[Global NK Commentary] China's 'Ice Silk Road' Strategy and its Geopolitical Implications - Proposals for Northern Policy

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Key Arctic-Related Mentions and Policy Documents

China's 'Ice Silk Road' (氷上絲綢之路) is more than just a rhetorical slogan; it is an official policy term reflecting the nation's explicit vision. This was externally formalized when the State Council Information Office of China published its first Arctic policy white paper, 'China's Arctic Policy' (中国 的 北极 政策) (hereinafter referred to as the 'White Paper') in January 2018, using the term.[1]The 'White Paper,' along with the 2017 report 'China's Antarctic Program' (中国 的 南极 事业), constitutes China's two major polar strategies.

Some domestic media tend to equate the 'Ice Silk Road' with the Arctic shipping route by adding 'one route' (一道) to the existing 'Belt and Road' (一带一路) initiative. However, this is difficult to interpret as an accurate textual interpretation. The 'Maritime Cooperation Vision for the Belt and Road Initiative' (一带一路 建设 海上 合作 设想), released in June 2017 by the National Development and Reform Commission and the State Oceanic Administration, proposed what are known as the 'three blue economic corridors' (蓝色经济通道), which are defined as follows:

∙ The existing Maritime Silk Road connecting China, the Indian Ocean, Africa, and the Mediterranean.

∙ A corridor connecting China, Oceania (Australia), and the South Pacific.

∙ A route traversing the Arctic Ocean and Europe, connecting China and Europe.

In other words, while the term 'one route' does include the Arctic shipping route, using it to refer solely to the Arctic shipping route can lead to an error in understanding China's expanded maritime governance strategy in a fragmented manner.

In November 2014, during his visit to Tasmania, Australia, President Xi Jinping boarded the icebreaker Xuelong (雪龙) to encourage the Antarctic expedition team, publicly declaring to both domestic and international audiences that the construction of a 'Polar Power' (极地强国) is an explicit national goal. At the time, President Xi stated, 'China's polar exploration endeavors have already achieved remarkable results,' and proclaimed that it is time to 'advance towards becoming a Polar Power' (我们要向极地强国进军), moving beyond the stage of a 'polar major country'.

In China's strategic discourse, 'major country' (大国) is a concept focused on outward, quantitative expansion such as increasing base facilities, expanding exploration scope, and augmenting budget allocation, whereas 'power' (强国), as seen in examples like maritime power, space power, and manufacturing power, represents the highest strategic aspiration to achieve qualitative advancement by mobilizing national capabilities. As of 2014, China had already obtained observer status in the Arctic Council (2013) and secured multiple bases in Antarctica, including the Great Wall (长城) and Zhongshan (中山) stations. Therefore, President Xi's remarks can be interpreted as a self-assessment of having achieved the status of a 'major country' in terms of input and participation, and a call for the next stage of qualitative leap based on these achievements.

Currently, China is actively pursuing specific tasks to achieve its 'power' goal, thereby increasing the intensity of its strategy:

∙ Technological Self-Reliance: Building indigenous state-of-the-art icebreakers and securing core technologies for deep-sea exploration.

∙ Governance Leadership: Strengthening its voice in international organizations such as the Arctic Council, moving beyond being a mere participant to becoming a 'Rule Maker.'

∙ Maximizing Practical Benefits: Securing tangible national interests through the commercialization of Arctic shipping routes and resource extraction, and pursuing sustainable development.

In 2015, Article 32 of the 'National Security Law' stipulated the protection of 'interests in polar regions, deep seas, and outer space' in addition to 'peaceful exploration and utilization.' This is considered a legislative measure that elevates the polar regions from objects of scientific exploration and economic utilization to the realm of national security.

At the 3rd Arctic Circle Assembly in 2015, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, through a video message, declared China a 'near-Arctic state' to the international community, emphasizing the justification for its involvement. Subsequently, the 2018 'White Paper' officially designated China as a 'near-Arctic state' and set core policy objectives for Arctic awareness, protection, utilization, and governance participation based on the principles of respect, cooperation, mutual benefit, and sustainability. The concept of 'near-Arctic' advocated by China, contrary to its impression, emphasizes not just geographical proximity but also the direct impact of climate and ecological changes in the Arctic on China, as well as its close economic interests. Furthermore, it is based on the logic that as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has a mission to safeguard global peace and security.

Furthermore, the 'White Paper' explicitly stated that China enjoys rights related to scientific research, freedom of navigation and overflight, fishing, laying submarine cables and pipelines, and exploration and development of seabed resources in the Arctic high seas, based on the international legal framework, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Concurrently, it formalized the construction of the 'Ice Silk Road,' an extension of the existing Belt and Road Initiative to the Arctic, and proposed the 'joint construction' with the international community of a new economic corridor connecting China and Europe via the Arctic shipping route.

This direction continues in the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). China has designated the deep sea, deep earth, and polar regions as 'three major strategic new frontiers' and has codified the acquisition of core technologies and expansion of influence in these areas. It specifically stated that the construction of a polar power is a subordinate execution goal and a key element for realizing a maritime power.

Recent developments are even more noteworthy. The White Paper 'China's National Security in the New Era' (新 时代 的 中国 国家 安全), released in May 2025 by the State Council Information Office, comprehensively integrates the Xi Jinping administration's 'holistic national security concept,' significantly expanding the scope of national security. In particular, the fact that Chapter 3, Section 4 addresses the protection of maritime rights and territorial integrity (领土 完整 性) together suggests that maritime interests are perceived on the same level as territorial sovereignty. While this is primarily aimed at the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas, it implies that as China's maritime interests expand to regions like the Arctic, the securing of maritime control may be emphasized as a justification for safeguarding national sovereignty. Consequently, this could lead to the justification of projecting maritime military power to protect its maritime interests, which warrants attention.

Achievements and Limitations of China's Ice Silk Road Strategy

Prospects for the economic value and viability of Arctic shipping routes are divided due to various variables such as the timing of ice melt and route prediction. However, there is broad consensus that the competitiveness of Arctic shipping routes will dramatically increase by 2050 at the latest. Accordingly, non-Arctic countries are also beginning to actively invest in and participate in Arctic-related activities.

While the overall volume of cargo on Arctic shipping routes is currently low in absolute terms, the growth rate is steep. The number of vessels operating, which was 1,298 in 2013, increased by approximately 37% to 1,781 in 2024, despite the geopolitical headwinds of the Russia-Ukraine war. During the same period, the total operating distance of these vessels more than doubled, from 6.1 million nautical miles to 12.7 million nautical miles, an increase of 108%.

Indicators demonstrating the acceleration of Arctic resource development are also clearly identifiable. The operating distance for bulk carriers increased by 233.7% from 139,000 nautical miles in 2013 to 450,000 nautical miles. The operating distance for gas carriers, which was nil in 2014, exceeded 870,000 nautical miles in 2024. Furthermore, its use as an international transit route has seen a significant increase, with the number of vessels increasing from 4 in 2010 to 97 in 2024, and cargo weight increasing from 100,000 tons to 3.1 million tons. These transit cargoes were identified as 95.2% crude oil from Russia to China (61.6%), bulk cargo (28.6%), and containers (2.6%). This suggests that the Northern Sea Route is effectively being reorganized into a monopolistic system with Russia as the origin and China as the destination.[2]

China's strategic investments are particularly concentrated in the energy sector, with over 90% of its total Arctic investments allocated to Russian energy projects. Chinese companies have not withdrawn despite the Russia-Ukraine war and continue to invest heavily in projects such as the Yamal LNG project. Additionally, China is expanding its influence by securing stakes in the 'Arctic LNG 2' project on the Gydan Peninsula through CNPC. Furthermore, with the agreement on the 'Power of Siberia 2' overland pipeline expected to be finalized in a legally binding Memorandum of Understanding in September 2025, geopolitical shifts surrounding the Arctic are anticipated to intensify.[3]

In terms of logistics and transportation, China is currently focusing on operating shipping routes and building vessels rather than constructing ports. The state-owned shipping company COSCO has maintained commercial operations every year during the ice-free season since 2013 and has accumulated indigenous icebreaker vessel construction capabilities through shipyards like Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding.

In the field of scientific research, the 'China-Iceland Aurora Observatory (CIAO),' opened by the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) in northern Iceland in 2018, can be considered a representative base. While China claims it is purely for scientific purposes, Western intelligence agencies strongly suspect it to be a dual-use facility capable of monitoring shipping routes and facilitating submarine communications.

However, China's advancement into the Arctic has not always been smooth. In Greenland, Shenghe Resources attempted to participate in rare earth mine development, but mining was disallowed following the 2021 general election results and security concerns from the United States and Denmark. Additionally, China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), a Chinese state-owned construction firm, bid for the expansion of three airports in Greenland, but this was also replaced by domestic capital in 2018 due to concerns about potential Chinese military base establishment, excluding China. Attempts to invest in an Arctic railway connecting Rovaniemi, Finland, and Kirkenes, Norway, were also abandoned due to local opposition and the Finnish government's assessment of insufficient feasibility.

These achievements and limitations demonstrate that China's 'Ice Silk Road Strategy' is situated within a complex geopolitical environment where economic opportunities intersect with security-related checks and balances.

Geopolitical Implications

Currently, approximately 80% of China's energy imports and a significant portion of its trade volume pass through the Strait of Malacca. Due to this structural vulnerability, China perceives the Arctic shipping route not merely as a commercial route but as an alternative strategic corridor to weaken U.S. maritime strategy and overcome the potential 'single point of failure' represented by the Strait of Malacca. While its limitations as an economic alternative to the Strait of Malacca are evident given the current volume of traffic on the Arctic route, its value as a 'critical emergency passage' during wartime or national emergencies is substantial.

Notably, the Arctic shipping route provides a path to bypass the U.S. naval forces and allied encirclement deployed along the South China Sea and Indian Ocean lines. Since a significant portion of the route falls within Russia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), it offers the advantage of being outside the operational range of the U.S. Navy, as long as strategic cooperation between China and Russia is maintained. However, this also entails a geopolitical cost, as it strengthens Russia's leverage over China, which holds the de facto key to the Arctic. If the Chinese navy secures northern access routes amidst increasing constraints on U.S. military power projection and operations in the East and South China Seas, the U.S. would face a strategic overload of having to significantly expand its existing encirclement to the Arctic region, potentially leading to a dispersal of the encirclement's density.

While there is currently no significant territorial dispute in the Arctic Ocean, the accelerating ice melt is becoming a seed for potential conflict. The emergence of new islands and the establishment of baselines as glaciers disappear, along with issues of continental shelf ownership due to glacial retreat and expanded deep-sea exploration, could emerge as strategic variables for the involved nations. The territorial competition between Russia, Denmark, and Canada over the Lomonosov Ridge, estimated to hold vast reserves of oil and gas, through the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), can be seen not as a resolution of conflict but as a preliminary skirmish.

China, which has no Arctic territory, opposes the monopoly of any single country and argues that the Arctic Ocean should be considered 'common heritage of mankind.' This is because maximizing the area of high seas is advantageous for securing space for intervention by non-Arctic countries like China. Conversely, coastal states such as Russia and Canada are increasingly seeking to strengthen sovereign control over Arctic waters, considering them their 'internal waters.' Currently, due to a lack of icebreaking capacity and the close ties between China and Russia, the U.S. is facing difficulties in conducting 'Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)' in the Arctic. Paradoxically, the very persistence of the need for such operations could introduce new instability into the Arctic security landscape.

Speculative Geopolitical Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1. Traditionally, U.S. security strategy has focused on two fronts, centered on the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, with the Arctic perceived as a 'natural fortress' protected by a thick ice sheet. However, rapid ice melt due to climate change is transforming the Arctic Ocean into a space where operations are possible year-round. This suggests that the Arctic, once the U.S.'s most secure strategic depth, is becoming a frontline for homeland defense.

The fact that seven of the eight Arctic Council member states (excluding Russia) are NATO members fundamentally creates a risk that the Arctic could become a geopolitical fault line where authoritarian and democratic blocs clash. In particular, the post-Russia-Ukraine war Western policy of isolating Russia has deepened Russia's dependence on China, which in turn has expanded China's access to the Arctic, turning the region into a site of complex security dilemmas involving the interests of the U.S., China, and Russia.

In terms of force projection, the melting of Arctic ice is creating new variables compared to the past. The deployment of weapon systems such as large-scale missile launch sites or radar bases, which were previously limited by unstable permafrost and ice, is now transitioning to an environment where permanent construction of air defense systems and hypersonic missile bases is possible as the bedrock is exposed. This is likely to lead to a competition to enhance early warning capabilities to secure 'golden time' for interception and to forward-deploy radar bases.

Furthermore, the submarine operating environment is also undergoing changes. In the past, submarine operations in the Arctic were constrained by the need to search for thin ice areas for missile launches. However, the accelerating ice melt means that these constraints are disappearing across vast areas of the Arctic.

However, these potential conflict factors do not necessarily lead to a new Cold War-like 'bloc formation' in the Arctic. The Arctic Ocean is a sanctuary where numerous sensitive Russian strategic assets are concentrated, and Russia is extremely wary of Chinese access to these assets. For example, the Kola Peninsula is home to Russian strategic nuclear submarine (SSBN) bases and nuclear facilities, and Russia maintains a highly restrictive stance on allowing China to collect data such as water temperature, salinity, and seabed topography, which are crucial for anti-submarine warfare intelligence.

Therefore, it is unlikely that Russia will easily accept the regular deployment of Chinese warships or their entry into the route under the pretext of protecting the Arctic shipping route. The fact that Russia was the most critical country towards China's accession as an observer to the Arctic Council in the past supports the underlying sentiment that Russia perceives China as a potential threat in this region. In essence, while Russia desperately needs economic cooperation with China, it is likely to exhibit strategic divergence regarding China's characteristic 'Belt and Road' approach of demanding port ownership and operational rights.

Hypothesis 2. For China, the route from Northeast China's three provinces through the Tumen River estuary directly to the East Sea is the shortest route to the Arctic Ocean. However, China is currently unable to use this passage and must endure strategic and economic inefficiencies by detouring to ports like Dalian or Qingdao, then proceeding north through the Korea Strait. Although the joint statement by the Chinese and Russian presidents in May 2024, which mentioned 'constructive dialogue' regarding the Tumen River, seemed to drive change,[4]North Korea and Russia immediately commenced construction of an additional road bridge near the existing 'Bridge of Friendship,' thereby strengthening their bilateral ties independently.[5] This signifies that the geopolitical obstacles China must overcome to secure the 'Tumen River estuary access' are formidable.

In other words, despite the superficial cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia, both Russia and North Korea are strongly resisting China's access to the Tumen River estuary for their own national interests. If the Tumen River estuary were opened, allowing China direct access to the East Sea, the value of Russian ports in the Primorye region would inevitably plummet. Therefore, by blocking the Tumen River estuary, Russia aims to guide the logistics of China's Northeast provinces to its own ports such as Vladivostok and Zarubino, thereby securing toll revenue and strategic leverage over China. Furthermore, from a security perspective, it seeks to prevent the situation where Chinese naval vessels operate freely in the East Sea and Sea of Okhotsk, which are considered its 'backyard.'

From North Korea's perspective, granting China access to the Tumen River estuary would be akin to economic and security 'self-harm.' If China gains direct access to the East Sea, the strategic value of North Korea's potential key foreign currency earner, the port of Rajin, would immediately diminish. Technically, the large-scale dredging of the Tumen River estuary and the construction of embankments would require the presence of Chinese heavy equipment and personnel on the front lines of the border, which could be an unacceptable security burden for the closed North Korean regime.

Therefore, the ideal scenario for North Korea is to block China's access to the Tumen River estuary, citing Russia's opposition and technical issues, while simultaneously inducing China to use the port of Rajin and demanding rental fees or energy support. Concurrently, it can seek to diversify its foreign currency earning channels by securing economic benefits such as increased labor quotas from Russia in return for cooperating with Russia to prevent China's access to the sea. Furthermore, it can employ a sophisticated 'bluffing' strategy by periodically leaking news of 'joint development of the Tumen River' among North Korea, China, and Russia to the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, thereby amplifying geopolitical uncertainty. This aims to instill in the U.S., South Korean, and Japanese authorities the perception that maintaining the status quo through the survival of the North Korean regime is a crucial measure to prevent the worst-case scenario of China dominating the East Sea. This ultimately translates into a 'raising the stakes' strategy to deter catastrophic military options against North Korea and enhance its strategic value.

Hypothesis 3. In the past, the United States enjoyed an overwhelmingly deep strategic depth, based on the vast oceans of the Atlantic and Pacific, as well as the formidable 'ice barrier' of the Arctic. However, the melting of the Arctic due to climate change is dismantling the natural barrier that protected its homeland, fundamentally altering the U.S. security environment. This consistent recognition of threats has been continuously reflected in various strategic documents, including the Arctic Policy Directive (2009), National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2013), and Arctic Strategy (2024). Notably, the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) in 2022 elevated the Arctic as a priority region for homeland defense.

The expansion of icebreaking capabilities to counter Arctic security threats, the modernization of the early warning radar system in Alaska, and the establishment of a multi-layered missile defense (MD) system inevitably require substantial financial investment. This cost burden, coupled with the U.S.'s 'new isolationism' or 'America First' stance, is highly likely to lead to the readjustment or reduction of budgets for overseas U.S. troop presence and the defense of allies. This, in turn, is likely to translate into demands for increased defense cost-sharing and a more active role in security responsibilities from allies, including South Korea.

Currently, it is presumed that the United States maintains a strategy of 'Bifurcated Response,' conceptualizing North Korea as a 'northern lock' to block China's access to the East Sea and South Korea as a 'southern net' to contain China's maritime expansion from a geopolitical perspective. However, this dichotomous framework is likely to increase security uncertainties over time unless a structural improvement in inter-Korean relations is presupposed. This is because if the two gears of South and North Korea rotate in opposite directions, the strategic intentions of the United States will face contradictory conflicts.

In other words, if the United States attempts to improve North Korea-U.S. relations while disregarding South Korea's position, the ROK-U.S. alliance is likely to fracture. Conversely, if the U.S. seeks to merely utilize South Korea as an outpost for containing China, it could paradoxically lead to China strengthening its economic and security influence over North Korea, thereby pressuring North Korea to fully open the 'lock' towards the East Sea, even setting aside the concerns and backlash from the South Korean public.

Ultimately, for the U.S. homeland defense strategy to be effective, a minimum level of peace and communication structure on the Korean Peninsula, where the 'northern lock' and 'southern net' can function organically, is essential. Furthermore, securing South Korea's strategic autonomy to drive and support this is also important.

Hypothesis Synthesis: Our Proactive Stabilization Strategy and the Redesign of Northern Diplomacy

South Korea must actively manage the risk of security entanglement arising from potential alignment, which could extend to the Arctic region, by sending a sophisticated strategic message to the United States. The core of the strategy is to highlight that South Korea can optimize the costs of U.S. regional intervention by proactively and autonomously controlling potential northern threats through the gradual improvement of inter-Korean and ROK-Russia relations.

Specifically, it must be emphasized that 'minimum communication and peace' on the Korean Peninsula are indispensable prerequisites for the organic functioning of the U.S.'s pursued 'northern lock (North Korea)' and 'southern net (South Korea).' The long-standing concern that improving inter-Korean relations could weaken the rationale for the presence of U.S. Forces Korea has already been largely offset by the U.S.'s 'neo-isolationist' stance and the trend of prioritizing homeland defense. Through this, an environment can be created for the U.S. to focus on its top strategic priority of effectively containing China, while simultaneously maintaining alliance cohesion through close technological cooperation in hardware sectors such as shipbuilding.

The subtle strategic divergence between China and North Korea/Russia, existing behind the macro-level confrontation between the U.S. and China, provides South Korea with significant strategic space. China tends to prioritize avoiding regional alignment that could burden its own security; therefore, South Korea must seek strategic points of contact considering China's position. Simultaneously, the core of a strategy aligned with South Korea's national interests lies in supporting the expansion of leverage for North Korea and Russia and mitigating their asymmetry with China, ensuring that their leverage against China does not weaken excessively.

An excessive weakening of Russia's leverage against China will inevitably lead to China's strategic benefit, intensifying U.S.-China competition and increasing South Korea's security burden.

• For example, in 2012, Russia formulated a plan to transition its air defense missile systems from the S-400 to the S-500. Following Western sanctions after the 2014 Crimean crisis, Russia's dependence on China deepened, weakening its leverage against China. This led to the conclusion of a deal for China to export advanced air defense missiles, the S-400 (2015), which had been a long-standing desire for China. China's subsequent deployment of these systems near the Korean Peninsula triggered a strategic chain reaction, prompting the deployment of the U.S. THAAD system. This resulted in the deterioration of ROK-China relations and pushed South Korea into a crisis, exposed at the forefront of regional alignment.

• The current close ties between North Korea and Russia also reflect strategic considerations stemming from the deepening asymmetry between these two countries in their relations with China. It is imperative to prevent a vicious cycle where these close ties accelerate regional alignment and escalate military tensions, pushing South Korea into the heart of conflict between regional blocs.

Therefore, South Korea must prioritize the restoration of relations with Russia. By initiating proactive communication before the end of the Russia-Ukraine war, it should secure leverage in the process of improving relations. If direct improvement of relations with Russia is constrained by the geopolitical situation, multilateral points of contact with countries bordering China and sharing similar security dilemmas with China, such as Vietnam and Mongolia, should be actively utilized and developed. This is also a strategy to form common ground with neighboring countries in the region that are contemplating an increase in asymmetry with China amidst growing uncertainties originating from the U.S.

Furthermore, based on these multilateral efforts, South Korea should seek to improve relations with North Korea, thereby presenting an effective balance against China's excessive penetration of influence into North Korea. This is significant from North Korea's perspective as it provides a strategic rationale and framework to redefine inter-Korean relations, which have lost momentum on a bilateral basis. It can also serve as a positive incentive, particularly as it offers a practical measure to alleviate strategic concerns arising from deepening dependence on China. Through this process, South Korea should pursue a strategy to seek the dispersion and mitigation of the asymmetry problem with China, which is likely to expand and deepen as uncertainties from the U.S. increase, and to secure autonomy in its North Korea and northern diplomacy.

To this end, South Korea must maintain strategic space through a sophisticated logic acceptable to both the U.S. and China.

• The logic directed at the U.S. should focus on enhancing the effectiveness of the U.S.'s strategy against China. It should emphasize that South Korea's northern policy contributes substantially to the effectiveness of the U.S.'s strategy to contain China by reducing North Korea's and Russia's dependence on China and increasing their negotiating power.

• The logic directed at China should focus on preventing regional alignment and easing tensions. It should highlight the difference between the efforts of regional countries to mitigate their asymmetry with China and the cohesion for U.S.-led containment of China. In other words, it should be argued that the strengthening of relations among regional countries actually prevents regional alignment, thereby creating a peaceful de-escalation framework that alleviates the security and military burdens faced by China.

The goal of this strategic sophistication is to elicit tacit approval and understanding from both the U.S. and China as a 'second-best option.' Through this, South Korea can complete the foundation for 'proactive stabilization' that safeguards national autonomy and interests, without being consumed as the frontline vanguard of a particular bloc amidst security environment uncertainties such as potential geopolitical upheavals originating from the Arctic. The success of this strategy hinges not merely on strategic declarations, but on whether South Korea can secure the practical capabilities to offer the value of an 'irreplaceable security partner' to the U.S. and the role of a 'strategic balancer' to China and Russia, based on its manufacturing and advanced technological capabilities in sectors such as shipbuilding.

[1] State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, "China's Arctic Policy" White Paper (Full Text). (2018.01.26.)http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2018n/202207/t20220704_130568.html

[2]Various maritime transport-related materials mentioned were referenced from Lee Dae-sik, “Is the Arctic Really Opening?”, RIO No.9 (January issue) Special Feature, (2025.1.31.). https://www.rioins.kr/notice/notice1__list.html?bmain=view&uid=34

[3] Jeon Jae-woo, "Geopolitical Implications of China-Russia's 'Power of Siberia 2'," KIDA Security Strategy FOCUS, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, (2025.12.17.).

[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, "Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Deepening the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a New Era on the Occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the Two Countries" (Full Text), (2024.05.16.) https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240516_11305860.shtml Article 3 of this statement stipulates: "Both sides will conduct constructive dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the matter of Chinese vessels sailing out to sea via the lower reaches of the Tumen River." (双方将同朝鲜民主主义人民共和国就中国船只经图们江下游出海航行事宜开展建设性对话)

[5] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun, “Significant Progress of the North Korea-Russia Road Bridge”, Beyond Parallel. CSIS. October 14 2025. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/significant-progress-of-the-north-korea-russia-road-bridge

■ Jeon Jae-woo_Senior Researcher, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

■ Responsible Editor: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr