[International Politics in the Age of AI] ③ China's Defense AI

I. Strategic Goal: Building a Techno-Security State

Under the Xi Jinping administration, China has declared its goal of achieving the 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation' by 2049, positioning China as the center of the world order and innovation. General Secretary Xi Jinping already declared in October 2017 at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China that 'Socialism with Chinese Characteristics has entered a new era,' and subsequently inscribed 'Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era' into the Party Constitution, thereby proclaiming that the period before and after is fundamentally different. China aims to achieve a basic 'new stage of socialist modernization' by 2035, setting a key milestone before advancing to the next objective.

In line with these efforts, the 4th Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held in October 2023, was a significant occasion in determining China's future course. The '15th Five-Year Plan' proposal passed at the session prioritizes 'national security' and 'qualitative development' alongside internal economic stability, such as boosting domestic demand, over mere quantitative economic expansion. The key theme of the 15th Five-Year Plan was 'New Quality Productive Forces (新质生产力).' This can be seen as a 'technological self-reliance strategy' aimed at establishing independent technological standards and ecosystems in 'new domains' that will change the future landscape, such as ▲Artificial Intelligence (AI) and advanced semiconductors, ▲Quantum Technology, ▲Biomanufacturing, ▲Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCI), and ▲Hydrogen and Fusion Energy, moving beyond simple technological catch-up. This represents a massive national endeavor to transform the structure of the Chinese economy from one centered on real estate and infrastructure to a high-value-added structure centered on data and algorithms.

To achieve the goal of basic 'socialist modernization' by 2035 (assuming per capita GDP reaches the level of a moderately developed country), an average annual growth rate of approximately 4.17% is required over the next decade. While the 4th Plenary Session did not explicitly state a growth target, China's National Bureau of Statistics reported a 4.8% economic growth rate for the third quarter of this year, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimates China's potential growth rate during the 15th Five-Year Plan period to be an average of 4.88% per year. Furthermore, immediately after the 4th Plenary Session, Premier Li Qiang projected that China's economy would reach 170 trillion yuan (approximately 34 quadrillion Korean won) by 2030, the end of the 15th Five-Year Plan period. This projection is interpreted as a target set under the premise of overcoming the United States' comprehensive blockade of advanced technologies.

In other words, China can be seen as assuming a long-term economic growth rate of at least 4%. To this end, under the Xi Jinping administration, China is elevating the national development framework from past 'informatization' to 'intelligentization' and pursuing a 'Techno-Security State' system where the Party directly controls technological development and resource allocation. The integrated strategic system for achieving the Techno-Security State, directly led by Xi Jinping, operates on four pillars: ▲innovation-driven development, ▲civil-military fusion, ▲national security strategy, and ▲military power enhancement. This stands in stark contrast to the initial policy emphasis in 2013 at the Third National People's Congress, where Xi Jinping stressed a 'prudent balance between the state and the market.' In essence, China has completely departed from its past emphasis on the 'balance between the state and the market' and is transitioning to a sophisticated 'Party-State Capitalism' where security and economy are inextricably linked.

II. AI Innovation and Ecosystem Building

Since the 2010s, China has embarked on concrete plans to enhance its AI capabilities. For example, the 'Internet+ Artificial Intelligence Three-Year Action Plan (2016)' set goals for establishing foundational infrastructure, such as AI resource and innovation platforms and the development of intelligent products, to foster the early growth of the AI industry. Subsequently, the 'Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (2017)' presented a three-step roadmap aiming for China to become a 'Premier Global Innovation Center' leading the world in AI theory, technology, and applications by 2030.

In the 2024 Government Work Report during the Two Sessions, the 'AI+' strategy, which goes beyond the 'Internet+' initiative, was officially proclaimed, elevating the deep integration of digital technology and manufacturing to a national agenda. This signifies that China's current AI policy has evolved from the initial 'foundation building' stage, through a phase of 'parallel regulation and promotion,' to the current 'AI+ Action' stage, which aims to achieve the intelligentization of all industries. As a follow-up measure, the 'Guidelines for the Construction of a National Artificial Intelligence Industry Comprehensive Standardization System (2024)' were issued, proposing guidelines to unify AI technology standards nationally and promote qualitative growth of the industrial ecosystem by establishing over 50 national and industry standards by 2026. Through such a consistent national mobilization process, China seeks to achieve 'corner overtaking' (弯道超车) and 'leapfrog development' (跨越发展) in the US-China technological and military competition, thereby securing a 'strategic high ground' (制高点) in the competition.

<Table 1> Major Policy Documents Related to AI in China

Despite China's clear direction and consistent policies, the United States' comprehensive blockade of advanced technologies against China, spearheaded by export controls on NVIDIA's advanced GPUs, has led many experts to offer pessimistic forecasts for China's technological rise. However, the reality observed throughout 2024 and 2025 paradoxically suggests that sanctions and blockades are fundamentally evolving China's AI technology ecosystem. China is no longer merely a technological follower; it is reshaping the global AI market landscape with strategies focused on 'extreme efficiency' and 'infrastructure control' to counter the United States. This Chinese response strategy can be understood as the product of a grand national strategy that organically combines three pillars: the development of advanced semiconductors and control over general-purpose semiconductors, software efficiency improvements, and control over physical infrastructure.

For instance, the model released by Chinese AI startup DeepSeek demonstrated performance comparable to cutting-edge US AI models while drastically reducing operational costs, sending shockwaves through Silicon Valley. The secret to their 'cost-effectiveness' lay in architectural innovations that improved the efficiency of utilizing limited GPU resources. This allowed DeepSeek to offer a groundbreaking price of $0.14 per million input tokens, which was approximately 1/20th to 1/30th of competing models like OpenAI's o1 at the time, and significantly cheaper compared to GPT-4o. DeepSeek's price competitiveness can be interpreted as an attempt to transform AI from a high-cost 'luxury good' into a more accessible 'general-purpose good' and to secure global leadership in the open-source ecosystem.

Furthermore, Chinese big tech companies have offset the 'computing power shortage' caused by US sanctions through massive capital investments. The unprecedented capital expenditures by Alibaba and Tencent go beyond mere facility investment; they are fundamentally strategic moves for survival and future dominance. Alibaba invested 72.5 billion yuan (approximately 14 trillion KRW) in FY2024, a 197% increase year-on-year, and plans to invest a staggering 380 billion yuan (approximately 73 trillion KRW) in AI and cloud infrastructure over the next three years.[9] Alibaba has clearly set the goal of achieving Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI) with this investment. It is aggressively expanding its market share in AI models through its self-developed open-source model series, Qwen (通义千问), utilizing its existing cash cows, e-commerce and cloud services, as funding sources for AI infrastructure development.

Tencent also invested 76.7 billion yuan (approximately 15 trillion KRW) in 2024, showing a record capital expenditure increase of 221% compared to the previous year.[10] Tencent is enhancing the performance of its proprietary model, Hunyuan (混元), while deeply integrating it into the WeChat ecosystem. Notably, it is building a virtuous cycle by reinvesting data generated from its vast services, including gaming, advertising, and fintech, into AI training, thereby leading the practical commercialization of B2C AI services.

In the semiconductor sector, China is employing a dual strategy that is both contradictory and complementary to directly overcome US sanctions. One core aspect of this strategy is self-reliance in advanced AI chips, with Huawei leading the charge. Although initially facing challenges with yields at 20% due to limitations in modifying SMIC's 7nm (N+2) process without EUV lithography equipment, China has recently increased yields to the 40% range through substantial government capital investment and process optimization, entering the phase of mass production stabilization. Additionally, the Chinese government is ensuring a stable domestic market through the 'Delete America policy' (Document 79), which mandates the removal of American hardware from the IT infrastructure of state-owned enterprises in sectors such as finance, energy, and telecommunications.[11] Consequently, Cambricon (寒武纪), known as the Chinese NVIDIA, has secured funds and data for technological accumulation by achieving a remarkable 13-fold increase in revenue in Q3 2025 compared to the previous year.

Behind these efforts for self-reliance in advanced chips lies a simultaneous strategy to dominate the global general-purpose semiconductor market. China is aggressively investing in general-purpose processes of 28nm and above, which are not subject to sanctions, and is projected to account for 39% of global general-purpose semiconductor production capacity by 2027. This signifies an intention to secure leadership in the supply chains of global manufacturing industries such as automotive, home appliances, and industrial equipment. The substantial profits generated from this will be channeled into R&D for vulnerable areas like HBM, advanced packaging, and AI accelerators through the 'Big Fund Phase III' (National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund Phase III), valued at $47.5 billion (approximately 65 trillion KRW), establishing a virtuous cycle. In essence, China is developing advanced technologies based on its dominance in the general-purpose market.

What is even more noteworthy is that China also controls the optical communication and power grid infrastructure, which are essential arteries for AI operation. In the optical module market, which determines data transmission speeds within data centers, InnoLight (中际旭创) and Eoptolink (新易盛) have become key partners for global tech giants, including NVIDIA. They are leading in next-generation technologies such as Co-Packaged Optics (CPO) and Linear Drive Pluggable Optics (LPO), holding significant market share.

Furthermore, to cope with the explosive power consumption of AI data centers, China has made large-scale investments in high-voltage power transmission networks and solid-state transformers, which are far more efficient than conventional transformers. This supports domestic companies like Jinpan Technology (金盘科技) in leading the global standards for the power infrastructure market. Metaphorically, this can be interpreted as a meticulous strategy where China, while competing with the United States for 'brains' (AI models), simultaneously controls the 'nervous system' (communications) and the 'heart' (power) to lead the underlying infrastructure of the global AI ecosystem.

In conclusion, China is responding to the hardware disadvantages caused by US sanctions primarily through optimization of software architecture. Simultaneously, by dominating the general-purpose semiconductor and physical infrastructure markets with massive capital investment, it is building a new AI camp that emphasizes 'optimal efficiency' and 'price competitiveness' against the US-centric AI order focused on 'peak performance'. The global AI hegemony competition is evolving beyond a mere technological gap struggle into an all-out war encompassing the entire ecosystem, including resources, power, talent, and infrastructure.

III. Defense AI: Civil-Military Integration and Strengthening Military Power

Having keenly recognized the importance of information superiority through the 1991 Gulf War, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is focusing on acquiring asymmetric 'killer' capabilities using AI to overcome the 'generation gap' with the United States. Chinese military theorists predict the advent of a battlefield 'singularity' where the speed of decision-making in warfare will surpass human cognitive abilities due to AI, and they are considering the operational possibility of fully autonomous systems that 'exclude humans from the loop' more openly than the US.

Currently, China perceives the United States as a 'formidable enemy' that must be overcome and views the AI technology competition as a key battlefield for ideological confrontation.[12] Interestingly, Chinese experts tend to overestimate the US military AI capabilities, which serves as a justification for further AI investment and development within China, much like the 'missile gap' debate during the Cold War.[13]

Consequently, the PLA recognizes AI technology as a critical factor determining victory or defeat in future warfare and has developed it into a new operational concept called 'intelligentized warfare (智能化战争)'. 'Intelligentization' signifies a new warfare paradigm that goes beyond the existing stages of 'mechanization' and 'informatization' by integrating AI across military systems to intelligently connect and utilize all elements of the battlefield. This has become a core objective of Chinese military modernization since President Xi Jinping first mentioned it at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, and the focus is on accelerating the transition to an 'intelligentized' system, primarily targeting the 100th anniversary of the PLA's founding in 2027.

The core doctrine for conducting intelligentized warfare is 'system destruction warfare (体系破击战)'. This concept aims not merely to physically annihilate enemy forces but to paralyze the enemy's ability to wage war by identifying and precisely striking command and control (C2), reconnaissance (ISR), communication hubs, and other critical nodes with AI. To achieve this, the concept of 'multi-domain precision warfare' has been developed, which integrates data from all domains—land, sea, air, space, and cyber—for AI analysis to match the optimal strike means. To achieve these objectives, China's defense AI ecosystem has evolved into a complex structure integrating traditional state-owned defense enterprises, rapidly growing private technology companies, and key research institutions. The core background for this development lies in the civil-military integration (军民融合) development strategy, which prioritizes technology within the framework of national security. In the Xi Jinping era, China's civil-military integration has been elevated to a core national strategy linking national security, economic development, and technological innovation.

To achieve the goals of civil-military integration, the Xi Jinping government has established a robust management system. In January 2017, the Central Commission for Civil-Military Integration was established, chaired by President Xi Jinping. This commission, composed of 26 key elites including members of the Politburo Standing Committee, major ministers, and top military officials, serves as the highest decision-making body for civil-military integration. Following the establishment of the Central Commission for Civil-Military Integration, the implementation of related policies has accelerated. Past civil-military integration (CMI) policies, which began with the conversion of military factories for civilian use during the Deng Xiaoping era, did not achieve significant results due to a lack of leadership consistency and conflicts of interest among departments. President Xi Jinping, aiming to overcome these limitations, has pursued a strong top-down approach since taking office, integrating resources, technologies, and personnel from civilian and military sectors with the goal of building a 'techno-security state'.

The civil-military integration strategy aims to simultaneously strengthen national defense and economic power through the optimization of economic resources and is pursued as a complex concept combining technology, policy, and politics. Through this, it seeks qualitative 'integration (融合)' that creates new synergies through deep penetration and interaction among elements, moving beyond mere 'combination (结合)' of the past. The Academy of Military Science of China categorizes the development stages of civil-military integration into the preliminary stage (until the mid-2010s), the transitional stage (until the early 2020s), and the deepening stage, evaluating that it has currently entered the deepening stage.

The ultimate goal of the civil-military integration strategy is to build an 'integrated civil-military strategic system and strategic capabilities'. In the short term, the objective is to form a 'deepening structure for civil-military integration development', which encompasses three attributes: 'full-element', 'multi-domain', and 'high-return'. In particular, in terms of 'multi-domain', 'major security domains' such as maritime, space, and cyber, as well as 'nascent technological areas' like AI and biotechnology, and new energy sources have been designated as key areas.

China has extensively studied the US model of civil-military interaction as its most important reference. Based on a deep understanding of US systems such as DARPA, PPBE (Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution), and JCIDS (Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System), China has prioritized the opening of its defense equipment acquisition system and the establishment of joint civil-military research facilities as two key pillars for implementing civil-military integration and realizing its vision of a techno-security state, tailored to its own characteristics. Subsequently, the Central Commission for Civil-Military Integration has opened up the acquisition system and expanded the issuance of 'licenses for research and production of weapons and equipment' and 'certificates for equipment contractors' to facilitate the entry of private enterprises into the defense market. Furthermore, the online portal 'General Equipment Procurement Information Network', established in 2015, has enhanced the transparency and accessibility of procurement information. In terms of establishing joint research facilities, China has built a large-scale comprehensive national research institute system, drawing inspiration from the roles of organizations like the US DARPA.

As key research institutions, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the seven universities specializing in defense, known as the 'Defense Seven Sons' (国防七子), form the core of research and development. In particular, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Beihang University, and Beijing Institute of Technology are leading technological development by securing numerous defense AI contracts. Furthermore, prestigious general universities such as Tsinghua University and Shanghai Jiao Tong University are also participating in AI technology development through collaboration with the military.[14] The demand for AI technical personnel is concentrated in the three major economic zones: the Yangtze River Delta (41%), the Pearl River Delta (29%), and Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei (9%), accounting for 78% of the total. These regions are densely populated with technology companies and research institutes. However, traditional defense hubs such as Sichuan Province and Shaanxi Province also play important roles in the AI supply chain.[15]

Currently, in the state-owned defense industry, traditional large defense enterprises such as China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), and China North Industries Group Corporation (NORINCO) continue to lead high-value, large-scale AI projects.[16] They are responsible for the intelligence integration of core weapon systems such as C4ISR, drones, and missile systems. In terms of contract numbers, civilian technology companies are the largest suppliers of AI equipment.[17] The majority of these are new technology companies established after 2010. For example, iFlytek, PIESAT, and JOUAV are supplying key technologies to the People's Liberation Army of China in the fields of voice recognition, satellite data analysis, and unmanned aerial vehicles.[18]

Consequently, the recent military buildup of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) is taking the form of 'intelligent warfare,' which organically combines physical strikes, psychological disruption, and the supporting unmanned logistics. Firstly, China is accelerating the establishment of autonomous operational systems by applying AI to target identification, tactical decision-making, and battlefield simulation. For instance, researchers at Xi'an Technological University (西安工业大学) achieved a breakthrough by analyzing 10,000 battlefield scenarios in 48 seconds using DeepSeek-based simulation, a significant improvement from the previous 48 hours.[19]

Secondly, the 'Jiu Tian' (九天), a super-large unmanned aircraft carrier identified in the air, is not merely a reconnaissance asset but can also be used as a platform for 'saturation attacks' to neutralize enemy air defense systems by simultaneously deploying over 100 drones through an 'heterogeneous swarm drone' system. This is assessed as an asymmetric warfare capability to directly counter the 'Hellscape' strategy being envisioned by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command for the defense of the Taiwan Strait. It demonstrates autonomous operational capabilities integrating offense and defense, in conjunction with high-power microwave systems like the FK-4000. On the ground, the autonomous military vehicle 'P60,' unveiled by the state-owned defense company Norinco in February, can autonomously perform battlefield support missions while traveling at 50 km/h. The Chinese military also possesses the capability to utilize AI robotic dogs for missions such as fire support, mine clearance, and reconnaissance.[20] Indeed, during the 'Golden Dragon 2024' joint exercise with Cambodia, robotic military dogs equipped with QBZ-95 assault rifles mounted on their backs were publicly displayed.[21]

This forward combat capability ensures sustainability through the rear 'intelligent unmanned logistics' system. The PLA's Joint Logistics Support Force has already established operational doctrines for autonomous transport of ammunition and supplies using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and robotic dogs, including the 'Rui Zhui' (锐爪) series. Through the integration of airborne drone resupply and unmanned warehouse systems, a precise supply chain that minimizes personnel casualties is being established. Notably, China deployed 88 units of the 'Rui Zhui' I around 2020, with 38 of them deployed in frontline areas near the Indian border to verify high-altitude operational capabilities.[22]

Furthermore, beyond the physical battlefield, the PLA is actively utilizing the open-source AI model DeepSeek to secure 'cognitive dominance' (制脑权) by controlling human will in the 'cognitive warfare' domain. This goes beyond mere propaganda; as evidenced by the case of disseminating deepfakes related to candidate Lai Ching-te during the Taiwan presidential election, it suggests that advanced cognitive warfare, involving the mass production of sophisticated disinformation through generative AI to induce social chaos, has already entered the practical application stage.

VI. Policy Implications

The race to secure dominance in advanced technologies, particularly in the field of AI, is recognized as a core battleground in the U.S.-China strategic competition. China is fundamentally evolving its AI ecosystem with massive capital investment to overcome the comprehensive technological blockade imposed by the United States. Amidst this technological hegemony competition between the U.S. and China, South Korea must minimize its exposure to situations where it is forced to make a 'choice.' In other words, South Korea's fundamental survival strategy should focus on expanding the space for 'balanced diplomacy' and securing 'strategic indispensability' by enhancing 'technological self-reliance.' To achieve this, South Korea needs to maintain its technological and manufacturing advantages, such as in High Bandwidth Memory (HBM), and leverage them as bargaining chips in its relations with both the U.S. and China. Furthermore, continuous research and development and talent cultivation are essential for maintaining and expanding technological self-reliance.

In the short term, by 2027, China is expected to aggressively invest in general-purpose processes of 28nm and above as part of its AI ascendancy, capturing 39% of the global general-purpose semiconductor production capacity. This is not a vague forecast but a near future that must be accepted as a constant. South Korea's leverage and core cost competitiveness in the supply chains of major manufacturing industries such as automobiles and home appliances are likely to weaken. Moreover, in the event of unforeseen circumstances that lead to a rigidification of South Korea-China relations, severe damage can be anticipated due to China's supply control, necessitating stable relationship management and the preparation of preemptive countermeasures.

From a security and defense perspective, the People's Liberation Army of China has set 'intelligent warfare' (智能化战争), which integrates AI technology across its military systems, as a key objective for military modernization. Primarily, it is accelerating the transition to this system by the centenary of the PLA's founding in 2027. These efforts are not confined to a single ministry like the Ministry of National Defense but are being pursued as a total national war effort linking economy, technology, and security through the 'military-civil fusion' (军民融合) strategy, directly led by President Xi Jinping, under the national strategic goal of building a 'Techno-Security State.'

Understanding the future security environment and adapting to the battlefield are immense challenges that cannot be solved solely by existing military organizations and experts. To effectively respond to these new types of complex security threats and intelligent battlefields, South Korea needs to establish a platform where collective intelligence from experts across various fields can be utilized under a national strategy framework, with the President taking direct leadership, rather than entrusting such matters solely to a single ministry like the Ministry of National Defense. This is only possible with the proactive intervention and command of the nation's highest leadership.■

VI. References

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) CSF News Briefing. 2025. "China's AI Market Competition: Alibaba and Tencent Engage in Unprecedented Investment Rivalry." April 7.

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) CSF China Experts Forum. 2025. "China Accelerates Military Weapon Development Based on DeepSeek AI." October 28.

Army Recognition. 2020. "Chinese Army (PLA) Inducts More Combat UGVs."

Fedasiuk, Ryan, Jennifer Melot, and Ben Murphy. 2021. "Harnessed Lightning - How the Chinese Military is Adopting Artificial Intelligence." CSET. October.

Kania, Elsa B. 2017. "Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power." Center for a New American Security (CNAS). November.

McFaul, Cole, Sam Bresnick, and Daniel Chou. 2025. "Pulling Back the Curtain on China's Military–Civil Fusion." Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET). September.

Peterson, Dahlia, Ngor Luong, and Jacob Feldgoise. 2023. "Assessing China's AI Workforce." Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET). November.

State Council of the People’s Republic of China. 2017. "A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (新一代人工智能发展规划)." Full English translation. July 8.

Artificial Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China (Scholarly Draft). 2025.

China Academy of Information and Communications Technology (CAICT) · JD Digits. n.d. "CAICT–JD Trustworthy AI White Paper (CAICT–JD 可信人工智能白皮书)."

Canada LeHoo Net (LaHoo). 2024. "U.S. Media: China’s ‘Document 79’ Directs Removal of U.S. Technology (美媒：中国‘79号文件’指示‘清除美国科技’)." March 9.

State Council. 2025. "Opinions of the State Council on Deepening the Implementation of the ‘AI+’ Action (国务院关于深入实施“人工智能+”行动的意见)." August 26. The Government of China website.

General Office of the State Council. 2016. "Internet+ AI Three-Year Action and Implementation Plan (“互联网+”人工智能三年行动实施方案).".

Relevant Departments of the State Council. 2024. "Guidelines for the Construction of a Comprehensive Standardization System for the National AI Industry, 2024 edition (国家人工智能产业综合标准化体系建设指南（2024版）)." The Government of China website.

Cyberspace Administration of China. 2023. "Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative AI Services (生成式人工智能服务管理暂行办法)." July 13. Cyberspace Administration of China official website.

[1]General Office of the State Council. 2016. "Internet+ AI 3-year Action and Implementation Plan (“互联网+”人工智能三年行动实施方案)." https://perma.cc/X2M9-N7RQ

[2] State Council, People’s Republic of China. 2017. "A Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (新一代人工智能发展规划)." 07.20. https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/translation-fulltext-8.1.17.pdf

[3]China Academy of Information and Communications Technology (CAICT) · JD Digits. n.d. "CAICT–JD Trustworthy AI White Paper (CAICT-JD可信人工智能白皮书)." https://perma.cc/9XZR-8KNE

[4]Smart farms (智慧农场), intelligent ports (智能港口), intelligent mines (智能矿山), intelligent factories (智能工厂), smart homes (智慧家居), intelligent education (智能教育), autonomous driving (自动驾驶), intelligent diagnosis and treatment (智能诊疗), smart courts (智慧法院), intelligent supply chains (智能供应链).

[5]Cyberspace Administration of China. 2023. "Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative AI Services (生成式人工智能服务管理暂行办法)." July 13.https://www.cac.gov.cn/2023-07/13/c_1690898327029107.htm

[6]Artificial Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China (Scholars’ Proposal). 2025. "Draft AI Law — Scholars’ Proposal (中华人民共和国人工智能法（学者建议稿）)." Perma. Accessed November 18, 2025.https://perma.cc/L9E4-5K3V

[7]Relevant Departments of the State Council. 2024. "Guidelines for the Construction of a Comprehensive Standardization System for the National AI Industry, 2024 edition (国家人工智能产业综合标准化体系建设指南（2024版）)." Government of China. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202407/content_6960720.htm

[8]State Council. 2025. "Opinions of the State Council on Deepening the Implementation of the “AI+” Action (国务院关于深入实施“人工智能+”行动的意见)." August 26. China Government Network. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/202508/content_7037861.htm

[9]CSF China Experts Forum (Korea Development Institute for International Economic Policy). 2025. "China's AI Market Competition: Alibaba and Tencent Engage in Unprecedented Investment Rivalry." April 7.

[10]CSF China Experts Forum (Korea Development Institute for International Economic Policy) (2025).

[11]LaHoo Canada. 2024. "U.S. media: China’s ‘Document 79’ directs removal of U.S. technology (美媒：中国‘79号文件’指示‘清除美国科技’)." March 9. https://lahoo.ca/2024/03/09/667321?utm

[12]Kania, Elsa B. 2017. Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China's Future Military Power.Center for a New American Security. November. p.12.

[13]Kania (2017).

[14]Kania (2017).

[15]Peterson, Dahlia, Ngor Luong, and Jacob Feldgoise. 2023. Assessing China's AI Workforce.CSET. November. pp. 11-12.

[16]McFaul, Cole, Sam Bresnick, and Daniel Chou. 2025. Pulling Back the Curtain on China's Military-Civil Fusion.CSET. September. pp. 12-13.

[17]Fedasiuk, Ryan, Jennifer Melot, and Ben Murphy. 2021. Harnessed Lightning - How the Chinese Military is Adopting Artificial Intelligence.CSET. October.

[18]McFaul et al. (2025).

[19]CSF China Experts Forum. 2025. "China Accelerates Development of Military Weapons Based on DeepSea AI." October 28.

[20]CSF China Experts Forum (2025).

[21]South China Morning Post. 2024. "Chinese military dogs of war go viral during joint drills with Cambodia." May.

[22]Army Recognition. 2020."Chinese Army (PLA) inducts more combat UGVs."

Author: Jeon Jae-woo_Senior Researcher, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

Contact and Editor: Lim Jae-hyun_EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhim@eai.or.kr