[Global NK Commentary] China's 'Ice Silk Road' Strategy and Geopolitical Implications - Proposals for Northern Policy

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Key References and Policy Documents on the Arctic

China's 'Ice Silk Road' (氷上絲綢之路) is not merely a rhetorical slogan but an official policy term reflecting the nation's explicit vision. This was formalized externally when the State Council Information Office of China published its first Arctic policy white paper, 'China's Arctic Policy' (中国 的北极政策) (hereinafter referred to as the 'White Paper'), in January 2018, using the term.[1]The 'White Paper,' along with the report 'China's Antarctic Program' (中国 的南极事业) published in May 2017, constitutes China's dual polar strategy.

Some domestic media tend to equate this with the Arctic shipping route by adding 'one route' (一道) to the existing 'Belt and Road' (一带一路) initiative. However, this is difficult to consider an accurate interpretation from a documentary perspective. The 'Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative' (一带一路建设海上合作设想), published in June 2017 by the National Development and Reform Commission and the State Oceanic Administration, presented the so-called 'three blue economic corridors' (蓝色经济通道), which are defined as follows:

∙ The existing Maritime Silk Road connecting China, the Indian Ocean, Africa, and the Mediterranean.

∙ A corridor connecting China, Oceania (Australia), and the South Pacific.

∙ A route passing through the Arctic Ocean connecting China and Europe.

In other words, while the expression 'one route' does include the Arctic shipping route, using it to refer solely to the Arctic shipping route can lead to an error in understanding China's expanded maritime governance strategy in a fragmented manner.

In November 2014, during his visit to Tasmania, Australia, President Xi Jinping boarded the icebreaker Xuelong (雪龙) to encourage the Antarctic expedition team, publicly declaring to both domestic and international audiences that the construction of a 'Polar Power' (极地强国) is an explicit national goal. At the time, President Xi stated, 'China's polar exploration endeavors have already achieved remarkable results,' and proclaimed that it is now time to 'advance from the stage of a polar major power to that of a polar power' (我们要向极地强国进军).

If 'major power' (大国) in Chinese strategic discourse emphasizes outward, quantitative expansion such as increasing base construction, expanding exploration scope, and boosting budget allocation, then 'power' (强国), as seen in examples like maritime power, space power, and manufacturing power, represents the highest strategic orientation aiming for qualitative advancement by mobilizing national capabilities. By 2014, China had already obtained observer status in the Arctic Council (2013) and secured multiple bases in Antarctica, including the Great Wall (长城) and Zhongshan (中山) stations. Therefore, President Xi's statement can be interpreted as a self-assessment that China had secured the status of a 'major power' in terms of input and participation, and a call for the next stage of qualitative leap based on these achievements.

Currently, China is indeed increasing the density of its strategy by pursuing the following specific tasks to achieve the goal of becoming a 'power':

∙ Technological self-reliance: Building its own state-of-the-art icebreakers and securing core technologies for deep-sea exploration.

∙ Governance leadership: Strengthening its voice as a 'rule maker' beyond a mere participant in international organizations such as the Arctic Council.

∙ Maximizing practical benefits: Securing tangible national interests through the commercialization of Arctic shipping routes and resource extraction, and pursuing sustainable development.

In 2015, Article 32 of the 'National Security Law' stipulated the protection of 'interests in polar regions, deep seas, and outer space' in addition to 'peaceful exploration and utilization.' This can be evaluated as a legislative measure that elevates polar regions from objects of scientific exploration and economic utilization to the realm of national security.

At the 3rd Arctic Circle Assembly in 2015, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, through a video message, declared China a 'near-Arctic state' to the international community, emphasizing the justification for its involvement. Subsequently, the 'White Paper' published in 2018 officially designated China as a 'near-Arctic state' and set core policy objectives for Arctic awareness, protection, utilization, and governance participation based on the principles of respect, cooperation, mutual benefit, and sustainability. The concept of 'near-Arctic' advocated by China, contrary to its impression, is based not merely on geographical proximity but on emphasizing the direct impact of Arctic climate and ecological changes on China and its close economic interests, as well as the logic that as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, it has a mission to safeguard global peace and security.

Furthermore, the 'White Paper' explicitly stated that China enjoys rights related to scientific research, freedom of navigation and overflight, fishing, laying subsea cables and pipelines, and exploring and developing seabed resources in the Arctic high seas under the international legal framework, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). At the same time, it formalized the construction of the 'Ice Silk Road,' an extension of the existing Belt and Road initiative to the Arctic, and proposed to the international community the idea of 'jointly building' a new economic corridor connecting China and Europe via the Arctic shipping route.

This direction continues into the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). China has designated the deep sea, deep earth, and polar regions as 'three major strategic new frontiers' and codified the acquisition of core technologies and expansion of influence in these areas. It specifically stated that building a polar power is a subordinate execution goal and a core element for realizing a maritime power.

Recent changes are even more noteworthy. The White Paper 'China's National Security in the New Era' (新时代的中国国家安全), published in May 2025 by the State Council Information Office, comprehensively summarizes the Xi Jinping administration's 'holistic national security concept' and significantly expands the scope of national security. In particular, the fact that Chapter 3, Section 4, addresses the protection of maritime rights and territorial integrity (领土完整) together suggests that maritime interests are perceived on the same level as territorial sovereignty. While this is primarily aimed at the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas, it implies that as China's maritime interests expand to regions like the Arctic, the assertion of maritime control could be emphasized as a justification for safeguarding national sovereignty. Consequently, this needs to be noted as it could lead to a stage where the justification for projecting maritime military power to protect its maritime interests is strengthened.

Achievements and Limitations of China's Ice Silk Road Strategy

Prospects for the economic value and business viability of the Arctic shipping route are mixed due to various variables such as the timing of ice melt and route prediction. However, there is broad consensus that the competitiveness of the Arctic shipping route will increase dramatically by 2050 at the latest. Accordingly, investments and participation in the Arctic Ocean by non-Arctic countries are also beginning to intensify.

While the overall volume of cargo on the Arctic shipping route is still low in absolute terms, its growth rate is steep. The number of operating vessels, which was 1,298 in 2013, increased by approximately 37% to 1,781 in 2024, despite geopolitical headwinds such as the Russia-Ukraine war, and the total operating distance of these vessels also surged by 108%, from 6.1 million nautical miles to 12.7 million nautical miles.

Indicators that resource development in the Arctic is accelerating are also clearly identifiable. The operating distance for bulk carriers increased by 223.7%, from 139,000 nautical miles in 2013 to 450,000 nautical miles. The operating distance for gas carriers, which was nil in 2014, exceeded 870,000 nautical miles in 2024. Furthermore, the utilization of the route as an international transit route has increased from 4 vessels in 2010 to 97 vessels in 2024, and the cargo weight has increased from 100,000 tons to 3.1 million tons. These transit cargoes were identified as crude oil (61.6%) from Russia to China, bulk cargo (28.6%), and containers (2.6%), accounting for 95.2% of the total. This suggests that the Northern Sea Route is effectively being reorganized into a monopolistic system with Russia as the origin and China as the destination.[2]

China's strategic investments are particularly concentrated in the energy sector, with over 90% of its total Arctic investments allocated to Russian energy projects. Chinese companies have not withdrawn despite the Russia-Ukraine war and continue to invest heavily in projects such as the Yamal LNG project. Additionally, China is expanding its influence by securing stakes in the 'Arctic LNG 2' project on the Gydan Peninsula through CNPC. Furthermore, with the legal binding memorandum of understanding for the 'Power of Siberia 2' overland pipeline expected to be finalized in September 2025, geopolitical shifts surrounding the Arctic are expected to intensify.[3]

In terms of logistics and transportation, China is currently focusing more on operating shipping routes and building vessels rather than constructing ports. The state-owned shipping company COSCO has maintained commercial operations every year during the ice-free season since 2013 and has accumulated independent icebreaker vessel construction capabilities through companies like Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding.

In the field of scientific research, the 'China-Iceland Aurora Observatory (CIAO),' opened in northern Iceland by the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) in 2018, can be considered a representative base. Although China claims it is purely for scientific purposes, Western intelligence agencies strongly suspect it to be a dual-use facility capable of monitoring shipping routes and submarine communications.

However, China's Arctic ventures have not always been smooth sailing. In Greenland, Shenghe Resources attempted to participate in rare earth mine development, but mining was not permitted due to the results of the 2021 general election in Greenland and security concerns from the United States and Denmark. Furthermore, China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), a Chinese state-owned construction firm, bid for the expansion of three airports in Greenland, but this was also excluded by China in 2018 when the US and Denmark, wary of potential military base establishment by China, replaced it with their own capital. Attempts to invest in an Arctic railway connecting Rovaniemi, Finland, and Kirkenes, Norway, were also abandoned due to local opposition and the Finnish government's assessment of insufficient feasibility.

These achievements and limitations demonstrate that China's 'Ice Silk Road Strategy' is situated within a complex geopolitical environment where economic opportunities intersect with security considerations.

Geopolitical Implications

Currently, approximately 80% of China's energy imports and a significant portion of its trade volume pass through the Strait of Malacca. Due to this structural vulnerability, China views the Arctic shipping route not merely as a commercial route but as an alternative strategic corridor to weaken US maritime strategy and overcome the potential 'single point of failure' represented by the Strait of Malacca. While the Arctic shipping route's limitations as an economic alternative to the Strait of Malacca are evident given its current cargo volume, its value as a 'critical emergency route' during wartime or national emergencies is substantial.

In particular, the Arctic shipping route provides a path to bypass the US naval power and allied encirclement deployed along the South China Sea and Indian Ocean lines. Moreover, a significant portion of the route falls within Russia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), offering the advantage of being outside the operational range of the US Navy as long as strategic cooperation between China and Russia is maintained. However, this also entails a geopolitical cost in the form of strengthened leverage for Russia, which holds the de facto key to the Arctic, over China. If the Chinese navy secures northern access routes amidst increasing constraints on US military power projection and operations in the East and South China Seas, the US would face a strategic overload of having to significantly expand its existing encirclement to the Arctic region, potentially leading to a dispersion of the encirclement's density.

Currently, it is difficult to consider there to be active territorial disputes in the Arctic Ocean. However, the accelerating ice melt is becoming a seed for potential conflict. The emergence of new islands and the issue of setting baselines as the ice disappears, along with the ownership of the seabed continental shelf due to ice loss and the expansion of deep-sea exploration areas, are likely to become strategic variables for the involved nations. The competition for sovereignty over the Lomonosov Ridge, estimated to hold vast reserves of oil and gas, which is unfolding between Russia, Denmark, and Canada through the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), can be seen not as a resolution of conflict but as a preliminary skirmish.

China, which has no Arctic territory, opposes the monopoly of any single country and advocates the logic that the Arctic Ocean should be considered 'common heritage of mankind.' This is because maximizing the area of high seas is advantageous for securing space for intervention by non-Arctic countries like China. On the other hand, coastal states such as Russia and Canada are increasingly seeking to strengthen sovereign control over Arctic waters, considering them their 'internal waters.' Although the US is facing difficulties in pursuing 'Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)' in the Arctic due to a lack of icebreaking capabilities and close Sino-Russian ties, the continuation of the current situation itself, paradoxically increasing the need for such operations, could lead to new instability in the Arctic security landscape.

Speculative Geopolitical Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. Traditionally, US security strategy has focused on a two-front war across the Atlantic and Pacific, with the Arctic perceived as a 'natural fortress' protected by a thick ice sheet. However, rapid melting due to climate change is transforming the Arctic Ocean into a space where operations are possible year-round. This suggests that the Arctic, once the safest strategic depth for the US, is becoming a frontline for homeland defense.

The fact that all Arctic Council member states except Russia are NATO members provides a fundamental background that cannot entirely dismiss the risk of the Arctic becoming a geopolitical fault line where authoritarian and democratic blocs clash. In particular, the West's policy of isolating Russia following the Russia-Ukraine war has deepened Russia's dependence on China, which in turn has expanded China's access to the Arctic, making this region a site of complex security dilemmas involving the interests of the US, China, and Russia.

In terms of force projection, the melting of Arctic ice is creating different variables than in the past. The deployment of large-scale missile launch sites or radar bases, which was limited in the past due to unstable permafrost and ice, is transitioning to an environment where permanent construction of air defense systems and hypersonic missile bases is possible as the exposed bedrock becomes accessible. This is likely to lead to competition for strengthening early warning capabilities to secure 'golden time' for interception and for forward deployment of radar bases.

The submarine operational environment is also undergoing changes. In the past, submarine movements in the Arctic were constrained by the need to search for thin ice areas for missile launches. However, accelerating ice melt means these constraints are disappearing across vast areas of the Arctic.

However, these potential conflict factors do not necessarily mean a slide into a new Cold War-style 'bloc formation' in the Arctic. The Arctic Ocean is a sanctuary where numerous sensitive Russian strategic assets are concentrated, and Russia is extremely wary of Chinese access to these assets. For example, due to the concentration of Russian strategic nuclear submarine (SSBN) bases and nuclear facilities in areas like the Kola Peninsula, Russia maintains a highly restrictive stance on allowing China to collect data on water temperature, salinity, and seabed topography, which are crucial for anti-submarine warfare intelligence.

Therefore, it is unlikely that Russia will easily accept the regular deployment of Chinese warships or their entry into the route under the pretext of protecting the Northern Sea Route. The fact that Russia was the most critical country towards China's accession as an observer to the Arctic Council in the past supports the underlying sentiment that Russia perceives China as a potential threat in this region. In short, while Russia desperately needs economic cooperation with China, it is likely to show strategic divergence regarding China's characteristic 'Belt and Road' approach of demanding port ownership or operational rights.

Hypothesis 2. For China, the route from Northeast China to the East Sea via the Tumen River estuary is the shortest path to the Arctic Ocean. However, China currently cannot use this passage and must endure the strategic and economic inefficiency of detouring to ports like Dalian or Qingdao, and then proceeding northwards through the Korea Strait. While the joint statement by the Chinese and Russian presidents in May 2024, mentioning 'constructive dialogue' regarding the Tumen River, seemed to drive change,[4] North Korea and Russia immediately commenced construction of an additional road bridge near the existing 'Friendship Bridge,' thereby strengthening their bilateral ties independently.[5] This signifies that there are formidable geopolitical obstacles to overcome before China can secure the desired 'Tumen River estuary access.'

In other words, despite the superficial cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia, Russia and North Korea are strongly preventing China's access to the Tumen River estuary for their own national interests. If the Tumen River estuary were opened, allowing China direct access to the East Sea, the value of Russian ports in the Primorye region would inevitably plummet. Therefore, Russia aims to guide the logistics of China's Northeast provinces to its own ports such as Vladivostok and Zarubino by blocking the Tumen River estuary, thereby securing toll revenue and strategic leverage over China. Furthermore, from a security perspective, it seeks to prevent the situation where the Chinese navy operates freely in the East Sea and Sea of Okhotsk, which are considered its 'backyard.'

From North Korea's perspective, granting China access to the Tumen River estuary would be akin to economic and security 'self-harm.' If China gains direct access to the East Sea, the strategic value of North Korea's potential key foreign currency earner, the Port of Rason, would immediately diminish. Technically, the large-scale dredging of the Tumen River estuary and the construction of embankments would require the presence of Chinese heavy equipment and personnel on the front lines of the border, which could be an unacceptable security burden for the closed North Korean regime.

Therefore, the ideal scenario for North Korea is to block China's access to the Tumen River estuary, citing Russia's opposition and technical issues, while simultaneously inducing China to use the Port of Rason and demanding rental fees or energy support. At the same time, it can seek to diversify its foreign currency earning channels by obtaining economic benefits such as an increased labor quota from Russia in return for cooperating with Russia to prevent China's access. Furthermore, it can employ a sophisticated 'bluffing' strategy by periodically leaking news of 'joint development of the Tumen River' among North Korea, China, and Russia to the US, South Korea, and Japan, thereby amplifying geopolitical uncertainty. This aims to instill in the US, South Korean, and Japanese authorities the perception that 'maintaining the status quo' through the survival of the North Korean regime is an important measure to prevent the worst-case scenario of China dominating the East Sea. This ultimately translates into 'raising the stakes' to deter catastrophic military options against North Korea and enhance its strategic value.

Hypothesis 3. In the past, the United States enjoyed an overwhelmingly deep strategic depth based on the vast oceans of the Atlantic and Pacific, as well as the robust 'ice barrier' of the Arctic. However, the melting of the Arctic due to climate change is dismantling the natural barrier that protected its homeland, fundamentally altering the US security environment. This consistent recognition of threats has been continuously reflected in various strategic documents, including the Arctic Policy Directive (2009), National Strategy for Arctic Region (2013), and Arctic Strategy (2024). In particular, the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) in 2022 elevated the Arctic as a priority region for homeland defense.

Significant financial investment is unavoidable for expanding icebreaking capabilities, modernizing the Alaska early warning radar system, and establishing a multi-layered missile defense (MD) system to counter Arctic security threats. This cost burden, coupled with the US trend of 'new isolationism' or 'homeland first,' is likely to lead to a readjustment or reduction in budgets related to the overseas deployment of US forces and the defense of allies. This, in turn, is likely to translate into demands for increased defense cost-sharing and a more active role in security for allies, including South Korea.

В настоящее время, с геополитической точки зрения, США придерживаются стратегии «раздельного реагирования» (Bifurcated Response), рассматривая Северную Корею как «северный замок», препятствующий выходу Китая в Восточное море, а Южную Корею — как «южную сеть», сдерживающую морскую экспансию Китая. Однако такая дихотомическая структура, если не будет предпосылкой для структурного улучшения межкорейских отношений, со временем увеличит неопределенность в сфере безопасности. Это связано с тем, что если два зубчатых колеса — Южная и Северная Корея — будут вращаться в противоположных направлениях, стратегические намерения США столкнутся с противоречием.

Иными словами, если США попытаются улучшить отношения между Северной Кореей и США, игнорируя позицию Южной Кореи, это может привести к трещинам в альянсе между Южной Кореей и США. Напротив, если они попытаются использовать Южную Корею исключительно как аванпост для сдерживания Китая, помимо опасений и сопротивления со стороны южнокорейского народа, это может привести к парадоксальному результату, когда Китай еще больше усилит свое экономическое и военное влияние на Северную Корею, вынуждая ее внезапно открыть «замок», ведущий в Восточное море.

В конечном счете, для того чтобы стратегия обороны материковой части США была эффективной, необходимы минимальный уровень мира и структура коммуникации на Корейском полуострове, позволяющие «северному замку» и «южной сети» функционировать органично. Кроме того, важно обеспечить стратегическую автономию Южной Кореи для стимулирования и поддержки этого процесса.

Сводка гипотез: Наша стратегия упреждающей стабилизации и переосмысление северной дипломатии

Южная Корея должна активно направлять высокоуровневые стратегические послания в адрес США, чтобы активно управлять риском вовлечения в безопасность, связанным с потенциальным включением Арктического региона в процесс формирования блоков. Суть стратегии заключается в том, чтобы подчеркнуть, что Южная Корея может оптимизировать затраты на участие США в регионе, упреждающе и автономно контролируя потенциальные угрозы на севере посредством постепенного улучшения отношений между Севером и Югом, а также между Южной Кореей и Россией.

В частности, необходимо подчеркнуть, что «минимальная коммуникация и мир» на Корейском полуострове являются неотъемлемым предварительным условием для органичного функционирования «северного замка» (Северная Корея) и «южной сети» (Южная Корея), которые преследуют США. Следует настаивать на том, что давние опасения по поводу того, что улучшение межкорейских отношений может ослабить обоснование присутствия американских войск в Корее, уже в значительной степени нивелированы в условиях новой политики «изоляционизма» США и усиления приоритета обороны материковой части. Таким образом, следует создать среду, в которой США смогут сосредоточиться на своей первоочередной стратегии эффективного сдерживания Китая, и в то же время поддерживать сплоченность альянса посредством тесного технологического сотрудничества в таких областях, как производство оборудования и т. д.

Тонкие стратегические расхождения между Китаем, Северной Кореей и Россией, существующие за кулисами макроскопического противостояния между США и Китаем, предоставляют Южной Корее важное стратегическое пространство. Поскольку Китай в первую очередь стремится избежать региональной блоковой конфронтации, которая может стать бременем для его собственной безопасности, Южная Корея должна искать точки соприкосновения, учитывая позицию Китая. В то же время, суть стратегии, соответствующей национальным интересам Южной Кореи, заключается в поддержке расширения рычагов влияния Северной Кореи и России, чтобы их рычаги против Китая не ослабли чрезмерно, и в смягчении их асимметрии по отношению к Китаю.

Чрезмерное ослабление рычагов влияния России против Китая неизбежно приведет к стратегическим выгодам Китая, что усилит конкуренцию между США и Китаем и увеличит бремя безопасности для Южной Кореи.

∙ Например, в 2012 году Россия разработала план перехода от зенитно-ракетных комплексов С-400 к С-500. После событий в Крыму в 2014 году и западных санкций зависимость России от Китая возросла, что ослабило рычаги влияния России против Китая. Это привело к заключению сделки по экспорту в Китай передовых зенитно-ракетных комплексов С-400 (2015 г.), что было давним желанием Китая. Размещение Китаем этих комплексов вблизи Корейского полуострова вызвало стратегическую цепную реакцию, спровоцировавшую размещение американских систем THAAD. Это привело к ухудшению отношений между Южной Кореей и Китаем и поставило Южную Корею в положение кризиса, когда она оказалась на переднем крае региональной блоковой конфронтации.

∙ Нынешнее тесное сближение между Северной Кореей и Россией также отражает стратегические размышления, связанные с усилением асимметрии между этими двумя странами по отношению к Китаю. Необходимо предотвратить порочный круг, когда это сближение ускоряет региональную блочную конфронтацию и усиливает военную напряженность, ставя Южную Корею в центр конфликта между блоками.

Поэтому Южная Корея должна в первую очередь стремиться к восстановлению отношений с Россией. Необходимо обеспечить рычаги влияния в процессе улучшения отношений, начав упреждающий диалог до окончания российско-украинской войны. Если прямое улучшение отношений с Россией затруднено, следует активно использовать и развивать многосторонние точки соприкосновения со странами, граничащими с Китаем и разделяющими схожие дилеммы безопасности по отношению к Китаю, такими как Вьетнам и Монголия. Это также стратегия формирования общих точек соприкосновения со странами региона, которые рассматривают усиление асимметрии по отношению к Китаю в условиях растущей неопределенности со стороны США.

Далее, опираясь на эти многосторонние усилия, следует стремиться к улучшению отношений с Северной Кореей, предлагая эффективный баланс против чрезмерного проникновения Китая в Северную Корею. Это значимо и с точки зрения Северной Кореи, поскольку предоставляет стратегическое обоснование и рамки для переосмысления усилий по улучшению отношений, которые исчерпали свой импульс на двустороннем уровне между Севером и Югом. В частности, это может служить положительным стимулом, поскольку может стать эффективным средством для смягчения стратегических проблем, связанных с растущей зависимостью от Китая. Через этот процесс Южная Корея также должна стремиться к распределению и смягчению проблемы асимметрии по отношению к Китаю, которая, вероятно, будет расширяться и углубляться по мере роста неопределенности со стороны США, и проводить стратегию по обеспечению автономии в отношениях с Северной Кореей и северной дипломатии.

Для этого Южная Корея должна поддерживать стратегическое пространство посредством изощренной логики, приемлемой как для США, так и для Китая.

∙ Логика в отношении США должна быть сосредоточена на повышении эффективности китайской стратегии США. Подчеркивается, что северная политика Южной Кореи в конечном итоге вносит существенный вклад в эффективность стратегии США по сдерживанию Китая, снижая зависимость Северной Кореи и России от Китая и повышая их переговорную силу.

∙ Логика в отношении Китая должна быть направлена на предотвращение региональной блоковой конфронтации и снижение напряженности. Необходимо подчеркнуть разницу между усилиями региональных стран по смягчению асимметрии по отношению к Китаю и сплоченностью для блокады Китая под руководством США. Другими словами, следует подчеркнуть, что укрепление собственных отношений региональных стран фактически предотвращает региональную блочную конфронтацию и создает мирную обстановку для снижения бремени безопасности, с которым сталкивается Китай.

Цель этой стратегической модернизации — добиться молчаливого согласия и понимания со стороны обеих сторон, США и Китая, как «второго лучшего варианта». Таким образом, Южная Корея сможет завершить основу «упреждающей стабилизации», которая защищает национальную автономию и интересы, не будучи использованной в качестве авангарда определенного блока в условиях неопределенности в сфере безопасности, такой как потенциальные арктические геополитические потрясения. Успех этой стратегии будет зависеть не от простого стратегического заявления, а от того, сможет ли Южная Корея обеспечить практические возможности для предоставления США ценности «незаменимого партнера по безопасности», а Китаю и России — роли «стратегического балансира», основываясь на своем производственном и передовом технологическом потенциале, в том числе в таких областях, как производство оборудования.

[1] Государственный совет Китайской Народной Республики, Управление новостей Государственного совета КНР, «Политика Китая в Арктике» Белая книга (полный текст). (26.01.2018) http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2018n/202207/t20220704_130568.html

[2] Упомянутые различные материалы, связанные с судоходством в Арктике, были взяты из статьи Ли Дэсика «Действительно ли открывается Арктика?», RIO No.9 (январский выпуск) специальный репортаж, (31.01.2025). https://www.rioins.kr/notice/notice1__list.html?bmain=view&uid=34

[3] Чон Джэу, «Геополитические последствия «Силы Сибири-2» между Китаем и Россией», KIDA Security Strategy FOCUS, Исследовательский институт оборонной политики Кореи, (17.12.2025).

[4] Министерство иностранных дел Китайской Народной Республики, Совместное заявление Китайской Народной Республики и Российской Федерации об углублении всеобъемлющего стратегического партнерства в новой эпохе в честь 75-летия установления дипломатических отношений между двумя странами (полный текст), (16.05.2024) https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240516_11305860.shtml В статье 3 данного заявления указано: «Обе стороны проведут конструктивный диалог с Корейской Народно-Демократической Республикой по вопросу навигации китайских судов по нижнему течению реки Туманная для выхода в море».

[5] Джозеф С. Бермудес-младший, Виктор Ча и Дженнифер Джун, «Значительный прогресс в строительстве автомобильного моста между Северной Кореей и Россией», Beyond Parallel. CSIS. 14 октября 2025 г. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/significant-progress-of-the-north-korea-russia-road-bridge

■ Чон Джэу_Исследователь Корейского института оборонной политики.

■ Ответственный за выпуск и редактирование: Ли Санджун_Исследователь EAI

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