[Visible Commentary] The Future of the United States, Trump, and the International Order through the Lens of Justification Strategies, Power, and Neo-Royalism

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pI-AhVo16mA&si=DTmSo96vq4Q0GkGq

Video Script

China's Strategies for Utilizing International Law and Institutions

China often justifies its actions by invoking principles of sovereignty and non-interference. However, it also selectively applies these principles at times. I am curious, if you could neutrally describe China's approach to justifying its actions, whether this pattern of using certain principles is a consistent strategy, or if it creates a confusing message that could affect how other countries view China's intentions.

I think China is sending a mixed message. But most countries send a mixed message, because they strategically engage with principles, often to bolster their own positions or undermine the positions of others. So it's not surprising to see China selectively invoke the principle of sovereignty, just as other countries do. Now, I want to talk specifically about UNCLOS, which I think is very interesting because it leads to this strategic use of rhetoric. On the one hand, China explicitly rejected the 2016 UNCLOS ruling concerning the Philippines. But what's interesting is that even while rejecting the ruling, it maintains very explicitly that it embraces the principles? So when you look at the rhetoric that China puts out to justify this,

it says that the UNCLOS ruling was simply a ruling driven by power politics, and you can see this by pointing out that the US is not a party to it. So basically, they say that the US and the Philippines are engaging in power politics. We embrace and respect international law, but we reject its application in this case. I'm not suggesting anyone is being sincere. But what's the point of this? And I would say that this is an attempt, on the one hand, to achieve its goals in the South China Sea, but on the other hand, to do so while respecting the institution. Does that mean everyone is convinced? Absolutely not. But it doesn't necessarily have to convince everyone. It just has to not give them a reason to react strongly. So I think it's very interesting that China is engaging in power politics. Everyone engages in power politics with principles. And China is still trying to present itself as a responsible actor.

They would say that they are doing so while respecting the institutions. Does that mean everyone is convinced? Absolutely not. But it is not necessary for everyone to be convinced. There is no reason to react strongly. That is why I find it very interesting that China is playing power politics. Everyone plays power politics with principles. And China is still trying to present itself as a responsible actor.

They would say that they are doing so while respecting the institutions. Does that mean everyone is convinced? Absolutely not. But it is not necessary for everyone to be convinced. There is no reason to react strongly. That is why I find it very interesting that China is playing power politics. Everyone plays power politics with principles. And China is still trying to present itself as a responsible actor.

Characteristics of the Trump Administration's Foreign Policy and Neo-Monarchism

Second question. I have a different take on how President Trump's foreign policy operates. One idea is that Trump is dividing the world into spheres of influence where great powers exercise their influence. Another idea is that Trump's foreign policy is based on personal interests, not a grand strategic plan, but a network of loyalists. So you described President Trump's foreign policy as an approach of spheres of influence first, and then later called it neo-monarchism, which focuses more on personal rule and royalty. Considering your work, do you think President Trump's foreign policy is more about personal interests, or do you still think it's about dividing spheres of influence among great powers? I really like this question. And I would be very honored if people could get something out of reading this work. When I wrote my article on great power collusion in Foreign Affairs, I wanted to address the idea of why, after years of rhetoric about great power competition, suddenly Trump is acting in ways that seem to undermine American power, namely, willing to trade off Ukraine and make deals at the expense of American power.

When I wrote my article on great power collusion in Foreign Affairs, I wanted to address the idea of why, after years of rhetoric about great power competition, suddenly Trump is acting in ways that seem to undermine American power, namely, willing to trade off Ukraine and make deals at the expense of American power. So my point here is that Trump sees the world as filled with a set of dealmakers. And what he wants to do is to have this kind of system. He colludes with often strong men who are like-minded to advance their interests. One of the things I said at the end of that article was that there was some overlap with the Concert of Europe. Namely, the idea that there are great powers, and they will work together and sort out deals. I noticed that they would make deals. But I also noticed that there were some differences from that. And one of the biggest is that while the Concert of Europe was not perfect, let's be clear, most leaders believed they were acting in the collective interest, and they believed they were advancing the interests of their states and of Europe as a whole. And one of the things I said is that I don't see that kind of long-term collective interest operating within this mode.

One of the things I said at the end of that article was that there was some overlap with the Concert of Europe. Namely, the idea that there are great powers, and they will work together and sort out deals. I noticed that they would make deals. But I also noticed that there were some differences from that. And one of the biggest is that while the Concert of Europe was not perfect, let's be clear, most leaders believed they were acting in the collective interest, and they believed they were advancing the interests of their states and of Europe as a whole. And one of the things I said is that I don't see that kind of long-term collective interest operating within this mode.

So when I sat down with my co-author, Abe Newman, to write a second piece, in some ways it played out. If this is not about collective interest, then what is it? So we started to develop the idea that this is not about the collective interest of states or nations, but about what we call neo-monarchic factions. These factions consist of sovereign leaders and networks of capital and institutions that support them. And ultimately, they are willing to work for ultimately much more extractive politics, not for the collective interest of the collective state, certainly not for the collective regional entity. And I think, unfortunately, this is the outcome that we are seeing. This leads to the next question, national security strategy, the actual emphasis on extraction. Willing to make deals if it provides wealth and prosperity. Wealth and prosperity for individuals, not for the state. And we can also see this in the states that respond to this. I am speaking with you in Seoul, South Korea. And one of the examples we have been using recently is the gift of the crown. People are learning, yes, unfortunately, that one way to interact with these factions is through symbols of flattery and symbols of royalty.

So when I sat down with my co-author, Abe Newman, to write a second piece, in some ways it played out. If this is not about collective interest, then what is it? So we started to develop the idea that this is not about the collective interest of states or nations, but about what we call neo-monarchic factions. These factions consist of sovereign leaders and networks of capital and institutions that support them. And ultimately, they are willing to work for ultimately much more extractive politics, not for the collective interest of the collective state, certainly not for the collective regional entity. And I think, unfortunately, this is the outcome that we are seeing. This leads to the next question, national security strategy, the actual emphasis on extraction. Willing to make deals if it provides wealth and prosperity. Wealth and prosperity for individuals, not for the state. And we can also see this in the states that respond to this. I am speaking with you in Seoul, South Korea. And one of the examples we have been using recently is the gift of the crown. People are learning, yes, unfortunately, that one way to interact with these factions is through symbols of flattery and symbols of royalty.

So when I sat down with my co-author, Abe Newman, to write a second piece, in some ways it played out. If this is not about collective interest, then what is it? So we started to develop the idea that this is not about the collective interest of states or nations, but about what we call neo-monarchic factions. These factions consist of sovereign leaders and networks of capital and institutions that support them. And ultimately, they are willing to work for ultimately much more extractive politics, not for the collective interest of the collective state, certainly not for the collective regional entity. And I think, unfortunately, this is the outcome that we are seeing. This leads to the next question, national security strategy, the actual emphasis on extraction. Willing to make deals if it provides wealth and prosperity. Wealth and prosperity for individuals, not for the state. And we can also see this in the states that respond to this. I am speaking with you in Seoul, South Korea. And one of the examples we have been using recently is the gift of the crown. People are learning, yes, unfortunately, that one way to interact with these factions is through symbols of flattery and symbols of royalty.

So when I sat down with my co-author, Abe Newman, to write a second piece, in some ways it played out. If this is not about collective interest, then what is it? So we started to develop the idea that this is not about the collective interest of states or nations, but about what we call neo-monarchic factions. These factions consist of sovereign leaders and networks of capital and institutions that support them. And ultimately, they are willing to work for ultimately much more extractive politics, not for the collective interest of the collective state, certainly not for the collective regional entity. And I think, unfortunately, this is the outcome that we are seeing. This leads to the next question, national security strategy, the actual emphasis on extraction. Willing to make deals if it provides wealth and prosperity. Wealth and prosperity for individuals, not for the state. And we can also see this in the states that respond to this. I am speaking with you in Seoul, South Korea. And one of the examples we have been using recently is the gift of the crown. People are learning, yes, unfortunately, that one way to interact with these factions is through symbols of flattery and symbols of royalty.

So when I sat down with my co-author, Abe Newman, to write a second piece, in some ways it played out. If this is not about collective interest, then what is it? So we started to develop the idea that this is not about the collective interest of states or nations, but about what we call neo-monarchic factions. These factions consist of sovereign leaders and networks of capital and institutions that support them. And ultimately, they are willing to work for ultimately much more extractive politics, not for the collective interest of the collective state, certainly not for the collective regional entity. And I think, unfortunately, this is the outcome that we are seeing. This leads to the next question, national security strategy, the actual emphasis on extraction. Willing to make deals if it provides wealth and prosperity. Wealth and prosperity for individuals, not for the state. And we can also see this in the states that respond to this. I am speaking with you in Seoul, South Korea. And one of the examples we have been using recently is the gift of the crown. People are learning, yes, unfortunately, that one way to interact with these factions is through symbols of flattery and symbols of royalty.

The Sustainability of Multipolar Systems and the Role of Norms

I have two follow-up questions. Senator Marco Rubio said that we are moving from a bipolar to a multipolar world. When we talk about multipolar systems, do you think they are sustainable without some fundamental norms, as we observed in the Concert of Europe? Even if it's a multipolar system, it shouldn't just be a system of hostile balance, but there should be more associative norms that underpin multipolarity, but people are just saying we're moving to multipolarity. Do you think it's sustainable?

I think any system, whether it's unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, requires some kind of norms to organize activity. This doesn't necessarily mean strong liberal norms that dictate how states should behave. I mean, at a very basic level, understanding what constitutes appropriate behavior, and understanding how to interpret the actions of others. And this is a means at a very basic level, so that it doesn't escalate in unintended ways. And this can be seen even in the most hostile situations. It's hard to say that the Soviet Union and the United States shared norms. But they had a shared understanding and practice of how to behave. They had the opportunity to develop this over a decade or two. For example, in practices that were developed particularly after the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was too close for comfort for everyone. Regarding weapons of mass destruction. So yes, we will have to develop some practices that allow these states to survive.

I think any system, whether it's unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, requires some kind of norms to organize activity. This doesn't necessarily mean strong liberal norms that dictate how states should behave. I mean, at a very basic level, understanding what constitutes appropriate behavior, and understanding how to interpret the actions of others. And this is a means at a very basic level, so that it doesn't escalate in unintended ways. And this can be seen even in the most hostile situations. It's hard to say that the Soviet Union and the United States shared norms. But they had a shared understanding and practice of how to behave. They had the opportunity to develop this over a decade or two. For example, in practices that were developed particularly after the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was too close for comfort for everyone. Regarding weapons of mass destruction. So yes, we will have to develop some practices that allow these states to survive.

Regarding weapons of mass destruction. So yes, we will have to develop some practices that allow these states to survive.

US-China Competition and the Possibility of Compromise

Based on the first question, do you think there is a possibility for the US and China to find common ground?

I hope so. And I think this is what I worry about. I actually think there were a lot of efforts toward this in 2016 and 2017 as great power competition was increasing. There were a lot of discussions about the possibility of accidental escalation. We tried to prevent this by trying to get some basic practices for how to manage interactions, for example, in the South China Sea. And I feel that this has significantly decreased, especially after COVID. I hope it can restart. I think it can restart, but what everyone needs to know is that it's not that we need to get along, but we need to ensure that there is room for peaceful change and interaction.

Structural Origins and Diffusion of Neo-Monarchism

Regarding neo-monarchism, as I read your article, I wondered whether the origins of neo-monarchism are in President Trump's personal characteristics or if they are more structural, given that after President Trump is gone in 2028, we are talking about democratic backsliding in many countries.

It's about maintaining power. So I think, for example, in the US, there's significant wealth, like AI investments, that are currently driven by networks coming from the Gulf states. Once the infrastructure is built, you can't just get rid of it. So my concern is certainly whether that type of response will continue to be promoted as the infrastructure is internalized, and whether those elites collude with other institutions and groups to legitimize them.

US National Security Strategy and Changes in Asian Policy

They have an entire narrative about why these people are special and why they are entitled to continue to rule. The more this becomes entrenched and the deeper it becomes embedded in society, the more likely it is to be seen as an order rather than a temporary phase. The last question is about the new national security strategy that the Trump administration just released. There is a lot of discussion in South Korea about how to view this as well. Because it outlines a very general long-term plan for what the US government should pursue in the future.

In this plan, the US places a lot of emphasis on rebuilding its own economy and does not mention competitors like China much. I counted China appearing 21 times in the document, but there are more mentions of the economy and very few mentions of military deterrence. However, we can also see some implications for military deterrence. So in South Korea, there is a lot of discussion about the changes in US competition with China.

What are the changes in US-China competition? And what should South Korea do if the US is less focused on leading in Asia and there is no mention of North Korea? So we think the North Korean issue is not a high priority in the thinking of the Trump administration. What implications do you see for this?

This is certainly not a document about great power competition. It's hardly a document at all. It says a lot about national interests and security, but it's not really a security document. As you mentioned, it doesn't mention North Korea. It doesn't mention Iran either, apart from mentioning operations last summer. It's very focused on creating a world where wealth is extracted and prosperity is generated, certainly not conflict. I think the things that are most important, and certainly important to South Korea, are the things that they discuss.

And this is part of the Trump administration, that they really need to be partners. That they need to bear the costs as security partners. That they need to be responsible for security issues. That they need to be responsible for dealing with all situations related to Taiwan. And they expect to be able to transfer responsibility for those things.

expect to be able to transfer responsibility for those things. So what does this mean? One of the big questions that all strategic partners of the US are asking is that since the end of the Cold War, what everyone has invested in is what I call a 'tying strategy.' We have inevitably tied our security to each other. Now, I think there was a perception in the early Trump administration that this would pass, that the US would come back, and that it would be rational. And there would be provision of public goods.

And there would be provision of public goods. Now, what kind of decisions need to be made? And I don't want to put my cards on the table. I'm not arguing that this is not a go-it-alone system. I think the US and all its partners have gained a lot from this type of cooperation. But when security becomes too tightly bound to the US and dependent on it, is it now time for more regional autonomy?

For both South Korea and Japan, and of course for Europe. But we are curious about the Trump administration's China policy in the long term. It's not clear in the document. We don't know. And it was interesting. Sorry. That's the worst answer. But I will be honest. We don't know. What's interesting is that there are still China hawks in the administration. And what was surprising about this national security strategy is that when everyone was guessing what it would say, there was a perception that the voices of China hawks would be clear. They are essential. They are in the Pentagon. Secretary Mark Esper was one of them. We will see.

But again, it asks us to talk about Taiwan and without China. And I think this is a real tension within Donald Trump and within his administration.

I want to be careful once again, because I am not advocating for this. But I'm not sure how much Donald Trump cares about Taiwan, other than the fact that Taiwan is a huge producer of semiconductor chips. I don't think he's someone who would care about this as an example of the liberal order, as the Biden administration would.

Others might care about this in terms of demonstrating norms of non-aggression, if not sovereignty. The mention of Taiwan is often related to, for example, shipping lanes. So here too, it's considered an economic issue. So I think what this suggests. And this is not to say where Trump himself is in the Washington system. Trump himself does not see Taiwan as essential to American security.

■ Go to English Video & Transcript

Q1: China's Foreign Policy and Selective Justification Strategies

Jeon Jae-seong: Let's start with the very first question. In your book, 'When Right Makes Might,' could you talk about how states use certain principles to justify their actions? China often does this by talking about sovereignty and non-interference, but sometimes it selectively applies these ideas. Considering your expertise, how would you neutrally describe China's approach to justifying its actions? That is, do you think this pattern of using certain principles is a consistent strategy, or do you think it creates a mixed message that could affect how other countries view China's intentions?

Goddard: I certainly think China is sending a mixed message. But the reason most countries send a mixed message is that they strategically engage with principles, and they do so to mobilize support for their own positions or to mobilize support for others. So it's not surprising to see China selectively invoke the principle of sovereignty, just as other countries do. Now, what I want to talk about specifically with China and UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) is that I think this is very interesting. Because it's about this strategic type of rhetorical use, right? So on the one hand, China explicitly rejected the UNCLOS ruling concerning the Philippines in 2016. But what's interesting is that even while rejecting the ruling, it maintains very explicitly that it embraces the principles to this day? So when you look at the rhetoric that China puts out to justify why it embraced this, it says that the UNCLOS is simply a ruling driven by power politics, which can be seen by the fact that the US is not a party to it, and points out that they are basically engaging in power politics like the US and the Philippines. We embrace and respect international law, but we reject its application in this case. I'm not suggesting anyone is being sincere. But what's the point of this? Right? And I would say that it's important that on the one hand, it's clearly an attempt to achieve its goals in the South China Sea, but on the other hand, to do so while operating within the institution. Does that mean everyone is convinced? Absolutely not. But it doesn't necessarily have to convince everyone. It just has to not give them a reason to react strongly. So I think it's really interesting that China is engaging in power politics. Everyone engages in power politics with principles, and China is still trying to present itself as a responsible actor within the institution.

Q2: Characteristics of Trump's Foreign Policy

Jeon Jae-seong: Okay. The second question is a different one. We have different takes on how President Trump's foreign policy operates. Thanks to your work, the idea that Trump is dividing the world into spheres of influence where great powers exercise their influence came to mind. Another idea is that Trump's foreign policy is based on his own interests, not a grand strategic plan, but a network of loyalists. So you first described President Trump's foreign policy as a kind of approach of spheres of influence. And later, very interestingly, you called it neo-monarchism, which focuses more on personal rule and royalty. So considering your work, do you think President Trump's foreign policy is more focused on personal interests now, or do you still think it's focused on dividing spheres of influence among great powers?

Goddard: I really like this question, and I'm truly honored that people can get something out of reading this work. You know, when I wrote my article on great power collusion in Foreign Affairs, what I wanted to address was the idea of why, after years of rhetoric about great power competition, suddenly we see Trump acting in ways that seem to undermine American power politics, right? The willingness to basically trade off Ukraine and make deals at the expense of American power. So my point here is that Trump sees the world as occupied by a set of dealmakers, and what he wants to do is to have a system where he colludes with other like-minded, often strong men, to advance their interests. One of the things I said at the end of that article was that there was an overlap with the Concert of Europe. The idea that there are great powers, and they can work together to sort out deals. I knew they would make deals. I knew there were some deviations from that. And one of the biggest is that while the Concert of Europe was certainly not perfect, most leaders, Metternich, Castlereagh, Tsar Alexander, etc., believed they were acting in the collective interest, and they believed they were advancing the interests of their states and of Europe as a whole. One of the things I said is that these kinds of long-term collective interests do not operate in this mode. So when I sat down with my co-author, Abraham Newman, to work on a second piece, it played out well in some ways. If this is not a collective interest, then what is it? So then we started to develop the idea that this is not about the collective interest of states or nations, but about what we call neo-monarchic factions. These factions are not just networks of sovereign leaders, but also networks of capital and institutions that support them. And ultimately, they are willing to mobilize not for the collective interest of the collective state. Certainly not for the collective regional entity, but ultimately for much more resource-extractive politics? And unfortunately, I think this is precisely the problem we are seeing. I know this is included in the next question, national security strategy, which emphasizes resource extraction. Willing to make deals if it provides wealth and prosperity, wealth and prosperity for individuals, not for the state. And as you know, we can see this and states responding to it. Of course, I am speaking with you in Seoul, South Korea, and one of the examples we have been using recently is the gift of the crown. Unfortunately, our allies and partners are quickly learning that one way to interact with this clique is through symbols of flattery and symbols of royalty.

Q3: Is the World Moving Towards a Multipolar System?

Jeon Jae-seong: Now let's move on to two additional questions. Senator Marco Rubio once said that we are moving from a bipolar world to a multipolar world. When we talk about multipolar systems, do you think they are sustainable without some fundamental norms, as observed in the Concert of Europe? Even if there is a multipolar system, it shouldn't just be a system of hostile balance of power. There should be more associative norms that underpin multipolarity. But people are just saying we are becoming multipolar. Do you think it's sustainable?

Goddard: I think any international political system, whether it's unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, requires some kind of norms to organize international activities. This doesn't necessarily mean strong liberal norms that dictate what states should do. I'm speaking very basically about understanding what constitutes appropriate behavior and understanding how to interpret the actions of others. Norms that prevent interactions between states from escalating into military conflict, when neither side intended to clash. You can see this even in the most hostile situations. It's hard to say that the Soviet Union and the United States shared norms. But they shared an understanding and practice of how to behave. They had the opportunity to develop this over a decade or two. For example, we can see this phenomenon in the development of practices after the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was too close for comfort for everyone regarding weapons of mass destruction. So yes, we will have to develop some practices that allow these countries to survive.

Q4: Can the US and China Find Common Ground?

Jeon Jae-seong: Based on your answer to the first question, do you think there is a possibility for the US and China to find common ground?

Goddard: I hope so. And I think this is what I worry about. I actually think there were a lot of efforts toward this in 2016 and 2017, even as great power competition was intensifying. There were many discussions about the possibility of accidental escalation. We are trying to prevent this by actually looking into basic ways to regulate interactions, for example, in the South China Sea. And it seems that this has significantly decreased, especially after COVID-19. I hope it can be reactivated. I think it can be restored, but what everyone needs to know is that it's not that we have to get along, but we need to ensure that there is room for peaceful change and interaction.

Q5: Personal/Structural Origins of Neo-Royalism?

Jeon Jae-seong: I'd like to ask about neo-monarchism. As I read your article, I wondered whether the origins of neo-monarchism are in President Trump's personal characteristics or if they are more structural, given that we are talking about democratic backsliding in many countries after President Trump leaves in 2028.

Goddard: No, and this is something that Abraham and I have talked about quite a bit. Our concern is that while we think much of this is in Trump's person, when he is there, there are others like Erdogan, Putin, Orban, Bolsonaro. But we think that beyond these kinds of individuals, the structure is in place to help powerful individuals from networks of really wealthy elites to gain power. For example, when we talk about the US, I think there's a significant amount of wealth right now. For example, there are AI investments that are currently driven by networks coming from the Gulf states. Once that infrastructure is in place, it can't be easily gotten rid of. So my concern is certainly whether that type of response continues to be promoted as the infrastructure is internalized? Then elites are absorbed into other institutions and groups that help legitimize them, with the entire narrative about why these people are exceptional and why they are entitled to continue to rule. So the more that becomes entrenched, and the more it becomes embedded in society, the more likely it is to be seen as an order rather than a mere phase.

Q6: Is the US Reducing Its Focus on China and the Asia-Pacific?

Jeon Jae-seong: The last question is about the new national security strategy that the Trump administration released. This is causing a lot of discussion in South Korea as well, because it outlines a very general long-term plan for what the US government should pursue in the future. In this plan, the US places a lot of emphasis on rebuilding its own economy and does not mention competitors like China much. I counted China appearing 21 times in the document, but it's mostly related to the economy rather than military deterrence. So in South Korea, there is a lot of discussion about the changes in US-China competition. Are there changes in US-China competition? What should South Korea do if the US is less focused on leading in Asia? Also, there is no mention of North Korea at all. So we think the North Korean issue is not that high a priority in the thinking of the Trump administration. What implications do you see for this?

Goddard: So this is not a document about great power competition. It's hardly a document at all. I mean, it says a lot about national interests and security, but it's not really a security document. As you mentioned, it doesn't mention North Korea, but it doesn't mention Iran either, apart from mentioning operations last summer? It's very focused on creating a world where wealth is extracted and prosperity is generated, and certainly not conflict. I think the things that are most important to South Korea are precisely the important discussions of the Trump administration. These discussions are a very important part of the Trump administration. The Trump administration basically, in many ways, expects partners to be responsible for the security issues that they are responsible for, namely, to be partners. Another thing that is almost not mentioned is Taiwan. Taiwan is expected to be responsible for dealing with all situations related to Taiwan, and to be able to transfer some responsibility for that. So what does this mean? One of the biggest questions that all strategic partners of the US are asking is that there has been a lot of investment for everyone. Since the end of the Cold War, in what I call a binding strategy, we have necessarily tied our security to each other. Now, in the first Trump administration, there was a sense that the US would come back, that it would be rational, and that there would be provision of public goods? What kind of decisions need to be made at this point? Right? And I don't want to put my cards on the table, but I want to make it not a go-it-alone system. I think the US and all its partners have gained a lot from this type of cooperation. But when security becomes too tightly bound to the US and dependent on it, is it now time for more regional autonomy in both South Korea and Japan? And of course, in Europe as well.

Jeon Jae-seong: But we are curious about the Trump administration's China policy in the long term. Because it's not explicit in the document.

Goddard: We don't know, and you know, that's not the worst answer, but frankly, we don't know. What's interesting is that there are still China hawks in the administration. And what was surprising to me about this national security strategy is that when everyone was guessing what it would say, there was a perception that the voices of China hawks would be clear. I mean, they are important. They are in the Pentagon, and Secretary Mark Esper was one of them. You will see. We are again asked to talk about Taiwan without China. And I think this is a real tension within Donald Trump and within his administration. Once again, I want to be careful here because I am not advocating for these things. But I'm not sure how much Donald Trump actually cares about Taiwan, other than the fact that Taiwan is a huge producer of semiconductor chips? I don't think he's someone who would care much about this issue as an example of the liberal order, as the Biden administration would. Others might care about this issue simply by demonstrating norms of non-aggression, if not sovereignty. The mention of Taiwan often centers around shipping lanes. So here too, this is considered an economic issue. So I think what this suggests. And this is not to say where Trump himself is in the Washington system, but I think Trump himself does not see Taiwan as essential to American security.

The Issue of Rare Earth Elements and the Impact of US-China Competition

Q7: The Impact of Rare Earth Issues on US-China Competition

Jeon Jae-seong: Very interesting. The last question is about the summit in Gyeongju, South Korea, a few weeks ago at APEC, and there was an observation that rare earth elements are an important card for China to pressure the US. We think the Trump administration is having difficulty or is in a dilemma pushing China because of critical minerals.

Goddard: Of course. And I think we can see this in the US's attempts to diversify its own supply lines. In fact, I was reading an article this morning. The New York Times had an article that Japan has been more successful than other countries. We can see the US looking for critical minerals in various regions. So while you are seeing that type of linkage now, I don't actually think that this will vary by administration. That is, I think any administration at this point would try to become more independent regarding critical minerals and diversify its supply lines.

Stacie Goddard, Professor at Wellesley College, USA.

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