[评论] 中国、特朗普与全球秩序的未来

YouTube 链接：https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pd6YxrGafi4&si=GQsLObjo1WoDgJkB

视频脚本

Let me jump straight to Question 1. In your book, you discuss ‘how great powers justify their actions using certain principles.’ China often does this by invoking sovereignty and non-interference, but sometimes selectively applies these principles. From your expertise, could you neutrally describe how China justifies its actions, and I’m curious whether this pattern of using certain principles is a consistent strategy or if it creates a confusing message that could affect how other countries perceive China’s intentions.

China’s Rhetorical Strategy and UNCLOS

I think China is sending a confusing message. But most countries send confusing messages, because often, if not more often, when they talk about principles, they do so strategically to support their own positions or to undermine the positions of others. So it’s not surprising that we see China selectively invoking the principle of sovereignty, but other countries do this as well. Now I want to talk specifically about China and UNCLOS, which I think is really interesting because it leads to the strategic use of rhetoric. On the one hand, China rejected the 2016 UNCLOS ruling concerning the Philippines. But what’s interesting is that it explicitly claims to accept the principles, even while rejecting the ruling. So when you look at the rhetoric that China puts forth to justify this,

it says that UNCLOS is simply a ruling driven by power politics. It points to the rules of the United States, which is not a party. So it says that the United States and the Philippines are playing power politics. We accept and respect international law, but we reject its application in this case. I’m not suggesting anyone is being sincere. But what is the point of this? And I would say the point is to achieve its goals in the South China Sea, on the one hand, but also to show that it is acting within the institutions. Does this convince everyone? Absolutely not. But it doesn’t have to convince everyone. It just has to not give them a reason to react strongly. So I think it’s really interesting that China is playing power politics, but everyone is playing power politics, and China is still trying to show itself as a responsible actor within the institutions.

Features of the Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy

within the institutions. >> Okay. Second question. Different question. We have different takes on how President Trump’s foreign policy operates. One idea is that Trump is dividing the world into spheres of influence where great powers exert their influence. Another idea is that Trump’s foreign policy is personal, based on his own interests. A network of loyalists, not a grand strategy plan, as you put it. So you described President Trump’s foreign policy first as a spheres of influence approach, and later, very interestingly, as neo-royalism, which is closer to personal rule and monarchies. Given your research, do you think President Trump’s foreign policy is about personal interests, or do you think it is still about dividing spheres of influence among great powers?

I really like this question. And I’m very honored that people can read my work and get something out of it. When I wrote my piece on great power collusion in Foreign Affairs, I wanted to address why, despite years of rhetoric about great power competition, Trump was suddenly acting in ways that seemed to undermine American political mobilization, that is, his willingness to abandon Ukraine or to make deals at the expense of American interests. My point here is that Trump sees the world as full of deal makers, and what he wants to do is have a system where he colludes with like-minded, often powerful men to advance their interests.

One of the things I said at the end of that piece was that there were some overlaps with the Concert of Europe. That is, the idea that there are great powers, and they work together and make deals. But I also noticed that there were parts that departed from it. And one of the biggest was that the Concert of Europe, while not perfect, and let me be clear, most of the leaders at the time believed they were acting in the collective interest, and that they were advancing the interests of their countries and of Europe as a whole. One of the things I said was that I don’t see those long-term collective interests in this mode. So when I sat down with my co-author, Abe Newman, to write a second piece, in some ways it works out. If this is not about collective interests, then what is it? And so we began to develop that this is not about the collective interests of states or peoples, but about what we call the neo-royalist clique. This clique is a network of sovereign leaders, and the capital and institutions that support them. And ultimately, they are willing to make deals, not to mobilize for the interests of the state, but for a much more extractive politics, that is, if it actually delivers wealth and prosperity. Wealth and prosperity for individuals, not for the state. And we also see states responding to this. I’m talking to you. In Seoul. And one of the examples we’ve been using recently is the crown gifting. People, yes. Unfortunately, our allies and partners are learning pretty quickly that one way to interact with this clique is through the symbols of flattery and royalty.

Okay. I have two follow-up questions. One is that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that we are moving from a bipolar to a multipolar world. So when we talk about a multipolar world, do you think it’s sustainable without some fundamental norms, as we observed in the Concert of Europe? Even though it’s a multipolar world, there should be some more cooperative norms behind the multipolar world, not simply a system of balance of power that is adversarial. But people are just saying we’re moving to a multipolar world. Do you think it’s sustainable? I think any system, whether it’s unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, needs some kind of norms to organize activity. This doesn’t necessarily mean strong liberal norms that tell states how they should behave. I’m talking about a very basic level of understanding what is appropriate behavior. Understanding how to interpret the behavior of everyone else. And this is very basic. So that you don’t escalate in unintended ways. And this can be seen even in more adversarial situations. The Soviet Union and the United States, it’s hard to say they had shared norms, but they did have shared understandings and practices about how to behave. They had the opportunity to develop this over a decade or two. For example, you can see this in the practice development after the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was too close for everyone. It’s about weapons of mass destruction. So yes, we will need to develop some practices that allow these states to survive.

So based on your answer to the first question, do you think there’s a possibility that the US and China can find common ground?

The Sustainability of Multipolarity and Norms

I hope so. And I think this is what I worry about. I actually think there was a lot of effort toward this, even amidst increasing great power competition in 2016 and 2017. There was a lot of discussion about the possibility of accidental escalation. We tried to establish some basic practices for how to manage interactions, for example, in the South China Sea, to try to prevent this. And I feel that this has decreased considerably, especially post-COVID. I hope it picks up again. I think it can pick up again, but everyone needs to know that it’s not about getting along, but it’s about ensuring that there is room for peaceful change and interaction. >> Well, on neo-royalism, reading your article, I was wondering whether the origins of neo-royalism are in President Trump’s personal characteristics or if it’s more structural, after President Trump is gone in 2028. Because we talk about democratic backsliding in many places.

You mentioned that there are some similarities with the Concert of Europe. The concept that great powers cooperate to solve problems. But this also means that there are some differences in the process of reaching consensus.

One of the biggest differences is that the Concert of Europe, while not perfect, and let me be clear, most of the leaders at the time believed they were acting in the collective interest, and that they were advancing the interests of their countries and of Europe as a whole. One of the things I mentioned was that these long-term collective interests do not work in this system. So when I started working on a second paper with my co-author, Abe Newman,

we began to explore the question of what constitutes this system if it’s not about collective interests. So we began to develop the idea that this is not about the collective interests of states or peoples, but about the collective interests of what we call the ‘neo-royalist click.’ This clique is composed of a network of sovereign leaders, as well as capital and the institutions that support them. And ultimately, they are not mobilizing for the interests of the state,

but are willing to make deals for a much more extractive political system. And I think unfortunately, this is the reality that we are seeing. This also connects to the next question, national security strategy, the emphasis on extraction. If it actually delivers wealth and prosperity, they are willing to make deals. Wealth and prosperity for individuals, not for the state. We also see states responding to this. I am talking to you. In Seoul. And one of the examples we’ve been using recently is the crown gifting. It is unfortunate that our allies and partners are learning pretty quickly that one way to interact with this clique is through the symbols of flattery and royalty.

Given that I am talking to you in Seoul, one of the examples we’ve been using recently is the crown gifting. It is unfortunate that our allies and partners are learning pretty quickly that one way to interact with this clique is through the symbols of flattery and royalty.

US-China Relations and Finding Common Ground

I have two follow-up questions. First, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo once mentioned that we are moving from a bipolar to a multipolar world. So when we talk about a multipolar world, do you think it’s sustainable without some fundamental norms, as you observed in the Concert of Europe? That is, even though it’s a multipolar world, there should be some more cooperative norms behind the multipolar world, not simply a system of balance of power that is adversarial. But people are just saying we’re moving to a multipolar world. Do you think it’s sustainable?

I think any system, whether it’s unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, needs some kind of norms to organize activity. This doesn’t necessarily mean strong liberal norms that dictate how states should behave. I’m talking about norms at a very basic level, understanding what is appropriate behavior, understanding how to interpret the behavior of everyone else. This is the minimum standard to avoid unintended escalation. So not escalating when it’s unintended.

This can be seen even in more adversarial situations. It’s hard to say that the Soviet Union and the United States had shared norms, but they certainly had shared understandings and practices about how to behave. They had the opportunity to develop this over a decade or two. For example, you can see this in the practices that developed after the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was a situation that was too close for everyone. It’s about weapons of mass destruction. So we will need to develop some practices that allow these states to survive.

Based on the first question, do you think there’s a possibility that the US and China can find common ground?

I hope so. And I think this is what I worry about. I actually think there was a lot of effort toward this, even amidst increasing great power competition in 2016 and 2017. There was a lot of discussion about the possibility of accidental escalation. We tried to establish some basic practices for how to manage interactions, for example, in the South China Sea, to try to prevent this. And I feel that this has decreased considerably, especially post-COVID. I hope it picks up again. I think it can pick up again, but everyone needs to realize that it’s not about getting along, but it’s about ensuring that there is room for peaceful change and interaction.

Structural Causes of Neo-Royalism

Speaking of neo-royalism, reading your article, I was wondering whether the origins of neo-royalism are in President Trump’s personal characteristics or if it’s more structural, after President Trump is gone in 2028. Because we talk about democratic backsliding in many places.

states. This is something that Trump and I talk about a lot. Our concern is that while many of these issues stem from Trump personally, there are also other figures like Erdogan, Putin, Orbán, and Bolsonaro (when he was in power). But we think that beyond these individuals, there is an idea that there are structures that allow powerful individuals and wealthy elite networks to maintain power. For example, in the United States, there is significant AI investment currently driven by networks originating in the Gulf states. Once the infrastructure is built, it cannot simply be removed. So my concern is whether the infrastructure, as it becomes internalized, continues to foster those types of responses, and whether those elites combine with other institutions and groups to gain legitimacy.

Yes. They have an entire narrative for why these people are special and continue to be fit to rule. The more this solidifies and becomes more deeply rooted in society, the more likely it is to be seen as order rather than a temporary phenomenon. The last question is about the new national security strategy that the Trump administration just released. There’s a lot of discussion about this in South Korea as well.

Because it outlines a very general, long-term plan for what the US government should pursue in the future. In this plan, the US places a lot of focus on rebuilding its own economy, and doesn’t mention competitors like China very much. China is mentioned 21 times in the document, but more in terms of economics than military deterrence. So in South Korea, there’s a lot of discussion about the changes in US-China competition. What are the changes in US-China competition,

and what should South Korea do if the US plays a less leading role in Asia? Also, there is no mention of North Korea at all. So I don’t think North Korea is a high priority in the thinking of the Trump administration. Do you see any implications for this?

如果美国在亚洲扮演领导角色的意愿减弱，韩国应该怎么做？其中也没有提及朝鲜。因此，我认为朝鲜问题在特朗普政府的考量中并非优先事项。您认为这会带来什么影响？

This is definitely not a document about great power competition. It’s barely a document. It says a lot about national interests and security, but it’s hard to see it as a clear security document. There is no mention of North Korea, and no mention of Iran, other than a reference to an operation last summer.

Yes. It’s very focused on creating a world that extracts wealth and generates prosperity, and definitely not conflict. What’s most important for South Korea is the discussion that South Korea needs to be a security partner that bears the burden. It has responsibility for security issues in many respects. And also for issues concerning Taiwan. It has responsibility to deal with any situation related to Taiwan, and it expects to be able to delegate that responsibility.

What does this mean? I think one of the big questions that all of the US’s strategic partners are asking is, since the end of the Cold War, all parties have invested a lot in what I call a ‘strategy of entanglement.’ We have inevitably entangled each other’s security.

In the early Trump administration, there was a sense that this would pass, that the US would come back and be rational, and that public goods would be provided. What kind of decisions need to be made at this point? I want to be clear about my position. I hope this does not become a ‘go it alone’ system. I think the US and all of its partners have gained a lot from this cooperation.

But if security has become so tightly bound to the US that it depends on it, is it now time for South Korea and Japan, and also Europe, to have more regional autonomy?

US National Security Strategy and China Policy

I’m curious about the Trump administration’s long-term China policy. It’s not clearly laid out in the document. I don’t know. And what was interesting, and this is frankly the worst answer, is that I don’t know. It’s interesting that there are still hawks within the administration. And what was surprising about this national security strategy, when everyone was guessing what it would say, was the sense that there would definitely be a voice for China hawks. They are essential. They are in the Department of Defense. Former Senator Mark Rubio also was. We’ll see. But again, the conversation is about Taiwan, asking for it without China. And I think this is the real tension within Donald Trump and his administration.

I want to be careful here, because I’m not advocating for this. But I don’t know how much Donald Trump cares about Taiwan, other than the fact that Taiwan is a huge producer of semiconductor chips. I don’t think he’s someone that the Biden administration would care about as an example of the liberal order.

Others might care about this in terms of showing a norm of non-aggression, if not sovereignty. The mention of Taiwan is mostly in terms of shipping lanes. So here too, this is seen as an economic issue. So what this suggests, and this is not to say that Donald Trump himself represents much of the Washington system, but Donald Trump himself does not see Taiwan as essential to US security.

韩语版可在EAI网站上找到。

问1：选择性论证中国的外交政策。

Chun：在您的大作《当强权即公理时》(When Right Makes Might) 中，您指出国家会利用某些原则来论证其行为。中国经常提及主权和不干涉，但有时也会选择性地运用这些理念。鉴于您的专业知识，您能否从中立的角度描述中国论证其行为的方式？也就是说，我很好奇，使用这些特定原则的模式是一种连贯的策略，还是会产生混淆的信号，从而影响其他国家如何看待中国的意图？

Goddard：我认为中国确实发出了混淆的信号。但大多数国家都会发出混淆的信号。因为它们常常，甚至更多时候，是战略性地谈论原则，以支持自己的立场或削弱对手的立场。因此，我们看到中国选择性地诉诸主权原则，这并不奇怪，因为其他国家也会这样做。现在，我想特别讨论中国和《联合国海洋法公约》(UNCLOS)。我认为这非常有趣，因为它导致了修辞的战略运用。一方面，中国拒绝了2016年针对菲律宾的《联合国海洋法公约》裁决。但有趣的是，尽管它拒绝了这项裁决，但它声称接受了这项原则。因此，如果我们看看中国用来论证这一点的言辞，它说《联合国海洋法公约》仅仅是美国主导的强权政治的裁决。它指出，美国不是缔约国，美国在这里玩的是强权政治。也就是说，是美国和菲律宾。我们接受并尊重国际法，但我们拒绝其在此案中的适用。我并不是说任何人都是真诚的。但这里的要点是什么？我想说，要点一方面是实现其在南海的目标，但另一方面是表明它在体制内运作。这是否会说服所有人？绝不。但它不必说服所有人。它只需要确保没有强烈的理由做出强烈反应。因此，中国在玩强权政治，这很有趣，但我们都在玩强权政治，而中国仍然试图将自己展示为体制内的负责任的参与者。

问2：特朗普外交政策的特点。

Chun：好的。第二个问题是不同的。我们对特朗普总统的外交政策如何运作有不同的看法。得益于您的观点，一种观点是特朗普正在将世界划分为大国可以施加各自影响力的领域。另一种观点是，特朗普的外交政策，正如您所说，是基于他的个人利益——一种“新王权主义”网络，而不是一个宏大的战略计划。您最初将特朗普总统的外交政策描述为一种势力范围的模式。后来，您非常有意思地称之为“新王权主义”，因为它更侧重于个人统治和王权。那么，根据您的研究，您认为特朗普总统的外交政策更多是关于个人利益，还是仍然是关于大国之间的势力划分？

Chun：好的。第二个问题是不同的。我们对特朗普总统的外交政策如何运作有不同的看法。得益于您的观点，一种观点是特朗普正在将世界划分为大国可以施加各自影响力的领域。另一种观点是，特朗普的外交政策，正如您所说，是基于他的个人利益——一种“新王权主义”网络，而不是一个宏大的战略计划。
您最初将特朗普总统的外交政策描述为一种势力范围的模式。后来，您非常有意思地称之为“新王权主义”，因为它更侧重于个人统治和王权。那么，根据您的研究，您认为特朗普总统的外交政策更多是关于个人利益，还是仍然是关于大国之间的势力划分？

Goddard：是的，我认为这个问题非常好，我很荣幸有人阅读我的文章并从中获得一些东西。当我写《外交事务》关于大国共谋的文章时，我想探讨为什么在多年明显的大国竞争的言辞之后，特朗普却采取了似乎削弱美国政治动员能力的行动——例如，他几乎放弃了乌克兰，并试图达成一项交易，即使是以牺牲美国国家利益为代价。特朗普将世界视为一系列交易方存在的场所，他试图做的是建立一个他可以与志同道合的人——通常是强大的男性——共谋以增进利益的体系。正如我在文章末尾提到的，这也有点像欧洲协调。大国合作以达成交易的方式。但我也发现了一些不同之处。尽管欧洲协调并不完美，但像梅特涅、卡斯尔里和亚历山大一世这样的领导人相信他们正在为集体利益行事，并且他们认为他们正在增进他们国家和整个欧洲的利益。我发现这些长期的集体利益在这种模式下不起作用。所以，当我和我的合著者艾夫·纽曼写第二篇文章时，我们深入探讨了如果不是集体利益，那它到底是什么。结果是，它不是关于一个国家或一个民族的集体利益，而是关于一个我们称之为“新王权集团”的集团的集体利益。这个集团包括主权领导人，也包括资本及其支持机构的网络。最终，他们追求的是一种更具剥削性的政治结构，而不是为国家或地区社区的利益服务。不幸的是，这就是我们现在所看到的。这也与下一个问题——国家安全战略——联系起来，它强调了实际的剥削。他愿意进行交易，只要能带来财富和繁荣，但这是为个人而非国家带来的财富和繁荣。正如我们在这里韩国首尔的对话一样，这种现象也体现在国家的回应中。我们最近使用的例子是“王冠礼物”。不幸的是，我们的盟友和伙伴很快就学会了与这个集团互动的一种方式就是通过奉承和王权的象征。

问3：世界是否正走向多极化？

Chun：我有两个后续问题。前国务卿迈克·蓬佩奥曾说过，我们正在从两极走向多极。当您谈到多极化时，您是否认为没有根本性的规范，它就像您在欧洲协调中观察到的那样，是可持续的？也就是说，即使存在多极化，也应该有一些支持多极化的联盟规范，而不仅仅是一个敌对的均势体系。人们只是说我们正在走向多极化，您认为这可持续吗？

Goddard：我认为，无论是一个单极、两极还是多极体系，都需要某种规范来组织活动。这不一定意味着强有力的自由主义规范来规定国家的行为。我指的是在非常基础的层面上，理解什么是适当的行为，以及如何解读每个人的行为，这样我们就不会无意中使局势升级。即使在最敌对的情况下，我们也可以看到这一点。很难说苏联和美国有共同的规范，但他们显然对如何行事有着共同的理解和实践。他们有机会在十年或两年内发展这一点。例如，在古巴导弹危机之后，在经历了让每个人都对大规模毁灭感到如此接近的事件之后，我们可以在实践中看到这一点。因此，他们需要制定能够让他们生存下去的实践。

问4：中美两国能否找到共同点？

Chun：基于第一个问题，您认为美国和中国有可能找到任何共同点吗？

Goddard：我希望如此。这也是我所担心的。事实上，在2016年、2017年大国竞争加剧时，人们对意外升级的可能性进行了大量讨论。我们试图讨论一些基本方法来约束我们在南海的互动，以防止这种情况发生。但我认为，尤其是在新冠疫情之后，这种情况大大减少了。我希望它能恢复活力。我认为它可以恢复活力，但我们不必互相成为好朋友，但我们必须认识到，必须为和平的过渡和互动留出空间。

问5：新王权主义：个人原因还是结构性原因？

Chun：关于新王权主义。在阅读您的文章时，我一直在想，新王权主义的根源是特朗普总统个人的特质，还是更具结构性的东西，因为即使特朗普总统在2028年消失了，许多国家也在谈论民主的衰退。

Goddard：不。这是我和艾夫讨论过很多的问题。我们认为它源于特朗普个人，但也有其他人物，如埃尔多安、普京、欧尔班和博索纳罗（在他任职期间）。但我们认为，超越这些个人，更重要的是存在一种结构，使得强大的个人和富有的精英网络能够维持权力。例如，在美国，目前有大量的AI投资是由海湾国家的网络推动的。一旦基础设施建立起来，就无法轻易消除。因此，我的担忧是，随着基础设施的内化，它是否会继续促进那种行为，并且精英们是否会与其他机构和团体联合起来，使他们合法化，并拥有一种关于他们为何特别以及为何有权继续统治的叙事。随着这种情况在社会中变得更加稳固和僵化，它就更有可能成为一种秩序，而不是一种短暂的现象。

问6：美国是否正在将注意力从中国和亚太地区转移开？

Chun：最后一个问题是关于特朗普政府刚刚发布的新的国家安全战略。在韩国，也有关于如何看待它的重大讨论。这份文件描述了美国政府未来应追求的非常普遍的长期计划。在该计划中，美国非常关注重建其经济，而对中国等竞争对手的提及却很少。文件中提到了中国21次，但更多的是关于经济，而不是军事威慑。因此，在韩国，人们对中美竞争的变化进行了大量讨论。中美竞争发生了什么变化？如果美国不再那么重视其在亚洲的领导地位，韩国应该怎么做？其中也没有提及朝鲜。因此，我认为朝鲜问题在特朗普政府的考量中并非优先事项。您认为这会带来什么影响？

Goddard：这份文件不是关于大国竞争的。它几乎不能算是一份文件。它确实谈到了国家利益和安全，但它不是一份关于安全的明确文件。正如您所提到的，没有提及朝鲜，也没有提及伊朗，除了去年夏天的一次行动。它非常关注创造财富和繁荣的世界，而不是冲突。对韩国来说最重要的是，在特朗普政府的背景下，有一个关于其伙伴必须承担这些成本的讨论。他们将在许多方面负责安全问题。此外，几乎没有提及台湾，而我们被期望处理所有与台湾相关的情况，并期望我们承担责任。这意味着什么？我认为美国所有战略伙伴都应该问的一个大问题是，我们都进行了大量投资。自冷战以来，我称之为“联盟战略”，我们不可避免地将我们的安全与彼此联系起来。现在，我认为有一种看法，在特朗普政府的早期，这种做法将会过去，美国将会回来，变得理性，并且会提供公共产品。在这一点上，应该做出什么决定？我想明确我的立场，我不希望这是一个“自生自灭”的体系。我认为美国和所有伙伴都从这种合作中获益良多。但如果我们的安全与美国联系如此紧密，以至于我们的安全依赖于此，那么现在是否是韩国和日本，乃至欧洲，拥有更多地区自主权的时候了？

Chun：但我对特朗普政府的长期对华政策感到好奇。这份文件并没有明确说明这一点。

戈达德：我不知道。有趣的是，这是最糟糕的答案，但我会诚实地告诉你。我不知道。有趣的是，政府内部仍然有鹰派。关于这份国家安全战略，令人惊讶的是，当每个人都在猜测它会说什么时，人们意识到中国鹰派的声音肯定会出现。他们对国防部至关重要。前国务卿迈克·蓬佩奥也是如此。但再次，他们正在管理不提及台湾的中国。在这里，我们看到了唐纳德·特朗普和他政府内部的实际紧张关系。再说一次，我必须谨慎，因为我不是在为他辩护。我不知道唐纳德·特朗普有多关心台湾，除了台湾是半导体芯片的主要生产国。我不认为他关心拜登政府认为重要的自由秩序的例子。其他人可能会认为这与展示不侵犯的规范有关，即使不是主权。对台湾的提及主要与航运路线有关。因此，在这里，这也被视为一个经济问题。因此，这意味着什么，而这并不代表特朗普本人在华盛顿的许多体系，特朗普本人并不认为台湾对美国的国家安全至关重要。■

■ 韦尔斯利学院戈达德教授。

■ 编辑：李尚俊，东亚研究所研究员 | 联系方式：02-2277-1683 (分机号 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr