[Global NK Commentary] The 8th Party Congress's Greatest Achievements and Prospects for the 9th Party Congress

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With the 9th Party Congress approaching in 2026, North Korea is making a final push to complete the tasks of the 8th Party Congress and showcase its achievements. As the comprehensive review of each sector over the past five years is linked to the direction of the five-year plan for 2026-2030, which will be presented at the 9th Party Congress, 2025, the final year of the 8th Party Congress, is a busy period for promoting task completion and generating results in each sector. Nevertheless, the areas where North Korea has exceeded expectations and can be considered the greatest achievements during the 8th Party Congress are defense and diplomacy. This is thanks to the strategic exploitation of international structural instability arising from the prolonged Russia-Ukraine war and the intensifying strategic competition between the US and China.

Defense Sector Goals and Achievements

At the 8th Party Congress in 2021, North Korea emphasized the advancement of nuclear technology, miniaturization and lightening of nuclear weapons, and tactical nuclearization for the completion of the nuclear armament construction project, presenting five major strategic weapon tasks: ① development of hypersonic weapons, ② production of super-large nuclear warheads, ③ improvement of accuracy for strikes within a 15,000 km range, ④ development of underwater and ground-based solid-fuel ICBMs, and ⑤ development of nuclear submarines and SLBMs. It demanded the early achievement of these goals. Furthermore, key objectives for the defense industry included achieving ① intelligence, ② precision, ③ unmanned operation, ④ high performance, and ⑤ lightening of armament equipment, demanding the unconditional completion of defense science and technology development and defense production goals and tasks by 2025 to guarantee the strongest military power.

If the defense achievement of the 7th Party Congress was the declaration of 'completion of nuclear armament' with the first test launch of the new ICBM Hwasong-15, the 8th Party Congress can be evaluated as a period of building overall capabilities for the 'completion of the nuclear armament project'.[1] First, the quantity of nuclear weapons has increased, the means of nuclear delivery have become more diversified, and the cycle for new improvements has shortened. In addition to the phased expansion of the Yongbyon enrichment facility, satellite imagery in June captured the construction of new enrichment facilities within the Yongbyon nuclear complex, indicating[2] that North Korea's nuclear weapon production material is projected to increase to 127-150 warheads by 2025, 201-243 by 2030, and 344-429 by 2040.[3] North Korea has been advancing the performance of its delivery systems through test launches: the ICBM Hwasong-17 in 2022, the Hwasong-18 in 2023, and the Hwasong-19 in 2024. The Hwasong-19, based on solid fuel, was advertised as the 'final complete ICBM' after its test launch. At the military parade celebrating the 80th anniversary of the Party's founding in October, a 'Hwasong-20' with a multiple warhead appearance was showcased as the latest model. Furthermore, consistent improvements in the performance of diversified delivery systems, including the Hwasong-16na hypersonic missile, the improved Pulhwasal-3-31 strategic cruise missile, and new surface-to-air missiles, are ongoing. Moreover, to build underwater nuclear capabilities, North Korea launched the tactical nuclear-armed submarine 'Hero Kim Gun Ok' in September 2023, followed by the 5,000-ton class vessels Choi Hyeon and Gang Geon in April and June 2025, respectively.

Second, laws, policies, and plans based on the advancement of nuclear capabilities have been specified and visualized. On September 8, 2022, the 7th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly adopted the Nuclear Force Policy Law, which includes preemptive nuclear strikes. At the 6th plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee in December 2022, North Korea designated South Korea as an 'obvious enemy' and established 2023 as a year of 'transformative strategy for nuclear force and defense development' based on mass production of tactical nuclear weapons and exponential increase in nuclear warheads. Accordingly, the national nuclear weapon comprehensive management system 'Nuclear Trigger' was announced in March 2023. On August 31, the first comprehensive military command training since Kim Jong Un took power was conducted, revealing a 'new invasion operation plan' that combines conventional forces with nuclear use. The 9th plenary meeting of the 8th Central Committee in December 2023 emphasized 'preparations for a great event to pacify the entire territory of South Korea using all physical means and capabilities, including nuclear weapons, in case of contingency.' Since 2025, with the second Trump administration, emphasis has been placed on nuclear force readiness, the nuclear shield theory, and the modernization of the army, navy, and air force. Nuclear weapons are not 'bargaining chips' but 'immutable tools for combat'[4] and are considered 'peace and sovereignty, and legitimate self-defense means granted by the state constitution.' North Korea maintains the stance that 'the new nuclear force strengthening line declared by the head of state must be consistently adhered to.'[5]

Third, organizational changes have included an expanded role for the military-political leadership and increased efficiency in the operation of the Party Central Military Commission. The efficiency of operations is evident in the number of meetings of the 8th Party Central Military Commission. While there were two meetings in 2021 and one in 2022, there were an exceptional four meetings in 2023, coinciding with 'completing war readiness' and other factors. There were no meetings in 2024 and one in 2025. The variation in the number of expanded meetings of the Central Military Commission by year also overlaps with external factors, specifically the timing of North Korea's military support due to the Russia-Ukraine war and the intensification of anti-South Korea policies. Meanwhile, with the start of the Nuclear Force Policy Law and tactical nuclear training in September 2022, organizational restructuring of the national nuclear force command structure and operation began to emerge. The Missile General Bureau was first identified in 2023, and the Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare General Bureau in 2025. Furthermore, with the emphasis on strengthening naval power and maritime defense capabilities, the mission and role of the Maritime Guidance Bureau have also changed and expanded.

Ultimately, the new defense policy that Kim Jong Un announced at the 8th Party Congress during his on-site guidance in March 2020 can be described as the development of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, coupled with an enhancement of offensive capabilities and operational capacity based on preemptive nuclear use.

Diplomacy Sector Goals and Achievements

Kim Jong Un's summit diplomacy, initiated around the 2018 inter-Korean summit, led to bilateral meetings with the leaders of North Korea-China, North Korea-US, and North Korea-Russia, highlighting diplomatic achievements at the 7th Party Congress. However, after the collapse of the Hanoi summit between North Korea and the US, Kim Jong Un's summit diplomacy did not yield tangible results.

However, the diplomatic achievements of the 8th Party Congress are different. The Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea in June 2024 has a broader and more concrete scope of cooperation than the 1961 Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, which included automatic military intervention. Furthermore, Kim Jong Un's summit diplomacy has expanded from bilateral to multilateral forums, including his attendance at the 80th anniversary of China's Victory Day in September 2025.

The 8th Party Congress also revealed a prioritization of foreign relations principles that signaled a return to the Cold War. Specifically, the principles of foreign relations shifted from 'independence-peace-friendship' to 'independence-friendship-peace,' leading to strengthened strategic relations between North Korea-Russia and North Korea-China, and strategic solidarity among North Korea-China-Russia. Concurrently, North Korea has defined the US and South Korea as 'main enemy' and 'primary enemy,' respectively, and since the 5th plenary meeting in June 2022, has abandoned the principle of 'dealing with them one by one' and consistently pursued a 'strength-to-strength, head-on confrontation' principle. The results of the 6th plenary meeting in January 2023, which replaced the New Year's address[6]attribute these policy shifts to changes in international relations. Citing the clear transition to a new Cold War system and the acceleration of multipolar trends in international relations, North Korea has presented 'enhancing national prestige,' 'defending national sovereignty,' and 'safeguarding national interests' as principles for external affairs. Furthermore, North Korea has declared itself a 'great power' and stated that it must write a diplomatic history befitting this status, pursuing nuclear coercion against the US and Japan, and strategic solidarity with Russia and Global South countries.

Goals and Policy Direction for the 9th Party Congress

Just as the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 and the US-China trade war during the second Trump administration in 2025 provided opportunities for advancing the tasks of the 8th Party Congress, the 9th Party Congress will be entirely different from the 8th Party Congress, which publicly acknowledged 'shortcomings'.

The 9th Party Congress is likely to highlight 'victory' and 'achievements' by showcasing accomplishments in defense and diplomacy, and actively present development tasks for each sector. In the defense sector, given the mention of strengthening the parallel development of nuclear and conventional forces[7] it is expected to pursue the strengthening of North Korean-style integrated nuclear-conventional operations (CNI) through the modernization of conventional forces. In particular, based on the experience of the Ukraine war, the pace of building low-cost, high-efficiency military capabilities based on emerging technologies such as drone warfare, and strengthening air and naval power is expected to accelerate.

Economic policy is also expected to shift from the existing 'consolidation and reinforcement' policy to a vision of a 'five-year plan for comprehensive revitalization and transformation.' However, given the predicted intensification of nuclear readiness requirements at the 9th Party Congress, growth through 'comprehensive revitalization and transformation' via strategic alliances with revisionist countries appears limited. The concentration of national resources on defense spending is likely to be even higher than during the 8th Party Congress. Changes in North Korea's external environment due to the potential end of the Russia-Ukraine war could also have an impact during the 9th Party Congress. Furthermore, the period of the next five years, 2026-2030, which will be presented at the 9th Party Congress, is a critical juncture that will create major turning points in the international structure and the Northeast Asian region. North Korea is likely to adopt a more aggressive approach to nuclear armament and pressure on South Korea to strategically leverage the phase of international system transformation.

Therefore, for President Lee Jae-myung's North Korea policy, the E.N.D. (Engagement, Normalization, Denuclearization) initiative, to be effective, it is necessary to move beyond the existing debate and framework of 'engagement and pressure' focused on traditional actors. More effort is needed to seek 'opportunity creation' that can strategically leverage the phase of international system transformation. ■

[1] After declaring the completion of nuclear armament following the launch of the ICBM-class 'Hwasong-15' on November 29, 2017, North Korea stated in the Rodong Sinmun on November 29, 2022, the fifth anniversary, that the launch of 'Hwasong-17' on November 18 was 'a product of self-reliance created with our strength, wisdom, and technology,' listing achievements of various Juche weapons. Regarding the test launch of 'Hwasong-19' on October 31, 2024, it was emphasized as 'securing the final complete ICBM' to be operated with 'Hwasong-18' and 'securing absolute superiority and hegemonic status of nuclear hegemony and strategic forces.' Kim Jong Un assessed it as a decisive milestone for the 'permanent absolute superiority' of strategic nuclear forces and the 'absolute and irreversible hegemonic status.' ('Korean Central News Agency,' November 1, 2024).

[2]'New Yongbyon Nuclear Facility Spotted by Satellite,' ('KBS,' June 10, 2025).

[3] Lee Sang-gyu, 'Analysis of Recent Changes in North Korea's Nuclear Weapon Production Capacity and Considerations for Denuclearization,' ('Security Strategy FOCUS,' KIDA., July 17, 2025).

[4] ('Korean Central News Agency,' February 8, 2025).

[5] ('Korean Central News Agency,' February 18, 2025).

[6] ('Rodong Sinmun,' January 1, 2023).

[7]Kim Jong Un stated during his on-site guidance at the Defense Science Institute's Armored Defense Weapon Research Institute and Electronic Weapon Research Institute on September 11-12 that the 9th Party Congress would present a policy of parallel development of nuclear weapons and conventional forces. ('Korean Central News Agency,' September 13, 2025).

■ Lee Horyeong_Senior Research Fellow, Center for Security Strategy Research, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

■ Responsible Editor: Lee Sangjun_EAI Researcher

Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr