[Global NK Commentary] Trump's Golden Fleet Concept, MASGA, and the ICE Pact

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1. US-China Maritime Power Transition and the Western Hemisphere

Historically, when a maritime hegemon faces a maritime power transition challenged by rising powers, it has redeployed naval forces previously stationed in various theaters, seeking new alliances or readjusting existing ones. For example, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when naval power growth by challengers such as the United States, Germany, and Japan occurred simultaneously, Great Britain, triggered by the Venezuelan Crisis of 1895, began to accept the US assertion of a sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. Concurrently, through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, it adjusted its naval presence in the Western Hemisphere and Asia to strengthen its homeland defense in Europe. During this process, Britain, after reaching a near-war crisis with France over Fashoda in 1898, resolved the relationship through the Entente Cordiale in 1904, bringing France into an alliance. This was ultimately a strategic adjustment to counter the rising German navy in its homeland.

At the beginning of the new year, global attention was drawn to Venezuela, the very country that requested US intervention in the Western Hemisphere against Britain over 130 years ago, as President Maduro was arrested by the Trump administration. While the Trump administration's swift military operation to arrest the Venezuelan president was highly unusual, it can be seen as a facet of the US's strategic adjustment to the US-China maritime power transition, clearly demonstrating its political will to strengthen dominance in the Western Hemisphere, as revealed in the National Security Strategy document released in November 2025. Prior to the document's release, in late October 2025, the US Department of Defense had already announced plans to move the state-of-the-art Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier, then deployed in the Mediterranean, to the Caribbean Sea. Although the swift military operation against Maduro was not anticipated, media reports suggested that the deployment of the Ford carrier strike group would enable the military ouster of the Maduro regime.

Considering that naval power in the Asia-Pacific theater remains crucial for deterring the Chinese navy, strengthening naval power in the Western Hemisphere implies a relative reduction in naval presence in the European and Middle Eastern theaters. In this context, the fact that Europe and the Middle East are ranked lower than the Western Hemisphere and the Asia-Pacific in the 2025 National Security Strategy, along with Africa, is not coincidental but reflects a strategic prioritization adjustment. This is evidenced by the current situation where, for the first time in decades, there is no US aircraft carrier positioned within the Central Command, responsible for the entire West Asia region, or the European Command. Approximately two months after the Department of Defense's reported plan to deploy a carrier strike group, Army special forces, and Marines to the Caribbean, President Trump announced the Golden Fleet concept in December, signaling an intention to minimize the quantitative disadvantage in naval competition with China, following the Maritime Strategy.

2. Trump's Golden Fleet Concept

According to estimates by the US Department of Defense and the Congressional Research Service in 2024, China's navy possessed approximately 370 combat vessels, projected to reach 395 in 2025. In contrast, the US Navy's combat vessel count was estimated at around 293 as of October 1, 2025. While the US Navy's combat vessels hold an advantage over the Chinese navy in terms of size, displacement, and firepower, the widening gap in the number of naval combat vessels between the two countries by 2030 is considered a foregone conclusion. In response, the Maritime Strategy announced in April of last year mandated the submission of interagency collaboration plans by November, mobilizing all relevant government departments, demonstrating an intent to rebuild the foundation of the US maritime industry, naval power, and shipbuilding. The Golden Fleet concept, announced on December 22, reveals the specific combination of combat vessels the Trump administration intends to comprise the future US Navy.

President Trump has assessed that the Navy's current warship construction plan, which has focused on small, new warships, does not align with the direction of the Trump administration's strategy. He announced the Golden Fleet construction plan, comprising 20-25 next-generation destroyers with a displacement of 30,000 to 40,000 tons, and a larger number of frigates. Considering that the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the current mainstay of the US Navy, have a displacement of approximately 9,500 tons, these next-generation destroyers would be larger than any combat vessels the US Navy has possessed in the past 80 years, excluding aircraft carriers. These new Trump-class combat vessels, which the US aims to possess in quantities of 20-25, starting with two, are expected to be equipped not only with future weapons such as electromagnetic railguns and directed-energy lasers but also with cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles, and long-range missiles.

Reports from late October of last year indicated discussions between the White House and the Department of Defense regarding the construction of next-generation warships weighing 15,000 to 20,000 tons. However, the actual plan involves even larger and more powerful combat vessels as the mainstays of the Golden Fleet. President Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, which includes approximately $26 billion in funding for the construction of new warships, and stated ambitiously on December 22 that the new warships would be over 100 times more powerful than the existing Iowa-class battleships. However, given that follow-up actions to the Maritime Strategy, whose specific plans were due in November last year, have not yet been disclosed, and considering the resignations of high-ranking officials within the administration, the feasibility of the Golden Fleet concept remains uncertain. Debates among experts are ongoing regarding the realization of the Golden Fleet, focusing on cost, the alignment of vessel types with operational concepts, the capacity of the shipbuilding supply chain, and legal constraints represented by the Jones Act and the Burns-Tollefson Act.

3. Progress and Challenges of the MASGA Project

The Trump administration's Golden Fleet concept includes not only large new combat vessels like the Trump-class but also new frigates and numerous unmanned autonomous vessels. Proponents of the Golden Fleet concept view it as enabling various adaptations of hedge strategies, where the latest large new combat vessels serve as arsenal ships—a concept pursued by the Navy in the 1990s but unrealized due to congressional budget rejection—providing concentrated firepower support from the rear, while frigates, numerous unmanned vessels, submarines, and drones engage in coordinated group operations in the forward areas to maximize enemy losses. Conversely, critics of the Golden Fleet concept point to excessive cost increases and limitations in actual construction feasibility, arguing that since large-scale naval battles between major warships are not the core variable in modern maritime warfare, the utility of large combat vessels weighing 30-40,000 tons is questionable compared to the astronomical investment required, relative to the utility of current warships.

While it is difficult to definitively answer the questions regarding the realization of the Golden Fleet concept and its cost-effectiveness at this juncture, it can be seen as a positive development for South Korea's efforts to revitalize the MASGA project. South Korea has undertaken maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) for US auxiliary ships on several occasions. On October 26 last year, during the APEC summit in Gyeongju, HD Hyundai signed a Memorandum of Agreement with Huntington Ingalls, the largest US defense shipbuilder, concerning cooperation in the design and construction of merchant and naval vessels. This marks the first time a South Korean shipbuilding company has ventured into constructing US Navy vessels. The US Navy plans to select the final contractor, proceed with design, and commence construction in August 2027. Furthermore, President Trump's announcement that the US Navy would cooperate with South Korean companies like Hanwha, which owns the Philadelphia shipyard, for the construction of new frigates in the Golden Fleet concept provides an opportunity for the MASGA project to expand into the construction of auxiliary ships and combat vessels.

If South Korea's shipbuilding capabilities are utilized from the initial order of 12 merchant vessels at the Philadelphia shipyard, through the construction of US auxiliary ships, and further to combat vessels such as frigates, the MASGA project can contribute to the realization of the Golden Fleet concept, thereby expanding its scope. The MASGA project, pursued by our companies in cooperation with the US administration and Navy, is making significant progress. However, as can be anticipated, the challenges that the South Korean shipbuilding industry realistically faces are by no means small, commensurate with the potential progress of the MASGA project driven by the Golden Fleet concept. Firstly, it remains uncertain whether the Philadelphia shipyard, which has focused on merchant ship construction to date and lacks experience in warship construction, can acquire the capabilities to construct frigates within the planned timeframe, as promoted by President Trump.

Specifically, experts believe that factors such as the high wage structure in the United States, a shortage of skilled labor in warship manufacturing, a high-cost component supply chain, and the "Buy American Act," which stipulates that over 60-75% of the components of finished products sold to the federal government must be of US origin, will disadvantage South Korean companies operating in the US. For instance, components such as radars, sensors, weapons, and engines are manufactured by different companies, and the US supply chain, which has worsened since the pandemic, faces operational difficulties. The competitiveness of South Korea's shipbuilding industry lies in its ability to easily procure high-quality steel, engines, and components from South Korea at competitive prices. However, US-made steel, engines, and radars are expensive and slow to supply. Furthermore, South Korea's wage levels are about 60% of those in the US, and crucially, the workers at the Philadelphia shipyard are likely unfamiliar with the design and various components of frigates.

Moreover, South Korean companies like Hanwha, which have entered the US market to circumvent the regulations of the Jones Act and the Burns-Tolleson Act, now face the "Buy American Act" again. This means they encounter the same supply chain and labor issues for various warship components that would not have been a significant problem if built in South Korea. The US manufacturing supply chain has been in decline since the pandemic. Whether the construction of auxiliary ships or warships at US shipyards can be improved hinges on Hanwha's ability to overcome legal restrictions and effectively manage the shipbuilding supply chain. Considering these aspects comprehensively, although there is an urgent need to build frigates quickly, leading to the initial decision to entrust the construction to Hanwha's Philadelphia shipyard, no one can guarantee the construction speed that the Trump administration desires.

4. Presidential Waivers Bypassing Domestic Law: Implications from the ICE Pact and the Finnish Case

Like Hanwha, HD Hyundai has also expressed its commitment to supporting the MASGA project through various options, including acquiring local shipyards in the US to circumvent the regulations of the Jones Act and the Burns-Tolleson Act. However, even considering Hanwha's case prior to shipyard acquisition, the challenges to be overcome within the US are considerable. On the other hand, amidst the US-China maritime power transition, the Trump administration, aiming to expand its influence in the Western Hemisphere and enhance its control over Arctic shipping routes, has continued the Icebreakers Cooperation Effort (ICE) Pact signed in July 2024 with Canada and Finland. Recognizing the construction of polar icebreakers for the US Coast Guard in Finland as a critical national security interest, it exercised a presidential waiver for the Tollefson Act. The plan is to build four of the eleven Arctic Security Cutters in two Finnish shipyards and the remaining seven in US shipyards.

Following the summit between President Trump and Finnish President Alexander Stubb in October last year, a Memorandum and fact sheet from President Trump containing these details were released on the 8th and 9th concerning the ICE Pact's icebreaker construction plan. Although presidential waivers bypassing the Burns-Tolleson Act were legally provided for, historical precedents were rare. Therefore, the general interpretation was that situations qualifying for a presidential waiver as a national security interest would be very limited. In this context, the implications of the presidential waiver exercised for Finland last year are worth careful consideration. Firstly, the background for granting the presidential waiver to Finland includes the fact that China already operates five icebreakers in the Arctic region, whereas the US currently has only two operational icebreakers.

Furthermore, one of the two US icebreakers is an old vessel commissioned in 1976, and the other is a vessel converted from a merchant ship by the US Coast Guard in September last year. Considering that the US Coast Guard internally estimates a need for at least nine icebreakers to operate in the Arctic region for US security interests over the next year, it can be inferred that the decision was made that overseas construction of icebreakers is necessary to restore the US position in Arctic waters, including Greenland, in the short term. Additionally, as stated in the fact sheet, overseas icebreaker construction is intended to temporarily supplement the numerical disadvantage in icebreakers compared to China and Russia while the Coast Guard rebuilds the supply chain infrastructure for icebreaker manufacturing within the US, thereby promoting domestic shipbuilding infrastructure investment in the short term.

Strategically, it is important to consider that the US has been simultaneously pursuing the expansion of MASGA and cooperation with Canada and Finland on icebreaker construction through the ICE Pact since October last year. Ultimately, as discussed, the US likely felt a short-term need to build more icebreakers than China, given the unstoppable US-China maritime power transition and the priority of strengthening its position in the Western Hemisphere. Russia, operating the world's largest fleet of over 50 icebreakers, including eight nuclear-powered ones, is a constant factor rather than a variable. By using a presidential waiver, the speed of icebreaker construction can be rapidly increased. Therefore, the exercise of the waiver for Finland is largely a response to the expansion of China's icebreaker fleet and maritime influence within the Western Hemisphere. The icebreakers to be built in Finland are expected to be delivered in early 2028.

Of course, follow-up measures to the ICE Pact decided at the ministerial meeting in November last year include plans for US shipbuilding workers to learn technology at Finnish shipyards through US international shipbuilding research funding, and investments of $1 billion for Canadian shipbuilder Davie to acquire and modernize a shipyard in Texas, aiming to transition to domestic icebreaker manufacturing in the long term. However, for the MASGA and Golden Fleet plans, which encompass merchant ships, auxiliary ships, and combat vessels such as new frigates, and aim to rebuild the overall infrastructure and supply chain of the US shipbuilding industry in the long term, there is currently no significant tactical need to invoke a waiver and produce several vessels within two years. If the US-China maritime power transition unfolds more threateningly than anticipated in the coming years, the invocation of a waiver might be considered. However, devising manufacturing methods that bypass domestic law or pursuing MASGA through long-term lobbying of Congress and the administration remain the more realistic options for now.

5. MASGA and Nuclear-Powered Submarine Projects Surrounding the Korean Peninsula

A few days after the announcement of the Golden Fleet concept in the US, on Christmas Day last year, North Korea unveiled the full exterior of the 'nuclear-powered strategic cruise missile submarine' it announced was under construction. On March 8 of the same year, North Korea had released photos of the lower part of the nuclear-powered strategic cruise missile submarine through the Rodong Sinmun, following Kim Jong Un's on-site inspection of the shipbuilding project. The full exterior was revealed for the first time through the Rodong Sinmun this time. Rodong Sinmun claimed the submarine's displacement to be 8,700 tons, and the inclusion of the term 'strategic cruise missile' suggests it is equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) or submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) carrying nuclear warheads. Kim Jong Un, who provided on-site guidance for the construction project, made remarks that seemed to allude to the MASGA project, which saw progress around the time of the Gyeongju APEC summit in 2025, and the US-South Korea nuclear-powered submarine construction agreement proposed by President Lee Jae-myung and approved by President Trump.

Chairman Kim Jong Un referred to South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine construction plan as an agreement reached with Washington at Seoul's request, characterizing it as an aggressive act that severely infringes upon North Korea's safety and maritime sovereignty, and a security threat that must be countered. Although the South Korean government subsequently clarified multiple times that the nuclear-powered submarines would be built in South Korea, President Trump announced on social media that South Korea's nuclear-powered submarines would be built at the Philadelphia shipyard following the US-South Korea summit during the APEC period. This indicates that the MASGA project is likely to be linked to deeper security technology cooperation between the US and South Korea in the long term, extending beyond shipbuilding cooperation.

The exercise of presidential waivers in the process of pursuing the ICE Pact's icebreaker construction, and the US's proactive approval of South Korea's nuclear-powered submarine construction plan, are underpinned by the structurally changing maritime strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, South Korea needs to develop a long-term perspective to read the trends of the US-China maritime power transition in the process of pursuing the MASGA project and the nuclear-powered submarine project, and build political trust between the US and South Korea. A long-term perspective for understanding strategic needs and political trust built through security and shipbuilding cooperation can serve as a crucial foundation for overcoming technical constraints and various legal obstacles. ■

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■ Oh In-hwan_Senior Research Fellow, East Asia Institute (EAI); Lecturer, Seoul National University.

■ Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow

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