[Global NK Commentary] ROK-US Alliance's Crisis Management on the Korean Peninsula and Peace Creation

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The purpose of this article is to evaluate the ROK-US alliance's achievements and shortcomings in crisis management on the Korean Peninsula and to explore strategies for peace creation that transform the unstable armistice system into a permanent peace regime. The ROK-US alliance was launched through the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty signed on October 1, 1953. The ROK-US alliance has played a crucial role in deterring war on the Korean Peninsula. Through this, it has made a decisive contribution to building a prosperous, free Republic of Korea, which is the world's 13th largest economy, an advanced liberal democracy, and a powerhouse of K-Culture soft power. However, the ROK-US alliance has not effectively deterred North Korea's armed provocations, which violate the Armistice Agreement. Since the armistice to this day, North Korea has not ceased its numerous infiltrations and localized provocations. Beyond managing the unstable armistice system, we can only be liberated from the anxiety of war by establishing a permanently stable peace regime.

With this awareness and strategic understanding, this paper aims to evaluate the reality of crisis management through case analysis and draw implications. It will also examine why the transfer of wartime operational control and ROK-US combined exercises and training are necessary to deter North Korean provocations. Subsequently, it will discuss measures for building military trust between South Korea, North Korea, and the US, which are prerequisites for establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and present a roadmap for establishing a peace regime, including the signing of a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula through operational and structural arms control. Finally, it proposes the establishment of a 'ROK-US Unification Consultative Committee' under the President for the construction of a unified, free Korea.

I. Crisis Management on the Korean Peninsula

The ROK-US alliance, forged in blood during the Korean War, has played a decisive role in deterring war on the Korean Peninsula for over 70 years through its combined combat readiness. It is extremely unusual for an unstable armistice system to persist for such a long period in human history.

Since the Korean War, North Korea has repeatedly committed infiltrations and localized provocations in violation of the Armistice Agreement. These include the attempted raid on the Blue House on January 21, 1968, and the armed guerrilla infiltration into Uljin and Samcheok in November of the same year; the Axe Murder Incident at Panmunjom in 1976; the bombing of the Aung San Martyrs' Mausoleum in 1983; the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 in 1987; the armed guerrilla infiltration into the Gangneung area in 1996; the First Battle of Yeonpyeong in 1999; the Second Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2002; the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in March 2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010; the landmine incident in August 2015 and Operation Freedom Shield on August 20; the trash balloon incident in 2024; and the recent frequent incursions across the Military Demarcation Line within the Demilitarized Zone in 2025. In total, there have been 3,121 violations of the Armistice Agreement, including 2,022 infiltrations and 1,119 localized provocations.[1] On November 17, 2025, the Ministry of National Defense announced, "We officially propose holding inter-Korean military talks to discuss the establishment of a baseline for the Military Demarcation Line to prevent accidental clashes between the South and the North and to ease military tensions." In its statement, the Ministry of National Defense pointed out, "Recently, there have been continuous situations where North Korean soldiers, while constructing tactical roads and fences and laying mines near the Military Demarcation Line within the Demilitarized Zone, have crossed our area across the Military Demarcation Line (MDL)."[2]

Last year, North Korea infiltrated 8,870 balloons into South Korean airspace 3,097 times over approximately seven months, from May 8 to November 28, with 3,358 of these trash balloons falling across the country, causing anxiety among the entire population.[3] Despite the judgment that this was intended to calculate the parameters for delivering chemical and biological agents in wartime, along with causing public unrest, the response measures and coordination system of the South Korean military and the UN Command did not function properly. Our military collected the dropped balloons while preventing civilians from approaching them. Had measures been taken in coordination with the UN Command to prevent incursions across the DMZ, further provocations could have been prevented. Regarding the resumption of loudspeaker broadcasts by our military in response to North Korea's incessant trash balloon provocations, a UN Command investigation revealed that it not only failed to deter North Korea's trash balloon provocations but also provided a pretext for further dissemination. Furthermore, the UN Command warned that our military's installation of loudspeakers and broadcasting of psychological warfare against North Korea within the DMZ without the approval of the UN Commander constituted a violation of the Armistice Agreement.[4] The Military Armistice Commission failed to investigate North Korea's violations of the Armistice Agreement and devise measures to prevent recurrence.

The sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, in particular, offer significant implications for how to effectively manage crises through the ROK-US cooperation system. Despite the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan by a torpedo while on patrol in territorial waters, resulting in the deaths of 46 sailors, no retaliatory action was taken. In response to the daytime invasion by North Korean forces, which resulted in civilian casualties and the burning of homes on Yeonpyeong Island, a retaliatory artillery bombardment was carried out, but the F16 fighter jets that were scrambled were forced to return without conducting retaliatory bombing. Regarding the Yeonpyeong Island shelling, the Commander-in-Chief's directive of "escalation control" and the Ministry of National Defense's actions under the UN Command's Armistice Rules of Engagement (ROE), based on the principle of proportionality of similar scale, are recalled as inappropriate measures for the President, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, in a situation where territory was attacked.[5]

As a result of the ROK military's failure to strongly retaliate with force, including exercising self-defense rights, against North Korea's incessant armed provocations, it has been manipulated by the North Korean military. Why has the ROK military been so powerless against North Korean provocations? The fear that its accumulated economy would be instantly destroyed, unlike North Korea which has nothing to lose from escalation, has prevented strong retaliation. Despite possessing the capability to independently judge and act in crisis situations, the ROK military has been unable to exercise crisis management authority due to the Combined Delegated Authority (CODA).[6]

The specific dynamics of Korean Peninsula security, the ROK-US combined defense system bifurcated into wartime and peacetime, and the UN Command's Rules of Engagement during the armistice have acted as limiting factors. The security dynamics of the Korean Peninsula, which can rapidly transition from peacetime to crisis and from crisis to wartime, involve a dual structure where the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which exercises operational control during peacetime, transfers operational control of ROK forces to the Combined Forces Commander when the DEFCON level is raised due to heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The Combined Forces Command exercises crisis management, early warning, operational plan development, combined training, and interoperability based on combined delegated authority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for localized provocation operations, border security operations, unit training, and disaster support. Crisis management authority does not reside with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In particular, the Rules of Engagement, developed by the UN Command to prevent escalation into war during North Korean provocations, based on the principle of proportionality of similar scale and involving highly lethal weapon systems, have constrained the military actions of the ROK military. Especially in cases of invasion, such as the Yeonpyeong Island shelling, which intentionally violated South Korean territory, self-defense rights should have been exercised. This is guaranteed by the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions, and the Hague Conventions, and is a war crime in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and Article 8 of the Rome Statute.[7]Therefore.

To address these issues, the system for effective crisis management must be reorganized. Crisis management authority must be transferred to the ROK military. If, in the future, immediate self-defense rights are not exercised due to concerns about escalation in response to North Korean provocations, the very existence of the government and our military will face profound challenges domestically and internationally. The government and the military must agree on the principle of respecting the exercise of self-defense rights in response to intentional North Korean provocations, after thorough information sharing and development of escalation prevention measures in prior consultation with the United States and the UN Command, and the Rules of Engagement must be revised and supplemented. In the event of North Korean provocations, combined forces must be immediately deployed to prepare for any eventuality, and the provocation origin, as well as command and support elements, must be immediately and decisively retaliated against to deter further provocations.[8]

Furthermore, to restore the unstable armistice system to normalcy, the North Korean and Chinese delegations, which withdrew in 1994, must return to the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom. When violations of the Armistice Agreement occur, the Military Armistice Commission, which manages the Armistice Agreement, must conduct on-site investigations and take responsive actions to prevent further violations of the Armistice Agreement.

1. Importance of Transferring Wartime Operational Control for Crisis Management

Currently, our combined defense system in peacetime and wartime operates such that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducts localized provocation operations, and when tensions escalate and DEFCON is raised, the Combined Forces Commander takes operational control of ROK forces and conducts operations. However, there is no country in the world with a bifurcated command system for peacetime and wartime.

At the first inter-Korean defense ministers' meeting in 2001, North Korea's People's Armed Forces Minister Kim Il-chol cynically told then-Minister of National Defense Cho Seong-tae, "Even if an agreement is made with the ROK military, which lacks operational control, it is meaningless if the US overturns it." This is also the primary reason why North Korea directly engages with the US, bypassing South Korea. Witnessing the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, Kim Jong-un, having perceived the vulnerability of the ROK-US combined defense system, stated in a letter to President Trump on August 5, 2019, "the ROK forces are no match for his Army."[9]This may have led to such an arrogant perception.

The command structure should be unified by adjusting the upper command structure of the Combined Forces Command, such as appointing a ROK Army General as the Combined Forces Commander and a US Army General as the Deputy Commander, thereby transferring wartime operational control and ultimately having the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise operational control during peacetime and the same individual concurrently serve as the Combined Forces Commander during wartime. Only then can crisis management and war be conducted in a unified manner. This opportunity to transfer wartime operational control should be used to reorganize the upper command structure into a joint force system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for military strategy, force enhancement, and military diplomacy, and the Strategic Command will be elevated to the Joint Military Command, with the Army, Navy, and Air Force Chiefs of Staff concurrently serving as commanders of the Ground Operations Command, Naval Operations Command, and Air Operations Command, respectively, under the command of the Joint Military Commander. During peacetime, the Joint Military Commander will concurrently serve as the Combined Forces Commander, directing localized provocation operations, and during wartime, will command the ROK-US combined forces as the Combined Forces Commander, thus unifying the command structure.

2. Crisis Management and Combined Exercises and Training

Combined training is conducted as part of combined combat readiness. Exercises such as key terrain seizure or ROK-US combined maneuver training have the effect of deterring North Korean armed provocations, as the deployed ROK-US combined forces can respond immediately.

Furthermore, exercises and training simulating real combat situations provide a path to victory in case of emergency. The Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS EX) exercise, conducted annually from mid- to late August, consists of the Ulchi exercise, a government exercise based on emergency preparedness plans, and the ROK-US combined military command post exercise (Freedom Shield), where the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Forces Korea implement operational plans at various levels of military authorities to enhance theater operational capabilities. Its purpose is to establish national emergency preparedness through exercises for national crisis management, including localized provocations, and wartime transition procedures, as well as total war exercises in case of war.

The Foal Eagle exercise is an annual field training exercise conducted jointly by the ROK Armed Forces and US Forces Korea to evaluate rear area defense operations and key command, control, and communication systems. The Hoguk exercise, conducted annually by the Joint Chiefs of Staff involving mobilized forces, is also a regular exercise. Army units on the western and eastern coasts conduct training by forming joint forces with naval and air assets. Combat power, including key terrain seizure training and tactical maneuvers by unit echelon, is evaluated along axes. Additionally, high-intensity combined training is continuously conducted between ROK and US Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force units. Developing combined joint multi-purpose live-fire ranges in addition to each service's live-fire ranges to ensure training conditions for continuous live-fire training by US Forces Korea is also a way to maintain combined defense posture. ROK-US combined training must be conducted continuously and with high intensity. Peace can be protected only when a dynamic and offensive strong military, burning with the will to defend the homeland, stands firm, and if an armed invasion occurs, it can be countered early to achieve victory and a unified Korea.

A 'peace state without the need to fight' is also impossible without the deterrence provided by a strong ROK-US combined force adept at roaring strategies and tactics in the field, which prevents the adversary from provoking. A ROK-US combined force without training becomes a mere shell, leading to the dissolution of the alliance and the loss of the very purpose of the US Forces Korea's presence, inevitably resulting in their withdrawal. It is crucial to note that a lack of training creates security vulnerabilities, inviting enemy invasion.

II. ROK-US Alliance and Peace Creation

Merely managing the unstable armistice system cannot guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula. Efforts must be made to transform the unstable armistice system into a permanent peace regime. This path is achieved through arms control. A Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula refers to a system where the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula is significantly diminished and South and North Korea coexist peacefully, based on the establishment of political, military, and economic trust between the South and the North and the resolution of hostile relations among related countries.[10]

Furthermore, it is necessary to draw lessons by closely analyzing the background and process of the emergence of the armistice system, as well as its maintenance and changes since its inception. Since the armistice system was not established solely by the independent will of South and North Korea, it cannot be resolved by the will of South and North Korea alone. This is why the participation of the United States and China, the signatories to the Armistice Agreement, is necessary.

Arms Control is defined as "various forms of military cooperation aimed at limiting the possibility of war between potential adversaries, limiting its scope and destructive power in wartime, and reducing the political and economic opportunity costs of preparing for war in peacetime." Our Ministry of National Defense defines arms control as "all efforts to reduce, eliminate, or minimize the risks and burdens arising from arms races by stabilizing or institutionalizing them."[11]Ultimately, arms control can be described as "efforts to achieve various forms of cooperation between states on an ongoing basis to reduce the possibility of war and minimize damage in wartime."[12][13][13]

Arms control is divided into military confidence-building measures, operational arms control, and structural arms control. The first category, Military Confidence Building Measures (M-CBMs), aims for a more functional level of control, such as mutual communication, prior notification of troop deployments and maneuvers, exchange of prior information and data, exchange visits of military personnel, and invitations to observe military exercises, rather than focusing on weapon systems and troops.

The second, Operational Arms Control, seeks to reduce the risk of war by controlling the deployment and operation of military forces to enhance transparency and prevent surprise attacks through mutual verification and monitoring. It involves demonstrating a lack of intent for surprise attack or war by openly disclosing and verifying all military activities and troop deployment situations to the adversary, thereby increasing predictability.

Finally, Structural Arms Control is a form of arms control that seeks to maintain a balance and stability of military power by controlling the fundamental components of military power, such as troop numbers and organization, at a structural level. This includes restrictions on the construction, acquisition, and mobilization of military forces, limitations on the use of specific weapons in certain areas, or regulations on the production or transfer of weapons.[14]

From the perspective of international political theory, arms control focuses on how to foster cooperation between states in conflict. It advocates for the conversion of offensive deployments into defensive ones as a means of promoting international cooperation and stability. Furthermore, it posits that cooperation occurs in the international security and political-economic spheres when there are mutual interests, rather than confrontation between states. Arms control can be achieved when there are agreed-upon principles, norms, and rules governing the bilateral relationship. When discussing arms control from a security perspective, it presents policy prescriptions and alternatives, such as how to apply concepts like reasonable sufficiency in defense, defensive advantage, non-offensive defense, and negotiation of strategies and tactics to actual defense strategies and military postures.[15]

1. A Situation Where Accidental Clashes Could Occur With All Communication Lines Severed Between South and North Korea

Upon arriving in Türkiye, the final destination of his tour of the Middle East and Africa, after attending the G20 Summit in South Africa, President Lee Jae-myung stated in a press conference with reporters aboard the plane that regarding the current inter-Korean situation, "There is not even rudimentary trust, leading to extreme rhetoric and actions." He added, "All communication lines have been completely severed. They are refusing all dialogue and contact." He further noted, "Even between the most hostile nations, there are emergency communication lines and hotlines, but North Korea has completely cut them off." He also expressed concern, stating, "There are instances where they fire warning shots, claiming we have crossed their territory because our perceived boundary of the Military Demarcation Line differs from theirs," and "We have reached a point where accidental clashes could occur at any time." He continued, "If an accidental clash occurs, there is no way to resolve it." President Lee emphasized, "In such times, we must exercise greater patience, secure deterrence capabilities to suppress provocations at any time, and then, based on that foundation, communicate, engage in dialogue, persuade, and open pathways." He urged, "We must continuously convey our goodwill, and if they are suspicious, it is better to speak twice than once. We must strive relentlessly to open even a needle's eye." President Lee mentioned that the Ministry of National Defense's proposal on the 17th for military talks with North Korea to establish a baseline for the Military Demarcation Line was part of an effort to open a channel for communication, stating, "We must do even this. We are always open."[16]

2. Principles and Strategy for Pursuing Arms Control

In a situation where all channels between South and North Korea are blocked, pursuing arms control requires clear principles and strategy. ➀ Through the formation of a South-North Military Joint Committee, discuss and pursue measures for military confidence-building, operational arms control, and structural arms control, starting from rudimentary stages in line with denuclearization progress. ➁ Pursue inter-Korean arms control in close prior consultation with the UN Command and US Forces Korea. ➂ Proceed incrementally after evaluating the implementation of inter-Korean military agreements before moving to the next stage. ➃ The South, North Korea, the UN Command, and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission will monitor and verify the implementation of agreed-upon inter-Korean arms control measures. ➄ All agreed-upon measures will be implemented transparently and publicly. ➅ Arms control will be pursued based on the principle of mutual threat reduction. ➆ Arms control needs to be pursued based on the principle of national consensus.

(1) Forward-looking Restoration of the September 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement

The September 19th Inter-Korean Military Agreement was signed after two inter-Korean general-grade military talks, eight document exchanges, 17 hours of marathon working-level talks, and consultations with the UN Command throughout the entire process.[17] It is necessary to restore the September 19th Military Agreement proactively and incrementally.

<Table 1> Key Contents of the Military Agreement for the Implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration

Source: Jeong Gyeong-yeong, "Peace Creation: ROK-U.S. Alliance and Peace Creation" (Paju: Hanul Academy, 2020), p. 217.

As seen in <Table 1>, the Military Agreement for the Implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration, Article 1 stipulates that the South and North agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other. Accordingly, artillery fire and large-scale exercises in the vicinity of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) were to be suspended, a no-fly zone was to be established around the MDL, and joint operational procedures (rules of engagement) were to be applied to prevent accidental clashes.

Article 2 stipulates that to establish a peace zone in the DMZ, the South and North would consult on military guarantee measures for mutual withdrawal of GP, demilitarization of the Joint Security Area (JSA), joint excavation of remains, and joint investigation and excavation of historical sites. Article 3 concerns the creation of a peace zone in the NLL area of the West Sea and the guarantee of safe fishing activities. To this end, they agreed to prevent accidental armed clashes, cease hostile acts, and establish a pilot joint fishing zone and consult on joint patrol measures.

Article 4, as military guarantee measures for exchanges and cooperation and activation of contact, stipulated the establishment of a joint use area in the estuary of the Han River and consultation on the issues of direct shipping routes to Haeju and passage through the Jeju Strait. Finally, Article 5 stipulates the installation and operation of direct telephone lines between military authorities and the formation of a joint inter-Korean military committee to promote mutual military trust, and to pursue consultations on sensitive military issues such as the scope of peace zones and joint fishing areas, and arms control in the future.

(2) Strategy for Promoting Inter-Korean Military Confidence-Building

The promotion strategy for inter-Korean military confidence-building is to pursue it in a direction that enhances the security of both Koreas and strengthens military stability, while gradually and incrementally advancing it considering the level and speed of inter-Korean relations to contribute to political confidence-building. Efforts will be made to form public consensus through public relations and advance notice to minimize inter-Korean conflicts as much as possible. Furthermore, priority will be given to consultations and implementation of measures that can be easily agreed upon by both sides, can be pursued independently by South Korea, and do not violate international justice. For example, participation in disaster rescue training will be expanded to joint training. By opening up research institutes and universities, which are institutions where security issues do not arise, and promoting mutual dispatch and observation, human ties will be strengthened. It is important to remember that military confidence-building measures can serve as a cornerstone for political confidence-building, and care must be taken not to undermine the atmosphere of mutual trust during the implementation and verification stages.[18]

(3) Strategy for Promoting Disarmament between South and North Korea

Considering past cases where disarmament or arms control was difficult without political confidence-building measures, priority will be given to weapons and equipment that are easily negotiable and pose a fatal threat to the other side. For North Korea's weapons of mass destruction, such as biochemical weapons, efforts will be made to actively utilize international arms control regimes like the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), rather than inter-Korean negotiations. For nuclear and missile-related matters, solutions will be sought through the international system centered on the United States.[19]

It is necessary to proceed primarily on the principle of the parties concerned, excluding the U.S. Forces in Korea, while paying attention to consultations with neighboring countries to avoid friction. If possible, a Northeast Asia multilateral security cooperation council will be formed to incentivize regional countries to act as a positive factor for Korean Peninsula disarmament. Verification will be carried out using international specialized organizations such as the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and third countries, to ensure the reliability of verification and preemptively eliminate the possibility of unnecessary misunderstandings between South and North Korea.[20]

(4) Direction of Arms Control Promotion

The proposed future directions for arms control promotion are as follows, in the order of additional military confidence-building, operational arms control, and structural arms control.

<Table 2> Direction of Arms Control Promotion by Sector

Source: Jeong Gyeong-yeong, "Peace Creation: ROK-U.S. Alliance and Peace Creation" (Paju: Hanul Academy, 2020), p. 241.

First, as additional military confidence-building measures, regularize the inter-Korean general-grade military talks and military working-level talks that have been held so far. Hold inter-Korean defense ministers' meetings and institutionalize them for continuous consultation on pending issues. Also, form and operate a joint inter-Korean military committee with the vice ministers of defense from both sides as co-chairs. Promote mutual notification and observation of large-scale exercises. As for military personnel exchange, form mutual visiting groups for exchange and promote cooperation between the National Defense University and the Kim Il-sung Military University. Promote inter-Korean military Taekwondo and soccer matches.

In the area of operational arms control, it involves ceasing hostile activities in cyberspace, limiting large-scale military activities and exercises, and conducting joint search and rescue exercises at sea, cooperating in natural disaster management such as earthquakes, heavy snow, floods, and wildfires, and exchanging military information to disclose mutual command structures, troop deployment and scale, combat equipment, defense policies, unit planning, and modernization plans between the South and the North.

As structural arms control measures, abolish North Korean nuclear weapons and biochemical weapons, and restrict short-to-medium range missiles. To prevent surprise attacks, redeploy offensive weapons and units such as long-range artillery units, special forces, tanks, and mechanized units to the rear. North Korea's military is composed of tactical units, operational units, and strategic reserves. The first echelon consists of four infantry corps in the front, augmented by artillery units, as tactical units. The second echelon consists of two mechanized corps and one artillery division deployed as operational units. The strategic reserve consists of ground forces from two mechanized corps, naval and air force units, and strategic forces, including nuclear and missile units.[21]

Since the redeployed units can launch an attack without warning, considering the capitals of South and North Korea, a redeployment of 40-60 km for North Korea's deep strategic depth and 20-30 km for South Korea is proposed, along with the redeployment of long-range artillery units threatening the Seoul metropolitan area to the rear and the closure of tunnel artillery positions.

Troop reduction can be pursued at the final stage of structural arms control, but it could be pursued preemptively as a symbolic measure of visible tension reduction on the Korean Peninsula. Our military plans to maintain approximately 500,000 troops by the end of 2030, recruiting women, from the current 470,000 as of the end of 2024, and North Korea needs to reduce its forces from the corresponding 1.28 million to 800,000 troops. The case of troop reduction in the Chinese military offers significant implications for the North Korean military.[22] If structural arms control is achieved between South and North Korea, North Korea's defense budget, which accounts for 25% of its GDP,[23]could be reduced to about 5%, signifying a regime transition that would allow a focus on the civilian economy.

During the peace regime establishment phase, U.S. Forces in Korea will play a role in deterring potential military provocations and stabilizing the peace regime. After unification, U.S. Forces in Korea will serve as a regional stabilizer to prevent military intervention by neighboring countries in the Korean Peninsula.

In the area of operational arms control, cease hostile acts in cyberspace, limit large-scale military activities and exercises, conduct joint search and rescue training at sea, cooperate in natural disaster management such as earthquakes, heavy snow, floods, and wildfires, and exchange military information to disclose command structures, troop deployment and size, combat equipment, defense policies, unit plans, and modernization plans of both sides.

When economic cooperation between South and North Korea is activated, political and social-cultural integration is achieved, and structural arms control is realized, South Korea, North Korea, the U.S., and China can conclude a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula to establish a peace regime. The peace treaty should include: ① Explicitly resolving the state of hostility and war and restoring peace, ② Mutual non-aggression and renunciation of the use of force, ③ Mutual respect for borders, ④ Demilitarization of the buffer zone into a peace zone, ⑤ Peaceful resolution of disputes, ⑥ Issues of war responsibility, ⑦ Issues of reparations and compensation, ⑧ Recognition and respect for the special relationship between South and North Korea, and ⑨ Implementation and practice of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement.[24]

Upon the conclusion of a peace treaty, the Military Armistice Commission could be transformed into a peace treaty monitoring organization through a new resolution by the UN Security Council. The peace treaty monitoring organization could consist of five members from the UN Command side (U.S., UK, South Korea, rotating participation from 14 UN participating countries, Secretary of the UN Command Military Armistice Commission) and five members from the communist side's Military Armistice Commission, namely the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Liberation Army, for a total of ten members.

Following the conclusion of a peace treaty, the role of U.S. Forces in Korea will inevitably change. As neighboring countries may question the rationale for the presence of U.S. Forces in Korea, clear role division and coordination will be necessary. Prior to the transfer of wartime operational control, U.S. Forces in Korea will serve as a preventer of North Korean provocations, a coordinator managing internal situations on the Korean Peninsula during the unification process, and a balancer of regional security after unification.[25]

III. Policy Recommendations

Managing the crisis of the ROK-U.S. alliance is a significant challenge in the current situation where all contact between South and North Korea is severed. The UN Command, which exercises jurisdiction over the DMZ, must take action regarding North Korea's frequent incursions across the Military Demarcation Line. It is the UN Command, not the Ministry of National Defense, that should propose military talks to North Korea. Chinese and North Korean representatives who withdrew from the Military Armistice Commission should return to the commission and manage the armistice system together with the UN Command. Furthermore, joint defense operations against localized provocations should be conducted in accordance with the 'Joint Plan for Preparedness Against Localized Provocations' agreed upon by the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command in 2013. Early transfer of crisis management authority, part of the Combined Defense Authority Delegation (CODA) exercised by the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff should be considered even before the transfer of wartime operational control.

To transform the Korean Peninsula, the source of conflict and confrontation, into a land of peace and common prosperity, extraordinary government strategies, public support, the resolve of our military, and cooperation with allies are required. By creating peace through risk reduction measures such as military confidence-building, operational arms control, and structural arms control, and by concluding a peace treaty among South Korea, North Korea, the U.S., and China, a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula will be established.

The ROK-U.S. alliance has played a decisive role in building a prosperous, free Republic of Korea. If the ROK-U.S. alliance moves beyond simply deterring war on the Korean Peninsula and sets the pursuit of a unified Korea as its vision, thereby realizing a unified Korea, the North Korean nuclear issue will be resolved, and liberation from the fear of war will be achieved. If South and North Korea unify without expending national energy on conflict, the synergy between North Korea's resources and labor and South Korea's capital and technology will lead to the world's third-largest economy by 2050, surpassing Japan and Germany.[26]

To realize such a unified Korea, it is proposed to establish a presidential commission, the 'ROK-U.S. Korean Unification Consultative Commission,' to develop a vision for a unified Korea and formulate unification strategies into policy.

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Gates, Robert M., Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014).

Goldman Sachs. “A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks (Part I).” September 21. 2009.

Schelling, Thomas C. & Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Perggamon-Brassry’s Classic, 1961).

Woodward, Bob, Rage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020).

[1] Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 『2022 Defense White Paper』 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2023), p.352,

[2] “Ministry of National Defense Proposes Inter-Korean Military Talks for the First Time in Seven Years… ‘Let’s Discuss Setting MDL Baseline,’ ” NEWSIS, November 17, 2025.

[3] Victor Cha and Andy Lim, “Garbage, Balloons, and Korean Unification Values.” Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). Nov. 26. 2025, https://www.csis.org/ analysis/garbageballoons-and-korean-unification-values.

[4] “UN Command: Loudspeaker Broadcasts to North Korea Provided Pretext for Additional North Korean Trash Balloon Dispersal... Violation of Armistice Agreement,” The Korea Herald, October 21, 2024,

[5] Lee, Myung-bak, 『The President's Time, 2008-2013』 (Seoul: 2015), pp.346-348.

[6] Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), p.497: The initial plan to retaliate against North Korea's shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, including R.O.K. fighter jets and artillery, was overly offensive and carried the risk of escalation. Therefore, U.S. President Obama, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen, and Secretary of Defense Gates all called their South Korean counterparts. Consequently, artillery fire was directed solely at the North Korean artillery positions that had initiated the shelling.

[7] The Anti-Injustice Committee, a coalition of civic groups related to North Korea, decided to indict North Korean National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il and his successor Kim Jong-un (Vice Chairman of the Party Central Military Commission) at the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges including 'war crimes' in relation to North Korea's shelling provocation on Yeonpyeong Island. “Anti-Injustice Committee to Indict Kim Jong-il and Son at International Criminal Court,” 《Yonhap News》, December 28, 2010.

[8] “Automatic U.S. Military Intervention in Case of North Korean Limited Provocation,” 《Maeil Business Newspaper》, March 24, 2013: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Jeong Seung-jo and Commander of the R.O.K.-U.S. Combined Forces Command James Thurman signed the 'R.O.K.-U.S. Joint Plan for Limited Provocation Response' on March 22, 2013.

[9] Bob Woodward, Rage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020).

[10] Jeong, Gyeong-yeong, 『Peace Creation: The R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance and Peacebuilding』 (Paju: Hanul Academy, 2020), pp.150-348; Jeong, Gyeong-yeong, 『Security Challenges and Resolve Towards a Unified Korea』 (Seoul: Jishikgwa Gamseong, 2017), pp.289-290.

[11] Thomas C. Schelling & Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Perggamon-Brassry’s Classic, 1961), p.142.

[12] Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, "What is Arms Control?" (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1992), p.6.

[13] Kim Yeol-soo, "National Security" (Seoul: Beopmunsa, 2010), p.312.

[14] Kim Yeol-soo, "National Security" (Seoul: Beopmunsa, 2010), pp.315-316.

[15] Han Yong-sup, "Peace and Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula" (Seoul: Bakyoungsa, 2004), pp.174-183.

[16] President Lee "North and South Completely Severed... Must Break Through Even a Pinhole," Yonhap News, November 17, 2025.

[17] Jeong Gyeong-young, "Misunderstandings and Truths of the Military Agreement to Implement the Panmunjom Declaration," Sejong Institute, "Current Affairs and Policy," Vol. 12 (October 11, 2018).

[18] Lee Pyo-gyu, "Measures for Realizing Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula," Jeong Gyeong-young, Han Gwan-soo, Lee Pyo-gyu, Ha Jeong-yeol, "Strategy for Promoting a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula," National Assembly Defense Committee Policy Service Task, December 19, 2018.

[19] Kim Jae-cheol, "Directions for Promoting Arms Control in Accordance with the Establishment of a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula," "Journal of Northeast Asian Studies," Vol. 48 (2008), p.275.

[20] Lee Pyo-gyu, "Measures for Realizing Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula," Jeong Gyeong-young, Han Gwan-soo, Lee Pyo-gyu, Ha Jeong-yeol, "Strategy for Promoting a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula," National Assembly Defense Committee Policy Service Task, December 19, 2018.

[21] Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, "2022 Defense White Paper" (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2023), pp.26-32.

[22] The Chinese military pursued troop reductions as part of its civil-military integration development strategy. The People's Liberation Army, which numbered 5 million in 1950, has been reduced to 2 million currently. China's experience of reducing its forces from 4.238 million in 1985, 2.3 million in 2005, and 2.1 million in 2015-2018, while providing jobs, severance pay and pensions, resettlement assistance, and converting defense factories and enterprises to civilian ones, offers significant implications for North Korea.

[23] Central Intelligence Agency, The CIA World Factbook 2025-2026 (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2025), p.500.

[24] Ha Jeong-yeol, "Inter-Korean Reconciliation and Cooperation and Resolution of Intra-South Conflicts," Jeong Gyeong-young, Han Gwan-soo, Lee Pyo-gyu, Ha Jeong-yeol, "Strategy for Promoting a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula," National Assembly Defense Committee Policy Service Task, December 19, 2018.

[25] "ROK-US Alliance to Prevent North Korean Provocations, Must Become Regional Security Commander After Unification," Donga Ilbo, July 29, 2015.

[26] Goldman Sachs. “A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks (Part I).” September 21. 2009.

■ Jeong Gyeong-young_Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Hanyang University.

■ Editor: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr