[New Year Special Commentary Series] ⑨ Europe in Straits: The ‘Donroe Doctrine,’ Greenland, and China

1. Introduction

Europe is in a state of siege. While the war in Ukraine is entering its fourth year with no end in sight and Russia's territorial ambitions continue, U.S. President Trump, a key ally in NATO, is escalating threats by demanding Greenland. Economically, with declining innovation momentum, the industrial base is being eroded by the penetration of Chinese high-value-added manufactured goods. To overcome these challenges, European Union unity is more critical than ever, yet the rise of far-right forces in many European countries is fueling political instability. From security threats from Russia to territorial demands and value conflicts with ally the United States, economic threats from China, and the rise of far-right forces, alarm bells are ringing from all sides. To prevent the collapse of the Atlantic relationship, Europe is striving for diplomacy with the U.S. while simultaneously extending a hand to the Indo-Pacific region as part of a hedging strategy. In this era of great transformation in the international order, cooperation and solidarity between Europe and Indo-Pacific nations are urgently needed. In this context, South Korea must align with Europe in both values and interests.

2. Easing of Atlantic Relations or Collapse?

The Donroe Doctrine

There are two main drivers fundamentally shaking Europe's geopolitical environment.

First is Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. For Europe, which experienced two world wars, 'peace without war' was a core security value. In the early Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was launched in 1949 as a political and military alliance of 12 European and North American countries to deter Soviet expansion. This collective defense system, which considers an attack on one member state as an attack on all, has continuously expanded its membership, and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it expanded its reach by admitting Eastern European countries. With the long period of peace after World War II, the invasion of a weaker nation by a stronger power within Europe was unimaginable. Consequently, NATO's mission shifted from traditional war deterrence to crisis management tasks such as defending democratic values, counter-terrorism, and cybersecurity. However, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered the taken-for-granted peace in Europe. Member states once again perceive Russia as the most significant direct threat to their national and regional security since the end of the Cold War. As a result, Finland and Sweden joined NATO, increasing the number of member states to 32.

The second driver is the strategic shift in the United States. With the advent of the second Trump administration, 'America First' is concentrating on the Americas, moving away from Europe. The United States, which has played a leading military and political role in NATO, is pressuring European nations to bear the burden of European security themselves. The tension in Atlantic relations is extending beyond defense cost-sharing to the erosion of the alliance of free and democratic values. The keynote speech by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in February 2025 was a shock to European leaders.[1]Vance strongly criticized Europe's democratic and security policies, stating that the greater threat comes not from 'outside Europe but from within.' He pointed to immigration policies and freedom of speech issues, which went beyond traditional security discourse and were perceived as 'culture war' agendas, provoking strong backlash from European leaders.[2]

This clash of values is more clearly evident in the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) released in November 2025.[3] The report assesses that Europe is pursuing a different 'civilizational direction' from the United States, citing NATO's inefficient defense system, economic stagnation due to excessive regulation, immigration issues, and advocacy for DEI values. It states that if this trend continues, Europe in 20 years will be vastly different from its current state, and it questions whether NATO member states, with a majority non-European population, will still perceive the U.S. as an ally. The report mentions U.S. engagement to create strategic stability between Europe and Russia but primarily focuses on criticism of NATO expansion and issues with Europe's economic, technological, and trade policies.

NSS 2025 prominently features the 'Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,' which advocates non-interventionism in regions distant from U.S. interests and focuses on maintaining hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Under this strategy, also known as the 'Donroe Doctrine,' President Trump has taken Venezuelan President Maduro into custody and brought him to a New York court on January 3rd. President Trump cited protection from drugs and securing oil resources as justifications, making no mention of defending democracy. While the Trump administration's gunboat diplomacy towards left-wing regimes in South America could expand unpredictably, it is clear that Europe is secondary in the Donroe Doctrine. The only other region considered a beneficial strategic space is the Indo-Pacific, as it is the center of the global economy and a theater of geopolitical competition with China.

European leaders view the NSS 2025, released in November, as a withdrawal of U.S. leadership from the Atlantic alliance. Laurel Rapp of Chatham House, a London-based think tank, notes that unlike the Trump administration's 2017 security strategy, which defined China and Russia as revisionist powers, this report reveals a transactional approach and a willingness to compromise with authoritarian regimes. Europe recognizes that this report has reaffirmed the variability and unpredictability of the United States, and therefore argues for strengthening strategic hedging through diversification of partnerships.[4] The cultural clash aspect is perceived as insulting. António Costa, President of the European Council, expressed strong concern, stating that the NSS 2025 could be interpreted as interference in European internal affairs. He criticized, 'Allies do not interfere in each other's political lives,' and that the U.S. cannot decide for European citizens which political party is right or wrong. Furthermore, regarding the EU's Digital Services Act (DSA), which the U.S. cited as infringing on freedom of expression, he defended Europe's regulatory autonomy, arguing that freedom of information and expression cannot exist in an information environment lacking pluralism.[5]

The Threat of Greenland Annexation

President Trump's recurring remarks about purchasing Greenland, a Danish territory, have escalated, becoming a significant source of tension in Atlantic relations. Trump first expressed his intention to purchase Greenland in 2019 via Twitter. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen dismissed it as 'absurd' at the time, leading Trump to cancel his visit to Denmark. Upon his re-election, Trump began to express his intention to pursue the purchase of Greenland again. Since December 2024, while still president-elect, he claimed 'the U.S. needs sovereignty over Greenland,' and in January 2025, he caused controversy by stating that the use of military force would not be ruled out to acquire Greenland. In March, he sent a high-level U.S. delegation to Greenland. In September, NATO conducted military exercises in Greenland without the U.S., demonstrating its commitment to protecting sovereignty. However, in December, Trump appointed Jeff Landry, the Republican Governor of Louisiana, as a special envoy to Greenland, drawing strong opposition from the Danish government and the people of Greenland.

Following the capture of Maduro, as Trump began to assert claims over Greenland again, Denmark and European leaders started to feel a serious threat. They perceive that the U.S.'s expansionism in the Western Hemisphere, seen in Venezuela, is now targeting Greenland. On January 4th, Trump stated from his private jet, 'We need Greenland. It's in our national security interest.' 'Greenland is full of Russian and Chinese ships, and Denmark cannot handle it.' The U.S. already has a defense agreement with Denmark from 1951, allowing free military activity at Thule Air Base in Greenland, so this logic has been repeatedly refuted. On January 5th, the day after Trump's remarks, Danish Prime Minister Frederiksen stated in an interview with a media outlet, 'If the United States attacks another NATO member, everything is over,' and 'The international community as we know it, the democratic rules of the game, and NATO, the world's strongest defense alliance, will be dismantled.' She strongly urged the U.S. to cease its threats.[6] On January 6th, leaders of seven major NATO member states—Denmark, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain—issued a joint statement declaring, 'The decisions regarding Greenland are made by Denmark and Greenland.' The statement further read, 'Denmark, including Greenland, is part of NATO, and Arctic security must be achieved collectively with NATO allies, including the United States, in accordance with the UN Charter, which includes sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of borders.'[7]

On January 14th, the Danish Foreign Minister and Greenlandic officials visited the White House and met with Vice President Vance and Secretary of State Mark Rubio. According to reports in The Washington Post and The New York Times on the same day, the meeting, requested by the Danish side to ease tensions, only confirmed their differing positions. Instead, they agreed to establish a high-level working group to discuss Arctic security in the future. Prior to this meeting, President Trump posted on his social media that Greenland is strategically necessary for the missile defense system he wants to build, the 'Golden Dome,' and that NATO could be much stronger and more effective if the U.S. owned Greenland. In response, eight NATO member states, including Denmark, Germany, France, and the UK, sent a small number of troops to express solidarity in Greenland's defense. Trump then threatened on January 17th to impose an additional 10% tariff on them starting February 1st. This would bring the total tariff to 25%, in addition to the existing 15% mutual tariff.

As the Greenland issue escalated to Trump's tariff threat, Europe also became more assertive. EU leaders are reportedly reconsidering the 160 trillion won ($120 billion) in retaliatory tariffs prepared during last year's trade negotiations with the U.S. and are discussing the possibility of selling U.S. bonds. In fact, a Danish pension fund sold its holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds. Influenced by this, U.S. stocks briefly plummeted. The eight NATO countries targeted by Trump's additional tariffs issued a joint declaration on January 19th, strongly warning that the threat of additional tariffs could endanger Atlantic relations.

The subsequent Davos World Economic Forum (WEF) became a venue for condemning Trump. In his speech on January 20th, French President Macron denounced, 'International law is being trampled, and we are entering a state of anarchy where the only law is the law of the strongest,' adding, 'Imperialist ambitions are resurfacing.' On the 21st, in a packed forum session, President Trump stated that Greenland is part of North America and that he wants negotiations immediately, but would not annex it by force. Following his meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, he wrote on his social media that he had withdrawn the threat of additional tariffs and agreed to a framework for negotiations on the future of Greenland and the Arctic. News emerged that this negotiation framework includes the construction of a U.S. military base in Greenland and mining rights. Greenlandic residents have protested this news, stating that NATO has no authority to make such deals with the U.S. on their behalf. While the Atlantic relationship, which was heading towards crisis, appears to have calmed down following the Davos Forum, the deepened distrust means that the relationship between the U.S. and NATO cannot return to its previous state.

Europe's Response

European leaders anticipate that this American-led unilateralism and hegemony in the Americas will persist beyond the Trump administration for some time, and they are accepting the structural loosening of U.S.-Europe relations as a reality. Paradoxically, this change coincides with Europe facing its most dangerous security environment since World War II. Since the latter half of 2024, military tensions have escalated with repeated sightings of suspected Russian drones in the airspace of Poland, Romania, Denmark, and Germany, prompting EU leaders to discuss the establishment of a 'drone barrier' and an eastern front surveillance system to counter hybrid warfare. Simultaneously, discussions about reviving conscription or introducing new military service systems are spreading to address troop shortages. Germany is pursuing amendments to its military service law to maintain a volunteer system but allow for conscription in case of troop shortages, while France has also announced the introduction of a new form of military service.

The premise of NATO's collective defense still relies on the overwhelming military guarantee and operational leadership of the United States. The U.S. has spent approximately 3.4% of its GDP on defense for NATO and has urged allies to reach similar levels. Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO has set a guideline for member states to spend 2% of their GDP on defense, but implementation has been limited. However, following the war in Ukraine and Trump's pressure, Europe's self-strengthening efforts have accelerated. At the NATO summit in The Hague in June 2025, member states agreed to spend 5% of their GDP on defense by 2035, with at least 3.5% allocated to core defense capabilities and targeted attack capabilities. The EU, with 22 out of 27 member states also being NATO members, has made military rearmament a core pillar of its foreign and security policy. Through the 'Readiness 2030' plan in 2025, the European Commission is promoting enhanced military mobility and defense industry innovation. This is essentially a goal akin to 'Military Schengen,' encompassing the movement of military equipment through a single approval process, the establishment of an emergency fast-track system, guaranteed priority access to infrastructure, sharing of logistics and transportation capabilities, and strengthening cooperation with NATO and partner countries.[8]

Since these European self-strengthening efforts are unlikely to yield results in the short term, Europe is compelled to continue diplomatic efforts to maintain the Atlantic alliance with the U.S. while simultaneously rearming to counter the Russian threat. At the same time, European leaders, having temporarily fended off Trump's threat of additional tariffs, will pursue strategic autonomy by utilizing their own leverage without further concessions from the unpredictable Trump administration.

3. Growing Perception of China Threat in Europe and De-risking Strategy

Europe's relationship with China is expected to see a spread of containment and conflict. The EU has pursued a tripartite strategy towards China, outlined in its 'EU-China: A Strategic Outlook' in March 2019. This strategy involves engaging with China as a partner on global issues such as the environment, as a competitor in trade and investment, and as a systemic rival that must be countered to prevent the spread of authoritarianism.[9] However, observing China's alignment with Russia in the Ukraine war has strengthened the perception of China as a security threat.

Furthermore, economic anxieties have grown regarding China's hollowing out of European industry. The perception is that a 'China Shock 2.0,' characterized by low-price overproduction and unfair competition from Chinese manufacturing, is sweeping across Europe, threatening the growth and stability of sectors such as the automotive and machinery industries, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors. The weakening of European manufacturing competitiveness could impact Europe's socioeconomic policies, which prioritize employment and welfare, thus shifting the focus of China policy towards economic security.[10] Whereas the 'China Shock 1.0,' following China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, impacted manufacturing and employment in developed countries, particularly the United States, with an influx of low-wage light industrial exports, 2.0 signifies overproduction and export offensives in high-value-added manufacturing, including electric vehicles, batteries, solar power, robotics, AI, and semiconductor equipment. In essence, the key difference this time is that Europe's core and strategic industries themselves are directly under threat.

As of 2024, China is the EU's third-largest export market and its largest import source, resulting in an EU trade deficit with China amounting to tens of billions of euros. EU exports to China were €19.2 billion in 2023 and €16.8 billion in 2024, while imports from China were €46.4 billion and €44.1 billion during the same periods, respectively. In both years, the annual trade deficit was approximately €27 billion. A more significant concern is the increasing proportion of manufactured goods within imports from China. In 2024, the main categories of goods imported by the EU from China included telecommunications equipment, machinery for processing electrical, and electrical machinery and apparatus—all manufacturing-related items.[11] The shift in China's export focus towards high-value-added manufacturing is heightening Europe's sense of crisis. The significant impact of Chinese electric vehicles on the German automotive industry serves as a prime example. While Chinese EV companies are leveraging subsidies and tax incentives to engage in price competition within the European automotive market, sales of German premium car brands such as Mercedes, BMW, and Audi are declining in the Chinese market.

The perception of crisis regarding China's hollowing out of European industry is attributed to China's pursuit of a total-war political-economic model, driven by concentrated investment and innovation in its manufacturing sector, intertwined with geopolitical competition. As Europe faces a vortex where Chinese manufacturing competitiveness erodes its core industries, there are growing calls for the EU to leverage its scale as a single market to protect and foster strategic industries through investment and innovation, and to secure flexible supply chains.[12]

From an economic security perspective, Europe is pursuing a strategy of de-risking to reduce its dependence on China. This involves managing potential economic and geopolitical risks emanating from China. The 'Future of European Competitiveness' report, led by Mario Draghi and published in September 2024, identified enhancing competitiveness through innovation and reducing external dependencies in areas such as digital and rare earth mineral supply chains as key priorities.[13] Although China's control over rare earth minerals has not been abruptly imposed on Europe, it remains a concern for European economic security. Rebecca Arcesati and Jacob Gunter point out that China's export controls on rare earth minerals extend beyond retaliatory measures in trade disputes, serving various objectives such as maintaining China's industrial dominance, attracting production investment to China, and hindering weapons production, thereby impacting supply chains in both civilian and military sectors. For instance, China's implementation of a licensing system to restrict rare earth exports can lead to situations where European automotive companies temporarily halt battery production and await shipments once their existing stock of imported rare earths is depleted. This ultimately serves to bolster the dominance of Chinese electric vehicles. China's rare earth export controls not only encompass mineral resources but also the processing technology, making it difficult for other countries to establish rare earth production capabilities. In this context, strategies to counter China's weaponization of rare earths include the EU providing subsidies to European companies, implementing protective regulations, and introducing import quotas for Chinese rare earths to reduce dependence on China.[14]

Europe and the United States share numerous cooperative agendas for countering China, including jointly responding to China's manufacturing overcapacity to enhance effectiveness, controlling exports of key advanced technologies to China, and cooperating on supply chain security. However, given the current strained relationship between Europe and the United States, it appears difficult to forge a united front against China. While the primary Chinese threat to U.S. security is the Taiwan issue, Europe's concern lies in the deepening Sino-Russian alignment within its region, presenting a different dimension. In the economic sphere, disagreements over tariffs and technology policies also exist, suggesting that cooperation against China is likely to be selective and partial.[15]

In a situation where Sino-European cooperation is not very realistic, major European countries and the EU are strengthening cooperation with Indo-Pacific nations as part of their de-risking strategy towards China. In this context, the primary targets will be Asian countries that perceive China as a threat regarding supply chain stability and cybersecurity. The EU's approach will be more multilateral and institutional than that of the United States, increasing the likelihood of cooperation from key Indo-Pacific nations such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia. This is also because Asian countries need to diversify from a U.S.-centric approach through hedging strategies.

4. Limitations of European-American Far-Right Solidarity

The spread of far-right forces within Europe is no longer a temporary phenomenon but has become a structural political trend. The emphasis on national interests over transnational cooperation in areas such as trade, conflict, and the environment, and the prioritization of protecting indigenous cultures over immigration, racial, and religious pluralism, are common trends in both Europe and the United States, suggesting a potential for solidarity between the two.

Following the European Parliament elections in June 2024, the European Parliament, with its 720 seats, is composed of eight political groups and independent members. Among these, nationalist right-wing groups are divided into three: the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR, 78 seats), Patriots for Europe (84 seats), and Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN, 25 seats). The ECR and Patriots advocate for reforming the EU into an intergovernmental union that prioritizes national sovereignty, rather than outright EU withdrawal. The ECR includes France's National Rally (Rassemblement National, RN), Italy's Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), Romania's AUR, and Poland's Law and Justice (PiS). The Patriots group, newly formed following the 2024 elections, has emerged as the third-largest political force and includes France's RN, Italy's Lega, Spain's Vox, and Hungary's Fidesz, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The ESN group includes parties from Germany (Alternative for Germany, AfD), Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia. These represent the most radical sovereignist factions, advocating for a significant reduction in EU powers or a transformation into a limited economic community, opposing environmental cooperation and military aid to Ukraine, and pursuing a strong nativist agenda focused on halting immigration.

Far-right parties in Europe are not only gaining control of local governments in several countries but are also increasing their potential to form national governments. Parties such as France's RN, the UK's Reform UK, and Germany's AfD have been expanding their influence by eroding the traditional support bases of left- and right-wing parties. Recent opinion polls indicate that Reform UK, led by Nigel Farage who spearheaded Brexit, has surpassed both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party in support. While it may be difficult for European far-right parties to form single-party governments, their participation as coalition partners could lead to policy divergences with mainstream European parties.

Besch and Verma categorize these far-right parties as 'revisionist right-wing' and analyze their extensive links with the MAGA (Make America Great Again) movement in the United States. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni have publicly stated that their ideological orientations are similar to the MAGA movement, and President Trump has also lauded them as representative European leaders. The AfD, in particular, exhibits strong ties with the MAGA network, with Elon Musk's controversial statement that "Only the AfD can save Germany" causing significant uproar. The shared stance of Vice President Vance and Musk in criticizing the EU's Digital Services Act as an infringement on freedom of expression, and the Trump administration's tendency to downplay the severity of environmental issues, are similar to those of European far-right parties like the AfD, reinforcing mutual legitimization through cooperation. Furthermore, some far-right parties advocate for economic reconciliation, such as the re-importation of Russian gas, thereby weakening NATO's unified sanctions against Russia.[16]

However, their solidarity will likely be limited. While MAGA and European far-right forces share a commonality in prioritizing national sovereignty and being wary of international organizations and supranational alliances, there are significant differences in national power and strategic options between the United States, a superpower, and individual EU member states, which comprise 27 countries. The U.S., as the largest financial contributor to major international organizations like the UN and WHO and a formidable military power, can selectively withdraw from or distance itself from multilateral systems. In contrast, European countries are mid-level and smaller states that derive greater benefits from multilateral cooperation. Considering these structural conditions, the option of withdrawing from the EU, citing interference from Brussels, has become a discarded card. Notably, Trump-style American First policies are bound to clash with the interests of European far-right populist parties whose core agenda is to protect their own farmers and workers. The imposition of sudden additional tariffs on European exports to the U.S. last year likely served as a stark reminder of differing economic interests compared to MAGA.

The gap between MAGA and European far-right forces is even wider in military and security aspects. The existential security threat perception that has spread throughout Europe following the Ukraine war necessitates collective defense centered on NATO and enhanced regional cooperation. Furthermore, the stance of some European far-right factions, which are more conciliatory towards China, may conflict with the U.S. strategy of containing China. The Greenland dispute likely served as a wake-up call for European far-right forces regarding Trump's unilateralism. Ultimately, the alliance between American and European revisionist right-wing movements will likely remain a loose association based on shared post-liberal values such as anti-immigration and anti-diversity.

5. Europe Turns Towards the Indo-Pacific Again

The loosening of the transatlantic alliance will likely prompt Europe to seek stronger relationships with democratic nations in the Indo-Pacific. Europe's enhanced strategic engagement with the Indo-Pacific region is a logical consequence of its hedging strategy. Major European countries joined initiatives for the Indo-Pacific strategy to uphold a rules-based order in the late 2010s and early 2020s. The EU[17], the United Kingdom,[18], Germany,[19], and France[20], among others, emphasized the link between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific. This was driven by a shared understanding with the United States that countering China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific across security, economic, and systemic dimensions is crucial for establishing a global rules-based order. However, the COVID-19 pandemic hindered the substantive progress of Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy into concrete policies.

The outbreak of the Ukraine war has caused Europe to refocus its attention on the Indo-Pacific. Approximately four months after the war began, in June 2022, NATO began inviting South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—the so-called IP4 countries—to its Madrid summit. This measure, based on the recognition that European and Indo-Pacific security are interconnected, was supported by the Biden administration at the time. While the IP4 countries attended NATO summits for three consecutive years, only the Prime Minister of New Zealand attended at the head of state level at the 2025 Hague summit, with other countries sending high-level delegations instead of their leaders.

A second Trump administration is unlikely to welcome the deepening cooperation between NATO and U.S. allied nations in the Indo-Pacific. In this context, for Europe to continue and strengthen its cooperation with the IP4, it needs to persuasively argue to the IP4 countries that engaging in European security aligns with their core interests in the Indo-Pacific, even without explicit U.S. support. Simultaneously, Europe recognizes that its capacity to contribute militarily and diplomatically to the security concerns of Indo-Pacific nations is limited. Consequently, Europe is expected to focus on value-based diplomacy—upholding freedom, human rights, and a rules-based international order—as the foundation for its Indo-Pacific engagement, rather than military cooperation, while complementing this with efforts in economic security. In this process, Europe will likely seek to strengthen cooperation with South Korea, Japan, and Australia in areas of tangible interest, such as military equipment, rare earth minerals, supply chain stabilization, and digital and AI technology.

In South Korea's case, the strategic alignment between North Korea, China, and Russia, along with North Korea's involvement in the Ukraine war, are factors increasing European interest in its security. However, South Korea also seeks to improve relations with China and Russia, which may limit its proactive diplomatic engagement for European security. Under these circumstances, Europe is expected to request South Korea's contribution through military equipment exports and defense industry cooperation, post-war reconstruction aid for Ukraine, supply chain cooperation in areas like semiconductors, and international coordination to uphold multilateral systems, rather than direct military support.

6. Conclusion

Europe will prioritize ending the Ukraine war and containing Russia, strengthening its rearmament and security cohesion. Furthermore, due to the weakening of the transatlantic alliance, it will seek to enhance cooperation with the Indo-Pacific region as a hedging strategy. Given the deepened distrust with the United States following the threat of Greenland's annexation, there is a significant possibility that Europe will seek alliances with like-minded liberal states in the Indo-Pacific to forge a new order beyond hedging. While security and trade remain under significant U.S. influence, Asian countries preoccupied with U.S.-China competition have substantial incentives to actively engage in cooperation with Europe. In particular, from the perspective of its de-risking strategy towards China, Europe will feel the need to strengthen cooperation with major Asian manufacturing countries in future industries such as semiconductors and AI. It will also show great interest in cooperating to stabilize supply chains for critical minerals like rare earths and key manufacturing components. As these issues are also shared concerns among major Asian manufacturing countries, the scope for cooperation could be broad.

We are entering an era of disorder where great powers use economic interdependence as a weapon of coercion or even openly display territorial ambitions. As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney stated in his speech at the World Economic Forum, conforming to great powers does not guarantee safety, and middle powers have the strength to build a new order that includes values such as respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations.[21] Since neither aligning with great powers nor pursuing a strategy of self-reliance can achieve autonomy, middle powers in Asia, such as South Korea, must cooperate with like-minded countries. In this chaotic period of collapsing international order, it is beneficial for both individual nations and the world to unite to ensure that a multilateral order based on mutual respect and reciprocity functions, at least to a minimal extent. European countries will be the best-prepared partners in achieving this goal. ■

[1] MSC, Munich Security Conference 2025: Speech by JD Vance and Selected Reactions, April 2025. https://securityconference.org/assets/02_Dokumente/01_Publikationen/2025/Selected_Key_Speeches_Vol._II/MSC_Speeches_2025_Vol2_Ansicht_gek%C3%BCrzt.pdf

[2] German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who publicly protested during the speech by stating "unacceptable," countered in a subsequent European defense panel that democracy must respect freedom of expression while also defending itself against extremists who seek to destroy it. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz also emphasized that the German society's consensus of "Never Again" regarding Nazism is incompatible with the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which is relatively lenient towards crimes of National Socialism.

[3] White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, November 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

[4] Laurel Rapp, “Trump’s new national security strategy: Cut deals, hammer Europe, and tread gently around autocrats,” December 9, 2025. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/12/trumps-new-national-security-strategy-cut-deals-hammer-europe-and-tread-gently-around?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[5] POLITICO, “EU’s Costa warns US against interference in Europe,” December 8, 2025. https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-council-antonio-costa-warns-us-against-interference-in-europe/

[6] Reuters, “Denmark's prime minister says Trump is serious about wanting Greenland takeover,” January 5, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/denmarks-prime-minister-says-trump-is-serious-about-wanting-greenland-takeover-2026-01-05/

[7] Foreign Policy World Brief, “NATO Leaders Push Back Against Trump’s Greenland Threats,” January 6, 2026. https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/06/trump-annex-greenland-nato-frederiksen-denmark/

[8] EU Commission, “ Commission takes steps to modernise European defence and improve military mobility,” https://commission.europa.eu/news-and-media/news/commission-takes-steps-modernise-european-defence-and-improve-military-mobility-2025-11-19_en

[9] EU Commission, EU-China: A Strategic Outlook, March 2019. https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2019-03/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf

[10] Abigael Vasselier and Tara Varma, “How should Europe position itself for systemic rivalry with China?.” Brookings Commentary, December 5, 2025. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-should-europe-position-itself-for-systemic-rivalry-with-china/

[11] eurostat, “China-EU - international trade in goods statistics,” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=China-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics.

[12] Jacob Gunter and Mikko Huotari, “Shockwaves Made in China,” Internationale Politik Quarterly, October 20, 2025. https://ip-quarterly.com/en/shockwaves-made-china.

[13] European Commission, “The future of European competitiveness: Plan A/ A competitive strategy for Europe,” September 2024. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/draghi-report_en#paragraph_47059 downloaded from.

[14] Rebecca Arcesati and Jacob Gunter, “China’s multi-purpose export controls raise pressure on Europe to derisk,” Mercator Institute for China Studies, October 1, 2025. https://merics.org/en/comment/chinas-multi-purpose-export-controls-raise-pressure-europe-derisk.

[15] Zack Cooper, “How should the United State cooperate with Europe on China strategy?.” Brookings Commentary, December 5, 2025. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-should-the-united-states-cooperate-with-europe-on-china-strategy/.

[16] Sophia Besch and Tara Verma, “Alliance of Revisionists: A New Era for the Transatlantic Relationship,” Survival 67;2, April-May 2025, pp. 7-38.

[17] The EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, September 2021.

[18] Global Britain in a Competitive Edge: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, 2021.

[19] Policy Guideline for the Indo-Pacific Region, 2020.

[20] France’s Defence in the Indo-Pacific, 2019.France’s Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, 2021.

[21]Davos 2026: Special address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2026/01/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/

■ Lee Suk-jong_EAI Chair Professor; Professor of Sociology, Sungkyunkwan University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow
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