[International Politics in the Age of Artificial Intelligence] ⑤ North Korea's Discourse and Practice in Defense AI: Between China's 'Intelligentized Warfare' and Russia's 'Intelligentization of Warfare'

I. Introduction

In what ways do North Korea's military intelligentization efforts exhibit similarities and characteristics when viewed through the lens of China's and Russia's military AI discourse? As military innovation driven by artificial intelligence (AI) technology spreads globally, the possibility of pursuing military intelligentization in North Korea is increasing. These changes can be more clearly understood in terms of their nature and direction when examined through a comparative framework, such as that of China's and Russia's military AI discourse.

Amidst intensifying great power competition, military innovation strategies based on AI have emerged in the United States over the past decade and have spread to China and Russia. Initially, the U.S. announced its Third Offset Strategy in 2014, believing that competitors like China and Russia had significantly caught up in military technology, aiming to further solidify its technological superiority (Work 2021). The core of this strategy was to implement faster and more efficient combat capabilities based on algorithms by introducing AI software and hardware into U.S. combat systems, which subsequently became the primary model for military innovation (Gentile et al 2021, ix-x). Following this, China began mentioning the offset strategy just two months after the U.S. announcement in January 2015, proposed the concept of the intelligent domain in the 2017 revision of Strategic Studies (Yatsuzuka 2022), and officially acknowledged the emergence of intelligentized warfare in its defense white paper in 2019. China is expected to adapt U.S. military innovation to align with its own concept of system-countering warfare. Russia has also emphasized the introduction of AI into its military. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stressed the need to introduce AI into weapon systems in 2021, and interest in the intelligentization of the Russian military has intensified with the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022. Notably, interest in Russia's military intelligentization dates back to 2013, with the emergence of the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine.

North Korea, needing to counter the U.S.'s future algorithmic warfare, is highly likely to pursue its own military intelligentization by referencing the models of China and Russia in this context. In particular, North Korea has intensified its interest in drone warfare following its participation in the Russia-Ukraine war in 2024. Over the two years of 2024-2025, North Korea conducted four performance tests of kamikaze drones under the observation of Chairman Kim Jong Un. On each occasion, Chairman Kim ordered the mass production of these drones.[1] It is therefore time to systematically understand the future direction of North Korea's military intelligentization and to explore South Korea's response measures.

This paper focuses on the high probability that North Korea will reference the military AI discourse of its allies, China and Russia, in its pursuit of military intelligentization. It aims to categorize the military AI discourse of China and Russia and, based on this categorization, to position North Korea's approach to military intelligentization. Furthermore, based on this analysis, it seeks to explore South Korea's defense and diplomatic strategies to counter North Korea's military intelligentization.

This working paper posits that North Korea's military intelligentization is closer to the Russian model of 'intelligentization of warfare,' which selectively adopts AI based on tactical needs, rather than the Chinese model of 'intelligentized warfare' that aims for integration across the entire combat system. To support this argument, the paper categorizes the military intelligentization discourse of China and Russia along two axes: 'degree of integrated approach' and 'strategic utilization,' and discusses which category North Korea's discourse and AI application areas fall into.

II. China and Russia's Military Intelligentization

A. China's Military Intelligentization: Intelligentized Warfare

At the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2017, President Xi Jinping called for the comprehensive modernization of the military, stating that one of its components should be to 'accelerate the development of military intelligentization (加快军事智能化发展)'.[2]

Subsequently, at the 19th National People's Congress, Xu Qiliang, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, first mentioned the necessity of military intelligentization. This was also a result of increased interest in the ripple effects of AlphaGo's victory over Lee Sedol in Go in March 2016 within China.

In its 2019 defense white paper, China officially presented the concept of 'intelligentized warfare' for the first time, suggesting the need to prepare for it as the form of future warfare.[3]

“Amidst the ongoing new scientific and technological revolution and industrial revolution, cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum information, big data, cloud computing, and the Internet of Things are accelerating their application in the military domain, and the landscape of international military competition is undergoing historical changes. Key military technologies in information technology are developing daily, and the trend towards long-range precision, intelligence, stealth, and unmanned systems in weapons and equipment is becoming more pronounced. The transformation towards information-based warfare is accelerating, and intelligentized warfare is beginning to emerge.”[4]

In the past, China's strategic thinking on warfare evolved from traditional people's war to people's war under modern conditions during the Deng Xiaoping era. Under Jiang Zemin, the focus shifted to local wars rather than large-scale conflicts, leading to the development of the PLA's military construction direction towards local wars under high-tech conditions in 1993 and local wars under informationized warfare conditions in 2004. In this context, mentioning intelligentized warfare as a strategic guideline was equivalent to stating that intelligentized warfare would be the next phase of warfare to prepare for. However, by stating that intelligentized warfare was beginning to emerge (端倪) rather than having fully transitioned, it implied that a full-scale shift in defense strategy or the emergence of military doctrines for intelligentized warfare would take time. Around this time, Chinese military experts, even if positive about the concept of intelligentized warfare, predicted that its full realization would take another 30 years (Cai and Lu 2017).

Meanwhile, China's 2019 defense white paper also called for accelerating the development of military intelligentization.[5] This indicates that China has consistently emphasized the necessity of military intelligentization since 2017 (Yatsuzuka 2022, 24-25).

Furthermore, at the 20th Party Congress in 2022 (October 16-22), there were mentions of pursuing a more specific understanding of 'the characteristics and laws of intelligentized warfare,' suggesting that China had entered the stage of developing military theories and doctrines. Xi Jinping's work report at the 20th Party Congress, quoted below,[6]mentions 'adhering to the integrated development of mechanization, informationization, and intelligentization' in the 12th item regarding the centenary goal of military building, and in relation to strategy and tactics, it states the need to study 'the characteristics and laws of informationized and intelligentized warfare' to update military strategy and develop strategic and tactical approaches. This represents a step forward from the 2019 defense white paper's statement that the emergence of intelligentized warfare was beginning to be discerned. Also noteworthy was the directive to develop unmanned intelligent warfare capabilities as one of the military policy tasks.

“We must achieve the goals for the centenary of the founding of the People's Republic by the scheduled time and build the People's Liberation Army into a world-class force, which is a strategic requirement for building a modern socialist country in all respects. We must resolutely implement the Party's command of the armed forces in the new era and the military strategic guidelines for the new era, uphold the Party's absolute leadership over the People's Liberation Army, adhere to the principle of building a strong military politically, through reform, with science and technology, with talented personnel, and according to law, carry out struggle, combat readiness, and construction simultaneously, adhere to the integrated development of mechanization, informationization, and intelligentization, and accelerate the modernization of military theory, military organizational structure, military personnel, and weaponry and equipment, thereby enhancing strategic capabilities to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests, and effectively fulfill the mission and tasks of the People's Liberation Army in the new era. … (omitted) … We must comprehensively strengthen training and combat readiness and enhance the People's Liberation Army's ability to win wars. We must study the characteristics and laws of informationized and intelligentized warfare, accelerate the modernization of military strategic theory, and develop people's war strategy and tactics. We must build a robust strategic deterrence capability system, increase the proportion of capabilities in new domains and of new quality, accelerate the development of unmanned operational capabilities, and integrate the construction and operation of network information systems.”[7]

Around this time, it was also confirmed through materials that the concept of 'control of intelligence' (制智权) has emerged, reflecting changes in warfare due to intelligentized warfare. An article published in the PLA Daily in 2021 explained the changes in warfare brought about by intelligentization as changes in control, changes in victory theory, changes in operational forms, and changes in combat power generation mechanisms.[8]Intelligentized warfare is described as a form of warfare where control of the intelligent domain amplifies control in other domains; thus, losing control of the intelligent domain inevitably leads to the loss of control in other domains. Therefore, 'control of intelligence' is emerging as a crucial concept, akin to air superiority or sea control. Furthermore, in terms of victory theory, intelligence is becoming more important than firepower, maneuver, or information. Operational forms are also expected to gradually shift towards unmanned systems as the standard with the development of intelligentization. Moreover, the combat power generation mechanism is predicted to move towards self-learning of unmanned equipment as unmanned systems accumulate combat experience. Additionally, another article in the PLA Daily pointed out that to prepare for intelligentized warfare, training methods must also evolve into intelligent training, requiring the establishment of an environment that allows for training in the collaboration between human and machine intelligence.[9]

For reference, the intelligentized warfare discussed in China reflects the idea that the intelligent domain determines military strength (Yatsuzuka 2022). This means that through AI, information integration, rapid decision-making, 'smart' attack methods, and the intelligentization of operations across all domains, the intelligent domain becomes the determinant of military capability. In other words, while in informationized warfare, limitations in reconnaissance and monitoring were obstacles to enhancing military strength, in intelligentized warfare, these bottlenecks are resolved with the help of AI. Extensive information collected from land, sea, and air, as well as space, is rapidly processed, enabling multi-domain integrated strikes. Concurrently, decision-making speed is expected to improve with the assistance of cloud computing and AI. Furthermore, swarming cooperation of intelligentized weapons and 'smarter' attacks become possible. In such intelligentized warfare, intelligentization in all domains, including the cognitive, social, and cyber domains, can become the key factor determining victory or defeat.

Generally, Chinese experts understand intelligentized warfare as a more comprehensive form of integrated warfare compared to warfare in the information age, consisting of intelligentized weapons, related operational methods, and information systems, including IoT-based information systems. From this perspective, Fang Hongliang of the National Defense University of China explains intelligentized warfare as 'Intelligentized warfare is integrated warfare conducted using intelligentized weapons and related operational methods in the domains of land, sea, air, space, electromagnetic, cyber, and cognitive, supported by IoT information systems.'[10]China's perspective on intelligentized warfare is based on the view that intelligentized warfare is an evolution of informatized warfare, a modern form of warfare. While informatized warfare was a contest between systems, conducted through networks connecting reconnaissance, decision-making, and strike execution to precisely target specific physical objectives, intelligentized warfare is also an evolution of informatized warfare, conducted as a "system of systems," and thus carries the nature of a contest between systems. In this vein, China has been known to apply its existing network warfare methods to intelligentized warfare, with the intention of paralyzing the adversary's information networks and then destroying the adversary's fragmented military power through long-range strikes (Dahm 2020).

Finally, to pursue AI-based military innovation, China is encouraging R&D related to AI in research institutions within the People's Liberation Army and is pursuing a civil-military integration strategy (Kania 2021).[11]Accordingly, each service is developing unmanned weapon system platforms and exploring potential applications such as AI in wargame simulations and the intelligentization of command systems through institutions like the National Defense University and the National University of Defense Technology. Efforts are also being made to develop intelligentized weapons and unmanned systems through state-owned defense enterprises. In terms of civil-military integration, state-led investment funds have been established, and AI technology development applicable to both civilian and military domains is being promoted through science and technology funds or civil-military integration funds established in major university hubs like Peking University and Tsinghua University, and in key regional bases such as Shanghai, Tianjin, and Shenzhen. Within this trend, private companies are also participating in research on unmanned helicopters and naval vessels.

B. Russia's Military Intelligentization: The Intellectualization of Warfare

In introducing the discourse on military intelligentization, Russia, rather than China, revealed its concerns at an earlier stage. While China only began mentioning military intelligentization at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, in Russia, AI and intelligent weapon systems began to be recognized as key instruments of future warfare in an article by Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov on February 27, 2013 (Gerasimov 2016, 26). In his article, "The Value of Science in Foresight," Gerasimov analyzed the landscape of future warfare, including hybrid warfare, and identified research in the fields of military equipment automation and artificial intelligence as factors that could influence modern warfare. Subsequently, in 2014, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the "Creation of Prospective Military Robotics through 2025," presenting a roadmap for the development of ground, air, and sea robotic systems (Bendett 2023).

Russia's continued emphasis on defense AI thereafter was a call for the development of weapons incorporating AI elements in the military sphere. In December 2020, President Putin identified the development of weapons with AI elements as one of five priorities necessary to counter the United States and NATO. In 2021, Defense Minister Shoigu emphasized the need to introduce AI technology into weaponry. Russia's emphasis on military intelligentization has further expanded since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022. In November 2022, President Putin stressed that Russia's sovereignty and security depend on domestic AI R&D, and in November 2023, he not only mentioned the danger of Western AI monopoly but also, a month later, requested the introduction of AI-based weapons and robotic systems (Bendett 2024, 3).

Notably, the Russia-Ukraine war has spurred the argument within Russian military science that unmanned systems and human-unmanned collaboration will become the new standard of warfare. Senior Russian military officials and theorists do not view the Russia-Ukraine war as a fundamental change in the nature of warfare, nor do they believe it necessitates a radical revision of Russian military operational and strategic concepts. However, they emphasize that the utilization of advanced military technologies such as AI can be a solution to the military challenges posed by the emergence of advanced military technologies (Petersen et al. 2025, i).

However, Russia emphasizes human decision-making, and the role of AI in warfare is expected to be limited to a supporting one. While China emphasizes the concept of "intelligentized warfare," Russia emphasizes the concept of "intellectualization of warfare" (интеллектуализация войны). This discourse views the intellectualization of warfare as a natural evolution of digital combat technologies and systems, but explains that the role of AI is confined to data analysis and decision support (Bendett 2024, 6).

While China views the trend of AI-based military development from the perspective of integrated and joint operations, Russia views it from the perspective of non-joint operations, and is known to have an utilitarian and pragmatic approach, seeking military advantages through AI in specific missions and domains (Bendett et al. 2021, 63-74). Russia does not emphasize intellectualization as a characteristic of future warfare, unlike China's intelligentized warfare, and is more likely to selectively utilize AI within the framework of existing warfare methods to counter non-military means during crises or to achieve information superiority in the initial stages of conflict. Consequently, the military application of AI has been discussed for purposes such as manipulating public opinion and influence operations, undermining the functioning of democratic institutions, disrupting and disabling critical infrastructure, and creating chaos in political and social spheres.

More specifically, the application of military AI in Russia is expected to be active in the fields of electronic warfare, unmanned systems, and cyber warfare (Bendett et al. 2021). Firstly, the introduction of AI in electronic warfare is estimated to increase operational efficiency by approximately 40% in areas such as signal classification, data translation, and identification of critical signals. Furthermore, the application of AI to unmanned systems can increase their operational speed, endurance, and range, and enhance collaboration between humans and machines, as well as between machines. In the realm of cyber warfare, AI is also being utilized to enhance information warfare capabilities and achieve victory in cyber conflicts. Machine learning can be used for identifying cyber vulnerabilities, efficient spear-phishing, enhancing the stealth of cyber operations, and activating the automatic functions of malware. The autonomous malware 'Crashoverride' is known to have been used in cyberattacks against Ukraine in 2016.

The Russian military has also proposed new concepts for AI application following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war.[12]However, Russia's primary areas of AI application continue to focus on loitering munitions, aerial drones, robotics, information warfare, and cyber warfare (see Bendett 2024).

C. Types of Military Intelligentization in China and Russia

Paul Lushenko (2023) has categorized the adoption of AI-based military technologies based on two variables: the level of decision-making (tactical or strategic) and the type of supervision (machine supervision or human supervision). According to him, military AI that involves machine supervision for strategic-level decision-making is classified as 'AI-General,' while strategic-level decision-making under human supervision is termed Mosaic Warfare. Military AI exhibiting machine supervision at the tactical level is categorized as Minotaur Warfare, and tactical-level human supervision is reflected in the Centaur Warfighting method.

Distinguishing between China's and Russia's military AI utilization, focusing on the differences between the two countries, the following two criteria are useful in illustrating the divergence in their military intelligentization directions. First, it is whether warfare is seen as becoming a war between integrated systems due to the adoption of AI. China holds a positive view on this matter and aims to achieve the integration of various combat systems through AI. In contrast, Russia is relatively cautious or negative about the idea that warfare must be conducted in an integrated manner through AI, believing that it is sufficient to utilize AI selectively in necessary areas rather than fundamentally revising existing strategic and tactical concepts.

Second, it is the perspective on whether AI should be utilized at the strategic or tactical level. China holds a positive view, aiming for an application similar to an AI commander. Conversely, Russia is negative about using AI at the strategic level, emphasizing that military decision-making authority must always be exercised by humans. Based on these criteria, the characteristics of China's and Russia's military intelligentization can be summarized as follows:

<Table 1> Types of Military Intelligentization in China and Russia

III. North Korea's Military Intelligentization and Development Direction

A. Discourse on Military Intelligentization

North Korea's discourse on the application of artificial intelligence in the military domain began with the concept of intelligentization of armaments in 2013. The emphasis on unmanned and intelligentized systems in North Korea's defense capability building dates back to 2013. This indicates that North Korea was interested in the military application of AI a decade ago. In a speech commemorating the 53rd anniversary of Kim Jong-il's leadership in the military-first revolution on August 25, 2013, then-Workers' Party of Korea First Vice Chairman Kim Jong-un demanded of the defense industry sector: "We must produce more and higher quality "our-style" armaments that are intelligentized, lightweight, unmanned, and precision-guided."

In 2014-2015, the issues of intelligentization and unmanned systems were repeatedly mentioned in New Year's addresses, on-site military inspections, and Politburo meetings. First, in the 2014 New Year's address, the intelligentization of armaments was presented as one of the requirements for the defense industry sector: "lightweight, unmanned, intelligentized, and precision-guided." Subsequently, Kim Jong-un presented "lightweight, unmanned, intelligentized, and precision-guided" as criteria for evaluating weapon development, and the test launch of tactical ballistic missiles in June 2014 was cited as an achievement in realizing precision-guided, lightweight, unmanned, and intelligentized weapons.[13] Furthermore, a decision by the Workers' Party of Korea Politburo in February 2015 emphasized the need to develop armaments that are precision-guided, lightweight, unmanned, and intelligentized "in line with the demands of modern warfare." These statements indicate that North Korea recognized that modern warfare not only involves precision strikes but also requires lightweight, unmanned, and intelligentized weapons.

The discourse on the necessity of intelligentizing armaments continued in North Korea even in 2020. Various domestic reports suggest that the North Korean leadership and public were aware of the United States' active utilization of artificial intelligence in military development. This is evidenced by the introduction of trends in the development of unmanned underwater vehicles by the US in the Rodong Sinmun, citing anti-US media.[14]

Additionally, at the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in January 2021, Chairman Kim Jong-un set the goals for defense industry R&D as "intelligentization, precision-guidance, unmanned operation, high performance, and lightweighting of armaments."[15] However, prior to this point, Chairman Kim Jong-un had also imposed heavy strategic weapons development tasks on the defense sector, including the development of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, improved accuracy of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and diversification of nuclear delivery systems (hypersonic, solid-fuel, underwater). Therefore, it is highly likely that North Korea's capacity for large-scale investment in the military application of AI in the early 2020s was limited. Nevertheless, this was the first time Chairman Kim Jong-un prioritized intelligentization among the goals for advancing armaments. This subtle change in wording suggests a potential relative increase in the priority of introducing advanced science and technology in military construction compared to the past.

North Korea was also aware, to some extent, of China's discourse on intelligentized warfare occurring in close proximity. Unusually, it provided a nearly detailed introduction of Xi Jinping's report delivered at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2022, dedicating a full page to it.[16] Among the sections related to defense policy, the part mentioning intelligentized warfare was as follows:

<Table 2> Xi Jinping's Report at the 20th Congress of the CPC and Rodong Sinmun Coverage

Examining this, only the part about "accelerating the development of unmanned operational capabilities" from China's discourse on intelligentized warfare was directly translated and presented. However, the sections advocating for the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization, and the need to study the characteristics and laws of informatized and intelligentized warfare, were omitted. This suggests that North Korea was relatively passive in developing military theories and doctrines necessary for preparing for future warfare, such as intelligentized warfare, at that time in 2022. In other words, the key sentence in the report of the 20th CPC Congress calling for the study of the characteristics of intelligentized warfare was not introduced in Rodong Sinmun, and the subsequent statement "accelerate the modernization of military strategy theory" was presented as a concise expression of the need for "modernization of military theory." Nevertheless, the selective introduction of the part of the Chinese report urging the "development of unmanned intelligent operational capabilities" indicated that North Korea also shared a consensus on the necessity of introducing unmanned weapon systems.

However, about two years later, reflecting the global expansion of drone utilization, Chairman Kim Jong-un actively requested the development of related military theories and doctrines. In November 2024, while conducting on-site guidance for the performance testing of suicide drones, Kim Jong-un explained that drones have become essential means in the military field due to their low production costs and high military effectiveness, and demanded that "these objective changes urgently necessitate the renewal of many aspects of military theory, military practice, and military education," instructing the defense science and education sectors to promptly find ways to apply new tactics and strategies.[17] At that time, Kim Jong-un even described his stance as a "line" that combines unmanned systems with operational plans and doctrines.

Six months later, tactical comprehensive training by service branch, in which Kim Jong-un participated, incorporated training methods for drone warfare by special forces. North Korean media reported soldiers operating drones and individuals wearing ghillie suits, which are known to be useful for evading drone detection.[18] This was interpreted as sharing tactics learned from the Russia-Ukraine war within special forces units.[19]

This appears to be the result of North Korean forces being deployed to Russia, providing an opportunity to acquire tactics necessary for drone warfare. North Korean troops deployed in Russia were able to learn tactics such as the "three-person, one-team" approach to counter Ukrainian FPV drones and the use of jamming guns.[20] Reports that North Korea also deployed electronic warfare units to Russia[21] have also led to interpretations that it is showing additional interest in counter-drone operations and means.

In summary, North Korea introduced the discourse on weapon intelligentization around the same time Russia mentioned the intellectualization of warfare and has expanded its interest in modern drone warfare through the Russia-Ukraine war. This suggests that North Korea has been developing its discourse on military intelligentization under the influence of Russia's military intelligentization discourse, while considering the lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine war.

B. Areas of Military Application of Artificial Intelligence

Given Chairman Kim Jong-un's demands for precision-guidance, lightweighting, unmanned operation, and intelligentization of North Korea's defense industry since around 2013, it is plausible that North Korea's efforts to achieve these goals have existed since an early stage. In particular, the goals of intelligentization and unmanned operation directly point to the utilization of AI and unmanned systems.

1) Unmanned Surface Vessels

North Korea has prioritized the development of unmanned infiltration boats and their manned variants based on AI technology. First, in March 2013, Chairman Kim Jong-un referred to advanced combat equipment of Military Unit 1501 as "highly intelligentized weapons." This equipment, described as capable of "automatically performing all combat actions, including navigation and firing control," is presumed to be an unmanned infiltration boat.[22] Additionally, during on-site guidance for the maneuvering training of newly built warships in August 2013, Kim Jong-un mentioned that this warship, capable of "automatic navigation, automatic firing control, and simultaneous attack," was a "highly intelligentized warship."[23] During this on-site guidance, Kim Jong-un ordered that the level of intelligentization be further increased in future warship construction. In October 2013, during on-site guidance for the maneuvering training of new warships, Kim Jong-un again mentioned that "high levels of intelligentization and lightweighting have been realized in a short period."[24] The warship Kim Jong-un inspected at that time is known to be a wave-piercing infiltration boat incorporating stealth shaping technology, capable of high-speed navigation at 90 km/h. This infiltration boat is considered a manned variant of the unmanned infiltration boat exposed through the report of Chairman Kim Jong-un's visit to Military Unit 1501 on March 24, 2013.

2) Unmanned Submersibles

North Korea has been developing nuclear unmanned underwater attack drones, such as the 'Haeil,' in the field of unmanned submarines. The nuclear torpedo 'Haeil,' first tested by North Korea in March 2023, was reported to have reached its target after traveling submerged for approximately 59 hours in an '8' shaped trajectory as a nuclear unmanned underwater attack drone.[25] The Haeil series underwent additional tests in August 2023 (Haeil-2) and January 2024 (Haeil-5-23).[26] Furthermore, some foreign media reported that an order was issued in late August 2025 to prepare the Haeil nuclear unmanned underwater attack drone for operational deployment.[27] However, since carrying a nuclear warhead requires a large unmanned submarine and related navigation and communication capabilities, further verification is needed to determine if North Korea has actually acquired such capabilities.

3) Anti-ship Missiles

In North Korea's military sector, artificial intelligence technology could be used to enhance the performance of conventional weapons, such as improving accuracy. A prime example was anti-ship missiles. The Rodong Sinmun mentioned that an anti-ship missile tested in June 2015 accurately searched for and hit its target due to its intelligent functions.[28] The surface-to-surface anti-ship missile developed by North Korea during this period was the Kum Song-3, based on Russia's Kh-35. Therefore, as North Korea reverse-engineered the Kh-35 to develop the Kum Song-3, it may have begun to focus on guidance and seeker technologies, a form of intelligent technology, incorporated into modern cruise missiles. The Kh-35 is equipped with an active homing function that allows it to autonomously detect and track targets using a radar seeker during the terminal attack phase.[29] In the test launch of the Kum Song-3 conducted on June 8, 2017, North Korea not only released footage of the launch but also showed the missile hitting a target vessel.

<Figure 1> Launch of Kum Song-3 on February 8, 2015

Source: JoongAng Ilbo (2017. 6. 9.)

For reference, North Korea has been placing significant emphasis on the development of cruise missiles, including anti-ship missiles, since the mid-2020s, conducting continuous test launches. In this regard, it is presumed that intelligent technologies have been incorporated into the anti-ship missiles that North Korea has been developing in earnest since 2020.[30] North Korea launched the Kum Song-3 anti-ship missile via a ground-based launch system in Muncheon in April 2020 and in Oncheon in March 2021. In February 2024, it even test-launched a new surface-to-surface anti-ship missile called 'Bada Sori-6' (Sea Eagle-6).[31] Regarding the Bada Sori-6, North Korean media reported that the missile flew for 1,400 seconds and hit its target.

4) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

North Korea's commitment to the unmanned operation of its armament systems is also evident in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Firstly, during an on-site inspection of tank training on January 28, 2017, Kim Jong Un demanded progress in the modernization and unmanned operation of engineering reconnaissance equipment,[32] which is understood as a call for the development of unmanned reconnaissance drones.[33] Subsequently, North Korea's development of unmanned reconnaissance drones accelerated rapidly in the early 2020s. This was because the early development of unmanned reconnaissance drones was also a key focus of North Korea's Five-Year Weapons Development Plan (2021-2026). The Saebyeol-4 (Morning Star-4), shown in <Figure-1>, is North Korea's version of a high-altitude reconnaissance drone and was first unveiled at the Armament Equipment Exhibition-2023 on July 26, 2023. The following day, it participated in a pre-event ceremony for the 70th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, flying at a low altitude over the skies of Pyongyang. Experts speculate that North Korea may have produced it through technological cooperation with Iran (Dempsey 2023).

<Figure 2> Saebyeol-4

Source: JoongAng Ilbo (2025.4.2)

<Figure 3> Saebyeol-9

Source: Chosun Ilbo (2023.7.29)

While the actual high-resolution reconnaissance capabilities of these unmanned reconnaissance drones are important, North Korea has claimed that the Saebyeol-4 and Saebyeol-9 possess such capabilities. Approximately two years after the unveiling of the Saebyeol-4 and Saebyeol-9, on March 27, 2025, the Korean Central News Agency reported that Chairman Kim Jong Un visited the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Union and the Detection and Electronic Warfare Research Group, confirming that these drones possess "detection capabilities to track and monitor various strategic targets and enemy activities on land and at sea." Subsequently, in mid-May 2025, these unmanned reconnaissance drones were mobilized for demonstration flights.[34]

Among these, the Saebyeol-9 is a model that can be used as an attack drone. North Korea introduced the Saebyeol-9 as an attack drone to Defense Minister Shoigu during his visit in July 2023. As the US MQ-9 Reaper, which the Saebyeol-9 appears to emulate, is an armament system capable of attacking moving targets with precision-guided munitions,[35] it was speculated that North Korea's Saebyeol-9 could also be utilized for anti-tank attacks and targeted assassinations.[36] Furthermore, during Chairman Kim Jong Un's on-site inspection of the North Korean Air Force's anti-aircraft combat and air raid training in May 2025, North Korea revealed the formation flight of the Saebyeol-9. This suggests that the North Korean military is pursuing an expansion in the operational scale of its attack drones.[37]

Additionally, North Korea unveiled two small reconnaissance drones at the 'Defense Development-2024' armament exhibition in November 2024.[38] These tactical reconnaissance drones, one a fixed-wing reconnaissance type and the other a rotary-wing reconnaissance type, could be combined with future kamikaze drones to conduct ground drone warfare, detecting and attacking tanks and armored vehicles.

5) Kamikaze Drones

Kamikaze drones are the weapon system that North Korea has shown the most recent interest in. Among the 10 types of small military unmanned aerial vehicles unveiled at the "Defense Development-2024" armament exhibition in November 2024 were a manta ray-shaped UAV similar to Israel's Harop or Iran's Shahed drone, a cross-shaped UAV similar to Israel's Hero-400 or Russia's Lancet-3, a cross-shaped UAV similar to Israel's Hero-120 or Russia's Lancet-1, and a small cardboard-shaped drone that is difficult to detect by radar. In addition, three types of quadcopter UAVs were exhibited alongside these,[39] and these UAVs are also highly likely to be operated as low-cost strike assets, given that they can be equipped with grenades or anti-tank bombs and used for suicide attacks.

Notably, among these, North Korea has been intensively developing manta ray-shaped and cross-shaped UAVs similar to the Harop and Hero series (<Figure 3>, <Figure 4>). It is presumed that North Korea was able to acquire related UAV technology by disassembling kamikaze and reconnaissance drones gifted by the Russian side during the North Korea-Russia summit in September 2023. Indeed, since then, North Korea has conducted four performance tests of kamikaze drones in August 2024, November 2024, March 2025, and September 2025.

<Figure 4> On-site guidance by Kim Jong Un on August 24, 2024

<Figure 5> On-site guidance by Kim Jong Un on November 14, 2024

Subsequently, Kim Jong Un emphasized the need for intelligence in the development of kamikaze drones. During the first performance test of kamikaze drones in August 2024, Chairman Kim Jong Un ordered, "We must move towards actively introducing artificial intelligence technology in drone development."[40] The following year, during an on-site inspection of the defense science research projects of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Technology Union and the Detection and Electronic Warfare Research Group in late March 2025, after confirming the performance of new unmanned reconnaissance and kamikaze drones, he designated "artificial intelligence technology" as the top priority for military modernization, not just unmanned equipment.[41] Furthermore, in September 2025, he ordered the "advancement of artificial intelligence and operational capabilities of North Korea's unmanned armed equipment systems." Additionally, on September 18, 2025, Chairman Kim Jong Un approved measures to further expand the research and development functions of the Geumseong series kamikaze UAV technology union. In this regard, North Korea is expected to increase investment in drone-related technology development.

Moreover, at the 80th anniversary military parade celebrating the Party's founding in October 2025, North Korea unveiled a containerized drone launcher, signaling its preparations to operate kamikaze drones in large numbers in the future. Each launcher could hold six Harop-type drones.[42] These launchers signify North Korea's capability to operate drones in large quantities in future warfare and can also be interpreted as a move to apply the trend of containerization of weapon systems.[43]

<Figure 6> North Korea's Drone Launcher (October 2025)

Source: Kyunghyang Shinmun (2025. 10. 12).

6) Combat Simulation

As a trend in the military application of artificial intelligence that may expand in the future, movements to utilize artificial intelligence in wargames and combat simulations are also being observed. In 2022, an article on the development of reinforcement learning (RL)-based wargame simulations was published in the North Korean academic journal 'Information Science,' which was interpreted as an attempt to apply artificial intelligence technology to artillery fire simulation. Furthermore, by referencing the list of studies by Chinese researchers that North Korea has consulted, it is presumed that the North Korean military is also interested in developing artificial intelligence technology for air combat simulations (Kim 2024).[44]

7) Electronic Warfare and Cyber Warfare

Additionally, areas where North Korea may utilize artificial intelligence technology in the future include electronic warfare and cyber warfare. Firstly, North Korea has been introducing additional electronic warfare equipment and jamming devices against the backdrop of military cooperation with Russia since 2023. Even before that, North Korea imported electronic warfare equipment from Russia in the late 1990s and has attempted GPS jamming near the Military Demarcation Line since the 2010s. With the additional introduction of electronic warfare equipment since 2023, the frequency of North Korea's GPS jamming has surged, exceeding 1,100 instances in 2024.[45] Consequently, in February 2025, a mid-altitude unmanned reconnaissance aircraft of the South Korean military experienced anomalies due to North Korean GPS jamming and crashed in South Korean territory.[46] Furthermore, it is also known that North Korea intensively hacked South Korean electronic warfare equipment manufacturers in late 2024.[47] In the field of electronic warfare, if artificial intelligence is introduced, signal classification and identification can be performed more efficiently. Therefore, along with North Korea's interest, this can be considered an area where artificial intelligence technology may be introduced in the future.

Moreover, there is a possibility that North Korea will introduce artificial intelligence technology into cyber warfare and conduct AI-based cyber warfare. It is already known that North Korea attempted spear-phishing using images generated by deepfakes in July 2025.[48] Additionally, as artificial intelligence is expected to enhance the stealth and efficiency of phishing attacks, claims that preparations must be made for North Korea's AI-based cyber warfare are being raised by experts both domestically and internationally (see Lakhani 2025).

C. Direction of North Korea's Military Informatization

North Korea presented the issues of informatization and unmanned systems around 2013-2014, earlier than China raised the issue of military informatization in 2017. Considering this point, it is possible that North Korea's defense AI discourse has been influenced by Russia's 'informatization of war' discourse rather than China's discussion of informatized warfare. Russia began discussing the issue of the informatization of war due to the emergence of unmanned systems from early 2013, along with the Gerasimov Doctrine discussions. Influenced by these discussions, North Korea appears to have begun discussing the informatization and unmanned systems of weapon systems from around 2013. Furthermore, the need for changes in military theory and training due to the advent of AI and autonomous weapon systems was a phenomenon raised in late 2024, influenced by North Korea-Russia military cooperation and the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia, rather than a result of accepting China's discussion of informatized warfare.

Furthermore, when examining the application areas of artificial intelligence in the military field, North Korea is pursuing informatization not by integrating various systems, but in the form of introducing unmanned systems and incorporating artificial intelligence technology into specific areas. This is also similar to Russia's approach of selectively developing unmanned systems and artificial intelligence according to military necessity. As such, by examining the discourse and main application patterns of North Korea's military informatization, it can be said that North Korea's military informatization is closer to the Russian model than the Chinese model.

<Table 3> Types of North Korea's Military Informatization

IV. Conclusion

This paper compares the discourses on military informatization in China and Russia and, based on classifying these discourses into different types, analyzes which type North Korea's military informatization discourse and direction are closer to. The result is that North Korea is pursuing military informatization closer to the Russian model, considering the influence of the Russian discourse and North Korea's own various constraints, between China's model of reconstructing warfare through the concept of informatized warfare and Russia's model of pragmatically adopting artificial intelligence according to tactical needs.

In particular, North Korea is accelerating military informatization recently under the influence of North Korea-Russia military cooperation and the lessons learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War. In November 2024, Chairman Kim Jong Un demanded the renewal of military theory and training to meet new realities, and training methods for drone warfare were disseminated. In addition, it is possible that combat methods acquired by troops deployed to Russia are being propagated within the special operations forces. The development of unmanned systems has also been accelerated, expanding the introduction of artificial intelligence technology from conventional infiltration boats, submarines, and missiles to unmanned aerial vehicles and kamikaze drones. In the future, North Korea is expected to advance the artificial intelligence technology required for kamikaze drones while also establishing a mass production system.

In light of these prospects, there are three implications for South Korea. First, North Korea's military informatization is likely to proceed selectively, focusing on necessary areas, thus requiring responses to be meticulously designed on a sector-by-sector and tactical basis. Second, given the high probability that North Korea will reference Russia's military informatization, continuous exchange with analysis teams of the Russo-Ukrainian War in the United States, Europe, and Ukraine, as well as the establishment of institutionalized communication channels, is crucial. Lastly, considering that North Korea's military informatization in the fields of unmanned aerial vehicles and kamikaze drones may rapidly advance, it is necessary to pursue military innovation to counter North Korea's future high-low mix threats while systematically establishing the R&D, defense industry, and acquisition base to support this.■

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[1]KCNA. 2025. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Provided Guidance on National Defense Science Research Projects of the Drone Technology Union and the Detection and Electronic Warfare Research Group.” March 27.

[2]Xi Jinping. 2017. “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive to Win the Great Victory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era—Report at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.” Xinhua Net. October 27.

[3]State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. 2019. *China's National Defense in the New Era*. July. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-07/24/content_5414325.htm

[4]The original text is as follows:
“Driven by the new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation, frontier technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum information, big data, cloud computing, and the Internet of Things are being applied more rapidly in the military field, and the international military competition landscape is undergoing historical changes. Military high-tech with information technology as its core is developing rapidly, and the trend of weapons and equipment becoming long-range precise, intelligent, stealthy, and unmanned is becoming more obvious. The form of warfare is accelerating its evolution towards informatized warfare, and intelligentized warfare is beginning to emerge.” State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China 2019.

[5]In this regard, China's 2019 defense white paper stated: “The construction of national defense and the military in the new era must thoroughly implement Xi Jinping's thought on strengthening the army and Xi Jinping's military strategic thought, adhere to the goals of strengthening the army politically, reforming the army, strengthening the army through science and technology, and governing the army according to law, focus on being able to fight and win wars, promote the integrated development of mechanization and informatization, accelerate the development of military intelligence, build a modern military power system with Chinese characteristics, and improve and develop the socialist military system with Chinese characteristics, continuously enhance the ability to perform the mission and tasks of the new era (新时代中国国防和军队建设，深入贯彻习近平强军思想，深入贯彻习近平军事战略思想，坚持政治建军、改革强军、科技兴军、依法治军，聚焦能打仗、打胜仗，推动机械化信息化融合发展，加快军事智能化发展，构建中国特色现代军事力量体系，完善和发展中国特色社会主义军事制度，不断提高履行新时代使命任务的能力。).” State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China 2019. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-07/24/content_5414325.htm

[6]Xi Jinping. 2022. “Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects—Report at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.” Xinhua Net. October 25.

[7]The original text is as follows: “Achieving the goal of building a strong military in one hundred years on schedule and accelerating the building of the People's Army into a world-class military is a strategic requirement for building a modern socialist country in all respects. We must implement the Party's strong military thought for the new era and the military strategic guidelines for the new era, adhere to the absolute leadership of the Party over the People's Army, adhere to strengthening the army politically, reforming the army, strengthening the army through science and technology, strengthening the army through talent, and governing the army according to law, adhere to fighting, preparing for war, and building simultaneously, adhere to the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization, accelerate the modernization of military theory, military organizational forms, military personnel, and weapons and equipment, enhance the strategic capacity to defend national sovereignty, security, and development interests, and effectively fulfill the mission and tasks of the People's Army in the new era. … Comprehensively strengthen training and preparation for war, and improve the People's Army's ability to win wars. Study and grasp the characteristics and laws of informatized and intelligentized warfare, innovate military strategic guidance, and develop strategic and tactical approaches for people's war. Build a strong strategic deterrence system, increase the proportion of new domain and new-quality combat forces, accelerate the development of unmanned intelligent combat forces, and coordinate the construction and application of network information systems.”

[8]People's Liberation Army Daily. 2021. “Intelligence Brings New Changes to Warfare.” January 7.

[9]Zeng Haiqing. 2022. “The Intelligent Era Calls for Training to Transform Towards 'Intelligence’.” People's Liberation Army Daily. July 21.

[10]Xinhua, December 27, 2018; Pang Hongliang, *The Evolution and Conception of 21st Century Warfare: Intelligentized Warfare* (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2018), p. 84.

[11]Refer to Elsa B. Kania's research at https://www.andrewerickson.com/2021/06/the-elsa-kania-bookshelf-sino-american-competition-technological-futures-approaching-battlefield-singularity/

[12]Russian Federation. 2024. "Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain and its Implications for International Peace and Security."United Nations. Submitted pursuant to UN General Assembly resolution 79/239. December 24. https://docs-library.unoda.org/General_Assembly_First_Committee_-Eightieth_session_(2025)/79-239-RussianFed-en.pdf(Accessed: December 11, 2025)

[13]<Rodong Sinmun>. 2014. “Respected Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un Guided the Test Launch of Newly Developed Precision-Guided Tactical Guided Missiles at the Cutting-Edge Level.” June 27.

[14]Rodong Sinmun reported, “Meanwhile, the Venezuelan newspaper El Nacional revealed that the U.S. Navy is developing unmanned submarines using artificial intelligence technology.” <Rodong Sinmun>. 2020. “Exposing the U.S. Armed Equipment Modernization Scheme.” March 23.

[15]<Rodong Sinmun>. 2021. “A Great Program of Struggle Leading the Construction of Korean-Style Socialism to New Victories – On the Report Made by Respected Kim Jong Un at the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea.” January 9.

[16]<Rodong Sinmun>. 2022. “Report by Comrade Xi Jinping at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.” October 24.

[17]<KCNA>. 2024. “Respected Kim Jong Un Provided On-Site Guidance for the Performance Tests of Various Self-Destructing Attack Drones Produced by the Unmanned Aerial Technology Union.” November 15.

[18]It is known as a type of camouflage useful for concealment from drones.

[19]Kim, Ji-heon. 2025. “Kim Jong Un Observes Tactical Comprehensive Training… ‘Vital Mission is to Complete War Preparations.’” <Yonhap News>. May 14.

[20]Kim, Min-young. 2024. "North Korean tactics revealed: Drone warfare in Ukrainian skies."Korea JoongAng Daily. December 27. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-12-27/national/northKorea/North-Korean-soldiers-dronehunting-tactics-revealed-in-Kursk-notebook/2210369(Accessed: October 20, 2025)

[21]Hwang, Joo-young. 2025. "North Korea sends more troops to aid Russia in Ukraine: NIS."The Korea Herald. February 27. https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10430364(Accessed: October 20, 2025)

[22]Kim, Tae-hoon. 2015a. “[Exclusive Report] North Korea Claims Development of Unmanned Combat Vessels, ‘Drones of the Sea’.” January 9; Kim, Tae-hoon. 2015b. “Breaking Through Waves at 90 km/h… North Korea Deploys Secret Weapons in Combat.” January 8.

[23]<Rodong Sinmun>. 2013a. “Respected Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army Kim Jong Un Guided the Maneuver Training of Newly Constructed Warships.” August 25.

[24]<Rodong Sinmun>. 2013b. “Respected Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army Kim Jong Un Inspected Newly Constructed Warships and Guided Maneuver Training.” October 12.

[25]<Rodong Sinmun>. 2023. “Conducting Important Weapons Tests and Strategic Purpose Launch Training.” March 24.

[26]<Rodong Sinmun>. 2023. “Test of Underwater Strategic Weapon System Including Nuclear Unmanned Underwater Attack Vehicle ‘Hail-2’ Type.” April 8; <Rodong Sinmun>. 2024. “We Will Never Tolerate Reckless Military Confrontation Frenzy – Spokesperson Statement of the Ministry of National Defense of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” January 19.

[27]Jeong, Bong-oh. 2025. “‘North Korea Deploys Underwater Nuclear Drones on East Sea as Demonstration… Aims for ‘Radioactive Tsunami’ in South Korean Ports.’” <Donga Ilbo>. September 5.

[28]<Rodong Sinmun>. 2015. “Respected Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army Kim Jong Un Observed the Launch Training of New Anti-Ship Missiles Being Deployed to the Korean People’s Army Navy Units.” June 15.

[29]Kim, Min-seok. 2017. “North Korea’s New Surface-to-Surface Missile Imitating Russia.” <JoongAng Ilbo>. June 9.

[30]North Korea has conducted approximately 20 cruise missile tests since mid-2020.

[31]<Rodong Sinmun>. 2024. “Respected Kim Jong Un Guided the Verification Firing Test of the Surface-to-Surface Missile ‘Suryong-6’ Type.” February 15.

[32]<Rodong Sinmun>. 2017. “Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guided the Winter Doctrinal Attack Tactical Exercise of the ○○○ Tank and Armored Infantry Regiment.” January 28.

[33]Furthermore, during the test of a new anti-aircraft guided missile system on May 28, 2017, drones were utilized as one of the aerial targets. <Rodong Sinmun>. 2017. “Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Observed the Test Firing of the New Anti-Aircraft Interceptor Guided Missile System Organized by the National Defense Science Institute.” May 28.

[34]<Rodong Sinmun>. 2017. “Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Observed the Test Firing of the New Anti-Aircraft Interceptor Guided Missile System Organized by the National Defense Science Institute.” May 28.

[35]Air Force. 2025. "MQ-9 Reaper."U.S. Air Force. January. https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper/(Accessed: October 20, 2025)

[36]The Saebyeol-4 type is widely believed to be a weapon system modeled after the U.S. RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, and the Saebyeol-9 type is modeled after the MQ-9 Reaper (Dempsey 2023).

[37]Kwon Yun-hee. 2025. “‘North Korea Achieved What South Korea Couldn’t’…Kim Jong Un’s Arrogance and Putin’s Backing.” <Seoul Shinmun>. May 18.

[38]<Military World>. 2024. “In-depth Analysis of North Korea’s Hwasong-19 Type, New Tanks, Drones, etc. Appearing at the 2024 Defense Exhibition.” November 25.

[39]Shin Dae-won. 2024. “North Korea’s ‘NK Defense Industry’ Sales…From Cardboard Drones to ICBMs [Shin Dae-won’s Military Flix].” <Herald Business>. November 23.

[40]<Korean Central News Agency>. 2024. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Provided On-Site Guidance for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Performance Tests Organized by the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Research Institute of the National Defense Science Institute.” August 26.

[41]<Korean Central News Agency>. 2025. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Provided Guidance for the Defense Science Research Projects of the Unmanned Aerial Technology Joint Enterprise and the Detection Electronic Warfare Research Group.” March 27.

[42]Kwak Hee-yang. 2025. “North Korea’s New Weapons Appearing at Military Parades…‘Hwasong-20 Type’ and Drone Launchers.” <Kyunghyang Shinmun>. October 12.

[43]With the advancement of surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and drone technology, the value of weapon platforms such as fighter jets and warships, which can operate a large number of precision-guided munitions, is expected to decrease in the future. Even if a large number of drones or missiles need to be transported to the launch point, it is sufficient to containerize them for covert transport. Accordingly, the containerization of weapon systems has become a trend in advanced weapons development. Hammes, T. X. 2018. "America is Well Within Range of a Big Surprise, So Why Can't It See?" War on the Rocks. March 12. https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/america(Accessed: October 20, 2025)

[44]According to Kim Hyuk, the Chinese research cited by North Korea is as follows. Huang, Qiwang and Weiping Wang. 2015. "Adaptive Human Behavior Modeling for Air Combat Simulation." 2015 IEEE/ACM 19th International Symposium on Distributed Simulation and Real Time Applications (DS-RT). October 14-16. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7395921/metrics#metrics(Accessed: October 20, 2025)

[45]From January to November 13, 2024, North Korea engaged in a total of 1,157 GPS jamming incidents, significantly exceeding the 715 incidents recorded in 2016, a year when North Korean GPS jamming was at a high level. Bae So-young. 2024. “North Korean GPS Radio Wave Jamming Exceeds 7,000 Cases This Year.” <Segye Ilbo>. November 17.

[46]Kim Ye-won. 2025. “Military Enhances ‘Anti-Jamming’ Capabilities Against North Korean GPS Radio Wave Jamming.” <News1>. February 28.

[47]Yang Nak-kyu. 2024. “North Korea Concentrates on Hacking Electronic Warfare Equipment [Yang Nak-kyu’s Defence Club].” <Asia Economy>. August 10.

[48]Cho Jae-hak. 2025. “North Korean Hacking Group Creates Deepfake Military Official ID for Cyber Attacks.” <Electronic Times>. September 15.

■ Author: Lee Jung-gu_Senior Researcher, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

■ Responsible Editor: Lim Jae-hyun_EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhim@eai.or.kr