[EAI-MOFA Roundtable] ① 新冷戦と変化するグローバル・地域秩序

YouTubeリンク : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kjFCBZ76Lz0

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最近、同僚と共編した『新冷戦と地域の再編（The New Cold War and the Remaking of Regions）』という本が出版されました。この本の多くの章の中で、シンガポールの同僚が書いた中国に関する章は特に興味深いです。

トランプ政権の誕生以来、新帝国主義や新重商主義といった概念が再び浮上し、これは第二次世界大戦以降存在してきた自由主義的国際秩序とその根幹をなす貿易体制の混乱とともに現れました。

その結果、大国間の新たな形態の競争が再現されています。これを冷戦と呼ぶことに抵抗を感じる人もいますが、たとえ激しい戦争でなくとも、紛争の様相は多様であり得ます。私たちが経験している転換期に関して、何かが起こっていることは確かです。

新冷戦秩序の本質と特徴

しかし、これは不確実な時代であり、歴史的にも次の競争ラウンドが現れるまでには、このような時期が何度かありました。アミタブ・チャクラバーティの「マルチプレキシティ（multiplexity）」という概念に着想を得て、これは単なるマルチプレキシティを超えたものです。これは本質的に、マルチプレキシティとマルチポラリティが組み合わさった混合的な秩序と言えます。したがって、第一に、この秩序の本質は、米国と中国という二つの先導国とその他の国々との格差が、世界の経済力および軍事力の構造の30～40％に達するまで、この状態を維持することでしょう。

したがって、これは転換期であり、最初の冷戦は広範な競争を特徴としていました。封じ込め政策と完全な断絶があり、世界中で代理戦争が繰り広げられました。この新たな冷戦は非常に分散的であり、イデオロギー的な境界線はもはや明確ではありません。イデオロギーは依然として重要ですが、二つの陣営に分かれるわけではありません。むしろ、西側の自由主義的秩序の内部で最も大きなイデオロギー的議論が繰り広げられています。

しかし、はっきり言えることは、第二位、第三位のプレイヤーが、最初の冷戦時代よりも今日、はるかに多くの主導権を持っているということです。これは、状況の暗さにもかかわらず、最初の冷戦ほど悪くはならないだろうという希望を与えます。今日、相互に交差する制度的構造が存在します。

G20、BRICS、上海協力機構、そしてある程度はクアッド（Quad）も存在し、これは多様なプレイヤーが交流する機会があることを意味します。民主主義理論を研究する人々は、ロバート・ダールの相互交差的亀裂の概念を国際秩序の文脈に適用できます。また、中国が歴史的に、台頭する大国の本質的なレベルほど修正主義的でないことも重要です。むしろ、現時点では、既存の大国からより多くの修正主義が現れています。これは一種の機会であり、

第二位の国々に交流の機会を提供し、ある程度利益を得させます。したがって、これは多極的で多重的な冷戦と言え、各国はそれぞれの限界内で最大限にゲームをしています。現在、米国、ロシア、中国という三つの主要大国は、影響圏という規範を復活させようとしており、これは大国の特徴です。これに反対する規範は、主権平等と領土保全です。

これが世界の残りの国々が真に望む規範であり、これは現在議論の対象となっています。これらの議論は歴史的なものです。事実、ヨーロッパ協調体制以降、大国は権力を自らの手に集中させようとしてきました。そのため、協調体制にはわずか五つの大国しかおらず、世界の残りは発言権がありませんでした。国際連盟体制では若干の改善がありましたが、サンフランシスコでの国際連合（UN）創設会議で状況が変わりました。

約50カ国が国連創設に参加し、二層構造が作られました。総会は影響圏と大国の地位に特別な役割を付与しました。しかし、総会は主権平等をもう一つの規範として受け入れました。

したがって、大国が影響圏の規範を推進する際、これは亀裂線の最前線にある周辺国に多くの困難をもたらします。ウクライナは間違った場所にあり、したがって、そのような国々はどのように行動すべきか慎重にならなければなりません。トランプにとっても同様です。三つの大国すべてが影響圏の規範を追求しており、これは国際秩序にとって大きな挑戦です。ご存知のように、米国の外交政策は最近、国家安全保障文書で劇的な変化を遂げました。

既存大国の破壊的役割と衰退への懸念

This document came out after I wrote my paper, but it seems to reinforce some of my arguments. It has a destructive element in many ways. Usually, it's the rising powers that destroy the international order, but here it's actually the established powers, fearing their decline, that are playing a destructive role.

So "Make America Great Again" is not just a domestic project but an international one, facing the fear of decline. This is problematic because this decline is not properly captured in the discussion of this topic, which is mostly domestic. I blame comparative political scientists for not bringing in the international factors properly. This paper talks about creating a new great power condominium, but I predict it will fail.

Let me say boldly here, the reason is that it expects reciprocity from the two rival powers. But those two powers will not play this game according to American interests or concepts. They may play along, as in the détente of the 1970s, but they have their own strategies. They want to overtake the US, and this is the big problem. The second problem is that this paper does not mention the word 'crisis.' International politics is often driven by unplanned crises. The war in Ukraine, for instance

was not planned. It happened, and the reason is that everyone has their own grand strategy. So, non-great powers have some... yes. Trump's policies assume restraint from Russia and China. What if they do not exercise restraint as Trump thinks? I think this is a big question mark for everyone involved. Second-tier powers have played historically important roles. This was very clear during the first Cold War. So, today the regional order

is being driven by the rise of non-great powers and the pursuit of strategic autonomy

is in transition, undergoing several changes. I want to emphasize three points. First, the formation of great power-led alliances is more difficult, except for existing ones like South Korea or Japan. Rising great powers have little incentive to join alliances unless they are directly threatened by another great power. China has pursued hegemony indirectly through gray-zone means, not through large-scale overt aggression, so many countries have no reason to join anti-China military alliances, unlike the great powers of the European industrial era.

Second, economic interdependence remains high. Although interdependence between the US and China has decreased, many countries remain heavily reliant on Chinese markets and supply chains, even though they are being weaponized by both sides, and this will continue. Third, the agency of non-great powers has increased. Economic growth and globalization have enhanced the bargaining power of second-tier powers in particular.

Despite some deglobalization, many countries are pursuing strategic autonomy with considerable success. So the world is multipolar. Multipolarity can emerge if China and the US continue to gain more advantages. But by 2030, India, Indonesia, and Brazil are expected to surpass several Western economies. India has already surpassed the UK in 2022, which has significant implications. Finally, what are the implications for the Korean Peninsula?

Geopolitical implications for the Korean Peninsula and strategic challenges

The Korean Peninsula is at the intersection of competing great power interests and is highly vulnerable to external interference. South Korea, in particular, faces the risks of entrapment and abandonment within its alliance with the US. However, the rise of China presents additional strategic challenges that clearly also offer opportunities for Seoul. In the past, there was no point in engaging with the Soviet Union or China, but this is no longer the case. So the clear message here is how to develop the capacity to play the game without falling into the trap of this great power conflict.

This is clearly a trap. And I think there is also the issue of how much you can rely on alliances. But alliances are still necessary. I am very clear about that. But economic interdependence with China could potentially be useful to mitigate the possibility of abandonment. Achieving a denuclearized North Korea seems difficult without peaceful communication.

North Korea considers nuclear weapons essential for regime survival. So regime deterrence and regime survival, and state deterrence or the deterrence of the state are confused. For North Korea, the regime is the state. This is the biggest challenge we face. So confidence-building measures can be the first path. Develop the idea of a no-first-use principle, and deterrence should be reinforced by other mechanisms, such as reconfirmation. So there is a big difference from historical precedents.

Realistic constraints of nuclear non-proliferation and priority of crisis prevention

Nuclear non-proliferation. I have written about this topic. South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are cases that occurred in unique circumstances, from which not much guidance can be drawn. The experience of Ukraine, in particular, has likely reinforced North Korea's skepticism about so-called security guarantees. Given these realities, nuclear non-proliferation seems impossible without regime change, which currently seems far-fetched. Therefore, the priority should be on crisis prevention, arms control-oriented confidence

building, freezing nuclear and missile development, exploring no-first-use pledges and de-escalation measures. Let's look at comparative insights from South Asia. South Asia also demonstrates the difficulties of nuclear confidence-building between continuously competing states. Pakistan, as a weaker state, relies heavily on asymmetric strategies under the nuclear umbrella, while India is increasingly challenging these actions. The Korean Peninsula should avoid a similar dynamic by pursuing phased confidence-building measures (CBMs). For example,

the risks of nuclear acquisition and the potential for amplifying regional instability

hotlines, crisis stability measures, military exchanges, and incremental disarmament. Currently, there are considerable voices arguing that South Korea, Germany, and Japan should acquire nuclear weapons to enhance their stability. However, I argue that nuclear proliferation would severely undermine the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and risk triggering major crises, at least in the early stages of nuclear acquisition, as happened in the Indian subcontinent. You will recall that the Kargil War was a direct consequence of nuclearization.

China would strongly oppose nuclearization by Japan and South Korea, which could undermine its regional military advantages. It does not want to see an equal, a nuclear-armed equal, which grants it equal standing in strategic negotiations.

Peace process on the Korean Peninsula and securing strategic autonomy

Nuclear weapons provide existential security. However, they do not guarantee stability, and there is a paradox of stability. Thus, the paradox of stability and instability will be further exacerbated in this context. Therefore, the cost-benefit calculation of nuclear acquisition needs to be considered. I will end my presentation here. We need to consider a multilateral peace process involving South Korea, China, and the US. These actors are entangled in this process. The best strategy at this point is to avoid becoming a victim of the great power game as the Cold War enters this Korean Peninsula

and becomes a pawn. Therefore, maintain as much agency as possible. Maintain as much strategic autonomy as possible. Good luck.