[Global NK 논평] 트럼프의 황금함대 구상, MASGA, 그리고 ICE Pact

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1. US-China Maritime Power Transition and the Western Hemisphere

Historically, when a maritime hegemon faced a maritime power transition initiated by a challenger, it has shown a pattern of redeploying naval forces previously stationed in peripheral theaters, seeking new alliances to replace them or readjusting existing ones. For instance, at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, as the naval power of challengers such as the United States, Germany, and Japan grew simultaneously, Great Britain, triggered by the Venezuelan Crisis of 1895, began to accept the United States' claim of a sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, while simultaneously signing the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. This allowed Britain to adjust its naval forces in the Western Hemisphere and Asia, thereby strengthening its defense of mainland Europe. In this process, Britain, after reaching a brink of war with France over Fashoda in 1898, adjusted its relationship with France through the Entente Cordiale in 1904, accepting France as an ally. This was ultimately a strategic adjustment to counter the rising German navy in the homeland.

At the beginning of the new year, global attention was drawn to Venezuela, which had requested US intervention in the Western Hemisphere against Britain over 130 years ago. This was because Venezuelan President Maduro was arrested by the Trump administration. The Trump administration's swift military operation to arrest the Venezuelan president is highly unusual. However, as revealed in the National Security Strategy document released in November 2025, the US's clear political will to strengthen its dominance in the Western Hemisphere can be seen as a facet of America's strategic adjustment to the US-China maritime power transition. Prior to the public release of the National Security Strategy document in late October 2025, the US Department of Defense had already announced plans to move the state-of-the-art Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier strike group, which was deployed in the Mediterranean, to the Caribbean Sea. While the swiftness of the military operation against Maduro was not anticipated, the media reported that the deployment of the Ford carrier strike group would enable the military ousting of the Maduro regime.

Given that naval power in the Asia-Pacific theater remains crucial for deterring the Chinese navy, strengthening naval power in the Western Hemisphere implies a relative reduction in naval power in the European and Middle Eastern theaters. In the same vein, the fact that Europe and the Middle East are ranked lower than the Western Hemisphere and the Asia-Pacific in the 2025 National Security Strategy document, along with Africa, is not coincidental but reflects a strategic prioritization adjustment. This is evidenced by the situation where, for the first time in decades, US aircraft carriers are not positioned within the Central Command, which is responsible for Western Asia, or the European Command. Merely two months after the Department of Defense's reported plan to deploy an aircraft carrier strike group, special forces, and Marines to the Caribbean, President Trump announced the 'Golden Fleet' initiative in December, signaling an intention to minimize the quantitative disadvantage in naval competition with China, following the Maritime Action Plan.

2. Trump's Golden Fleet Initiative

According to estimates by the US Department of Defense and the Congressional Research Service in 2024, the Chinese navy possessed approximately 370 warships, and this number was projected to reach 395 in 2025. In contrast, the US Navy's fleet size was estimated to be around 293 as of October 1, 2025. While US Navy warships hold an advantage over the Chinese navy in terms of size, displacement, and firepower, it is a foregone conclusion that the gap in the number of naval warships between the two countries will inevitably widen over the next five years, reaching 2030. In response, the Maritime Action Plan in April of last year ordered all relevant departments under the executive branch to submit collaborative plans by November, demonstrating an intent to rebuild the foundation of the US maritime industry, naval power, and shipbuilding industry as a whole. The 'Golden Fleet' initiative, announced on December 22, reveals the specific combination of warships that the Trump administration desires for the future US Navy.

President Trump assessed that the Navy's current warship construction plan, which has focused on small, new warships, does not align with the direction of the Trump administration's strategy. He announced the 'Golden Fleet' construction plan, which includes 20-25 next-generation destroyers with a displacement of 30,000 to 40,000 tons, and a larger number of frigates. Considering that the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the current mainstay of the US Navy, have a displacement of approximately 9,500 tons, these next-generation destroyers would be larger than any warships the US Navy has possessed in the past 80 years, excluding aircraft carriers. These new Trump-class warships, which the US aims to build, starting with two and eventually reaching 20-25, are expected to be equipped with future weapons such as electromagnetic railguns and directed-energy lasers, as well as cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, and long-range missiles.

Reports from late October of last year indicated that the White House and the Department of Defense were discussing the construction of next-generation warships with a displacement of 15,000 to 20,000 tons. In reality, larger and more powerful warships have been planned as the mainstay of the Golden Fleet. President Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, which includes approximately $26 billion in funding for the construction of new warships, and in his announcement on December 22, he expressed ambitious aspirations, stating that the new warships would be more than 100 times more powerful than the existing Iowa-class battleships. However, given that the specific details of the Maritime Action Plan were due by November last year and no follow-up actions have been reported, coupled with the resignations of high-ranking officials within the administration, the feasibility of the Golden Fleet initiative remains uncertain. Experts are debating the practicality of the Golden Fleet, considering factors such as cost, the coherence between warship types and operational concepts, the capacity of the shipbuilding supply chain, and legal constraints represented by the Jones Act and the Burns-Tollefson Act.

3. Progress and Challenges of the MASGA Project

The Trump administration's Golden Fleet initiative includes not only new large warships like the Trump-class but also new frigates and numerous unmanned autonomous vessels. Those who view the Golden Fleet initiative favorably suggest that the latest large new warships could function as arsenal ships—a concept pursued by the Navy in the 1990s but unrealized due to congressional budget rejection—providing concentrated firepower support from the rear. In the front lines, a hedge strategy could be implemented through the coordinated operations of frigates, numerous unmanned vessels, submarines, and drones to maximize enemy losses. Conversely, those who view the Golden Fleet initiative negatively point to excessive cost increases and practical construction limitations, arguing that since large-scale naval battles between large warships are not the core variable in modern maritime warfare, the effectiveness of large warships weighing 30,000-40,000 tons will not be commensurate with the astronomical costs invested, leading to skepticism about their utility compared to current warships.

While it is difficult to definitively answer the questions of the Golden Fleet's realization and its cost-effectiveness at this moment, it can be considered a positive development for South Korea's efforts to revitalize the MASGA project. South Korea has undertaken the maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) of US auxiliary support vessels on several occasions. On October 26th last year, during the APEC summit in Gyeongju, HD Hyundai signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Huntington Ingalls, the largest US defense shipbuilder, for cooperation in the design and construction of merchant and naval vessels, marking the first time a South Korean shipbuilding company has ventured into building US Navy vessels. The US Navy plans to select the final contractor, proceed with design, and commence construction in August 2027. Furthermore, President Trump's announcement that the US Navy would cooperate with South Korean companies like Hanwha, which owns the Philadelphia shipyard, for the construction of new frigates in the Golden Fleet initiative provides an opportunity for the MASGA project to expand into the construction of auxiliary support vessels and warships.

If South Korea's shipbuilding capabilities can be utilized, starting from the 12 merchant ship orders currently received by the Philadelphia shipyard, and extending to the construction of US auxiliary support vessels, frigates, and other warships, the MASGA project can contribute to the realization of the Golden Fleet initiative. The MASGA project, pursued through cooperation between our companies and the US administration and Navy, is making significant progress. However, as anticipated, the challenges that the South Korean shipbuilding industry realistically faces are by no means small, commensurate with the potential progress the Golden Fleet initiative could bring to the MASGA project. First and foremost, it remains uncertain whether the Philadelphia shipyard, which has focused on merchant ship construction to date and lacks experience in warship construction, can acquire the capabilities to build frigates within the planned timeframe, as promoted by President Trump.

Specifically, experts believe that factors such as the high wage structure in the United States, a shortage of skilled labor for warship manufacturing, the high cost of component supply chains, and the 'Buy American Act,' which stipulates that more than 60-75% of the components of finished products must be of US origin for federal government procurements, will disadvantage South Korean companies operating in the US. For example, radar, sensors, weapons, and engines are manufactured by different companies, and the US supply chain, which has worsened since the pandemic, is not functioning smoothly. South Korea's shipbuilding competitiveness lies in its ability to easily procure high-quality steel, engines, and components at competitive prices from within South Korea. However, US-made steel, engines, and radar are expensive and slow to supply. Furthermore, South Korea's wage level is about 60% of that in the US, and most importantly, the workers at the Philadelphia shipyard are likely unfamiliar with the design of frigates and various components.

Moreover, South Korean companies like Hanwha, which have entered the US market to circumvent the regulations of the Jones Act and the Burns-Tollefson Act, encounter the 'Buy American Act' once again. They face issues with the supply chain for various warship components and labor that would not have been a significant problem if the ships were built in South Korea. The US manufacturing supply chain has been in decline since the pandemic. Whether the construction of auxiliary support vessels or warships at US shipyards can be improved hinges on Hanwha's ability to overcome legal restrictions and effectively manage the shipbuilding supply chain. Considering these factors comprehensively, although there is an urgent need to build frigates quickly, leading to the initial plan to entrust the construction to Hanwha's Philadelphia shipyard, no one can guarantee the speed of construction that the Trump administration desires.

4. Presidential Waivers Circumventing Domestic Law: Implications from the ICE Pact and the Finnish Case

Like Hanwha, HD Hyundai has also expressed its intention to support the MASGA project by exploring various options, including acquiring US-based shipyards, to circumvent the regulations of the Jones Act and the Burns-Tollefson Act. However, even for Hanwha, which is ahead in acquiring a shipyard, the challenges to overcome within the US are considerable. On the other hand, amidst the US-China maritime power transition, to expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere and enhance its control over Arctic routes, the Trump administration has continued the Icebreakers Cooperation Effort (ICE) Pact signed by the Biden administration with Canada and Finland in July 2024. It has designated the construction of US Coast Guard icebreakers in Finland as a matter of critical national security interest, thereby exercising a presidential waiver on the Tollefson Act. The plan is to build 4 out of a total of 11 Arctic Security Cutters in two Finnish shipyards, with the remaining 7 to be built in US shipyards.

Following the summit between President Trump and Finnish President Alexander Stubb in October last year, a memorandum and fact sheet from President Trump containing these details regarding the ICE Pact's icebreaker construction plan were released on the 8th and 9th. Although presidential waivers to bypass the Burns-Tollefson Act were legally provided for, historical precedents were scarce. Therefore, the general interpretation was that situations qualifying for a presidential waiver as a matter of national security interest would be very limited. In this context, the implications of the presidential waiver exercised for Finland last year are worth considering. Firstly, the background for granting the waiver to Finland includes the fact that China already operates five icebreakers in the Arctic region, whereas the US currently has only two operational icebreakers.

Furthermore, one of the two US icebreakers is an old vessel commissioned in 1976, and the other was converted from a merchant ship by the US Coast Guard in September last year. Considering that the US Coast Guard internally estimates that it needs at least nine icebreakers to operate in the Arctic region for its security interests, it can be inferred that the decision was made that overseas construction of icebreakers is necessary to quickly restore the US position in Arctic waters, including Greenland. Additionally, as stated in the fact sheet, the overseas construction of icebreakers is intended to temporarily supplement the numerical disadvantage in icebreakers compared to China and Russia while the Coast Guard rebuilds the supply chain infrastructure for icebreaker manufacturing within the US, thereby promoting domestic shipbuilding infrastructure investment in the short term.

At a strategic level, it is important to consider that the US has been simultaneously pursuing the expansion of MASGA and cooperation with Canada and Finland on icebreaker construction through the ICE Pact since October last year. Ultimately, as discussed earlier, the US appears to have felt a short-term need to build more icebreakers than China, in order to prioritize strengthening its position in the Western Hemisphere amidst an unstoppable US-China maritime power transition. Russia, with its fleet of over 50 icebreakers, including eight nuclear-powered ones, is more of a constant than a variable. By using a presidential waiver, the speed of icebreaker construction can be rapidly increased. Therefore, the exercise of the waiver for Finland is largely a response to the expansion of China's icebreaker fleet and maritime influence within the Western Hemisphere. The icebreakers to be built in Finland are expected to be delivered in early 2028.

Of course, follow-up measures for the ICE Pact, decided at the ministerial meeting in November last year, include plans for US shipbuilding workers to learn technology at Finnish shipyards through the US International Shipbuilding Fund, and a $1 billion investment plan for Canadian shipbuilder Davie to acquire and modernize a shipyard in Texas, aiming to transition to manufacturing icebreakers in the US in the long term. However, for MASGA and the Golden Fleet plan, which encompass merchant ships, auxiliary support vessels, and new frigates, and aim to rebuild the infrastructure and supply chain for the entire US shipbuilding industry as a long-term goal, there is currently no pressing tactical need to invoke waivers and produce a few vessels within two years. If the US-China maritime power transition unfolds at a more threatening level than anticipated in the coming years, the invocation of waivers might be considered. However, devising manufacturing methods that circumvent domestic laws or pursuing MASGA through long-term lobbying of Congress and the administration are currently the more realistic options.

5. MASGA and Nuclear-Powered Submarine Projects Surrounding the Korean Peninsula

A few days after the announcement of the Golden Fleet initiative in the US, on Christmas Day last year, North Korea unveiled the full exterior of its 'nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine,' which it announced was under construction. On March 8th of the same year, North Korea had released photos of the lower part of the nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine during an on-site inspection by Kim Jong Un, as reported by the Rodong Sinmun. The full exterior was revealed for the first time through the Rodong Sinmun this time. The Rodong Sinmun claimed the submarine has a displacement of 8,700 tons and, given the term 'strategic guided missile,' is presumed to be equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) or submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) carrying nuclear warheads. Kim Jong Un, who conducted the on-site inspection of the construction project, made remarks that seemed to allude to the MASGA project, which saw progress around the time of the Gyeongju APEC summit in 2025, and the ROK-US nuclear-powered submarine construction agreement proposed by President Lee Jae-myung and approved by President Trump.

Chairman Kim Jong Un stated that the South Korean plan to build a nuclear-powered submarine was 'agreed upon with Washington at Seoul's request,' characterizing it as an 'aggressive act that gravely infringes upon North Korea's security and maritime sovereignty' and a 'security threat that must be responded to.' Although the South Korean government later clarified multiple times that the nuclear-powered submarine would be built in South Korea, President Trump's social media post announcing that South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine would be built at the Philadelphia shipyard, following the ROK-US summit during the APEC period, indicates that the MASGA project is likely to be linked to deeper ROK-US security technology cooperation in the long term, beyond shipbuilding collaboration.

The background for the presidential waiver being exercised in the process of promoting the ICE Pact's icebreaker construction, and the US's proactive approval of South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine construction plan, lies in the structurally changing maritime strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, South Korea needs to build political trust with the US through the MASGA project and the nuclear-powered submarine project, maintaining a long-term perspective on the trends of the US-China maritime power transition. This is because a long-term perspective that understands strategic needs and political trust built through security and shipbuilding cooperation can serve as a crucial foundation for overcoming technical constraints and various legal obstacles. ■

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■ Oh In-hwan_Senior Researcher, East Asia Institute (EAI); Lecturer, Seoul National University.

■ Responsable et éditeur : Lee Sang-jun_Chercheur, EAI

    Contact : 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr