[Global NK Commentary] China's 'Ice Silk Road' Strategy and Geopolitical Implications - Proposals for Northern Policy

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Key Arctic-related Mentions and Policy Documents

China's 'Ice Silk Road' (氷上絲綢之路) is not merely a rhetorical slogan but an official policy term reflecting the nation's explicit vision. This was officially formalized when the State Council Information Office of China published its first Arctic policy white paper, 'China's Arctic Policy' (中国 的 北极 政策) (hereinafter referred to as the 'White Paper') in January 2018, using the term.[1]The 'White Paper,' along with the report 'China's Antarctic Program' (中国 的 南极 事业) published in May 2017, constitutes China's two major polar strategies.

Some domestic media tend to equate the 'Ice Silk Road' with the Arctic shipping route by adding 'one route' to the existing 'Belt and Road' initiative. However, this is difficult to consider an accurate interpretation from a textual perspective. The 'Maritime Cooperation Vision for the Belt and Road Construction' (一 带 一路 建设 海上 合作 设想), published in June 2017 by the National Development and Reform Commission and the State Oceanic Administration, proposed the so-called 'three blue economic corridors,' which are defined as follows:

∙ The existing Maritime Silk Road connecting China, the Indian Ocean, Africa, and the Mediterranean.

∙ A corridor connecting China, Oceania (Australia), and the South Pacific.

∙ A route passing through the Arctic Ocean and Europe, connecting China and Europe.

In other words, while the expression 'one route' does include the Arctic shipping route, using it to refer solely to the Arctic shipping route can lead to an error in understanding China's expanded maritime governance strategy in a fragmented manner.

In November 2014, during his visit to Tasmania, Australia, President Xi Jinping boarded the icebreaker Xuelong (雪龙) to encourage the Antarctic expedition team, publicly declaring to both domestic and international audiences that the construction of a 'polar power' (極地强國) is a national official goal. At the time, President Xi stated, 'China's polar exploration program has already achieved remarkable results,' and proclaimed that it is now time to 'advance towards becoming a polar power' (我们要向极地强国进军), moving beyond the stage of a 'polar country'.

In China's strategic discourse, 'power' (大国) is a concept focused on outward, quantitative expansion such as increasing bases, expanding exploration scope, and increasing budget allocation, while 'strong nation' (强国) is the highest strategic orientation that aims to achieve qualitative advancement by mobilizing national capabilities, as seen in examples of maritime, space, and manufacturing powers. As of 2014, China had already obtained observer status in the Arctic Council (2013) and secured multiple bases in Antarctica, including the Great Wall (長城) and Zhongshan (中山) stations. Therefore, President Xi's remarks can be interpreted as a self-assessment that China has secured the status of a 'power' in terms of input and participation, and a call for the next stage of qualitative leap based on these achievements.

Currently, China is indeed increasing the density of its strategy by pursuing the following specific tasks to achieve the goal of becoming a 'strong nation':

∙ Technological Self-Reliance: Building indigenous state-of-the-art icebreakers and securing core technologies for deep-sea exploration.

∙ Governance Leadership: Strengthening its voice as a 'Rule Maker' beyond a mere participant in international organizations such as the Arctic Council.

∙ Maximizing Practical Benefits: Pursuing actual national interests and sustainable development through the commercialization of Arctic shipping routes and resource extraction.

In 2015, Article 32 of the 'National Security Law' stipulated the protection of 'interests in polar regions, deep seas, and outer space' in addition to 'peaceful exploration and utilization.' This can be evaluated as a legislative measure that elevates the polar regions from objects of scientific exploration and economic utilization to the realm of national security.

At the 3rd Arctic Circle Assembly in 2015, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, through a video message, declared China a 'near-Arctic state' to the international community, emphasizing the justification for its involvement. Subsequently, the 2018 'White Paper' officially designated China as a 'near-Arctic state' and set core policy objectives for Arctic awareness, protection, utilization, and governance participation based on the principles of respect, cooperation, mutual benefit, and sustainability. The concept of 'near-Arctic' advocated by China, contrary to its impression, emphasizes the direct impact of Arctic climate and ecological changes on China and its close economic interests, while also grounding its claims in the logic of its responsibility as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to safeguard global peace and security.

Furthermore, the 'White Paper' explicitly stated that China enjoys rights related to scientific research, freedom of navigation and overflight, fishing, laying submarine cables and pipelines, and exploration and development of seabed resources in the Arctic high seas based on the international legal framework, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). At the same time, it formalized the construction of the 'Ice Silk Road,' an extension of the existing Belt and Road initiative to the Arctic, and proposed to the international community the idea of 'jointly building' a new economic corridor connecting China and Europe via the Arctic shipping route.

This direction continues into the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). China has designated deep seas, deep earth, and polar regions as 'three major strategic new frontiers' and codified the acquisition of core technologies and expansion of influence in these areas. It specifically stated that building a polar power is a subordinate execution goal and a key element for realizing a maritime power.

Recent changes are even more noteworthy. The white paper 'China's National Security in the New Era' (新 时代 的 中国 国家 安全), released in May 2025 by the State Council Information Office, comprehensively integrates the Xi Jinping administration's 'holistic national security concept,' significantly expanding the scope of national security. In particular, the fact that Chapter 3, Section 4 addresses the protection of maritime rights and territorial integrity (领土 完整) together suggests that maritime interests are perceived on the same level as territorial sovereignty. While this is primarily aimed at the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas, it implies that as China's maritime interests expand to regions like the Arctic, securing maritime control may be emphasized as a justification for safeguarding national sovereignty. Consequently, this needs to be noted as it could lead to a stage where the justification for projecting maritime military power to protect its maritime interests is strengthened.

Achievements and Limitations of China's Ice Silk Road Strategy

Regarding the economic value and business viability of the Arctic shipping route, prospects are mixed due to various variables such as the timing of ice melt and route prediction. However, there is little disagreement that the competitiveness of the Arctic shipping route will increase dramatically by 2050 at the latest. Accordingly, investments and participation in the Arctic Ocean by non-Arctic countries are also showing signs of accelerating.

While the overall volume of cargo on the Arctic shipping route is currently low in absolute terms, its growth rate is steep. The number of vessels operating, which was 1,298 in 2013, increased by approximately 37% to 1,781 in 2024, despite geopolitical headwinds such as the Russia-Ukraine war. During the same period, the total operating distance of vessels more than doubled, from 6.1 million nautical miles to 12.7 million nautical miles.

Clear indicators are also emerging that Arctic resource development is accelerating. The operating distance of bulk carriers increased by 223.7% from 139,000 nautical miles in 2013 to 450,000 nautical miles. The operating distance of gas carriers, which was nil in 2014, exceeded 870,000 nautical miles in 2024. Furthermore, the use of the route as an international transit route has increased from 4 vessels in 2010 to 97 vessels in 2024, and the cargo weight has increased from 100,000 tons to 3.1 million tons. These transit cargoes were confirmed to be primarily crude oil from Russia to China (61.6%), bulk cargo (28.6%), and containers (2.6%), accounting for 95.2% of the total. This suggests that the Northern Sea Route is effectively being reorganized into a monopolistic system with Russia as the origin and China as the destination.[2]

In particular, China's strategic investments are concentrated in the energy sector, with over 90% of its total Arctic investments allocated to Russian energy projects. Chinese companies have not withdrawn despite the Russia-Ukraine war and continue to invest heavily in projects such as the Yamal LNG project. Additionally, China is expanding its influence by securing stakes in the 'Arctic LNG 2' project on the Gydan Peninsula through CNPC. Furthermore, with the agreement on the 'Power of Siberia 2' overland pipeline expected to be finalized in a legally binding memorandum of understanding in September 2025, geopolitical shifts surrounding the Arctic are expected to intensify.[3]

In terms of logistics and transportation, China is currently focusing on operating shipping routes and building vessels rather than constructing ports. The state-owned shipping company COSCO has maintained commercial operations every year during the ice-free season since 2013 and has accumulated indigenous icebreaker vessel construction capabilities through companies like Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding.

In the field of scientific research, the 'China-Iceland Aurora Observatory (CIAO),' opened by the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) in northern Iceland in 2018, can be considered a representative base. While China claims it is purely for scientific purposes, Western intelligence agencies strongly suspect it to be a dual-use facility capable of monitoring shipping routes and communications for submarines.

However, China's advance into the Arctic has not always been smooth. In Greenland, Shenghe Resources attempted to participate in rare earth mine development, but mining was denied following the results of the Greenland general election in 2021 and concerns over security from the United States and Denmark. Additionally, China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) bid for the expansion of three airports in Greenland, but this was also replaced by domestic capital in 2018 due to security concerns about potential Chinese military basing, excluding China. An attempt to invest in an Arctic railway connecting Rovaniemi, Finland, and Kirkenes, Norway, was also abandoned due to local opposition and a determination of insufficient feasibility by the Finnish government.

These achievements and limitations demonstrate that China's 'Ice Silk Road Strategy' is situated within a complex geopolitical environment where economic opportunities intersect with security considerations.

Geopolitical Implications

Currently, approximately 80% of China's energy imports and a significant portion of its trade volume pass through the Strait of Malacca. Due to this structural vulnerability, China views the Arctic shipping route not just as a commercial route but as an alternative strategic corridor to weaken US maritime strategy and overcome the potential 'single point of failure' represented by the Strait of Malacca. While its limitations as an economic alternative to replace the Strait of Malacca are clear given the current volume of traffic on the Arctic route, its value as a 'critical emergency route' during wartime or national emergencies is significant.

In particular, the Arctic shipping route provides a path to bypass the US naval power and allied encirclement deployed along the South China Sea and Indian Ocean lines. Notably, a significant portion of the route falls within Russia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), offering an advantage as it can remain outside the operational range of the US Navy as long as strategic cooperation between China and Russia is maintained. However, this also entails a geopolitical cost in the form of strengthened Russian leverage over China, which holds the de facto key to the Arctic. If the Chinese navy secures northern access routes amidst increasing constraints on US military power projection and operations in the East and South China Seas, the US would face a strategic overload of having to significantly expand its existing encirclement to the Arctic region, potentially leading to a dispersion of the encirclement's density.

While it is difficult to consider there to be active territorial disputes in the Arctic Ocean at present, the accelerating ice melt is becoming a seed for potential conflict. New islands and baselines emerging as glaciers disappear, and issues related to the ownership of the seabed continental shelf due to glacial melt and the expansion of deep-sea exploration areas, are likely to emerge as strategic variables for the involved nations. The competition for sovereignty over the Lomonosov Ridge, estimated to hold vast reserves of oil and gas, which Russia, Denmark, and Canada are pursuing through the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), can be seen not as a phase of conflict resolution but as a preliminary skirmish.

China, which has no Arctic territory, opposes the monopoly of any single country and advocates for the Arctic Ocean to be considered 'common heritage of mankind.' This is because maximizing the area of high seas is advantageous for securing space for intervention by non-Arctic countries like China. On the other hand, coastal states such as Russia and Canada are increasingly seeking to strengthen sovereign control over Arctic waters, considering them their 'internal waters.' Currently, due to a lack of icebreaking capabilities and close Sino-Russian ties, the US is facing difficulties in pursuing 'Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)' in the Arctic. Paradoxically, the continuation of the current situation, where the need for such operations is increasing, could itself lead to new instability in the Arctic security landscape.

Speculative Geopolitical Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. Traditionally, US security strategy has focused on a two-front war across the Atlantic and Pacific, with the Arctic perceived as a 'natural fortress' protected by a thick ice sheet. However, rapid melting due to climate change is transforming the Arctic Ocean into a space where operations are possible year-round. This suggests that the Arctic, once the safest strategic depth for the US, is transforming into a frontline for homeland defense.

The fact that seven of the eight Arctic Council member states, excluding Russia, are NATO members fundamentally creates a risk that the Arctic could become a geopolitical fault line where authoritarian and democratic blocs clash. In particular, the post-Russia-Ukraine war Western policy of isolating Russia has deepened Russia's dependence on China, which in turn has expanded China's access to the Arctic, turning this region into a site of complex security dilemmas involving the interests of the US, China, and Russia.

In terms of force projection, the melting of Arctic ice is creating new variables compared to the past. The deployment of weapon systems such as large-scale missile launch sites or radar bases, which were previously limited by unstable permafrost and ice, is now possible in an environment where exposed bedrock allows for the permanent construction of air defense systems and hypersonic missile bases. This is likely to lead to competition for enhanced early warning capabilities to secure 'golden time' for interception and forward deployment of radar bases.

Furthermore, the submarine operating environment is also undergoing changes. In the past, submarine operations in the Arctic were constrained by the physical challenge of searching for thin ice areas for missile launches. However, accelerating ice melt means these constraints are disappearing across vast areas of the Arctic.

However, these potential conflict factors do not necessarily mean a new Cold War-style 'polarization' in the Arctic. The Arctic Ocean is a sanctuary where many of Russia's sensitive strategic assets are concentrated, and Russia is extremely wary of China's access to it. For example, the Kola Peninsula is home to Russian strategic nuclear submarine (SSBN) bases and nuclear facilities, and Russia maintains a highly restrictive stance on allowing China to collect data on water temperature, salinity, and seabed topography, which are crucial for anti-submarine warfare intelligence.

Therefore, it is unlikely that Russia will easily accept the regular deployment or entry of Chinese warships into the Arctic under the pretext of protecting Arctic shipping routes. The fact that Russia was the most critical country towards China's accession as an observer to the Arctic Council in the past supports the underlying sentiment that Russia perceives China as a potential threat in this region. In short, while Russia desperately needs economic cooperation with China, it is likely to show strategic divergence regarding China's characteristic 'Belt and Road' approach of demanding port ownership or operational rights.

Hypothesis 2. For China, the route from Northeast China's three provinces, through the Tumen River estuary to the East Sea, is the shortest route to the Arctic Ocean. However, China is currently unable to use this passage and must endure the strategic and economic inefficiency of detouring to ports like Dalian or Qingdao, then proceeding north through the Korea Strait. Although the joint statement by the Chinese and Russian presidents in May 2024, which mentioned 'constructive dialogue' regarding the Tumen River, seemed to drive change,[4] North Korea and Russia immediately commenced construction of an additional road bridge near the existing 'Friendship Bridge,' thereby strengthening their bilateral ties independently.[5] This signifies that the geopolitical obstacles to securing the 'Tumen River estuary' that China desires remain formidable.

In other words, despite the apparent cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia, Russia and North Korea are strongly resisting China's access to the Tumen River estuary for their own national interests. If the Tumen River estuary were opened, allowing China direct access to the East Sea, the value of Russian ports in the Primorye region would inevitably plummet. Therefore, Russia aims to guide the logistics of China's Northeast provinces to its own ports such as Vladivostok and Zarubino by blocking the Tumen River estuary, thereby securing toll revenue and strategic leverage over China. Furthermore, from a security perspective, it seeks to prevent the constant movement of the Chinese navy in the East Sea and Sea of Okhotsk, which are considered its 'backyard,' for its own purposes.

From North Korea's perspective, granting China access to the Tumen River estuary would be tantamount to economic and security 'self-harm.' If China gains direct access to the East Sea, the strategic value of North Korea's potential key foreign exchange earner, the port of Rajin, would be immediately halved. Technically, the large-scale dredging of the Tumen River estuary and the construction of dikes would require the presence of Chinese heavy equipment and personnel on the front lines of the border, which could be an unacceptable security burden for the closed North Korean regime.

Therefore, the ideal scenario for North Korea is to block China's access to the Tumen River estuary, citing Russia's opposition and technical issues, while simultaneously inducing the use of the port of Rajin to demand rental fees or energy support. At the same time, it can seek to diversify its foreign exchange earning channels by securing economic benefits such as an increased quota for labor from Russia, in exchange for jointly preventing China's access to the East Sea. Furthermore, it can employ a sophisticated 'bluffing' strategy by periodically leaking news of 'joint development of the Tumen River' among North Korea, China, and Russia to the US, South Korea, and Japan, thereby amplifying geopolitical uncertainty. This aims to instill in the US, South Korean, and Japanese authorities the perception that maintaining the status quo through the survival of the North Korean regime is an important measure to prevent the worst-case scenario of China dominating the East Sea. This ultimately translates into 'raising the stakes' to deter catastrophic military options against North Korea and enhance its strategic value.

Hypothesis 3. In the past, the United States enjoyed an overwhelmingly deep strategic depth based on the vast oceans of the Atlantic and Pacific, as well as the robust 'ice barrier' of the Arctic. However, the melting of the Arctic due to climate change is dismantling the natural barrier that protected the homeland, fundamentally altering the US security environment. This consistent recognition of threats has been continuously reflected in various strategic documents, including the Arctic Policy Directive (2009), National Strategy for Arctic Region (2013), and Arctic Strategy (2024). Notably, the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) in 2022 elevated the Arctic as a priority region for homeland defense.

The expansion of icebreaking capabilities, modernization of the early warning radar system in Alaska, and the establishment of a multi-layered missile defense (MD) system to counter Arctic security threats inevitably require substantial financial investment. This cost burden, coupled with the US trend of 'neo-isolationism' or 'homeland-first,' is likely to lead to a readjustment or reduction in budgets for overseas US military posture and allied defense. This, in turn, is likely to translate into demands for increased burden-sharing and more active security role-sharing from allies, including South Korea.

Actualmente, desde una perspectiva geopolítica, se considera que Estados Unidos mantiene una estrategia de "Respuesta Bifurcada", concibiendo a Corea del Norte como un "cerrojo del norte" que impide la expansión de China hacia el Mar del Este, y a Corea del Sur como una "red del sur" que frena la expansión marítima de China. Sin embargo, esta dicotomía, a menos que se base en una mejora estructural de las relaciones intercoreanas, tiene la probabilidad de aumentar la incertidumbre de seguridad con el paso del tiempo. Esto se debe a que si los dos engranajes, Corea del Sur y Corea del Norte, giran en direcciones opuestas, la intención estratégica de Estados Unidos se enfrentará a contradicciones conflictivas.

En otras palabras, si Estados Unidos intenta mejorar las relaciones entre Corea del Norte y Estados Unidos sin tener en cuenta la posición de Corea del Sur, la alianza entre Corea del Sur y Estados Unidos podría resquebrajarse. Por el contrario, si se intenta utilizar a Corea del Sur únicamente como un puesto de avanzada para contener a China, además de las preocupaciones y la oposición del pueblo surcoreano, existe la posibilidad de que China fortalezca aún más su influencia económica y de seguridad sobre Corea del Norte, presionando a Corea del Norte para que abra de par en par el "cerrojo" que conduce al Mar del Este, lo que resultaría en una consecuencia paradójica.

En última instancia, para que la estrategia de defensa del territorio continental de Estados Unidos sea efectiva, es esencial una estructura mínima de paz y comunicación en la península coreana donde el "cerrojo del norte" y la "red del sur" puedan funcionar orgánicamente. Además, es importante que Corea del Sur asegure su autonomía estratégica para impulsar y respaldar esto.

Síntesis de Hipótesis: Nuestra Estrategia de Estabilización Preventiva y el Rediseño de la Diplomacia del Norte

Corea del Sur debe enviar mensajes estratégicos de alto nivel a Estados Unidos para gestionar activamente el riesgo de implicación en seguridad derivado de la posible inclusión del Ártico en la alineación. El núcleo de la estrategia es destacar que Corea del Sur puede optimizar los costos de intervención de Estados Unidos en la región mediante el control preventivo y autónomo de las amenazas potenciales del norte a través de la mejora gradual de las relaciones intercoreanas y las relaciones entre Corea del Sur y Rusia.

En particular, para que el "cerrojo del norte" (Corea del Norte) y la "red del sur" (Corea del Sur) que persigue Estados Unidos funcionen orgánicamente, se debe enfatizar que la "comunicación y paz mínimas" en la península coreana son una condición previa indispensable. Se debe argumentar que la vieja preocupación de que la mejora de las relaciones intercoreanas podría debilitar la justificación de la presencia de tropas estadounidenses en Corea del Sur ya se ha visto considerablemente compensada por la tendencia de Estados Unidos hacia el "neoislamiento" y el fortalecimiento de la prioridad de la defensa del territorio continental. A través de esto, se puede crear un entorno que permita a Estados Unidos centrarse en su estrategia prioritaria de contención efectiva de China, y al mismo tiempo, mantener la cohesión de la alianza a través de una estrecha cooperación tecnológica en áreas de hardware como la construcción naval.

La sutil brecha estratégica entre China y Corea del Norte/Rusia, que existe detrás de la confrontación macro entre Estados Unidos y China, proporciona a Corea del Sur un espacio estratégico importante. Dado que China tiende a evitar principalmente la formación de bloques regionales que supongan una carga para su propia seguridad, Corea del Sur debe buscar puntos de contacto estratégicos teniendo en cuenta la posición de China. Al mismo tiempo, el núcleo de la estrategia que se alinea con los intereses nacionales de Corea del Sur reside en apoyar la expansión de la influencia de Corea del Norte y Rusia como palanca contra China, y en mitigar su asimetría frente a China.

El debilitamiento excesivo de la palanca de Rusia contra China redundará inevitablemente en beneficio estratégico de China, lo que intensificará la competencia entre Estados Unidos y China y aumentará la carga de seguridad de Corea del Sur.

∙ Por ejemplo, en 2012, Rusia elaboró un plan para la transición de sistemas de defensa aérea de S-400 a S-500. Tras la crisis de Crimea en 2014, la dependencia de Rusia de China se intensificó debido a las sanciones occidentales, debilitando la palanca de Rusia contra China. Esto condujo a la conclusión de la exportación de S-400, armas aéreas avanzadas que eran un viejo anhelo de China (2015). Y el despliegue de estas armas por parte de China cerca de la península coreana provocó una reacción estratégica en cadena que desencadenó el despliegue del THAAD por parte de Estados Unidos. Esto provocó un enfriamiento de las relaciones entre Corea del Sur y China y empujó a Corea del Sur a una crisis, exponiéndola en la vanguardia de la formación de bloques regionales.

∙ El actual acercamiento entre Corea del Norte y Rusia también refleja las consideraciones estratégicas derivadas de la creciente asimetría de estos dos países frente a China. Se debe prevenir el círculo vicioso en el que este acercamiento acelera la formación de bloques regionales y aumenta las tensiones militares, empujando a Corea del Sur al centro del conflicto entre bloques regionales.

Por lo tanto, Corea del Sur debe priorizar la restauración de las relaciones con Rusia. Debe asegurar una palanca en el proceso de mejora de las relaciones iniciando una comunicación preventiva antes de que termine la guerra ruso-ucraniana. Si la mejora directa de las relaciones con Rusia se ve limitada por las circunstancias, se deben utilizar y desarrollar activamente puntos de contacto multilaterales con países que comparten dilemas de seguridad similares frente a China, como Vietnam y Mongolia, que tienen fronteras con China. Esta es también una estrategia para formar un denominador común con los países vecinos de la región que están considerando aumentar su asimetría frente a China en una situación de creciente incertidumbre proveniente de Estados Unidos.

Además, basándose en estos esfuerzos multilaterales, se deben buscar mejoras en las relaciones con Corea del Norte, presentando así un punto de equilibrio efectivo contra la infiltración excesiva de influencia de China en Corea del Norte. Esto es significativo desde la perspectiva de Corea del Norte, ya que proporciona un marco y una justificación estratégica para redefinir los esfuerzos de mejora de las relaciones, cuya dinámica se ha agotado a nivel bilateral intercoreano. En particular, puede servir como un incentivo positivo al ser una medida efectiva para aliviar las preocupaciones estratégicas derivadas de la creciente dependencia de China. Nosotros también debemos perseguir una estrategia para dispersar y mitigar el problema de la asimetría frente a China, que es probable que se amplíe y profundice a medida que aumenta la incertidumbre proveniente de Estados Unidos, y para asegurar la autonomía de la diplomacia hacia Corea del Norte y la diplomacia del norte.

Para ello, Corea del Sur debe mantener un espacio estratégico a través de una lógica sofisticada que sea aceptable tanto para Estados Unidos como para China.

∙ La lógica hacia Estados Unidos debe centrarse en aumentar la eficiencia de la estrategia de China de Estados Unidos. Se enfatiza que la política del norte de Corea del Sur contribuye sustancialmente a la eficiencia de la estrategia de contención de China de Estados Unidos al reducir la dependencia de Corea del Norte y Rusia de China y aumentar su poder de negociación.

∙ La lógica hacia China debe centrarse en prevenir la formación de bloques regionales y aliviar las tensiones. Se debe enfatizar la diferencia entre los esfuerzos de los países de la región para mitigar su asimetría frente a China y la cohesión para el bloqueo de China centrado en Estados Unidos. Es decir, se argumenta que el fortalecimiento de las relaciones por parte de los países de la región previene la formación de bloques regionales, creando un esquema de alivio pacífico que reduce la carga de seguridad y militar que enfrenta China.

El objetivo de esta sofisticación estratégica es obtener la aquiescencia y la comprensión de ambas partes, Estados Unidos y China, como una "tercera opción". A través de esto, Corea del Sur podrá completar la base de una "estabilización preventiva" que defienda la autonomía y los intereses nacionales, sin ser consumida como la vanguardia de un bloque específico en medio de la incertidumbre del entorno de seguridad, como las posibles convulsiones geopolíticas árticas. El éxito de esta estrategia dependerá no solo de declaraciones estratégicas, sino también de si Corea del Sur puede asegurar la capacidad práctica de proporcionar a Estados Unidos el valor de un "socio de seguridad irremplazable" y a China y Rusia el papel de "equilibrador estratégico", basándose en su industria manufacturera y su avanzada capacidad tecnológica, como la construcción naval.

[1] Oficina de Información del Consejo de Estado de la República Popular China, "Política de China sobre el Ártico" Libro Blanco (Texto Completo). (26.01.2018) http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2018n/202207/t20220704_130568.html

[2] Se hace referencia a varios materiales relacionados con la navegación marítima mencionados en Lee Dae-sik, "¿Realmente se está abriendo el Ártico?", RIO No.9 (Edición de enero) Artículo Especial, (31.01.2025). https://www.rioins.kr/notice/notice1__list.html?bmain=view&uid=34

[3] Jeon Jae-woo, "Implicaciones Geopolíticas de "Fuerza de Siberia 2" entre China y Rusia", 『KIDA Security Strategy FOCUS』, Instituto Coreano de Investigación para la Defensa, (17.12.2025).

[4] Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Popular China, Declaración Conjunta de la República Popular China y la Federación Rusa sobre la Profundización de la Asociación Estratégica Integral de Asociación de Nueva Era en el 75º Aniversario del Establecimiento de Relaciones Diplomáticas (Texto Completo), (16.05.2024) https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240516_11305860.shtml La Cláusula 3 de esta declaración estipula: "Ambas partes entablarán un diálogo constructivo sobre la cuestión de la navegación de buques de la República Popular China a través del curso inferior del río Tumen para acceder al mar."

[5] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha y Jennifer Jun, "Progreso Significativo del Puente Carretero Corea del Norte-Rusia", Beyond Parallel. CSIS. 14 de octubre de 2025. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/significant-progress-of-the-north-korea-russia-road-bridge

■ Jeon Jae-woo_Investigador del Instituto Coreano de Investigación para la Defensa.

■ Responsable y Editor: Lee Sang-jun_Investigador del EAI

    Consultas: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr