[Global NK Commentary] How to Get Kim Jong Un to Negotiate with Trump

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Following President Trump's re-election, expectations for the resumption of US-North Korea summits have persisted. Throughout his campaign, President Trump consistently expressed interest in meeting with Chairman Kim Jong Un, stating that he had a good personal relationship with Kim and that Kim "missed him." However, Kim firmly rejected the meeting, stating that "negotiations with the US have gone as far as they can go," and criticized the US policy of hostility toward North Korea. Despite Kim's refusal, Trump's summit proposals continued. While on an Asian tour for summits with South Korea and China, Trump again hinted at the possibility of meeting with Kim Jong Un, expressing 100% openness to a meeting, though no specific plans were in place, and reiterating his good relationship with Kim. Trump seemed intent on recreating the scene from June 2019 when they met at Panmunjom, a meeting that was proposed abruptly via tweet.

Although a meeting between the two leaders did not materialize during this Asian tour, considering Trump and Kim Jong Un's past interactions, an impromptu meeting would not be entirely surprising. A meeting could occur at any time if Kim Jong Un decides to accept Trump's persistent overtures. However, it is unlikely that substantial negotiations would result from such a sudden encounter. Just as the June 2019 Panmunjom meeting yielded no tangible outcomes, the possibility of achieving concrete results for denuclearization and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula from an unprepared meeting between the two leaders is minimal. In any case, the key to US-North Korea summits currently rests with Kim Jong Un.

Why Kim Jong Un Met Trump in Singapore

Kim Jong Un has met with Trump three times. They held their historic first summit in Singapore in June 2018, followed by a second summit in Hanoi, Vietnam, in February 2019. In June of the same year, they had their third meeting at Panmunjom at Trump's impromptu invitation. So, why did Kim Jong Un agree to the first summit with Trump?

One of the most significant reasons was North Korea's confidence in its nuclear capabilities, as Kim Jong Un perceived the situation at the time to be favorable to North Korea. North Korea had pursued nuclear armament for decades and finally announced the completion of its nuclear deterrence against the United States, following the launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the US East Coast. North Korea asserted that it could protect peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and globally by achieving a de facto balance of power with the United States.

In fact, North Korea had long believed in the power of nuclear deterrence and strived to possess independent nuclear deterrence against the United States. The logic of nuclear deterrence explains that mutually assured destruction can be guaranteed among nuclear-armed states. Pyongyang declared in 2017 that mutually assured destruction had begun to function against Washington. Kim Jong Un himself stated that since North Korea had now physically demonstrated its capability to strike the US mainland at any time, it would be more difficult for the United States to dare attack North Korea. While no one can be certain whether North Korea had fully acquired the technology and capability for a credible second-strike nuclear attack against the US after a massive US first strike, North Korea declared that it had achieved nuclear deterrence. Kim Jong Un emphasized that even if the United States attempted another war wielding nuclear weapons, it would not dare to invade due to North Korea's strong nuclear deterrence. Based on its confidence in its nuclear deterrence, Kim Jong Un declared a new strategic line at the plenary meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea on April 20, 2018, a week before the first inter-Korean summit.

Another reason for Kim Jong Un's policy shift was Trump's new foreign policy based on 'America First.' Trump signaled his intention to pursue foreign policy prioritizing US interests, regardless of previous relationships with allies or adversaries. Against this backdrop, Trump heightened tensions with European and Asian allies while improving relations with Russia. In essence, he was pursuing a foreign policy entirely different from previous US administrations.

Trump was pursuing an isolationist strategy that could significantly impact the security environment on the Korean Peninsula. Trump's foreign policy was a welcome change from North Korea's perspective, making the situation more favorable. After the summit with Kim Jong Un in Singapore, Trump commented, "The past does not have to define the future. Yesterday's conflicts do not have to be tomorrow's wars. As history has repeatedly proven, adversaries can become friends... Chairman Kim has an unparalleled opportunity before him to be remembered as the leader who opened a brilliant new era of security and prosperity for his people." Kim Jong Un welcomed Trump's new foreign policy, stating that he highly valued Trump's willingness and ambition to resolve issues through dialogue and negotiation in a pragmatic manner, despite their adversarial past. In summary, Kim Jong Un visited Singapore with strong confidence in Pyongyang's nuclear deterrence, expecting to extract strategic concessions from Trump on the Korean Peninsula issue, and agreed to a joint statement. He believed the situation was favorable to North Korea at the time and entered negotiations with the United States.

Reasons for the Failure of the Hanoi Summit

Kim Jong Un met Trump again in late February 2019 in Hanoi, Vietnam, expecting further concessions, but failed to reach any agreement. North Korea has long perceived that security guarantees and a peace regime should precede denuclearization, and that peace leads to denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Jong Un believed the Singapore joint statement reflected this order and the principle of 'action for action,' as it first stipulated Trump's promise of security guarantees to North Korea, followed by Kim Jong Un's reaffirmation of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. A gap in perception existed between Trump and Kim Jong Un, which was the primary reason for the failure of the Hanoi summit. After the summit, Trump stated that there were differences in opinion between them, claiming that Kim Jong Un wanted to discuss less significant issues rather than the core matters desired by the US. Kim Jong Un had hoped to persuade Trump at Hanoi to accept the first step of partial denuclearization measures by North Korea. He sought to persuade Trump to lift the major economic sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council in 2016 and 2017 in exchange for the dismantling of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. Kim Jong Un indicated that this was the maximum measure North Korea could take at the time.

However, Trump set a different negotiation framework than Kim Jong Un expected. It was a demand for complete denuclearization at once. Kim Jong Un's strategy at Hanoi was to negotiate with the US through a phased approach. But the summit collapsed because Trump demanded a much bigger 'big deal' than Kim Jong Un had anticipated. Accepting complete denuclearization solely in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions was a negotiation that Kim Jong Un could not accept. North Korea sought to secure its regime's safety in return for complete denuclearization, hence its demand for a phased approach rather than a single large transaction. As Pyongyang's security concerns are focused on ending the US policy of hostility, North Korea has consistently demanded a change in US policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, after the Hanoi summit, Kim Jong Un expressed regret over the summit's failure in a speech. He confessed that he had serious doubts about whether his strategic decision and courageous actions at the Hanoi US-North Korea summit were correct. He criticized that the US approached the summit with methods that were completely unattainable, stating that it served as an opportunity to be wary of whether the US truly intended to improve bilateral relations.

Following the failure of the Hanoi Summit, Kim Jong-un's perceptions reverted to the pre-2018 era. In reality, a fundamental dilemma exists between denuclearization and a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has consistently approached this issue with the United States as an exchange game. Pyongyang has never viewed the nuclear issue as solely North Korea's problem, but rather as an issue concerning the entire Korean Peninsula, including the United States. From North Korea's perspective, the United States is the entity threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula, and North Korea believes it has prevented war on the peninsula through nuclear deterrence. Therefore, North Korea believes that regime security must precede complete denuclearization. Ultimately, North Korea's concept of denuclearization implies that not only North Korea but also other nuclear powers, including the United States, must engage in nuclear disarmament. North Korea views denuclearization as possible only when the adversarial relationship with the United States fundamentally changes and a permanent peace regime is established on the Korean Peninsula.

The divergence in perceptions between North Korea and the United States is the primary reason for the failure of the Hanoi Summit. Pyongyang has consistently argued that security guarantees and a peace regime must be established before any denuclearization measures by North Korea. This includes not only a simple peace treaty or normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States but also the termination of the adversarial relationship between the two countries. This signifies the need for a fundamental change in the security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula. The Hanoi Summit clearly demonstrated that reaching an agreement was impossible given the significant gap in perceptions between North Korea and the United States.

Lessons from the Panmunjom Meeting for Future Negotiations

Kim Jong-un met with Trump again at Panmunjom on June 30, 2019. The reunion of the two leaders, initiated by Trump's tweet, surprised the world but ultimately ended in failure once more. Despite the impromptu nature of the meeting, North Korea also hoped for a new turning point following the failure of the Hanoi Summit. The two leaders agreed to resume working-level talks, but no agreement was reached due to the significant differences in their positions. North Korea claimed that the United States was not at all prepared for nuclear negotiations and criticized the U.S. for attempting to use the talks for domestic political gain. The Panmunjom meeting demonstrated that while impromptu meetings between Trump and Kim Jong-un are possible, achieving substantial results is difficult. As long as Trump is eager to meet with Kim Jong-un, a meeting can be arranged at any time if Kim Jong-un decides to do so. However, no significant outcomes can be expected from meetings that are not meticulously prepared in advance.

To Encourage Kim Jong-un to Negotiate with Trump

What do the three meetings between Trump and Kim Jong-un signify? What steps are necessary to bring Kim Jong-un to the negotiating table in the future? Considering the current geopolitical situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula, the South Korean government's ability to influence North Korea-U.S. negotiations is considerably limited. However, despite these constraints, several lessons can be drawn from past experiences.

First, for Kim Jong-un to come to the negotiating table, there needs to be an expectation that an agreement can be reached with Trump. In 2018, enhanced nuclear capabilities and Trump's changed foreign policy led Kim Jong-un to the negotiating table. After the failure of North Korea-U.S. negotiations in 2019, Kim Jong-un declared a strategy of 'frontal breakthrough' and announced the enhancement of nuclear capabilities at the 8th Party Congress in January 2021. This implicitly acknowledges that the nuclear progress up to 2017 was insufficient to persuade Trump. From this perspective, it is crucial to thoroughly analyze Kim Jong-un's perception of North Korea's nuclear capabilities. If the increased nuclear and missile capabilities since 2020 instill new confidence in Kim Jong-un, the possibility of resuming summit talks with Trump will increase. Of course, given North Korea's participation in the Ukraine war, its security alliance treaty with Russia, and its improved relations with China through participation in Victory Day celebrations, Kim Jong-un's need to negotiate with Trump may diminish. Furthermore, with Kim Jong-un perceiving the current world order as multipolar, there is little reason for him to be preoccupied with negotiations with the United States. However, considering the unstable history of North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia relations, North Korea cannot indefinitely rely on China and Russia for its destiny. Ultimately, the possibility remains that North Korea will attempt negotiations with the United States, the source of threat, once a certain level of confidence is restored. Although difficult, the South Korean government must strive to open this window of opportunity and seize the right moment.

Second, even if Trump and Kim Jong-un meet suddenly, it is better than not meeting at all. However, such meetings should be prepared in advance, even if secretly. The reason Kim Jong-un traveled to Hanoi, despite a train journey of over 60 hours, was the expectation of reaching a summit agreement. Kim Jong-un's expectations were clearly generated through multiple mutual contacts between high-ranking officials from both North Korea and the U.S., such as U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo and North Korean Vice Chairman Kim Yong-chol of the Workers' Party, following the Singapore summit. In a situation where high-level talks between North Korea and the U.S. do not precede the meeting, as was the case with the Panmunjom meeting, it is unlikely that Kim Jong-un would expect a summit agreement. In the current situation, the South Korean government has very little leverage to promote high-level negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. However, the South Korean government must create a detailed roadmap to build the foundation for North Korea-U.S. negotiations and continuously present alternatives to North Korea and the United States, respectively. As neither North Korea nor the United States is presenting concrete plans, South Korea is the only country capable of proposing solutions to the current situation. Otherwise, if contact between North Korea and the U.S. begins, South Korea is likely to be bypassed. This is why, in addition to strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance, a sustained engagement policy toward North Korea must be pursued.

Third, to drive changes in the international order, a catalyst that can shock the existing environment is necessary. In this regard, the South Korean government needs to cautiously strengthen its diplomacy with China and Russia. The weaker Kim Jong-un's trust in China and Russia becomes, the higher the possibility of approaching the United States. It is true that South Korea's diplomacy with China and Russia faces significant constraints in the current situation where North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia relations are strengthening. However, South Korea must also strive to expand its strategic space in foreign policy, keeping in mind the possibility of a multipolar order. Although the momentum for ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation has weakened under the Trump administration, South Korea's multifaceted diplomatic efforts are becoming increasingly important. In particular, it is essential to closely observe the changes in the U.S.'s relations with China and Russia under the Trump administration and pay attention to the possibility of a new security environment emerging. In such a situation, the likelihood of Kim Jong-un engaging in North Korea-U.S. negotiations may further increase.

■ Hwang Ji-hwan_Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Seoul.

■Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr