[New Year Special Commentary Series] ④ China's Diplomacy in 2026: Expectations for a Multipolar World Order and Active Pursuit of Expanded Global Role

I. A Changed Perception of International Affairs: A Multipolar World Order and China's Five Global Roles

Following 2025, China perceives 2026 as a historical watershed moment for the transformation of the international order. The Xi Jinping administration views the most prominent characteristic of this period as the decline of a unipolar hegemonic system, which has lost international support, and the full emergence of a multipolar world.

At the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, held for the first time in five years at the end of 2023, the Xi Jinping administration presented 'multipolarization of the world and economic globalization' as key foreign policy tasks and objectives, and has consistently emphasized them. In early 2025, with the potential launch of a second Trump administration, China anticipated and was wary of strong pressure and offensive actions from the United States against China. However, as the US-China relationship experienced rough confrontations over trade issues during the second Trump administration, China's concerns about the US gradually weakened, and it appears to have gained confidence in its relationship with the US starting from the US-China summit in Busan in October 2025. Extending this trend, the Xi Jinping administration assesses that the multipolarization of the world it has pursued has also made considerable progress.

Nevertheless, the Xi Jinping administration still views the current international landscape as a complex mix of various challenges and risks. In particular, China assesses that international trade norms have been destroyed and economic globalization has been severely damaged by US tariff policies. Furthermore, it is concerned that geopolitical instability is continuously spreading, with localized conflicts and border clashes occurring more frequently than at any other time in history since World War II.

However, on the other hand, the Xi Jinping administration looks back on 2025 as a year of considerable diplomatic achievements. It openly expresses confidence, assessing that China's capabilities have been fully demonstrated and its role has been expanded in the international community. Foreign Minister Wang Yi states that China's international influence (国际影响力), innovative leadership (创新引领力), and moral appeal (道义感召力) have significantly improved.[1]

In other words, the Xi Jinping administration argues that amidst increasing uncertainty and instability in international affairs, China's capabilities and role in the international community are actually growing and becoming more prominent and important. Despite severe damage to economic globalization, it claims that the resilience of the world economy remains, with the vitality and stability of the Chinese economy at its core.

China is highlighting its capabilities and new roles in the international community in 2025 and 2026. In 2025, it presented five major international capacities – peace, unity, openness, justice, and inclusiveness – and showcased diplomatic achievements based on these. In 2026, in a more evolved form, it has detailed the leading roles China has played in the international community, categorizing them into five types. For example, it asserts that amidst turbulent global affairs, China acts as an 'anchor of stability' (稳定锚), a 'strong backbone' (主心骨) in the new surrounding environment, a 'guiding star' (定盘星) for the changing international order, an 'engine of growth' (主引擎) driving global economic development, and a 'counterweight' (压舱石) in times of international moral crisis.

Representative examples of China's leading roles presented include hosting the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Forum Ministerial Meeting in May 2025, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit in Tianjin in August, the Victory Day celebrations in September, the China-Central Asia Summit, the expanded BRICS Summit, and mediating the Cambodia-Thailand conflict. Most notably, it claims to have created a new paradigm of interaction in US-China relations by pursuing a response strategy that combines strong struggle with dialogue against US tariff pressure. China does not hide its expectation that although uncertainty and chaos in international affairs will continue in 2026, the US role will diminish and its hegemonic status will weaken. Based on the significant diplomatic achievements and confidence gained in 2025, China reveals its intention to seize the opportunity to strengthen its leadership in the international community by more actively and proactively exploiting the vacuum created by the United States, unlike before.

Internally, China recognizes 2026 as a crucial year when the '15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030)' officially begins, aligning a new phase of domestic economic development with external strategic demands. The Xi Jinping administration fundamentally aims to achieve the mid- to long-term development goal of building a strong socialist modernized country by 2035. Therefore, China faces the reality of needing to concentrate its diplomatic efforts on creating an international environment and conditions conducive to domestic development amidst global economic instability. However, it also grapples with the strategic consideration of not missing the golden opportunity to expand China's influence and leadership in the international community during this historical transition period of the decline of the unipolar order, which is occurring once in a century.

II. Pioneering a New Horizon for Chinese Great Power Diplomacy: A Duet of Building a Modernized Power and Strengthening Global Leadership

Every year, Foreign Minister Wang Yi has summarized the year's diplomatic achievements and announced the key diplomatic tasks for the following year at the 'Seminar on International Situation and China's Diplomacy.' The speech delivered on December 30, 2025, presents a distinctly different message from the outset with the title, 'Pioneering a New Realm of Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics in a Period of Historic Transition.'

Foreign Minister Wang Yi has outlined seven key diplomatic tasks for China in 2026. First, providing strategic support for national development and rejuvenation, specifically, robust diplomatic support for the '15th Five-Year Plan.' Second, establishing a new paradigm of interaction in major power relations, particularly with the United States. Third, building a community of shared future for surrounding regions. Fourth, promoting joint modernization with the Global South. Fifth, expanding global openness and cooperation. Sixth, reforming global governance. Seventh, safeguarding national interests.

On the surface, the seven diplomatic tasks appear to maintain the existing diplomatic framework. However, upon closer examination of the specific details and content, one can discern a trend towards seeking a new shift in diplomatic strategy by the Xi Jinping administration. Since coming to power, the Xi Jinping administration has consistently maintained a diplomatic strategy of firm struggle on core interests, such as the Taiwan issue, while fundamentally pursuing low-cost, stable international relations to focus on domestic development. However, as it has gained confidence in the expansion of China's role in the international community through 2025, China now seeks to simultaneously pursue the construction of a modernized power with Chinese characteristics and actively secure strategic initiative amidst the chaos and intense international competition of the international order.

In his year-end speech for 2025, Minister Wang repeatedly emphasized 'initiative' more than ever before, using phrases such as 'strengthening historical initiative,' 'securing strategic initiative in fierce international competition,' and 'enhancing political standing in the international community.' This suggests that China is seeking to enter a new phase of great power diplomacy, actively expanding its global influence and leadership during this historical transition period of multipolarization.

Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, a wide array of diplomatic rhetoric and discourse has been presented, to the point of being considered excessive, yet debates about their feasibility and specificity have persisted. Wang Yi's 2025 speech also shows an intention to translate discourse into concrete policies and strategies. For example, the ambiguous concept of a community of shared future, which has been consistently emphasized, has been structured with concrete goals for neighboring diplomacy, namely the 'Five Homes' (五大家园) – peace, security, prosperity, beauty, and friendship. Based on this, China demonstrates policy intentions to realize integrated development with neighboring countries by strengthening economic cooperation through RCEP and accelerating the early implementation of 'China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) 3.0.'

1. Launch of the 15th Five-Year Plan and Diplomatic Tasks

China defines the period of the 15th Five-Year Plan as a 'crucial period for laying the foundation and fully exerting efforts to basically achieve socialist modernization.' The 15th Five-Year Plan carries significant political implications different from previous five-year plans. It not only serves as a gauge for laying the foundation for the goal of building a modernized power by 2035 but also can be used as a crucial justification for President Xi Jinping's potential pursuit of a fifth term beyond a fourth, thus carrying the critical task of achieving tangible results. Therefore, as the inaugural year of the '15th Five-Year Plan' in 2026, the Xi Jinping administration will prioritize and intensively support diplomatic and economic policies focused on breakthroughs in core technologies for high-quality development.

China judges that strategic competition with the United States is likely to continue and intensify in the long term. In preparation for this, the 15th Five-Year Plan clearly indicates that the focus of economic policy for the next five years will be on the qualitative upgrading of manufacturing and strengthening technological self-reliance. China anticipates that the development of 'new quality productive forces' (新质生产力), such as artificial intelligence (AI), smart manufacturing, and green energy, will be a key variable determining China's external competitiveness. Beyond mere economic policy, China has set the important diplomatic task of responding to technological blockades by the West, including the United States, and redefining China's position in the global value chain.

Notably, at the 4th Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, 'national defense capabilities' and 'international influence' were newly added as leapfrog goals to the long-term vision for 2035. This effectively signals China's intention to transition into a comprehensive great power with both military strength and global influence in the long run. In essence, China is actively revealing its intention to design and lead the international order and US-China relations to its advantage according to the internal development plan and timeline of the '15th Five-Year Plan,' moving beyond the stage of withstanding external pressure.

However, while the 15th Five-Year Plan contains ambitious goals and a strong will to implement them, as it is directly linked to the stability of the Xi Jinping regime, it still faces numerous obstacles in reality. Internally, structural reforms and revitalization of the Chinese economy are necessary, and externally, there are challenges in overcoming technological controls by the West, including the United States. China will focus its diplomatic efforts on the success of the 15th Five-Year Plan, but conversely, if the plan does not proceed successfully, it could lead to the constraint of the new great power diplomacy that China seeks to pursue.

2. Reforming Global Governance and Leading Norms in Future Advanced Domains

The reform of global governance is a key area where China is focusing its efforts to pioneer a new horizon for great power diplomacy. Since coming to power, the Xi Jinping administration has consistently advocated for global governance reform, but it is difficult to say that concrete reforms beyond discourse have been actively pursued. However, China is now expressing its intention to go beyond reforming the global governance system and to build and lead specific governance systems in various domains.

China posits that it will continue its role as a guardian and builder of the existing international system in 2026. At the same time, it is presenting a plan to practice 'true multilateralism,' effectively targeting the United States, and is also expressing its will to build and lead governance systems by proposing the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), emphasizing the authority and status of the United Nations. For example, China officially launched the International Mediation Center (国际调解院), the first intergovernmental international organization for resolving international disputes through mediation, on May 30, 2025, and its founding agreement entered into force on August 29. The International Mediation Center aims for the peaceful resolution of international disputes and cooperation among 'Global South' countries, led by China.

Furthermore, it is attempting to lead norms in future advanced fields, which are governance blind spots. Specifically, it is concretizing its intention to secure leadership in industrial standards and norms within future advanced industrial areas such as artificial intelligence (AI), the digital economy, and green low-carbon development. In his speech at the opening ceremony of the 2025 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) held at the Shanghai Expo Center on July [Date], 2025, Chinese Premier Li Qiang emphasized, 'China is willing to use its development experience and technology to enhance the technological capabilities of countries around the world, especially the Global South.'[2] China has also actually proposed the establishment of the 'World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (世界人工智能合作组织).' Through this, it claims to be striving to enhance the AI capabilities of the Global South and resolve the 'digital divide.' Concurrently, China is targeting the United States, which effectively controls the export of AI technology and high-performance semiconductors, and seeks to garner support for China centered around countries in the Global South.

3. Promoting Joint Modernization with the Global South and Expanding Global Leadership

China's diplomacy towards the Global South is also evolving towards seeking concrete cooperation measures. While China previously emphasized solidarity by asserting its status as a member of the Global South, its diplomatic rhetoric was central. Now, it is proposing joint modernization with the Global South and presenting practical and concrete economic incentives. For instance, 2026 marks the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Africa, and China plans to promote the 'African Modernization Cooperation Support Initiative,' accelerate the signing of Economic Partnership Agreements (经济伙伴关系协定) for joint development with African countries, and expedite the implementation of a 'zero tariff' policy for Africa.

China asserts that modernization does not mean Westernization, and seeks to link its support for modernization in the Global South to the structuring of Chinese influence through the transplantation of the so-called Chinese development model. Furthermore, China is attempting to actively utilize the Global South to expand its leadership in global governance. China considers BRICS an important platform for cooperation with the Global South, supports the expansion and strengthening of the BRICS mechanism, and intends to actively utilize BRICS countries as partners in promoting multipolarization. To counter value-based diplomacy centered on the West, China is presenting a pragmatic alternative model of 'common development' and 'shared modernization' to the Global South.

III. China Seeks a New Paradigm in US-China Relations

1. US Strategy and a New Conception of Relations

It is no exaggeration to say that the discussion of pioneering a new horizon for great power diplomacy is, in fact, focused on diplomacy with the United States. Indeed, the success of the first task proposed by Foreign Minister Wang, the 15th Five-Year Plan, will be a key variable in the relationship with the United States. The remaining five diplomatic tasks, excluding the second task concerning US relations, are also essentially part of a diplomatic strategy towards the US, even if not explicitly naming the US. That is, China is pursuing a community of shared future for surrounding regions, leading global governance reform, proposing modernization solidarity with the Global South, emphasizing openness and economic globalization, and safeguarding national interests, all while simultaneously responding to and engaging in dialogue with the US in the short term and preparing for strategic competition with the US in the medium to long term. In other words, the seven diplomatic tasks are organically linked and interact, effectively constituting a diplomatic strategy towards the US. In essence, the Xi Jinping administration's endeavor to pioneer a new horizon for great power diplomacy signifies its attempt to seek new approaches and initiatives in its strategy towards the US and in US-China relations.

The most significant challenge and variable in China's diplomacy in 2025 was the launch of a second Trump administration. The Xi Jinping administration harbored strong concerns and vigilance regarding the complex challenges, uncertainties, and instability that would result from the launch of a second Trump administration. China repeatedly emphasized the existing three principles of US-China relations – mutual respect (相互尊重), peaceful coexistence (和平共处), and win-win cooperation (合作共赢) – while simultaneously presenting four 'red lines,' thereby declaring a firm stance of absolutely no compromise or concession on issues concerning US pressure and offense against China, particularly regarding its system, right to development, democracy and human rights, and Taiwan.

In the first half of 2025, tensions in US-China relations persisted due to the US imposition of 'reciprocal tariffs' and strengthened export controls, followed by strong countermeasures from China. However, after intense conflict and confrontation, the two countries entered a new phase, seeking compromise more quickly than anticipated. Five rounds of tariff negotiations between the US and China were held starting in May, and a summit was finally held in Busan on October 30, 2025. The leaders of both countries agreed to a provisional suspension of tariffs and export controls at this meeting.

Notably, the Taiwan issue, which China had been most wary of and prepared to respond to resolutely, did not emerge as the biggest point of contention between the US and China, contrary to expectations. While President Trump exerted strong tariff pressure on China, he maintained an unexpectedly cautious stance on the Taiwan issue, unlike during his first term. In particular, the planned transit of Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te through the United States in early August for a visit to diplomatic allies in Central and South America was suddenly canceled. It was reported that the Trump administration denied Lai's transit through New York. Traditionally, Taiwanese presidents have actively utilized transit through the US to engage in informal political exchanges with high-ranking US officials during their tours of Central and South America. Consequently, it is understood that the Trump administration's denial was a consideration to avoid provoking China ahead of the ongoing tariff negotiations and the upcoming summit.

Through this process, China appears to have somewhat alleviated its concerns and vigilance regarding the uncertainties of a second Trump administration. With reciprocal visits and summits between the leaders of the two countries anticipated in Beijing in early 2026 and in Washington in the latter half of the year, the possibility of seeking compromise through dialogue rather than confrontation is being raised. China has not mentioned the so-called 'five noes' and four red lines that it raised towards the US in 2023 and 2024. The Xi Jinping government, which previously responded strongly by presenting red lines, is now proposing the establishment of a new relationship model through interaction with the US.

2. Implications and Constraints of the New US-China Relations Paradigm

Foreign Minister Wang Yi argues that a more effective path must be forged to pioneer new avenues for major power relations. In other words, China is demonstrating its intention to establish a new, stable relationship model that goes beyond merely managing the conflict in US-China relations. However, China has not provided specific details on how or in what manner it intends to build this stable new relationship. The possibility that it may be a discourse of a similar nature to the previously mentioned 'new model of major power relations' or 'new type of international relations' cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, given that the Xi Jinping government is presenting a new direction for its diplomacy with the US under the premise of opening new horizons for major power diplomacy at a historical turning point, its concrete actions in 2026 warrant close attention.

The new US-China relations paradigm envisioned by China is still in the exploratory stage, so its background and intentions are not entirely clear. However, two distinct possibilities can be considered. First, it is possible that changes in China's recent perception and judgment of the international situation are reflected. That is, the judgment that a historic transformation is underway in international affairs, underpinned by the decline of the US-led unipolar system. China may have concluded that it needs to redefine its relationship with the US within the context of the new international order moving towards multipolarity.

Indeed, as mentioned earlier, China is leading reforms in global governance to strengthen the multipolar order and is reinforcing practical solidarity with Global South countries. In other words, the plan is to actively seize the opportunity presented by the decline of US hegemony to enhance China's international influence and leadership, thereby establishing a new balance of power with the US. Recent Chinese domestic media have repeatedly reported on the US's failure to control natural disasters, political disorder, ridicule of its leaders, dissatisfaction among allies, and weakening global influence, portraying the US as a country of chaos, decline, and incompetence, thereby constructing a narrative of 'systemic decay.' Conversely, China is presented as a stable and rational alternative great power, which serves to strengthen domestic support and highlight the superiority of the Chinese system.

However, while these endeavors by China may help to consolidate its internal system and boost national pride, they also risk overinflating internal expectations and excessively provoking the US, potentially leading to an intensification of the strategic competition that China seeks to circumvent. Particularly given that the US, despite its hegemonic decline, still holds overwhelming advantages in military power and advanced technology, a realistic approach for China would be to gradually and cautiously expand its influence within a long-term strategic framework.

Second, it is also possible that considerations of China's domestic political and economic situation are actively reflected in its strategy towards the US. President Xi Jinping is seeking a long-term rule of at least four consecutive terms, and the success or failure of the 15.5 Five-Year Plan, which commences this year, is crucial in this regard. Therefore, from President Xi's perspective, there may be an intention to stabilize the relationship with the US, at least tactically, by delaying or circumventing full-scale strategic competition with the US for the next five to ten years. The success or failure of the 15.5 Five-Year Plan is a critical variable that could significantly impact Xi Jinping's long-term rule. To achieve high-quality development and yield results as envisioned in the 15.5 Five-Year Plan, it is necessary to find a new approach, not only by overcoming US technological controls but also by avoiding strategic competition with the US as much as possible. In this scenario, China would appropriately respond to the economic transactions desired by the Trump administration, actively seek compromise, and secure stable time for building a modernized great power. However, if the Trump administration does not reciprocate and expands the scope of competition to advanced technology and military fields where the US holds a relative advantage, it will not be easy for China to circumvent this.

In conclusion, the new stabilization model for US-China relations newly proposed by the Xi Jinping government, regardless of the scenario, is inherently vulnerable to the unpredictable and provocative policies of the Trump administration. This suggests that the Xi Jinping government is contemplating a critical strategic choice at a historical crossroads. That is, whether to adhere to the existing gradual expansion strategy, focusing on regime stability and development while framing the strategic competition with the US as a long-term race, or to actively seize the opportunity, judging that the decline of US unipolarity is proceeding faster than expected, and focus more on strengthening China's global leadership.

IV. Tasks for Restoring ROK-China Relations

Not only have ROK-China summit talks been held twice in two months, but a state visit was also abruptly arranged at the very beginning of the new year. This is a highly unusual occurrence but serves as a positive signal demonstrating the strong will of both the ROK and Chinese governments to restore relations. Currently, ROK-China relations face complex challenges and stand at a critical juncture requiring a new framework. ROK-China relations have been stagnant since the THAAD conflict in 2016, having been in their worst state and lacking momentum for recovery for nearly a decade. There was a growing concern that the two neighboring countries might fall into a chronic state of conflict. Given the highly unstable and uncertain domestic situations in both the ROK and China, as well as the surrounding international environment, an attempt to restore bilateral relations is necessary. President Lee Jae-myung has emphasized that this year marks the 'First Year of Full Restoration of ROK-China Relations,' underscoring the urgency and importance of this endeavor. However, numerous structural challenges must be overcome for ROK-China relations to be restored. In particular, as China shows new movements to strengthen its initiative in its relationship with the US amid expectations of progress towards a multipolar international order, ROK-China relations are likely to become increasingly vulnerable to the influence of US-China strategic competition. Now that both countries have confirmed their will to restore relations, it is time to prioritize and systematically prepare for the challenges ahead.

The consecutive summit meetings not only demonstrated a strong will to restore relations but also reaffirmed the existence of a strategic 'dreaming of different dreams' with mutually divergent expectations and demands. President Xi Jinping, following the previous summit, once again emphasized 'opposition to protectionism and the practice of true multilateralism.' He even went a step further this time, urging that 'we must stand firmly on the right side of history and make the right strategic choices.' This clearly reiterated China's expectations and demands of South Korea. President Lee Jae-myung, albeit indirectly, requested China's role in North Korean issues. While South Korea's summit agenda focused on the Korean Peninsula issues, including North Korea, it was also an occasion to reaffirm China's strategic expectations and interests concerning South Korea within the context of US-China relations.

The North Korean and US factors, which have consistently been the biggest variables in ROK-China relations over the past 34 years, have once again surfaced as divergent demands from both countries. Although there are clear limitations, the first step towards restoring bilateral relations must begin with frankly placing the mutually divergent expectations and demands on the table and accurately understanding and grasping them. The crucial aspect is to identify the appropriate boundaries of what can be accepted regarding each other's demands and expectations and to enhance mutual understanding. China's demands and expectations of South Korea are clear: South Korea should not excessively lean towards the US in the context of intensifying US-China strategic competition. If the Trump administration exerts various demands and pressures on South Korea to contain China within the Taiwan Strait and the first island chain, it will be difficult for South Korea to restore relations with China as expected, and there is a risk that conflicts and misunderstandings could be amplified in the current absence of dialogue and communication between the ROK and China. Historically, ROK-China issues have often been addressed only after they arise, leading to belated attempts at consultation. As a result, the situation has escalated beyond the bilateral scope, making resolution difficult. Therefore, it is necessary for the ROK and China to maintain continuous and close strategic dialogue to gain a clearer understanding of each other's maximum expectations and minimum red lines. This will enable both countries to prevent and manage the deterioration of the situation caused by external variables.

Furthermore, if South Korea requests a 'constructive' role from China on the North Korean issue, it is essential to first accurately understand what China means by 'constructive role' and whether it aligns with the role expected by the South Korean government. It is also necessary to accurately grasp the implications of China's recent series of attitude changes towards North Korea's nuclear program and its planned responses to North Korea's claim of being a nuclear-weapon state. First and foremost, the ROK and China need to regularize discussions on the North Korean (nuclear) issue and continue them. Through this process, both countries should identify the gaps in their mutual perceptions and policies, recognize them in advance, and seek areas for cooperation. Based on this, strategic communication should be actively pursued to share perceptions with China regarding the impact of North Korea's claim of being a 'nuclear-weapon state' on peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula but also in East Asia.

Even if ROK-China relations are restored, it is necessary to realistically acknowledge the difficulty in securing China's role as a facilitator or mediator in dialogue concerning North Korea, as South Korea expects. We must not overlook the fact that China possesses the influence to act as a spoiler. This is another reason why efforts for understanding and persuasion through close strategic communication with China should not be neglected. Priority should be given to enhancing communication and cooperation between the ROK and China in areas such as information exchange and measures related to preventing and deterring North Korean provocations that could lead to instability on the Korean Peninsula, and stabilizing the North Korean regime, which represents a fundamental common ground regarding North Korea-related issues.

Looking back at the 34-year history of ROK-China relations, when conflicts between the two countries escalated, official government-level dialogue was completely suspended and did not easily resume, making it impossible to find solutions and further worsening the situation. Therefore, it is necessary to establish multi-layered strategic dialogue channels, from working-level to top-level, that can function to find points of resolution when conflicts arise between the two countries. Even if the instability on the Korean Peninsula, amplified by external variables, cannot be resolved solely through bilateral efforts between the ROK and China, close communication and enhanced understanding between the two countries are crucial to prevent and manage situations where external factors collectively worsen ROK-China relations, as seen in the THAAD conflict.

Specifically, there is a lack of regularized and systematic official or unofficial dialogue channels between the ROK and China, and existing channels have not maintained continuity. Recalling the lesson that the suspension of dialogue channels, which should function during conflicts and crises, has exacerbated relations due to a lack of communication, it is necessary to discuss the establishment of communication channels that can be stably sustained at the national level, transcending administrations.

[1]Wang Yi Attends and Delivers Keynote Speech at the Symposium on the International Situation and China's Diplomacy in 2025 (2025-12-30)https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202512/t20251230_11790364.shtml

[2]Li Qiang Attends and Delivers a Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the 2025 World Artificial Intelligence Conference and the High-Level Conference on Global AI Governance (2025.07.26)https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202507/t20250726_11677829.shtml

■Lee Dong-ryulProfessor of Chinese Studies, Dongduk Women's University.

■ Responsible Editor: Lee Sang-junEAI Researcher | Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr