[Evaluation of North Korea's 5-Year Economic Development Plan] ③ Economic Cooperation Between North Korea and Russia After the Russia-Ukraine War

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(This article is a revised and supplemented version of Kim Kyu-cheol and Nam Jin-wook (forthcoming), "The Impact and Implications of Close North Korea-Russia Ties on the North Korean Economy.")

1. Background

The deployment of North Korean troops to Russia demonstrated that the Russia-Ukraine War is a significant variable not only for European geopolitics but also for the Korean Peninsula. Early in the war, North Korea clearly expressed its pro-Russia stance, rare in the international community, by recognizing the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. In March 2024, Russia's veto of the extension of the UN Security Council's expert panel on North Korea sanctions weakened the existing sanctions monitoring system, raising concerns about potential sanctions evasion. As the war prolonged, relations between the two countries gradually deepened, centered on military and diplomatic cooperation. When Russia faced shortages of conventional weapons such as artillery shells, North Korea provided military supplies, and in June 2024, the two countries signed a treaty, effectively elevating their relationship to an alliance level. Subsequently, North Korea dispatched soldiers to Russia and has continued high-level cooperation in various fields, including economy, judiciary, and logistics.

North Korea and Russia are also consistently observed to be circumventing sanctions by complementing each other's deficiencies. Beyond providing conventional weapons and dispatching soldiers, North Korea is supporting Russia by sending laborers. Russia, in turn, is supporting North Korea by condoning the import of items banned by sanctions or allowing the export of petroleum products exceeding established limits.

In this context, objectively analyzing the reality of economic cooperation between North Korea and Russia and, based on this, exploring future policy responses is essential for understanding the geopolitical situation on the Korean Peninsula and designing policies toward North Korea and Russia. Therefore, this study analyzes the current state of economic cooperation between North Korea and Russia, the nature of their close ties, and their ripple effects using data. Specifically, it examines various external economic items such as foreign trade, dispatch of overseas workers, and tourism between the two countries, and evaluates the impact of cooperation related to military supplies production on the North Korean economy as a whole. Through this, it aims to understand the implications of the strengthened North Korea-Russia ties in the post-Russia-Ukraine war era on the surrounding environment of the Korean Peninsula and to provide a basis for future North Korea-Russia relations outlook and policy formulation.

2. North Korea-Russia Economic Relations: Focusing on External Economic Data

(1) Foreign Trade

To assess the importance of Russia as a trading partner for North Korea, this study analyzes trade volume and product composition. In terms of trade volume, Russia's share in North Korea's total trade is very low. Over the past decade, North Korea's exports to Russia have hovered around 1%, and imports have also been limited, mostly below 2%. In 2020, due to COVID-19, trade with China sharply declined, leading to an increase in imports from Russia, but the actual amount was not significant. While annual trade volume is reported to have slightly increased in the past two years due to border reopening and improved North Korea-Russia relations, its share in North Korea's overall trade remains in the 1% range. In contrast, China accounts for an absolute majority of both North Korea's exports and imports, representing 95% and 98% respectively as of 2024. This indicates that China remains North Korea's largest trading partner even after the Russia-Ukraine war.

In terms of products, Russia plays a limited role. North Korea's main export items are exported to China, not Russia, and the products exported to Russia, such as musical instruments and pumps, do not generate significant export revenue, making Russia an insignificant trading partner for North Korea from a foreign exchange earnings perspective. For imports, major items like food, consumer goods, and industrial intermediate goods are mostly sourced from China, and Russia's share is not substantial.

However, Russia plays a crucial role in energy and some key industrial goods, particularly refined petroleum products and industrial equipment for power plants. Russia's share in North Korea's refined oil imports is more than double that of China, indicating a considerable reliance on Russia for petroleum supply. Furthermore, a significant number of North Korean power plants were built based on Soviet technology and equipment, and related parts and equipment are reportedly procured mainly from Russia. In this regard, despite the small trade volume, Russia serves as an important trading partner for North Korea as a supplier of key items.

There are also reports of Russia providing food to North Korea following the recent close ties between the two countries, but the actual scale is difficult to ascertain due to the absence of official statistics. However, the sharp decrease in North Korea's food imports from China since 2024 supports the possibility of Russian food imports.

In summary, while trade between North Korea and Russia is limited in overall volume, Russia plays a crucial role as a partner in supplying key industrial goods and energy, which North Korea finds difficult to secure independently. Considering these characteristics, Russia can be assessed as a key country providing essential resources for the operation of the North Korean economy, exerting direct and indirect influence on North Korea's industrial and energy stability beyond mere trade volume.

(2) North Korean Overseas Workers

North Korea has long earned foreign currency by dispatching workers abroad. UN Security Council Resolution 2397, adopted in December 2017, required the repatriation of North Korean workers within 24 months, and officially prohibited the employment of North Korean workers from 2020. Nevertheless, reports indicate that North Korean workers are still active in various countries, including China and Russia. According to research, as of 2017, approximately 32,000 North Korean workers were staying in Russia, with about 70% employed in the construction sector. These workers were estimated to remit between $300 and $900 per month to the North Korean authorities, through which North Korea reportedly earned about $200 million in foreign currency annually.[2]

Since the North Korea-Russia summit in September 2023, the two countries have held two sessions of the Joint Economic Committee, during which the dispatch of North Korean workers to Russia and 'trainee' exchange programs were reportedly discussed as major agenda items. Considering past cases where North Korean students in Russia were mobilized for labor, the possibility of new methods for sending workers to circumvent sanctions cannot be ruled out. The U.S. Department of State, in its 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report, reported that approximately 150 North Korean workers were engaged in construction work in Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia as of January 2024, corroborating these circumstances.[3]

Furthermore, according to research, the 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty' signed in June 2024 between North Korea and Russia contains provisions suggesting prior preparation for the dispatch of North Korean workers to Russia. Article 14, which specifies 'persons sentenced to deprivation of liberty,' is interpreted as a clause considering the possibility of North Korean workers defecting, and Article 15 appears to establish a framework for regular cooperation between the judicial and public security agencies of both countries to jointly respond in the event of defections. The subsequent visits of high-ranking officials from North Korea's key public security and judicial agencies to Russia immediately after the treaty signing support this interpretation. Article 17 addresses not only human trafficking and extremism but also illicit funds and drug-related issues, reflecting an intention to prevent defections by high-ranking personnel or losses of foreign currency. Article 18, concerning information and communication cooperation, is analyzed as having the purpose of blocking the inflow of external information amidst expanded personnel exchanges between the two countries.[4].

While existing research and media reports provide a general overview of the scale and significance of North Korean workers dispatched to Russia, these accounts are based on unofficial information, limiting the ability to accurately determine their scale or trends. Therefore, this study aims to estimate the scale of North Korean worker dispatch more reliably by utilizing official entry and exit statistics released by Russia.

<Figure 1> Number of North Korean Nationals Entering Russia

(Unit: Persons)

Source: Federal State Statistics Service of Russia (https://www.fedstat.ru/organizations/?expandId=946881#fpsr946881).

Note: The 'Unclassified' category refers to the value calculated by the author by subtracting the sum of purpose-specific categories from the total sum.

<Figure 1> shows the number of North Korean nationals entering Russia, as provided by the Federal State Statistics Service of Russia. This statistic provides quarterly entry numbers from 2010 to the first quarter of 2025, along with detailed entry records by purpose of visit. According to the data, the average quarterly number of North Korean visitors to Russia from 2010 until the third quarter of 2017, before sanctions were fully implemented, was approximately 5,500. However, starting from the fourth quarter of 2017, the number of entries began to decrease, falling to 2,488 by the second quarter of 2018.

The purposes of visit are categorized as business, tourism, visiting relatives, transit, permanent relocation, and transport sector workers, with a total also provided. Interestingly, until the fourth quarter of 2018, the sum of visitors by specific purpose matched the total number of entries. However, from the first quarter of 2019 onwards, a discrepancy emerged between these two figures. This study designates this difference as 'Unclassified' and analyzes its trend. In 2019, the number of 'Unclassified' North Korean entries was 6,924, accounting for approximately one-third of the total 21,481 entries. During the period of border closure due to COVID-19, 'Unclassified' entries were zero. However, after the border reopened, they reappeared at 76 in the second quarter of 2023. A notable change occurred after the signing of the North Korea-Russia 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty' in the latter half of 2024. In the third quarter of 2024, 'Unclassified' entries numbered 3,767, and in the fourth quarter, 3,759, accounting for over 70% of the total entries. This indicates that a significant portion of North Korean nationals entering Russia at that time did so through means not classified under existing visit purposes.

UN Security Council Resolution 2397, adopted in December 2017, completely prohibited North Korean workers from being employed abroad, stipulating a two-year implementation period before full application from 2020. Considering that the discrepancy between the sum of visitors by purpose and the total number of entries in Russian statistics began in the first quarter of 2019, and the sharp increase in 'Unclassified' entries after the signing of the new North Korea-Russia treaty in June 2024, it is reasonable to classify these entries as North Korean workers dispatched to Russia.

In summary, despite the official prohibition of North Korean overseas worker dispatch due to international sanctions, official Russian statistics and various circumstances suggest that North Korean workers continued to be dispatched to Russia even after the sanctions were imposed. In particular, their numbers are estimated to have rapidly increased from the latter half of 2024, recovering to pre-sanction levels. As the war has prolonged, Russia has a greater incentive to accept North Korean workers, even at the risk of sanctions, due to severe labor shortages, while North Korea also utilizes this as a key means of foreign currency procurement, creating a situation where both sides' interests align. Furthermore, the 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty' signed by the two countries includes provisions on preventing defections and controlling personnel, indicating prior preparation for the expansion of North Korean worker dispatch to Russia. The possibility that North Korean soldiers dispatched to Russia may not return after the war and could be effectively converted into laborers for construction and infrastructure restoration is also being raised.[5] .

(3) North Korean Tourism: Focusing on Russian Tourists

As major export items were blocked due to sanctions, North Korea faced a foreign currency shortage and actively sought to revitalize its tourism industry as a solution. However, with the complete closure of borders due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the entry of foreign tourists was suspended, and the strategy of earning foreign currency through tourism also had to be halted. After North Korea declared victory in its COVID-19 quarantine efforts and reopened its borders, allowing foreign tourists to visit, it is noteworthy that the first tourists were Russians, not Chinese. Furthermore, in June 2025, the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Area, which Chairman Kim Jong Un has emphasized as a "project that stakes the nation's pride," was completed, and the Russian Ambassador to North Korea and embassy officials attended this event as special invited guests. This symbolically demonstrates the North Korean authorities' special attention to attracting Russian tourists. Despite these efforts, the number of Russian tourists visiting North Korea to date is still far below the level anticipated by North Korea.

<Figure 2> Number of Russian Nationals Entering North Korea

(Unit: Persons)

Source: Federal State Statistics Service of Russia (https://www.fedstat.ru/organizations/?expandId=946881#fpsr946881).

<Figure 2> presents the number of Russian visitors to North Korea from 2010 to the second quarter of 2025, categorized by purpose of visit, based on data from the Federal State Statistics Service of Russia. Russian visits to North Korea temporarily exceeded 8,000 in 2011, but from the mid-2010s until the border closure due to COVID-19, the number remained around 3,000-4,000 annually. After North Korea reopened its borders in 2023, the number of visitors showed a clear upward trend. In 2023, 1,238 people visited North Korea, and this number significantly increased to 6,469 in 2024. The upward trend continued in 2025, with 1,267 entries in the first quarter and 2,772 in the second quarter. Prior to COVID-19, personal visits such as visiting relatives and purposes related to transportation, like vehicle maintenance, accounted for a large proportion. However, the pattern has significantly changed since 2024, with a marked increase in tourism-related entries. The number of Russian tourists, which was only around 300-700 annually before the sanctions, increased to 1,957 in 2024 following the strengthening of North Korea-Russia relations, and this upward trend continued in 2025 with 262 entries in the first quarter and 1,673 in the second quarter. This change indicates that the North Korean authorities are actively pursuing Russian tourist arrivals as a crucial means of foreign currency earnings and are making significant efforts in this regard.

Can North Korea's tourism industry expect a boom due to the increase in Russian visitors? Experts generally hold a skeptical view. Firstly, it is pointed out that since a significant portion of Russian visitors to North Korea use air travel, it is difficult to substantially expand tourism demand in the short term. Furthermore, the Russian Far East, which is adjacent to North Korea, has a relatively small population and lower income levels, suggesting limited potential demand for North Korean tourism. Issues regarding the competitiveness of North Korean tourist destinations themselves are also persistently raised. Poor transportation infrastructure, low attractiveness as a resort destination, and short periods suitable for beach activities due to climatic conditions are cited as factors diminishing the appeal of the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Area, a representative tourist destination. Additionally, continuous surveillance and control over tourists are considered structural problems that reduce visitor satisfaction and lower the likelihood of repeat visits. These factors collectively suggest that the increase in Russian visitors alone is unlikely to lead to sustained growth in North Korea's tourism industry.

The general consensus is that to secure a significant amount of foreign currency through tourism, North Korea needs to attract Chinese tourists rather than Russian ones. According to statistics from the China National Tourism Administration, Chinese visitors to North Korea surged from 131,000 in 2010 to 207,000 in 2013, which is interpreted as a result of the Chinese government officially designating North Korea as a destination for group tours. Even before COVID-19, an estimated 240,000 to 270,000 Chinese tourists visited North Korea annually, and group tours by Chinese nationals have consistently been highlighted as a key factor in the success of North Korea's tourism industry. In contrast, as indicated by Russian official statistics, the number of Russian tourists visiting North Korea for tourism purposes appears unlikely to exceed 10,000 annually. This confirms the previous assessment that relying solely on Russian tourists will make it difficult for North Korea's tourism industry to achieve its foreign currency earnings goals.

3. Impact of North Korea-Russia Military Cooperation on the North Korean Economy

Historically, economic cooperation between North Korea and Russia has been known to be primarily focused on the military sector. There have been numerous media reports confirming North Korea's provision of military supplies such as artillery shells and missiles to Russia, and the revelation of North Korean troop deployment to Russia in June 2024 further underscored the centrality of military cooperation in their relationship. However, previous discussions on North Korea-Russia military cooperation have largely relied on circumstantial evidence, such as photographs of cargo ship and train movements, and lacked specific analysis on how this military cooperation has impacted the North Korean economy as a whole.

This study, therefore, combines data on the distribution of North Korean enterprises compiled by the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET)[6]with satellite-based nighttime light data, a widely used proxy indicator for economic activity. This approach allows for a quantitative and structural empirical evaluation of the ripple effects of North Korea-Russia military cooperation on the North Korean economy.

To determine when military supply cooperation between North Korea and Russia began in earnest, this study examined the frequency of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's visits to military factories using the "Kim Jong Un Public Activities Press Release DB" provided by the Korea Institute for Unification Studies.[7]The analysis revealed that Kim Jong Un visited military factories only once between 2020 and the first half of 2023. However, the frequency of such visits sharply increased from August 2023 onwards, a trend that continued steadily through the first half of 2025.

The visit of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to Pyongyang in July 2023 is considered a critical turning point. At the time, the U.S. Department of State assessed this visit as linked to efforts to secure weapons necessary for the Ukraine war, and indeed, evidence of North Korea providing weapons to Russia began to emerge in the latter half of that year. Considering the Russian Defense Minister's visit in July 2023, Kim Jong Un's frequent inspections of military factories thereafter, and the circumstances surrounding the provision of weapons to Russia, it is reasonable to interpret that the military supply cooperation between the two countries was formally agreed upon around July 2023, and North Korean military factories began operations accordingly.

According to research, North Korea's military factories primarily belong to the heavy chemical industry sector, with a particular emphasis on the chemical, electronics, and machinery industries.[8]This indicates that North Korea's military supply production base is structurally concentrated in these industries. Given these industrial characteristics, an expansion of North Korea-Russia military cooperation would likely have stimulated production activities in the heavy chemical industry and its sub-sectors first and most significantly. Conversely, industries with less connection to military supply production would have experienced relatively limited operational rates. Based on this background, this study tests the following hypothesis: "The strengthened North Korea-Russia military cooperation since the Russia-Ukraine war has led to a more active increase in industrial production in regions with a high concentration of military factories compared to other regions."

To examine the impact of military cooperation between North Korea and Russia on North Korea's regional economies, this study employed a methodology called the 'Bartik (shift-share) instrumental variable' approach. This technique is designed to analyze how external industry-specific shocks affect different regions by combining these shocks with the industrial structure of each region. First, based on data from 2010-2022 provided by KIET, the study analyzed the heavy chemical industry and military industry in each city, county, and district of North Korea.[9]The proportion of this in the regional economy was calculated. In other words, using information on the proportion of mentions of heavy chemical industry and military industry enterprises belonging to each region, regional 'heavy industry indices' and 'military industry indices' were calculated. These indices, along with nighttime light intensity, which can be considered a proxy for industrial activity, allow for a comparison of whether production activities actually became more active when military cooperation with Russia was strengthened, in regions where military-related industries are concentrated.

<Figure 3> Distribution of Industrial and Nighttime Light Intensity by City, County, and District in North Korea

The results examined through scatter plots are presented in <Figure 3>. The X-axis represents the proportion of mentions of heavy chemical and military industry enterprises in each city, county, and district, while the Y-axis represents the difference between nighttime light intensity in Q1 2025 and Q1 2020. The graph shows that the points are generally spread in the upper right direction, and the slope is also positive. This indicates that regions with a higher proportion of heavy chemical and military industries experienced a greater increase in nighttime light intensity in 2025 compared to 2020. Subsequent statistical analysis using an econometric model confirmed the same conclusion. Specifically, regions with a concentration of heavy chemical and military factories showed a significant increase in nighttime light intensity, with industries directly linked to the production of military supplies showing a greater positive effect than other heavy chemical industry sectors. This can be seen as empirical evidence that military cooperation between North Korea and Russia has not only involved simple military transactions but has also practically stimulated production activities in related industries within North Korea.

This time, the analysis was conducted at a more granular level than city/county, setting individual enterprises as the basic unit, to examine how nighttime light intensity changed after North Korea-Russia military cooperation. The core of this analysis is to evaluate how much benefit enterprises producing military supplies received from military cooperation. To this end, a hypothetical scenario (counter-factual) of 'what if there had been no cooperation?' was set up and compared with the actual changes. Specifically, first, data from both enterprises belonging to the heavy chemical industry and other enterprises were used to identify common influencing factors that enterprises received in the past. Based on this, it was estimated what changes enterprises belonging to the heavy chemical industry would have shown if there had been no North Korea-Russia cooperation. Finally, by comparing this hypothetical scenario with the actual changes in nighttime light intensity, it was possible to confirm how much North Korea-Russia military cooperation actually activated the corporate activities of the heavy chemical industry.

<Figure 4> presents the results of comparing the changes in nighttime light intensity of enterprises in North Korea's heavy chemical, military, and light industries with a hypothetical scenario of 'what if there had been no cooperation?', using the method described above. According to this, the activity levels of heavy chemical and military industry enterprises[10]were significantly higher than they would have been without North Korea-Russia cooperation. Specifically, nighttime light intensity began to rise immediately after the North Korea-Russia military cooperation, remained at a certain level for a period, and then surged significantly immediately after the signing of the new treaty between North Korea and Russia. The upward trend continued for some time thereafter before showing some stabilization in early 2025. In contrast, the nighttime light intensity of light industry enterprises showed a declining trend after the North Korea-Russia cooperation. This suggests that industries closely related to the daily lives of residents may not have received sufficient electricity supply compared to the military and heavy chemical industries. In other words, essential industries for residents' lives, such as food and beverage processing, can be interpreted as having been prioritized lower than military and heavy chemical-related industries by the North Korean authorities in terms of electricity supply.

<Figure 4> Trend of Nighttime Light Intensity by Major Enterprise in North Korea

<Table 1> shows the growth rates by industry in North Korea since 2020, as estimated by the Bank of Korea. According to the table, the heavy chemical industry showed a noticeable recovery in 2023 and 2024 in the growth trend of North Korean industries after COVID-19. In contrast, the light industry, which is closely related to the daily lives of residents, showed almost no change during the same period. While other factors such as border reopening may have contributed to economic recovery to some extent, the distinct gap in growth between the heavy chemical industry and the light industry is noteworthy. This suggests that the recent growth trend of North Korean industries has been significantly influenced by military cooperation with Russia. In other words, the expansion of military supply production has clearly contributed to the growth of the heavy chemical industry, but its effects have not spread to the civilian economy sectors such as the light industry, which is closely related to the daily lives of residents, aligning with the analysis of this study.

<Table 1> North Korea's Industrial Growth Rates

(Unit: %)

Source: Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (https://ecos.bok.or.kr/)

4. Conclusion and Implications

Synthesizing the results of the data analysis on North Korea's external economic relations with Russia, the following can be summarized. First, Russia's influence on North Korea's foreign trade is limited in terms of scale. Nevertheless, Russia continues to play a key supplier role for strategically important items such as petroleum products and power generation equipment. Meanwhile, due to the Russia-Ukraine war, labor shortages in Russia and North Korea's need for foreign currency have converged, leading to the dispatch of North Korean overseas workers despite international sanctions. This labor cooperation is likely to remain a core area of cooperation between the two countries even in the post-war period. In the tourism sector, North Korea is actively promoting the attraction of Russian tourists, but the contribution to actual foreign currency earnings remains limited to Chinese tourists, suggesting that the economic effects of North Korea-Russia tourism cooperation will be limited.

Several important implications can be drawn from the possibility that North Korea-Russia labor cooperation may continue even after the Russia-Ukraine war. The circumstances of North Korean workers being dispatched to Russia despite sanctions suggest the need to re-examine the effectiveness of sanctions and to closely manage remittance flows and foreign currency acquisition channels in third countries such as Russia. Furthermore, given the potential severity of the working conditions and human rights issues faced by North Korean workers dispatched to Russia, a strategy of urging human rights protection in cooperation with international organizations is also necessary. Additionally, as Russia will continue to require labor, technology, and infrastructure for its post-war reconstruction, the South Korean government could consider policies to encourage Russia to utilize South Korean technology and capital instead of North Korean labor. In particular, areas such as Arctic shipping route development, icebreaker construction, and port and logistics infrastructure expansion are fields that Russia is intensively pursuing for future growth and strategic competitiveness, where South Korea's shipbuilding and construction-related technologies and experiences could be usefully applied. From this perspective, economic cooperation with South Korea can be seen as a strategically unavoidable option for Russia, and if the Russia-Ukraine war ends and there is room for improvement in South Korea-Russia relations, it is necessary to consider policy options to reconfigure the South-North-Russia economic cooperation framework and encourage North Korea's return to dialogue.

The impact of North Korea-Russia military cooperation on the North Korean economy can be summarized as follows. Following the strengthening of cooperation in the military sector, production activities in regions concentrated with heavy industry and military industries have noticeably increased. In particular, the activity of factories producing military supplies directly related to the Russia-Ukraine war, such as artillery shells and small arms, has significantly increased, while light industry enterprises, such as food products, have become less vibrant, leading to a clear imbalance in industrial growth. This trend is also confirmed by the Bank of Korea's estimates of industrial growth rates, which show a distinct growth trend in heavy industries since 2023, while light industries have remained almost stagnant. This indicates that while North Korea-Russia military cooperation has contributed to strengthening production capacity in specific sectors such as military and heavy industries, its effects have not spread to the civilian economy as a whole. Consequently, North Korea's economic growth after North Korea-Russia cooperation has shown a biased structure centered on the military sector rather than a recovery of the overall industry.

The phenomenon of limited production expansion in industries other than heavy and military industries due to North Korea-Russia cooperation focused on military supplies clearly demonstrates the structural vulnerabilities and growth imbalances of the North Korean economy. Considering that sectors directly related to people's livelihoods, such as food, energy, and light industry, are relatively neglected due to military-centered economic growth in North Korea, the South Korean government needs to closely monitor civilian-related industries and economic activities within North Korea. To this end, it is necessary to utilize international organizations and various information channels to continuously assess the vulnerabilities in these sectors and establish a monitoring system capable of early detection of crisis signals that may arise in areas directly connected to the lives of residents. ■

[2] Lukin and Zakharova (2018).

[3] 『VOA』, "State Department Investigates North Korean Overseas Workers' 'Forced Labor' Conditions... Collecting Information on Human Trafficking", November 29, 2024.

[4] Ahn, Jeno (2024).

[5] Jeong, Eun-yi (2025).

[6] Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade (KIET), 'North Korea Industry and Enterprise DB' (https://nkindustry.kiet.re.kr/index.do)

[7] https://www.kinu.or.kr/nksdb/, This database classifies Kim Jong Un's activities based on reports from the Rodong Sinmun and Korean Central News Agency, providing information not only by date, accompanying persons, location, and title, but also by category such as observation, event attendance, on-site inspection, and military affairs.

[8] Oh, Kyung-seop et al. (2018).

[9] Refers to chemicals, metals, electrical, electronics, and machinery, which are sub-sectors of heavy chemical industries.

[10] Refers to factories classified as military factories in Oh, Kyung-seop et al. (2018) among the enterprises included in the KIET's North Korea Industry and Enterprise DB.

References

Kim, Gyu-cheol, Nam, Jin-wook, 『The Impact and Implications of Closer North Korea-Russia Ties on the North Korean Economy』, Korea Development Institute, Forthcoming.

Anzeno, "Issues and Ripple Effects of Human Rights Problems of North Korean Overseas Workers under the New Russia-North Korea Treaty," Issue Brief No. 597, Institute for National Security Strategy, 2024.

Oh, Kyung-seop, Kim, Jin-ha, Han, Byung-jin, and Park, Yong-han, "Causes and Status of North Korea's Military-Economic Over-expansion," KINU Research Monograph 18-23, Korea Institute for National Unification, 2018.

Jeong, Eun-i, "Why Does Russia Prefer North Korean 'Soldier Laborers'?," Online Series 25-32, Korea Institute for National Unification, 2025.

Lukin, Artyom, and Liudmila Zakharova, “Russia-North Korea economic ties: is there more than meets the eye?,” Orbis 62.2, 2018, pp.244-261.

VOA, "State Department Investigates Reality of North Korean Overseas Workers' 'Forced Labor'... Collecting Information on Human Trafficking," 2024.11.29.

Federal State Statistics Service (https://www.fedstat.ru/organizations/)

Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade 'North Korea Industry and Enterprise DB' (https://nkindustry.kiet.re.kr/index.do)

Korea Institute for National Unification, Kim Jong Un Public Activities Press Release DB (https://www.kinu.or.kr/nksdb/)

Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System (https://ecos.bok.or.kr/)

■ Kim, Gyu-cheol_Senior Researcher, Global and North Korean Economy Research Division, KDI School of Public Policy and Management.

■Lee, Sang-jun_EAI Researcher

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