Evaluation of North Korea's Five-Year Economic Development Plan: II. Policy Adjustments in the 'Five-Year Economic Development Plan' as Seen Through the Plenary Meetings of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee

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1. Introduction

The 'Five-Year National Economic Development Plan' (hereinafter referred to as the 'Five-Year Plan'), presented at the 8th Party Congress in 2021, was announced in a completely different environment compared to the 'Five-Year National Economic Development Strategy' (hereinafter referred to as the 'Five-Year Strategy') from the 7th Party Congress five years prior. At the time of the 'Five-Year Strategy' announcement in 2016, the Rodong Sinmun described it as an ambitious growth strategy, calling it a 'brilliant blueprint for accelerating the final victory of our revolution.'[1] The strategy at the time emphasized large-scale investment in heavy industry and aimed to fully establish the 'Our Style Economic Management Method,' which grants a certain level of management autonomy to enterprises and cooperative farms. Externally, it pursued a strategy of expanding foreign capital attraction centered on over 20 special economic zones. This policy direction can be seen as having been influenced by the relatively favorable economic conditions of the first half of the Kim Jong Un regime (2012-2016), driven by market expansion and increased trade.[2]

However, the domestic and international environment rapidly deteriorated following the announcement of the 'Five-Year Strategy.' In response to successive nuclear and missile tests in 2016-2017, the UN Security Council imposed stringent economic sanctions, the effects of which became fully apparent from 2017 onwards. Attempts to ease sanctions through inter-Korean and inter-Korean-US summits were thwarted by the collapse of the Hanoi North Korea-US summit in 2019. Subsequently, from 2020, unprecedented border closures were implemented due to the COVID-19 pandemic, plunging the North Korean economy into a severe recession comparable to the 'Arduous March' of the past.

As can be seen in <Table 1>, the economic situations at the time of the 'Five-Year Strategy' announcement and the 'Five-Year Plan' announcement are starkly contrasted. In the four years preceding the announcement of the 'Five-Year Plan,' the average trade volume decreased to approximately $3.1 billion, half of the previous period, and economic growth rate shifted from positive to -2.9%. Furthermore, the government's budget revenue growth rate also decreased by 1.6 percentage points, indicating a worsening fiscal situation. Consequently, the role of the 'Five-Year Plan' was significantly reduced to a 'consolidation and reinforcement' strategy centered on self-reliance and self-sufficiency.

<Table 1> Average of Key Economic Indicators for the Four Years Preceding the Announcement of the Five-Year Plan and the Five-Year Strategy

Source: Trade volume and economic growth rate from Statistics Korea's North Korea Statistics; budget revenue from Lee Jong-gyu (2022)

This study aims to evaluate the progress of the 'Five-Year Plan,' pursued under such domestic and international constraints, by focusing on the discussions held at the plenary meetings of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee. During the Kim Jong Un era, the Party's official decision-making bodies have been restored,[3]and particularly, the plenary meetings of the Central Committee have functioned as key policy adjustment bodies during periods when Party Congresses are not convened. Plenary meetings are attended by all members and candidate members of the Central Committee. While six such meetings were held during the 7th term, there have been a total of 13 meetings during the 8th term, held twice annually (June and December) after the 8th Party Congress.[4] Generally, the June plenary meeting serves as an interim review of the first half's performance, while the December plenary meeting focuses on the annual performance evaluation. Therefore, the outcome reports presented at the plenary meetings are crucial data for understanding not only North Korea's self-assessment of its policies but also the process of policy adjustment in response to changes in the domestic and international environment.

Based on these plenary meeting discussions, this report examines how economic policies and their directions have changed in response to domestic and international environmental shifts, divided into three periods as shown in <Table 2>. The first period is when the self-reliance line was strengthened following the intensification of economic sanctions and the failure of the Hanoi talks (late 7th term to early 8th term). During this period, under the judgment that sanctions were inevitable in the long term, state control over the distribution sector, which was central to market development, was intensified, and the self-sufficient economic line was further emphasized. The second period is when state control was strengthened amidst the COVID crisis (mid-8th term), with intensified control across society and the economy, and the plenary meetings primarily focused on emergency epidemic prevention measures. The third period is when the focus of economic policy shifted to local development policies (late 8th term). The prolonged pandemic and the continuation of control-oriented policies likely accumulated fatigue and dissatisfaction among the populace, which may have contributed to the emphasis on local economies. Meanwhile, North Korea may have gained some room to address the urban-rural gap, a structural problem, after securing a certain level of economic support from Russia as a reward for military support during the Ukraine war, leading to closer North Korea-Russia relations. This process of change demonstrates that the 'Five-Year Plan' was not a fixed set of goals but was adjusted in response to changes in the domestic and international environment. The following sections will examine the adjustment process of the 'Five-Year Plan' in detail, focusing on the decisions from the plenary meetings of each period.

<Table 2> Summary of Plenary Meeting Discussions and Changes in the Domestic and International Environment

2. Plenary Meeting Discussions by Period

1) Period of Strengthening Self-Reliance (Late 7th Term - Early 8th Term)

In the North Korea-US summits held twice in 2018 and 2019, the core agenda consistently demanded by North Korea was the lifting of sanctions. This indicates that the sanctions had a significant impact on the North Korean economy. UN Security Council resolutions adopted successively from 2016 completely banned the export of anthracite coal, iron ore, and textiles, which accounted for 90% of North Korea's exports, and also prohibited the dispatch of North Korean laborers abroad, a major source of foreign currency. These measures effectively made it impossible to secure funds necessary for economic development. Resolution 2397, adopted by the Security Council in 2017, was particularly a decisive obstacle to the implementation of the 'Five-Year Strategy.'[5] This resolution completely banned the export of capital goods essential for the reconstruction of heavy industries such as machinery, metals, and electrical/electronic components to North Korea. In fact, statistics on North Korean imports from China show that imports of major capital goods, including machinery, electrical/electronic equipment, and transport machinery, have almost ceased since 2018. Chairman Kim Jong Un assessed at the 8th Party Congress that the achievements of the 'Five-Year Strategy' were 'far below expectations in almost all sectors,' which is interpreted as being partly due to disruptions in heavy industry investment caused by the blockage of capital goods imports.

The 'Five-Year Plan' presented at the 8th Party Congress, in this context, largely inherited the policy direction from the decision document of the '5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee (December 2019).[6] The policy direction presented at the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee can be summarized in two main aspects. First, the 'State Distribution System Reinforcement Policy' was pursued with the intention of improving fiscal conditions amidst prolonged sanctions.[7] The plenary meeting emphasized 'strengthening the state's unified leadership and management' and set 'the restoration of the state commercial system and socialist commerce' as key tasks. This direction continued at the 8th Party Congress with the slogan 'strengthening the state's unified leadership and strategic management of economic activities,' and at the subsequent 2nd Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee (February 2021), it strongly criticized 'units that neglect the Party's decisions and directives and acts of self-interest,' ordering intensified control. This is interpreted as a warning against Party, military, and cabinet-affiliated enterprises using their privileges to engage in independent foreign trade or pursue profits by linking with the market. This centralized distribution control was materialized through the expanded operation of grain distribution centers in the grain sector and state-run stores in the consumer goods sector. Since the distribution sector was the most market-oriented area in North Korea, these measures led to a contraction of market activities. In other words, it can be assessed as a retreat from the economic policies of decentralization and marketization that were key drivers of economic growth in the first half of Kim Jong Un's rule.

Second, the self-reliant economic line was strengthened. In the report of the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee, Chairman Kim Jong Un emphasized, 'All Party organizations and officials must bear the grave mission entrusted by the era and strive for the frontal breakthrough to shatter the enemy's sanctions and blockade schemes with the power of self-reliance.' This sentiment continued at the 8th Party Congress, where it was declared that 'the basic seed and theme of the Five-Year Plan are self-reliance and self-sufficiency.' While the self-reliant economic line is North Korea's fundamental economic policy aimed at minimizing foreign trade and establishing a complete domestic production base, its importance was further emphasized in the 'Five-Year Plan.' Specifically, 'localization of raw materials, fuel, and equipment' and 'self-sufficiency in food' were set as core tasks.[8] Along with the slogans of self-reliance and self-sufficiency, terms such as 'eradication of import dependency,' 'localization,' 'resource conservation,' and 'mobilization of labor' were mentioned, which can also be interpreted as a political message demanding that non-strategic sector enterprises and ordinary citizens endure hardships in a situation of trade blockade due to sanctions.[9]

2) Period of Intensified State Control Amidst the COVID Crisis (Mid-8th Term)

From 2021, as the COVID-19 pandemic prolonged, North Korea's top national priority became emergency epidemic prevention. Although the 8th Party Congress only mentioned it as a 'response to the global health crisis,' the 4th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee designated COVID-19 emergency epidemic prevention as the 'number one national priority,' emphasizing it as a 'most critical task that must be carried out vigorously without the slightest complacency, oversight, or loophole.' Under this directive, high-intensity quarantine policies were implemented, significantly exacerbating the difficulties in people's lives. With lockdowns implemented at the household, production, and business unit levels, collective quarantine life became routine, ironically creating an environment conducive to the spread of other infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and waterborne illnesses (Han Ha-rin, Lee Dae-eun, 2022). Based on media reports and testimonies from defectors, the livelihoods of those engaged in fishing or relying on small-scale farming appear to have rapidly deteriorated due to the prohibition of work and entry into mountainous areas, based on unscientific quarantine guidelines suggesting that COVID-19 could be transmitted through wind, dust, and seawater.

Another notable feature in the plenary meeting decisions during the COVID period is the pronounced emphasis on rural issues. In particular, the report of the 4th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee devoted more than one-third of its discussion to rural issues. The 'New Era Rural Development Theses' were adopted at the meeting, which is symbolically significant as it is the second set of rural development theses presented since the 'Theses on the Socialist Rural Question of Our Country' in 1964. The widening gap in living standards and economic conditions between urban and rural areas following the spread of marketization appears to be the main background for the adoption of these theses, reflecting accumulated relative deprivation and dissatisfaction among farmers. This is relatively clearly reflected in the content of the theses. While the previous 'Socialist Rural Theses' focused on alleviating the urban-rural gap through support from developed urban areas to underdeveloped rural areas, the 'New Era Rural Development Theses' explicitly acknowledge the structural severity of the urban-rural gap and emphasize balanced and simultaneous development across society.[10]Specifically, the plenary meeting presented the 'Rural Village Remodeling Project' as a task requiring special emphasis and declared the full-scale promotion of 'rural housing' construction. According to the Rodong Sinmun on February 2025, approximately 80,700 housing units have been built in about 1,500 rural villages over the past three years, and it was reported that over 20,000 more units are currently under construction, confirming that this policy is being pursued as a key national project.[11]Alongside this, a rural support policy was announced, which includes the complete exemption of debts owed by cooperative farms to the state that have not been repaid.[12]Meanwhile, the 4th plenary meeting identified the 'complete resolution' of the food problem through increased agricultural output as a key project. This appears to be based on the judgment that a food base is essential for regime maintenance amidst an economic downturn caused by sanctions against North Korea and the COVID-19 shock.

Following its declaration of the end of COVID-19 in August 2022, North Korea began presenting more specific economic goals and achievements through its plenary meetings. At the 6th plenary meeting of the 8th term, '12 important goals' were newly presented. This can be seen as a strategy of selection and concentration, focusing goals on key areas due to the significant practical constraints in simultaneously growing all industrial sectors during an economic crisis. Subsequently, at the 9th (December 2023) and 11th (December 2024) plenary meetings, the achievement rates of the '12 important goals' were reported, with the main contents presented in <Table 3>. North Korea claimed that the annual production targets (compared to the beginning-of-year targets) for the '12 important goals' were met in both 2023 and 2024. This generally aligns with the Bank of Korea's estimated economic growth rate for North Korea, which shifted from negative growth from 2020-2022 to positive growth of 3.1% in 2023 and 3.7% in 2024. In particular, when announcing its 2024 growth rate estimate for North Korea, the Bank of Korea explained the background of growth by stating that 'manufacturing, construction, and mining significantly increased due to the promotion of domestic policy projects such as the Five-Year Plan for National Economic Development and the '20x10' policy for regional development, as well as the expansion of North Korea-Russia cooperation internationally'.[13]

However, considering that detailed targets and development directions for key industries such as metals and chemicals have not been presented since 2024, it is judged that a limited strategy focused on core sectors, rather than balanced development across all industries, is being further strengthened.

<Table 3> Economic Sector Achievements Reported at the 9th and 11th Plenary Meetings

3) Transition to Regional Economic Development Policy (Late 8th Term)

Starting in 2024, North Korea's economic policy has rapidly shifted its focus to 'regional economy.' The starting point was the '20x10' policy for regional development presented by Chairman Kim Jong Un in his policy speech at the 14th Supreme People's Assembly in January 2024. This plan aims to modernize all cities and counties in the country within 10 years by constructing 20 modern local industrial factories each year. Considering that there are 211 regions (as of 2011) at the level of cities, counties, and districts, which are North Korea's basic administrative units, this can be evaluated as a large-scale national project that effectively covers the entire country. In August of the same year, Chairman Kim Jong Un inspected construction sites for local factories and instructed that the construction of 'three essential facilities'—including hospitals and other healthcare facilities, complex cultural facilities, and grain management facilities—be carried out concurrently with factory construction. At the subsequent 11th plenary meeting of the 8th term (December 2024), this policy was defined as 'a policy that is being vigorously pursued as the Party's significant political issue and greatest long-cherished aspiration, considered the foremost revolutionary task.' In reality, 20 sites were selected as the first year's targets in 2024 and completed in 2025, and 21 new regions have been selected for construction in 2025. Most of these are factories producing light industry products such as food, daily necessities, processed seafood, and furniture.[14]

While the content of the regional development policy itself is important, what warrants more attention is why regional economies have emerged as a policy focus at this particular juncture. Diverse interpretations are being offered regarding the background of the promotion of 'Regional Development 20x10,' the core of regional economic development policy. A number of studies point to the exacerbation of social instability due to the widening urban-rural gap as its background.[15]This interpretation suggests that since Kim Jong Un came to power, the economic gap between Pyongyang and the regions has widened, leading to serious political concerns about growing discontent among regional residents and a subsequent weakening of control. In response, regional development policies were pursued. The widening urban-rural gap is confirmed by various surveys. According to the North Korean Social Change Survey conducted by the Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, 'farm workers' were identified as the 'poorest occupation in North Korea' in all surveys from 2013 to 2020. Furthermore, UNICEF's 2017 MICS (Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey) data shows that households in the bottom 20% of household assets accounted for only 0.4% in Pyongyang, compared to 63.2% in Yanggang Province. This problematic awareness is also confirmed in official statements by the North Korean authorities. In January 2024, at the expanded Political Bureau meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea,[16]Chairman Kim Jong Un stated that 'the failure to adequately supply even basic daily necessities to regional residents is a serious political problem,' and defined the resolution of the gap between the center and the regions as a 'political struggle task that must be carried out.'

On the other hand, the possibility of capital and material inflows due to the expansion of North Korea-Russia economic relations is also raised as another background for the promotion of regional development policies.[17]In his speech at the groundbreaking ceremony for a factory in Seongcheon County in February 2024, Chairman Kim Jong Un mentioned, 'The state will fully guarantee the funds, labor, cement, and steel required for factory construction,' suggesting that financial resources secured through military and economic cooperation with Russia could be utilized for regional development policies. Considering that North Korea, which has faced long-term economic constraints due to international sanctions and COVID-19 border closures, has begun to seriously pursue the construction of regional industrial factories requiring substantial capital and materials, the possibility that some resources secured through the so-called 'war boom' have been injected into regional development policies cannot be ruled out.

Can regional economic development policies actually improve the lives of regional and rural residents? According to the expanded Political Bureau meeting, the construction of regional industrial factories is being pursued with the central government guaranteeing funds, materials, and equipment, and mobilizing soldiers for construction labor. In the short term, it appears that the burden on residents during the construction process is not significant. However, considering the precedent where the North Korean authorities have imposed various extra-budgetary burdens such as patriotic grain contributions and fund donations when necessary, there is a possibility that the burden on residents will increase in the future during the construction and maintenance of regional factories. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the newly constructed regional factories will be able to operate stably. According to a survey by the Ministry of Unification, 47.2% of respondents reported factory operating rates below 60% between 2016 and 2020, an increase of 17 percentage points compared to the previous five years (30.3%).[18]Given that existing factories are already facing difficulties in normal operation due to shortages of raw materials and electricity, further observation is needed to determine if new regional factories can operate stably.

Regional economic-centered policies are also likely to affect the implementation of the 'Five-Year Plan.' To date, the 'Five-Year Plan' has been pursued by concentrating limited resources on key tasks through selection and focus. However, if national resources are concentrated on the construction of regional industrial factories and related facilities, there may be adjustments or burdens in the implementation of the '12 Major Goals,' which are key tasks of the existing 'Five-Year Plan.'[19]

3. Conclusion and Future Outlook

This report analyzes how the 'National Economic Development Five-Year Plan' presented at the 8th Party Congress in 2021 has been adjusted in response to changes in the internal and external environment, focusing on the discussions at the plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. The analysis was divided into three periods based on the nature of the plenary meeting discussions and changes in policy direction. In the first period (late 7th term to early 8th term), the line of self-reliance and self-sufficiency was fully advocated against the backdrop of the failure of the Hanoi summit and the prolonged sanctions. During this process, state control over distribution was strengthened, and the economic policies of the early Kim Jong Un era, which aimed for marketization and decentralization, are assessed to have regressed to some extent. In the second period (mid-8th term), as the COVID-19 pandemic prolonged, emergency quarantine measures emerged as the top priority for state operations, and control over society and the economy was maximized. Discussions at the plenary meetings during this period focused on rural issues, leading to the adoption of the 'Rural Development Program for the New Era,' which can be seen as a strong response to the accumulated urban-rural gap and farmer discontent. In the third period (late 8th term), North Korea's economic policy shifted towards a regional economy-centered approach. The full-scale promotion of the 'Regional Development 20x10' policy is interpreted not merely as a change in industrial policy, but as a political choice to alleviate the accumulated social instability resulting from prolonged control and economic hardship. This period, in particular, is also a time when the close relationship between North Korea and Russia, following the war in Ukraine, created an environment where North Korea could expect a certain level of financial and material support. These changes in external conditions may have acted as background factors enabling the pursuit of large-scale policies such as reporting the achievement of the '12 Major Goals' and the construction of regional industrial factories.

Through the policy adjustment process described above, the crisis and opportunity factors facing North Korea become clearer. Currently, North Korea's greatest crisis factor is the increasing social instability, particularly in regional and rural areas. The strengthening of state control over the distribution of food and goods, along with stringent COVID-19 quarantine measures, appears to have amplified discontent, especially in rural areas, which are the most vulnerable segments of North Korean society. Based on media reports and defector testimonies from the post-COVID-19 period, acts of changing one's status from farm worker to laborer to escape rural realities, or using bribes to move to urban areas, have become widespread. Furthermore, the number of unregistered individuals working without affiliation in gold mines, coal mines, and construction sites after leaving farms to make a living has increased, suggesting a weakening of control over rural society. These phenomena indicate that instability in regional and rural areas has accumulated during and after the pandemic, and can be interpreted as a significant background for the introduction of the 'Rural Development Program for the New Era' and the 'Regional Development 20x10' policy. Meanwhile, the strengthening of economic cooperation between North Korea and Russia is acting as an opportunity factor for North Korea. The increase in production in the heavy industry sector, centered on military goods production, is partially reflected in the Bank of Korea's estimates of North Korea's economic growth rate. Although the goals of the 'Five-Year Plan' have been scaled down to the '12 Major Goals,' the reported achievement of these goals for two consecutive years in 2023 and 2024, and the fact that the construction of regional industrial factories, which requires substantial resources, could proceed as planned, suggest some level of support from Russia.

At the 13th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee, held in December 2025, Chairman Kim Jong Un evaluated that 'the economic development goals for this year, along with the Five-Year Plan, have been completed.' He also designated 2025 as a 'historically transformative year that has charged the momentum to break through the final line (boundary) of the Five-Year Plan execution and move to a new stage.'[20]Considering these remarks, it is likely that the new economic plan to be presented at the 9th Party Congress will place growth targets more prominently. At the same time, given that the 20 cities and counties targeted for the regional development policy were finalized at this plenary meeting, it is expected that the regional development policy will be included as a core project and actively pursued in the next economic plan. However, the crisis and opportunity factors mentioned from the 8th term are highly likely to remain significant variables even after the 9th Party Congress. Close observation will be needed in the future to determine whether the currently pursued regional development policies can actually contribute to alleviating instability in regional and rural areas and restoring central control. Meanwhile, North Korea-Russia relations, which have acted as an opportunity factor, also remain a crucial variable that will shape the direction of North Korea's economic policy going forward. This is because the scale and nature of economic benefits North Korea can obtain through the war may change depending on whether peace negotiations for the war in Ukraine proceed.

[1] Lee Seok-ki, 2021.

[2] Hong Je-hwan, Kim Seok-jin, 2021.

[3] Kim In-tae, 2025.

[4] At the 8th Party Congress, 139 members and 111 candidate members of the Party Central Committee were elected.

[5] Kim Seok-jin, 2021.

[6] Lee Seok-ki, 2021.

[7] Choi Ji-young, 2024.

[8] Hong Je-hwan, Kim Seok-jin, 2021.

[9] Lim Soo-ho, 2021.

[10] Song Hyun-jin, 2024.

[11] Rodong Sinmun, 2025.2.18.

[12] Measures to alleviate the financial burden on cooperative farms were also introduced at the time of the 'Socialist Rural Theses' announcement in 1968. At that time, Kim Il Sung decided to completely abolish the agricultural in-kind tax from 1964 to 1966. The agricultural in-kind tax on cooperative farms was a tax where a certain percentage (25-27%, actually 30%) of agricultural products produced by farmers was mandatorily paid to the state.

[13] Etoday, 2025.08.29.

[14] Kim Du-hwan, 2025.

[15] Lee Sang-geun, 2024; Cho Dong-ho, 2024; Han Ki-beom, 2024.

[16] The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea is the executive body of the Central Committee, responsible for the daily policy decisions and implementation of the Party. The supreme decision-making body of the Workers' Party is the Party Congress, which has been convened approximately every five years since Kim Jong Un came to power. During the periods when the Party Congress is not in session, major Party affairs are managed by the plenary meetings of the Central Committee, and Party affairs between plenary meetings are handled through Political Bureau meetings. Expanded Political Bureau meetings are held with the participation of not only Political Bureau members but also lower-ranking officials such as alternate Political Bureau members. Political Bureau meetings typically include Political Bureau meetings (expanded meetings), the Political Bureau Presidium, and Political Bureau consultations. A total of 23 such meetings were held during the 7th term, and 30 meetings as of May 2025 during the 8th term. Kim In-tae, 2025.

[17] Lee Sang-geun, 2024.

[18] Ministry of Unification, 2024

[19] Yang Moon-soo, 2025

[20] Tongil News, 2025.12.12.

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■ Jeong, Seung-ho_Professor, Department of Northeast Asian International Trade and Logistics, Incheon National University.

■ Contact and Editing: Lee, Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr