implicitly divide and manage the world cannot be recognized as a legitimate multipolar order within North Korea's discourse of self-determination.

What North Korea desires is not a balance among great powers, but a structure that constrains the high-handedness of great powers themselves. Therefore, North Korea positions itself not alongside China or Russia, but within a community of identity with the Third World, the Global South, and weaker nations. North Korea explains that "multilateral cooperation organizations like BRICS are invigorating the process of global multipolarization" and claims that "the Western world has no choice but to recognize that BRICS has emerged as a distinct and powerful pole driving the establishment of a new international economic order and the construction of a multipolar world." This is a different logic from emphasizing the emergence of other great powers, such as China and Russia, excluding the U.S.[11]

The language of imperialism, neo-colonialism, and subordination through aid, which repeatedly appears in North Korean discourse, functions as a universal critical logic targeting not only the West but all great powers in general. This logic can potentially be applied as a standard to the expansion of economic and military influence by China and Russia, and it provides a theoretical shield that North Korea can use to refuse pressure or conditional support from these countries in the future.

The multipolar order proposed by North Korea has a dual discourse structure designed to justify strategic cooperation with China and Russia while simultaneously guarding against their great power ambitions. However, precisely because of this duality, North Korea's multipolarization fails to present a concrete vision of the future order. The answers to who constitutes the poles, what the rules among the poles will be, and how the self-determination of weaker nations will be institutionally guaranteed are intentionally left blank. This uncertainty is not merely a theoretical flaw but can be seen as strategic ambiguity chosen by North Korea to maintain diplomatic flexibility. Multipolarization should be viewed not as a commitment to a specific great power or subordination, but as a discursive device to secure political space that neutralizes U.S. pressure.

The multipolar world proposed by North Korea appears, on the surface, to be a consistent worldview. The narrative of the decline of Western hegemony, the rise of the non-Western world, the emergence of anti-Western great powers such as China and Russia, the collective resistance of sovereign states, and the formation of a new international order are presented as a single historical flow. However, when analyzed theoretically, the three core concepts that form its foundation—self-determination, anti-Westernism, and multipolarization—reveal contradictions rather than complete integration.

First, the subject that North Korea emphasizes, the self-determination line, is essentially based on the Westphalian concept of sovereignty. It is the principle that all states have the right to choose their own system and development path without external interference. Here, a tension arises between self-determination and multipolarization. The principle of self-determination presupposes the equal sovereignty of all states, but multipolarization implies an order where a few great powers hold structural superiority. If a multipolar order is managed by a few poles, including China and Russia, the self-determination of weaker nations like North Korea will inevitably be limited. This is likely why North Korea redefines the poles of multipolarization not explicitly, but as a collective of sovereign states.

The tension between self-determination and anti-Westernism is also evident. Self-determination is, in principle, a neutral concept; whether a country allies with the U.S. or cooperates with China should be that country's sovereign choice. However, North Korea's anti-Western discourse includes a moral judgment that defines cooperation with the West itself as submission or subjugation. At this point, self-determination transforms from a universal principle of sovereignty into a conditional value recognized only when belonging to a specific bloc, the anti-Western bloc. This results in North Korea itself limiting the concept of self-determination.

The combination of multipolarization and anti-Westernism is also theoretically unstable. Multipolarization is an analytical concept concerning the distribution of power, while anti-Westernism is a matter of historical responsibility and moral legitimacy. North Korea combines these two to create a narrative of Western decline and the rise of a just majority, but it does not discuss the possibility that future multipolarization may intensify competition among great powers and regional power struggles.

These conceptual tensions are also revealed in how North Korea perceives great power cooperation systems or sphere of influence orders. While North Korean discourse superficially criticizes U.S. hegemony, it is underpinned by a distrust of systems where a few great powers manage the world. A structure where the U.S., China, and Russia implicitly divide and manage the world is nothing more than new imperialism to North Korea. Therefore, North Korea does not understand multipolarization as a concert of great powers but reinterprets it as the collective resistance of sovereign states.

However, this reinterpretation is increasingly likely to diverge from the reality of power structures. North Korea's emphasis on solidarity with the Third World and the Global South is also a strategy to bridge this contradiction. North Korea positions itself not as part of the socialist bloc or the China-Russia bloc, but within the historical solidarity of weaker nations that have fought against imperialism. Criticisms of imperialism, neo-colonialism, and subordination through aid are directed at the West, but also serve as a normative standard applicable to all great powers in general. This provides a theoretical basis for North Korea to define any future economic or military pressure from China and Russia as an infringement on its self-determination.

Ultimately, North Korea's discourse on multipolarization has a dual nature: it serves as a shield to protect self-determination and a tool to justify dependence on great powers. This contradiction is not merely a theoretical inconsistency but a structural dilemma in North Korean diplomacy. The more North Korea approaches China and Russia to avoid U.S. pressure, the greater the possibility of conflict with their great power interests. Multipolarization is a discursive device to preemptively resolve this conflict, but in the long run, it may itself transform into a new constraint.

IV. Development and Prospects of North Korea's Multipolarization Strategy

The reason North Korea has prominently featured the discourse of multipolarization in recent years is less about a simple interpretation of the international situation and more about an effort to expand its strategic space within a changing environment. Multipolarization, rather than being a consistent vision of order for North Korea, has functioned as a strategic rhetoric to relativize U.S. pressure, coordinate relations with China and Russia, and maintain its self-determination.

Through its discourse on multipolarization, North Korea seeks to undermine the structure where nuclear possession and regime survival are deemed abnormal within the U.S.-centric unipolar order, and to establish nuclear possession as a means of security for sovereign states. This is consistent with its efforts to define denuclearization as an anachronistic demand and to solidify nuclear armament as a constitutional status. North Korea criticizes the Trump administration's "America First" policy while emphasizing the legitimacy of its multipolarization discourse. North Korea criticizes that "the more the current U.S. administration pursues unilateral policies based on 'America First,' which prioritizes exclusive U.S. interests, the more the trend of global multipolarization will accelerate, leading to the total collapse of the evil empire, the U.S., and imperialism."[12]

Simultaneously, multipolarization serves as a bargaining chip with China and Russia, emphasizing anti-Western solidarity while prioritizing self-determination and the solidarity of weaker nations to pursue a prospect of avoiding great power dependence. This perception is likely to lead to a strategy of pursuing long-term confrontation and limited negotiation in relations with the U.S. while advancing nuclear capabilities, and maintaining strategic closeness while simultaneously exercising structural caution in relations with China and Russia. Ultimately, the discourse of multipolarization functions as an ideological asset for defending self-determination in North Korean diplomacy and a practical tool for broadening options among great powers, embodying both the core implications and structural limitations of North Korea's foreign strategy.

These changes pose significant policy challenges for South Korea. First, there is the issue of South Korea developing its own discourse on how it perceives the changing international order and how it will design a desirable international order. In a situation where the future discourse on the international order presented by the U.S. is in extreme chaos, a vision of order is needed that protects South Korea's national interests, is morally justifiable, and is effective in redefining relations with North Korea. If discourses such as the nuclear non-proliferation norms proposed by the U.S. or the West are fundamentally shaken, and if these phenomena are rationalized by the order discourse of multipolarization, South Korea will face significant difficulties not only in its nuclear deterrence strategy but also in maintaining a rule-based order in the future.

Second, South Korea needs to pay attention to the fact that North Korea's discourse on multipolarization does not automatically stabilize its relations with China and Russia. North Korea maintains a fundamental distrust of great power dependence, which implies that North Korea-China-Russia relations could expose tensions and rifts at any time in the long term. South Korean diplomacy needs to present a new dialogue framework that considers sovereignty, regional security, and the future of the Korean Peninsula together in this process.

Third, there is a possibility that South Korea's position could become structurally vulnerable amidst the spread of multipolar discourse. If the US, China, and Russia attempt to reposition the Korean Peninsula based on their respective strategic interests, North Korea will seek direct participation at the negotiation table as a sovereign state, while South Korea is likely to find itself in a difficult position amid great power competition. While maintaining its alliance with the US, South Korea faces the challenge of its alliance policy undergoing changes and the need to redefine relations with China and Russia. South Korea must proactively propose the principles and rules upon which the stability and sovereignty of the Korean Peninsula should be based within this evolving order. Furthermore, in its relations with North Korea, it must go beyond managing confrontation and severance, and strengthen its persuasive power in the discursive space surrounding order and sovereignty. ■

[1] Seok, Sang Hun. 2025. “Crafting a Multipolar World: Pyongyang's Evolving Narratives,” The RUSI Journal 170(3): 74–82.

[2] "The multipolarization of the world is an unstoppable demand of the times," Rodong Sinmun, September 5, 2000.

[3] "The world's movement toward multipolarity is an unstoppable trend," Rodong Sinmun, March 4, 2006.

[4] "The multipolarization of the world is an unstoppable international trend," Rodong Sinmun, February 22, 2008.

[5] "Background to the Emergence of the Theory of a 'New Cold War'," Korean Central News Agency, June 7, 2008.

[6] "'The Cold War Structure in Northeast Asia Must Be Eliminated'," Korean Central News Agency, March 10, 2011.

[7] Park Won Gon, “The World of the New Cold War as Depicted by North Korea,” East Asia Institute, Policy Briefing, March 9, 2023.

[8] Lee Dong-ryul, “China's Perception and Calculations Regarding North Korea's 'New Cold War Theory'” East Asia Institute, Policy Briefing, February 27, 2023; Jang Se-ho, “Russia's Stance on North Korea's Perception of the New Cold War” East Asia Institute, Policy Briefing, March 23, 2023.

[9] “What Does the War Danger Exacerbated by the West Signify?” Rodong Sinmun, August 24, 2025.

[10] “A Just New World Exists with Thorough Anti-Imperialist Self-Reliance,” Rodong Sinmun, June 8, 2025.

[11] “The Growing Trend Toward Multipolarity,” Rodong Sinmun, May 10, 2025.

[12] “'America First' Which Prioritizes Exclusive US Interests Will Actively Drive the Multipolarization of the Entire World.” Rodong Sinmun, March 15, 2025.

■ Jeon Jae-sung_Director of EAI, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University.

■ Responsible for and Edited by: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr