[New Year Special Commentary Series] ➉ The Convergence of North Korea's 2026 Strategy: 'Denuclearization Refusal – Two-State Theory – CNI'

Introduction

As of the end of January 2026, North Korea has not officially announced a specific schedule for the 9th Party Congress. As is widely known, the Party Congress is the most significant political event in a socialist state, and in North Korea, it is defined as the supreme guiding body of the Workers' Party of Korea. The Party Congress serves as a mechanism to institutionalize the direction of state operation through the revision or amendment of the Party's platform and rules, the formalization of its line, policies, and strategies, and the election of key central leadership bodies such as the General Secretary and the Party Central Committee.[1]

However, North Korea's Party Congress cannot be explained solely by regular convention. Following the 6th Party Congress during the Kim Il-sung era in 1980, there was a 36-year hiatus until the 7th Party Congress in 2016, for which North Korea has never provided an official explanation. There are reports, however, that Kim Il-sung mentioned that 'the 7th Party Congress cannot be held without a breakthrough in the issues of food, clothing, and shelter,' suggesting that the Party Congress is not merely a formal political event but also serves as a 'political accounting session' that summarizes the regime's achievements and legitimizes its policies.[2]

In this context, the 9th Party Congress is not just a matter of scheduling but a crucial juncture that will indicate how the Kim Jong-un regime will reorganize and institutionalize the state's operational tasks for the next five years, based on a hierarchy and logic. Particularly, given that the 8th Party Congress in 2021 presented mid-term state plans, including a 'Five-Year Plan for National Defense Development,' the 9th Party Congress is likely to serve as an occasion to solidify the next phase of Kim Jong-un's rule by realigning directives for economic, military, and foreign policy.

Even if the Party Congress has not yet convened, the outline of the strategies and policies North Korea will adopt in 2026 and beyond can be discerned. Kim Jong-un's policy speech at the 13th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly in September 2025 indicated the direction for its external perceptions, inter-Korean strategy, and relations with the United States. Subsequent reports from North Korean media have presented the 'parallel development of nuclear and conventional forces' as its military strategy.

Therefore, this paper aims to analyze and evaluate North Korea's strategies towards the U.S. and South Korea, and its military strategy up to 2025, based on publicly available data, and to forecast its strategic direction for 2026. Specifically, it will examine: first, how North Korea's strategy towards the U.S. combines the tensions of 'denuclearization refusal – pursuit of sanctions relief – maintaining dialogue channels'; second, how the institutionalization of the 'hostile two-state theory' is reshaping its policy towards South Korea; and third, the aspects and limitations of the 'parallel development of nuclear and conventional forces' evolving into North Korea's version of conventional-nuclear integration (CNI).

North Korea's Strategy Towards the U.S.

North Korea claims that the current world order is undergoing rapid change. It particularly identifies the "U.S.'s ambition and its unrestrained abuse of power" as the source of "global instability and total crisis" due to the collapse of the unipolar U.S.-led order.[3]Consequently, North Korea's security is also facing serious challenges. Based on this view of the international order and its perception of the U.S., Kim Jong-un intends to pursue the following policies.

First, to halt ROK-U.S. combined exercises and the deployment of U.S. strategic assets. As is widely known, during the Korean Peninsula peace process of 2018-2019, Kim Jong-un repeatedly demanded the cessation of combined exercises and the deployment of strategic assets whenever he met with U.S. President Donald J. Trump. Kim Jong-un's personal letter to Trump on August 5, 2018, stated the following:

In anticipation of working-level negotiations between the two countries to continue discussions on important issues, I was under the impression that provocative combined military exercises would be canceled or at least postponed... Who are the combined military exercises conducted in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula aimed at, whose actions are they intended to block, and ultimately, whom are they intended to defeat and attack?[4]

In his policy speech in September 2025, Kim Jong-un argued that the U.S.'s combined exercises and strategic asset operations have "intensified to a perceptible degree compared to a few years ago," and that "various bilateral and multilateral war games are being conducted simultaneously without temporal or spatial gaps, and more nuclear elements are being included, which is the reality we face."[5]

North Korea's persistent raising of these issues suggests that it perceives an environment and possibility for the suspension of combined exercises and the deployment of strategic assets that is greater than at any other time. The current South Korean government, particularly the Ministry of Unification, has stated that "ROK-U.S. combined military exercises are a means to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula, and cannot be an end in themselves."[6]

Currently, South Korea and the U.S. are pursuing 'alliance modernization.' The core of this is a structure where South Korea takes the lead in defending the Korean Peninsula, with the U.S. providing support. The U.S. intends to use its forces in Korea not only for the Korean Peninsula but also to counter China in the Indo-Pacific region. General Paul LaCamera, Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, has stated on several occasions that "the role of U.S. Forces Korea is not solely focused on repelling North Korea" and that "to maintain peace through strength, we must sometimes move to other regions."[7]This implies that the existing ROK-U.S. alliance is moving beyond a singular response to the North Korean threat to expand its role and scope into a regional alliance countering China.

Late last year, General LaCamera also commented that "South Korea possesses the capabilities, experience, and strategic location to contribute to long-term stability in the Indo-Pacific."[8]If alliance modernization deepens in this manner, large-scale ROK-U.S. combined exercises as currently conducted may become unnecessary. Operation Plan 5022, agreed upon and implemented by South Korea and the U.S. in 2024, similar to previous plans, involves the projection of large reinforcement forces, including U.S. ground troops, in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula.[9]However, since the Iraq War, the U.S. has primarily conducted operations involving air and naval forces for deep strikes, followed by the deployment of minimal ground forces.

As the core of alliance modernization is to shift the role of U.S. Forces Korea to countering China, South Korea will bear the primary responsibility for ground operations in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the nature, scale, and content of current ROK-U.S. combined exercises, which assume the deployment of large U.S. reinforcement forces in case of a North Korean invasion, could significantly change. President Trump's negative perception of combined exercises and strategic asset deployments will also have an impact. At a press conference following the U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore in 2018, President Trump described ROK-U.S. combined exercises as "expensive and provocative war games."[10]Subsequently, during the cost-sharing negotiations of his first term, he attempted to claim these costs by introducing a new item called 'operational expenses.'[11]Therefore, the possibility that President Trump might declare a suspension of combined exercises and strategic asset deployments to facilitate negotiations with North Korea cannot be ruled out. North Korea persistently exploits such situations, raising issues and criticizing ROK-U.S. combined exercises and strategic asset deployments without exception.[12]

Second, North Korea refuses denuclearization talks but desires sanctions relief. In his September 2025 Supreme People's Assembly speech, Kim Jong-un emphatically stated, "I can state with certainty that denuclearization is absolutely, absolutely impossible for us." North Korea argues that denuclearization would be an "act of violating the constitution" since it has enshrined nuclear armament in its constitution. Simultaneously, it has mentioned the futility of sanctions in more than five sentences as follows.[13]

“Would we seek to lift sanctions? Absolutely not! Absolutely not. Sanctions by hostile forces have provided us with a learning effect to become stronger, and have fostered immunity and resistance that will not be subdued by any pressure. There will be no negotiations, nor will there ever be, to trade anything with adversarial nations by obsessing over lifting sanctions. If they think they can pressure and break us with sanctions or displays of force, they are mistaken. If they fail to face the changed reality and continue to talk about ‘denuclearization’ while imposing sanctions and pressure, let them do so.”

In connection with sanctions, North Korea argues that the “choice” rests with the United States and that time is “on their side.”[14]This suggests that as long as denuclearization is demanded and sanctions are continued, North Korea can proceed with nuclear advancement. However, interpreting the context as a whole, one can discern North Korea's suffering from sanctions. If sanctions were truly harmless, there would be no need to emphasize them for over five sentences. Objective data also confirms North Korea's vulnerability to sanctions.

Source: General Administration of Customs of China; UN Comtrade Database; KOTRA, 'Trends in North Korea's Foreign Trade,' data compiled for each year.

As can be seen in the graph above, the effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea can be understood by comparing the period around 2017-2018, when comprehensive sanctions began to be imposed. North Korea's foreign trade, which peaked in 2016, began to decline sharply from 2019. Even after the three years of COVID-19, during which all external contact was cut off, North Korea's foreign trade volume remains at around 30% compared to before the comprehensive sanctions. Therefore, Kim Jong Un's argument that sanctions are ineffective paradoxically implies a desire for sanctions relief.

Third, there is a willingness to pursue dialogue with the United States. In conjunction with the aforementioned sanctions, North Korea may ultimately seek relief through dialogue or direct negotiation with the United States. Since the 2024 US presidential election period, North Korea has significantly lowered its level of criticism towards the US. Expressions like 'dotard,' used during Trump's first term and the Biden administration, have disappeared.[15]This also differs from the Biden administration's demand for denuclearization, to which North Korea responded by claiming it was "justifying an illegal and immoral hostile policy" and asserting that they "must confront the US imperialists to the end with ideology and arms."[16]

In Kim Jong Un's speech last September, which detailed his policy towards the US, he invoked terms like "hostile forces" and "imperialists," but did not directly name the United States. For example, instead of specifying the US, he referred to them collectively as "hostile forces" in phrases such as, "They must be aware that if hostile forces continue their reckless displays of force around us without limit, they may provoke our patience." He then left the door open for dialogue with the US through the following two widely known statements.[17]

“If the United States abandons its unrealistic obsession with denuclearization and, based on acknowledging reality, desires genuine peaceful coexistence with us, there is no reason why we cannot stand face-to-face with the United States.” “I personally still have good memories of the current US President, Trump.”

Prior to Kim Jong Un's speech, Kim Yo Jong, the Vice Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea, stated in a message, "I do not wish to deny the fact that the personal relationship between our head of state and the current US President is not bad."[18]Considering North Korea's rhetoric towards the US, such expressions are effectively a declaration of willingness to engage in dialogue. Particularly noteworthy is Kim Yo Jong's statement: "It should be recognized that it is not beneficial for two nuclear-armed states to move in a confrontational direction, and if so, it would be good to seek other avenues of contact based on such new thinking."[19]

The "new thinking" that North Korea speaks of is likely to be a nuclear disarmament negotiation conducted with North Korea recognized as a nuclear-weapon state in fact (de facto), rather than denuclearization talks. Unlike the Korean Peninsula peace process of 2018-19, North Korea appears to be seeking crisis management-oriented nuclear disarmament negotiations, with the goal not being the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula or North Korea, but rather maintaining the adversarial relationship between the US and North Korea. This is similar to how the US and the Soviet Union engaged in disarmament talks during the Cold War to reduce the possibility of nuclear war through escalation, rather than complete peaceful coexistence. North Korea's objective is understood to be obtaining sanctions relief through dialogue with the US and emerging as a de facto nuclear-weapon state.

It is assessed that North Korea desires recognition as a nuclear-weapon state through sanctions relief, similar to India and Pakistan. The possibility of North Korea being officially recognized as a nuclear-weapon state by the United States, or even by Russia, which is closely aligned with North Korea, is very low. This is because the five nuclear-monopoly states, established under the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, are unlikely to abandon their privilege by recognizing North Korea's nuclear status. Furthermore, condoning North Korea's nuclear weapons would lead to the collapse of the non-proliferation regime, potentially triggering a nuclear domino effect, with South Korea likely at the forefront. Therefore, it is believed that North Korea desires a path to becoming a de facto nuclear-weapon state through sanctions relief, akin to India and Pakistan.

In summary, North Korea's strategy towards the US in 2026 will unfold as an extension of the 2025 trajectory, evolving into a more calculated approach with the resumption of US-North Korea negotiations in mind. North Korea is likely to seek direct talks with the US, aiming for sanctions relief under the premise of de facto nuclear-weapon state status. To this end, it will set the cessation of ROK-US joint exercises and the deployment of strategic assets as minimum conditions and pursue a framework of nuclear disarmament negotiations rather than denuclearization. This strategy is understood as an attempt to leverage both the continued effects of sanctions and the changing strategic environment of the US administration.

North Korea's Strategy Towards South Korea

The 'two hostile states' theory proclaimed by Kim Jong Un at the 8th WPK Central Committee's 9th Plenary Meeting on December 2023 remains valid and is expected to be strengthened in 2026. Kim Jong Un declared, "The North-South relations are no longer those of compatriots or of the same people, but have been completely solidified into relations between two hostile states, two belligerent nations at war."[20]

Subsequently, North Korea has begun to erase the concept of a single nation, which it has maintained since its founding in 1947, and is engaged in a process of 'unification erasure.' A prime example is the complete demolition of the 'Three Charters for National Reunification (Juche, Peace, National Unity)' Monument in Pyongyang in early 2024. Furthermore, North Korea has militarized the inter-Korean Military Demarcation Line (MDL) as a 'border,' systematically removed expressions like 'compatriot' and 'unification' from its media, and abolished its dedicated unification-focused organization for inter-Korean affairs.

However, the specific reasons for abandoning unification, the most crucial issue, have not been elucidated. While the systematic deletion of the concept of unification across symbolic, institutional, spatial, military, and discursive dimensions has continued, North Korea's supreme leadership or regime has failed to present a new vision to replace it. This stance by North Korea is believed to be partly due to the burden of breaking from its predecessors. Kim Il Sung defined 'socialist construction and the unification of the fatherland' as the two great historical missions upon founding North Korea. Kim Jong Un's declaration of abandoning unification constitutes an act of relinquishing one of the core elements of legitimacy bestowed by Kim Il Sung.

In this regard, Kim Jong Un's policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in September 2025 is noteworthy.[21]This is because the supreme leader himself presented specific arguments for abandoning unification, as follows:

First, the de facto two-state theory. Citing North and South Korea's simultaneous admission to the UN in 1991, Kim Jong Un argues, "For several decades, we and the Republic of Korea have de facto existed as two states in the international community." Second, it invokes historical animosity from the outset and assigns responsibility to South Korea. Referring to the Syngman Rhee government and Article 3 of the South Korean Constitution, he contends that it was South Korea that "obstinately opposed the aspirations of the entire nation to live and develop independently in one territory." Third, it claims that ROK-US joint exercises are the core of the hostile policy towards North Korea. It argues that the US brings strategic assets into South Korea, and South Korea "colludes" with the US in "reckless" anti-North Korean military actions in the form of joint exercises. Fourth, it defines South Korea as an adversarial entity regardless of its government's nature. The statement, "The reality is that regardless of whether it professes 'democracy' or wears the guise of 'conservatism,' South Korea's inherent ambition to collapse our system and regime has never changed and can never change; an enemy is an enemy," represents North Korea's perception. Unlike in the past, it no longer differentiates between the South Korean government and the South Korean people. The distinction previously made between the 'puppet government' and 'South Korean people' has disappeared. Finally, it emphasizes that North and South Korea have become thoroughly estranged and can no longer merge. It asserts that South Korea is a "colonial vassal" of the United States and that "socialist culture and Yankee culture cannot mix."de factoThis is the theory of two states, which has been discussed. Assuming the simultaneous admission of North and South Korea to the UN in 1991, Kim Jong Un argues, “For several decades, we and the Republic of Korea have existed as two de facto states in the international community.” Second, it summons historical animosity from the outset and presents the theory of South Korea's responsibility. Referencing the Syngman Rhee government and Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, it argues defensively that it was South Korea that “stubbornly opposed the aspirations of the entire nation to live and develop autonomously in one territory.” Third, it claims that joint ROK-US military exercises are at the core of the policy of hostility toward North Korea. It states that South Korea, by drawing strategic assets into the country, has been engaging in joint exercises with the United States in “reckless” anti-North Korean military actions in collusion with the U.S. Fourth, it defines South Korea as a hostile other, regardless of the nature of its government. The statement, “The reality is that regardless of whether it professes to be 'democratic' or wears the mask of 'conservative,' South Korea's inherent ambition to collapse our system and regime has never changed and can never change, and an enemy is still an enemy,” represents North Korea's perception. Unlike before, it does not differentiate between the South Korean government and the South Korean people. The distinction previously made between the 'puppet government' and 'South Korean people' has disappeared. Finally, it emphasizes that North and South are thoroughly heterogeneous and can no longer be merged. It argues that South Korea is a “colonial vassal” of the United States and that “socialist culture and Yankee culture cannot mix.”

These arguments by North Korea confirm that the theory of two hostile states is a fundamental shift in its line, removing unification as a core component of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as expressed by Kim Jong Un in his policy speech, and is not a sudden judgment made today.[22]In 2026, North Korea is highly likely to more systematically teach the arguments of the two hostile states theory to its populace and solidify it. In particular, through the upcoming 9th Party Congress, it is expected to institutionalize the theory by inserting content related to two hostile states into the North Korean constitution or the WPK rules, as already directed by Kim Jong Un.

In his policy speech last September, Kim Jong Un declared, "We will legally solidify the fact that we and South Korea are two distinct countries separated by a border, which can never become one."[23]

However, North Korea's problem lies in the fact that the more it argues, as Kim Jong Un expressed, that "relations between the North and South have not only become thoroughly estranged but are two completely antagonistic entities, and unification can ultimately only be achieved by the elimination of one," the more the system competition intensifies. Kim Jong Un's assertion frames the Republic of Korea as the primary enemy to be overcome and defeated, rather than a subject with whom coexistence is possible. Unlike the object of "living without interfering with each other" as expressed by Kim Yo Jong, the necessity of proving the superiority of its system and overcoming the liberal democratic <<Republic of Korea>> is rather increasing.[24]North Korea's competition with South Korea, which is an advanced country in military, economic, social, and cultural aspects excluding nuclear possession, is bound to have limitations.

Furthermore, the declaration of abandoning unification ultimately leaves only the use of force as an option. The 'revolution' towards South Korea emphasized in the North Korean system is symbolically based on unification, peace, and the nation. Without these, the revolution is reduced to Kim Jong Un's following declaration.

Defining the South Korean puppets as the primary hostile state and immutable enemy most dangerous to our military, and deciding it as our state policy to occupy and pacify their territory in case of emergency, is a most righteous measure for the eternal safety and future peace and stability of our state.[25]

Consequently, North Korea will pursue continuous arms competition and military buildup targeting South Korea. This is a complete revival of 'military-first' (Seon-gun) politics, which will continue to impose negative effects on the North Korean economy. In conclusion, North Korea's strategy towards South Korea in 2026 is expected to involve the strengthening and institutionalization of the two hostile states theory. In particular, it will systematically teach the necessity of antagonizing South Korea to the North Korean populace, and may officially include the concept of two hostile states in the constitution or WPK rules at the 9th Party Congress. As North Korea's line becomes institutionalized, it is judged that at least for 2026, or longer, there will be "no occasion to sit together, nor will we do anything together" with South Korea, as expressed by Kim Jong Un.[26]

North Korea's Military Strategy

The core of North Korea's military strategy in 2026 will be represented by the 'parallel development of nuclear forces and conventional forces' policy. While inspecting the Armored Equipment Research Institute and the Electronic Weapons Research Institute of the National Defense Science Institute in September 2025, Kim Jong Un assessed that the combat capability of armored forces had significantly improved and stated, "The upcoming 9th Party Congress will present a policy of parallel development of nuclear forces and conventional forces in the field of national defense construction," indicating a shift from a nuclear-centric line to the simultaneous development of nuclear and conventional weapons.[27]

This differs from the nuclear development outlined in the 5-year plan for national defense development announced at the 8th Party Congress in 2021. At that time, North Korea emphasized the advancement of nuclear technology, miniaturization and light-weighting of nuclear weapons, and tactical nuclearization for the "completion of the great cause of nuclear force construction." The five strategic goals for this were presented as: ① Development of hypersonic weapons, ② Production of super-large nuclear warheads, ③ Improvement of accuracy for strikes within a 15,000 km range, ④ Development of underwater and land-based solid-fuel ICBMs, and ⑤ Development of nuclear submarines and SLBMs.[28]

However, since 2025, North Korea has limited the development of capabilities that can directly strike the US mainland and is emphasizing the development of conventional weapons. Regarding Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), there have been no test launches since the Hwasong-19 type was launched in October 2024, as of January 2026. The subsequent model, Hwasong-20, was only revealed in physical form at the military parade celebrating the 80th anniversary of the WPK founding last October. In contrast, Kim Jong Un is personally overseeing the development of various conventional weapons. In the naval sector, the 5,000-ton class Choe Hyon Ho and Kang Gam Chan were launched in May and June 2025, respectively. Kim Jong Un praised these vessels as "multi-purpose destroyers equipped with the most powerful armament" and "key naval assets that will contribute to the nation's nuclear war deterrence." He also expressed his ambition to "commission two destroyers of the Choe Hyon class (5,000 tons) or larger into the navy each year."[29]

In the air force, it is reported that in May, Kim Jong Un observed a real-time training session of a "elite fighter division" near Pyongyang and inspected the development and deployment of new air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons. Test-fired were medium-range radar-guided air-to-air missiles mounted on MiG-29s, other medium-range air-to-air missiles, and precision-guided glide bombs.[30]This is interpreted as a demonstration of the North Korean Air Force's will to modernize its aging capabilities.

Additionally, in March 2025, he oversaw test firings of suicide and reconnaissance drones. Kim Jong Un defined unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and artificial intelligence (AI) as the "main direction of modern warfare" and instructed to "drastically increase the production capacity of unmanned systems and artificial intelligence, and establish a comprehensive strategy for the development of 'intelligent unmanned aircraft.'"[31]In September, while conducting performance tests of tactical attack drones, he stated that unmanned weapons would become "important means for carrying out various tactical strike and reconnaissance missions on land, sea, and air battlefields."[32]

In May 2025, Kim Jong Un inspected a tank factory of an armored division, a core strategic unit of the army, emphasizing, “Replacing the last-century armored weapons with the latest tanks and armored vehicles is the most crucial issue in modernizing our military equipment.” He further stated, “The comprehensive renewal of the armored weapon system for the entire army is the key task for achieving the ‘Second Armored Revolution’ set forth by the Party.”[33] Although its exact capabilities are unconfirmed, the South Korean military has also unveiled a new tank equipped with an active protection system, which is still under development.

North Korea's efforts in 2025 can be characterized as a strategy of 'parallel development of nuclear and conventional forces,' which analytically can be viewed as a North Korean version of 'Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI).' Such an attempt weakens the traditional paradigm that clearly separates conventional and nuclear warfare, potentially lowering the threshold for escalation to nuclear use in crisis situations. This approach aims to plan and operate conventional and nuclear forces not as separate deterrents, but as an integrated deterrence and warfighting system under a single strategic objective. This concept was systematized in the United States in the early 2010s, with its ideological origins traceable to NATO's flexible response strategy adopted in the 1960s.[34]

North Korea is exploring and attempting to apply this. North Korea is developing its theater war plans and crisis/deterrence plans by integrating conventional operational plans and nuclear force employment plans, rather than separating them, into interconnected scenarios and options. The 'nuclear trigger' and 'volcano alert' systems unveiled in 2024 and 2025 can be interpreted as part of this integrated operational concept. These systems are designed to assist the supreme leader in making phased and flexible decisions by presenting conventional combat capabilities and nuclear response options in a scenario assuming an attack by South Korea and the United States. They are particularly assessed as an attempt to prevent the leader's options from being reduced to a binary choice between 'massive nuclear retaliation or surrender' in a limited nuclear use phase, and to maintain various response pathways, including sustained conventional combat and limited nuclear options.

However, the North Korean version of CNI faces inherent limitations that are structurally difficult to overcome. For CNI, which integrates conventional and nuclear forces, to function effectively, the ability to rapidly review and select from multiple response options and to precisely manage escalation according to crisis levels is paramount. Yet, in a system like North Korea's, where political and military power is extremely concentrated under a single leader's rule, such operational capabilities are inherently constrained. Nuclear and major military decisions in North Korea are centralized with the supreme leader, and there are no institutional mechanisms for delegating decision-making authority to lower commanders during crises.

Consequently, in high-intensity crisis situations, the process from information reporting to judgment and decision-making is likely to be inevitably delayed. Particularly in wartime or crisis situations, if communication networks are disrupted or the command structure is physically or electronically attacked, there is a risk of 'decapitation' where the supreme leader's decision cannot be transmitted to the force employment system. This does not imply the elimination of the leadership itself, but rather a situation where effective control becomes impossible due to the severance of communication and command links, even if the leadership exists. In such a linear and vertical command structure, the phased escalation management and flexible option adjustments required by CNI, which necessitate adaptive responses to changing situations, are structurally difficult to establish.[35]

Furthermore, limitations in North Korea's C4ISR capabilities are also a key factor constraining the development of CNI. C4ISR, encompassing Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, serves as the information and command network for the integrated operation of forces in modern warfare. For CNI to function effectively, real-time target information, situational awareness across the battlefield, post-strike damage assessment, and intelligence analysis capabilities to predict the adversary's intentions and next actions are essential.

However, North Korea's reality is characterized by a limited number of military reconnaissance satellites, some tactical reconnaissance drones, and a high reliance on human intelligence (HUMINT). These intelligence sources have fundamental limitations in terms of scope, accuracy, and real-time capability, and are particularly vulnerable to electronic warfare or cyberattacks. As a result, grasping the diverse military situations occurring at the theater level as a single integrated picture and operating conventional and nuclear options in conjunction with it remains practically impossible.[36]

The most critical vulnerability is the lack of 'synchronization,' which precisely aligns conventional and nuclear forces in time and space. The core requirement of CNI is the precise coordination of when, where, and by what signal conventional strikes and nuclear options will be combined. This presupposes an integrated command system among the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Forces, launch platforms and control systems where tactical nuclear and conventional forces are interconnected, and a joint operational structure capable of real-time information sharing.

However, North Korea has limited inter-service jointness, and its conventional and nuclear forces operate under different command and control systems. Considering that North Korea's adversary is the United States, its capabilities are qualitatively incomparable to the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) system being pursued by the U.S. military. JADC2 is a system that connects all sensors and weapon systems across the land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains in real-time, enabling commanders to instantly select the optimal strike means, whereas North Korea lacks the technological and organizational foundation for such a level of integration. Consequently, if unintended escalation rapidly unfolds in a crisis situation and pressure for early nuclear use increases, CNI, lacking synchronization, is more likely to act as a factor amplifying instability rather than enhancing deterrence stability.[37] This means it could become a factor for a preemptive strike by the United States.

More fundamentally, implementing CNI requires the technological capability and capital necessary to build conventional forces and the supporting C4ISR systems. This ultimately means allocating additional economic resources to the military sector, inevitably entailing increased defense spending and the associated burden. Furthermore, North Korea's development of Army, Navy, and Air Force capabilities shows a fundamental gap compared to the military power of the ROK-U.S. alliance in both qualitative and quantitative terms. For example, the Kang Gam Chan, presented as a symbol of its 5,000-ton destroyer fleet, ran aground during its launch in May 2025, demonstrating that North Korea's experience in building and operating large surface vessels remains limited. Moreover, these vessels are assessed to have limitations in anti-submarine detection and anti-torpedo defense systems, likely exposing limitations in survivability and mission capability in actual combat situations. While the Air Force is developing its own air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, the MiG-29, considered North Korea's most modern fighter jet, is a fourth-generation aircraft introduced in the late 1980s, showing a significant generational and technological gap compared to the fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 and F-22 operated by the ROK and U.S. Air Forces. Amidst these structural disadvantages, North Korea's pursuit of its version of CNI will ultimately lead to North Korea engaging in an excessive arms race and further increasing the burden on its economy.

Conclusion

North Korea's strategy in 2026 can be summarized as an attempt to 'pursue sanctions relief while leaving the door open for dialogue, institutionalize hostile policy towards South Korea, and expand deterrence and warfighting options through the integrated operation of nuclear and conventional forces.' However, this strategy entails costs, including increased economic burden internally and heightened crisis instability externally.

In response, South Korea and the United States need to prepare the following measures:

First, in preparation for potential dialogue, South Korea and the United States must refine 'negotiation agendas' and 'red lines.' North Korea's objective is not denuclearization but rather the de facto recognition of its status as a nuclear-weapon state and the easing of sanctions. Therefore, even if negotiations resume, rather than aiming for an all-encompassing agreement, it is necessary to incrementally build crisis management-oriented agreements (reducing military risks, limiting tests and deployments, increasing transparency) while simultaneously designing a system of conditional adjustments to sanctions, maintaining alliance defense posture, and embedding verification mechanisms to ensure the process does not lead to the de facto acceptance of North Korea's nuclear possession. In other words, while negotiations are necessary, the structure of negotiations should be designed to prevent the sequence North Korea desires (weakening the alliance – sanctions relief – entrenchment of nuclear weapons).

Second, in response to the potential institutionalization of the 'two hostile states theory,' South Korea must transition its approach to North Korea towards a long-term strategy involving messaging and institutional preparations. As North Korea increasingly removes the concept of unification and institutionalizes hostility towards South Korea, approaches that seek to reverse the relationship through short-term reconciliation events become less realistic. Therefore, South Korea needs to reorient its North Korea policy from aiming for 'resumption of dialogue' to ① avoiding military conflict, ② deterring provocations, ③ maintaining humanitarian channels, and ④ strengthening the domestic foundation for long-term unification and peace discourse. Particularly, if North Korea intensifies its rhetoric that does not distinguish between the South Korean government and its people, South Korea needs to consistently maintain its messaging towards the North Korean populace (fact-based information on survival, economy, and future) to counteract the effect of 'hostile othering.' This is not propaganda but one of the most cost-effective long-term strategies South Korea can adopt in a regime competition.

Third, South Korea and the United States must prevent North Korea's demand for the suspension of 'combined exercises and strategic asset deployments' from becoming a minimum condition for negotiation. Combined exercises and the deployment of strategic assets are part of the alliance's defense posture and signals of deterrence. If these are preemptively made into 'bargaining chips,' North Korea is likely to redefine negotiations as an exchange for weakening the alliance and reducing deterrence against North Korea, rather than focusing on denuclearization. However, this does not mean the alliance should show no flexibility. The key lies not in the form of concessions but in the design of conditions and procedures. For instance, adjustments to exercises should be linked to verifiable crisis mitigation measures (military transparency, cessation of specific activities, activation of risk reduction channels, etc.) rather than being a reciprocal measure to North Korea's 'political demands.' Within the alliance, it is necessary to guard against the simplistic notion that 'reduced exercises equals peace' and maintain policy options by distinguishing between the purpose of exercises (deterrence, readiness) and their format (scale, publicity, timing).

Finally, in preparation for the crisis instability that North Korea's CNI could trigger, South Korea and the United States must strengthen war deterrence designs that reduce the 'pressure for early nuclear use' and the 'potential for miscalculation.' As North Korea moves towards integrating conventional and nuclear forces, the risk of accidental escalation increases if signals become confused or synchronization fails during a crisis. The response to this should not be merely a slogan of 'stronger retaliation' but an expansion of functioning crisis management mechanisms. Specifically, first, targeted non-nuclear deterrence means (precision strikes, electronic warfare, cyber operations, anti-drone/anti-missile defense) should be developed to separate and disrupt North Korea's nuclear and conventional operations. Second, the speed of alert and information sharing at the combined level and decision-making procedures should be shortened to minimize the 'decision delay' that North Korea anticipates. Third, to reduce mutual misperceptions during crises, military hotlines, mechanisms to prevent accidental clashes, and systematic management of exercise/operation signals (publicity/secrecy, message consistency) need to be established. Ultimately, the more North Korea attempts to increase its 'options,' the more South Korea and the United States must design their deterrence structure in a way that diminishes the effectiveness of those options.

In conclusion, South Korea and the United States' response in 2026 should not be a matter of choosing between 'hardline' and 'flexible' approaches, but a complex strategy that enhances deterrence credibility while securing initiative in crisis management and negotiation conditions.

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[28]Lee Ho-ryeong, "North Korea's 8th Party Congress: Maximum Achievements and Prospects for the 9th Party Congress," "Global NK Commentary," East Asia Institute (EAI), December 5, 2025.

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[30]"KCNA," May 16, 2025.

[31]"KCNA," March 26, 2025.

[32]"KCNA," September 18, 2025.

[33]"KCNA," May 4, 2025.

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■ Park Won Gon_Director of the EAI North Korea Research Center; Professor at Ewha Womans University.

■ Responsible for and edited by: Lee Sang Jun_EAI Researcher
    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr