[New Year Special Commentary Series] ① EAI's Top 10 Trends in International Affairs for 2026

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1. US-China Strategic Competition in 2026: Foreign Policy Shaped by Domestic Politics

The US-China strategic competition in 2026 will be a key variable defining the future world order and the security environment in the Asia-Pacific. This year, with both countries facing significant domestic political schedules, the US-China strategic competition will exhibit a pattern of stability amidst tension. The United States is focusing on economic recovery and revitalizing the middle class ahead of the midterm elections on November 3. To this end, the second Trump administration is pursuing a foreign policy strategy of tariffs, protectionist trade, attracting foreign investment, and limiting overseas intervention. While pursuing strategic competition with China, the US will seek negotiations for economic recovery through trade agreements, while preparing for the deterioration of US-China economic relations, including China's retaliatory tariffs and export restrictions on key minerals.

China, too, is pursuing both stability and performance across security and the economy ahead of the 21st Party Congress in 2027, which will determine whether President Xi Jinping secures a fourth term. President Xi has already normalized the prospect of a long tenure, presenting 'building a great modern socialist country' and 'completing the national security system' as long-term national development goals, not to mention his potential fourth term. While China will respond assertively on issues directly related to its core interests, such as the Taiwan issue, it will focus on strengthening its internal capabilities for building a modern power, thereby circumventing direct confrontation and friction with the US and expanding its international standing and influence.

2. US-China Competition for Maritime Dominance in the Western Pacific

As the US continues to militarily contain China, the gap in military power between the two countries in the Western Pacific is gradually narrowing. The naval power gap between the two nations, particularly around the First Island Chain, is shrinking further. China, seeing a weakening of the initial offensive by the second Trump administration, is expressing confidence in its military dominance within the First Island Chain. However, it is unlikely that psychological confidence based on Chinese nationalism will translate into actual strategy toward the US in the short term, leading China to consider the full-scale use of military force. This is because the stability of the South China Sea, a crucial maritime route for China as a continental and maritime power, is important for achieving China's goal of building a modern power. China will employ a long-term strategy of gradually expanding its overall maritime power in the Western Pacific while exerting diplomatic efforts to prevent numerous US allies or partners from forming an anti-China coalition.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration is fortifying US military bases and enhancing its survivability in response to China's strengthening military presence within the First Island Chain, while pursuing 'burden-shifting,' transferring the responsibility for conventional forward defense to allies such as South Korea and Japan. The US-China security competition is expected to intensify further, moving beyond simple arms buildups into a dual front of 'action-reaction spirals' involving the fortification of US bases in the First Island Chain and the blockade of supply chains to China.

3. China's Rise as a Nuclear Power and the Reshaping of the US-China Security Framework

China has recently shifted from a passive strategy towards nuclear weapons to a strategy of nuclear buildup. The US Department of Defense projects that China will increase its nuclear warhead stockpile to over 600 by 2025, to more than 1,000 by 2030, and to approximately 1,500 by 2035. China aims to solidify mutual assured destruction (MAD) by establishing a system that ensures retaliatory capability even after a first strike, based on its 'Early Warning Counterstrike (EWCS)' doctrine and approximately 350 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, thereby making it impossible for either side to initiate a nuclear attack first. The US perceives China's nuclear buildup not merely as defensive modernization but as a structural challenge aimed at achieving strategic nuclear balance with the US and weakening US resolve to intervene in conventional conflicts. It is anticipated that both the US and China will continue a nuclear arms race in the long term, with China focusing on enhancing its nuclear capabilities and the US on preventing China from achieving nuclear superiority.

4. Japan's Foreign and Security Strategy: Multilateral Cooperation and ROK-Japan Relations Amidst Dependence on the US and Pressure on China

Japan has been making concerted efforts to stabilize US-Japan relations since the beginning of the second Trump administration. However, the humiliatingly perceived US-Japan trade negotiations have led Japan to recognize that it cannot entirely rely on the US, which views alliances as transactional, for its security. Consequently, Japan is exploring multifaceted responses to the decline of US hegemony, including rebalancing toward a relationship of appropriate interdependence with the US, strengthening its own defense capabilities, expanding cooperation with like-minded countries (South Korea, Australia, NATO, etc.), and enhancing strategic communication with China. The deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations, triggered by Prime Minister Takaichi's remarks regarding Taiwan in November 2025, is complicating these efforts, and Sino-Japanese confrontation and China's coercive diplomacy are expected to continue into the new year. The worsening of Sino-Japanese relations is likely to push Japan towards strengthening its dependence on the US rather than reducing it, and it is also expected to act as a variable in efforts to build strategic solidarity with like-minded countries. Amidst the turbulent US-China relations, the Takaichi administration is likely to focus on managing ROK-Japan relations in a stable manner.

5. Upheaval in the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Order

The international situation in Southeast Asia surrounding the South China Sea will also become increasingly important in the future. Amidst intensifying US-China strategic competition along the first island chain in the Western Pacific, confrontations between the US and China and their allies are escalating in the West Philippine Sea. Concurrently, an "S-Quad (+)" is materializing, with Japan, Australia, and some NATO countries joining US-Philippines maritime patrols and exercises. This signifies the strengthening of an expanded security cooperation framework aimed at deterring China's maritime expansion in the South China Sea and maintaining freedom of navigation. Meanwhile, China is escalating its assertive gray-zone strategy in the South China Sea. With the Philippines, which has maritime territorial disputes with China, assuming the ASEAN chairmanship in 2026, maritime security is projected to become a key keyword for security in the Indo-Pacific region.

6. Diversification of Alliances and Proliferation of Multi-layered Multilateralism

Amidst the deepening of US and Chinese self-interest policies, bilateral and mini-lateral cooperation and alliances among regional countries in response are noticeably increasing, and this trend is expected to continue this year. Particularly, as the US weakens its security commitments to its Asian allies and security partners from a transactional perspective and disregards alliances, the importance of strategic alliances centered on regional countries is expected to further strengthen. The trend of inter-regional security cooperation, involving major European countries in addition to Asian nations, will likely intensify. For instance, the NATO-IP4 (South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand) is expected to be increasingly approached internally as a platform connecting Europe and the Indo-Pacific, regardless of US participation.

7. Europe's Strategic Autonomy and Shift in Foreign Policy

A second Trump administration perceives Europe as an increasingly detached partner in terms of security, economy, and values, while Europe views American unilateralism and the weakening of the transatlantic alliance as structural trends. Europe continues its efforts to maintain the transatlantic alliance while simultaneously strengthening NATO-centric defense capabilities and expanding military autonomy. With the ongoing threat from Russia even after the war in Ukraine, Europe is accelerating defense budget increases and the integration of defense cooperation within Europe, and is pursuing an economic security-focused policy toward China, recognizing China's low-price overproduction and infiltration into strategic industries as security threats.

Within this context, Europe's Indo-Pacific strategy is being reshaped around supply chains, defense industry, and technological cooperation, rather than military intervention. Europe seeks to strengthen practical linkages with Indo-Pacific nations to jointly protect security and industrial bases amidst US-China competition, and will consider South Korea a key partner alongside Japan and Australia. Europe's foreign policy in 2026 is expected to converge towards maintaining value-based diplomacy while actually placing greater emphasis on defending security and industrial competitiveness.

8. Persistent Global Economic Uncertainty: Tariff War 2.0 and US-China Trade Negotiations

From a global economic perspective, 2025 was a year marked by a tariff war initiated by the Trump administration. The Trump administration's comprehensive tariff negotiations, which spared neither allies nor friendly nations, led to the spread of protectionism. Throughout 2026, the uncertainty in the global economic order will persist in two aspects. First, 2026 is projected to be Tariff War 2.0. If the 2025 tariff war was a process of reaching intergovernmental agreements, 2026 may see conflicts and confusion surrounding the implementation of these agreements, and the possibility of new negotiations beginning. The US-South Korea fact sheet also contains provisions for a second round of trade negotiations, including agricultural products and digital trade. Second, the 2025 tariff war served as a prelude to US-China trade negotiations. Given that China today is not the same China as in 2020 when the Phase One agreement was reached, there is a high probability of greater uncertainty emerging from the 2026 US-China trade negotiations. In 2026, South Korea needs to prepare for the implementation of existing agreements with the US and negotiations in new areas amidst the macro-level changes of US-China trade negotiations.

9. New Fronts in the US-China AI Hegemony Competition

The war between the US and China over advanced technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, is expected to continue more intensely and in more diverse aspects this year. Thus far, the global AI competition has primarily focused on the development of frontier AI models. This year, as the utilization of AI begins in earnest with a focus on Agentic AI, more attention will be paid to experiments in AI diffusion across various sectors such as infrastructure, manufacturing, healthcare, education, and public domains that can support it. While the US holds an advantage in frontier AI technology, competition between the US and China will intensify in AI infrastructure and diffusion areas. Given that China possesses advantages and favorable conditions accumulated in various fields of artificial intelligence, it is likely that the US-China AI competition will evolve in differentiated directions rather than the US achieving unilateral and overwhelming dominance.

10. North Korea's 'Decision to Break Up' and Imagined Multipolar Order: South and North Korea and Foreign Policy Strategy After the 9th Party Congress

North Korea is highly likely to institutionally solidify its direction for inter-Korean and foreign policy at the 9th Party Congress scheduled for 2026. Kim Jong Un, General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, has already presented the outline in a speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in September 2025, and is expected to solidify the severance of inter-Korean relations into an irreversible structure by reflecting the 'two hostile states' theory proclaimed in December 2023 into the constitution and party bylaws. This is a reaffirmation of a path that fundamentally blocks dialogue and exchange with South Korea and justifies the use of force and territorial occupation if necessary. Although seemingly hardline on the surface, it is in fact closer to a 'self-defensive declaration of separation' signaling that North Korea will no longer seek an exit from the system competition with South Korea. It is also a response to the message that the institutionalization of US-ROK extended deterrence means that the use of nuclear weapons by North Korea will lead to the end of the regime.

Externally, North Korea is emphasizing the new Cold War and bloc confrontation to overcome sanctions and solidify its de facto nuclear-armed state status through solidarity with China and Russia. However, as China remains cautious about the term 'new Cold War,' North Korea, along with Russia, is prominently advocating the discourse of a 'just multipolar order.' At the 9th Party Congress, this perception is likely to be formalized as an official line, and limited dialogue may be suggested in US policy, focusing on nuclear disarmament rather than denuclearization. However, the bloc-centered multipolar order that North Korea anticipates has a low probability of realization, considering historical experiences and the realities of the international order. Ultimately, North Korea is entering a phase of formalizing a dual strategy: institutionally separating from South Korea and expanding the imaginative space regarding the world order. ■

■ In Charge and Editing: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Researcher
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr