[Viewpoint Commentary] Trump, US-China Relations, and the Korean Peninsula

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QYi7jg3iqfo

Video script

The Trump Administration's Foreign Policy and the Erosion of Alliance Confidence

The first question is your view on President Trump's foreign policy. I think it's very difficult to discern a grand strategy for Donald Trump. I think we all understand that his economic policies are in conflict with his security policies. So he is undermining cooperation with Japan, undermining cooperation with India, and undermining cooperation with South Korea, which the Department of Defense believes is a crucial partner in dealing with the rise of China.

That's right. We don't really see this interagency process. We see Trump prioritizing coercive economic policies. The effect is to undermine confidence in American security policy. I know that in the Department of Defense there are people who believe that the United States should do more to counter China with its Indo-Pacific strategy, along with India, Japan, and Australia, and Donald Trump has very little respect for so-called non-great powers. Whether they are European countries,

or Taiwan, or Ukraine, or South Korea, or Japan. So the overall foreign policy is undermining American security in East Asia. We see the Department of Defense constantly pushing back against the President's economic policies, trying to remind the President that security is important. So we see this push and pull between his economic instincts and his security needs.

The Uncertainty of Sino-American Relations and South Korea's Diplomatic Challenges

It's very difficult for the United States to recover from its general indifference to its allies, despite Donald Trump's economic policies and the efforts of the Department of Defense. The second is probably about US-China relations. Nations do not like uncertainty. They are afraid of being abandoned at a crucial moment. The only way to cope with this uncertainty is to improve relations with China.

If you cannot count on American support and you cannot count on the stability of economic agreements in the future, you may pay a high price for Chinese retaliation, but you will not have American support. So the risk is that you enter into agreements with the United States that are beneficial or appear to be beneficial, but in reality, they are constantly renegotiated, security commitments are weakened, and at the same time, you face greater Chinese pressure.

I cannot imagine a worse situation for South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and other countries in East Asia. This is what the President has done. I see no evidence that he is reconsidering, as if the allies have no confidence in American policy going forward. We see efforts, for example, in Canada to strengthen cooperation with China. Other countries too.

We see Australia strengthening cooperation with China. Your country is also trying to strengthen cooperation with China. China has leverage that it uses to pressure American allies by exploiting their lack of confidence in the United States. We see South Korea caught between an unreliable United States, an unpredictable United States, and China, which is trying to use coercive policies to force South Korea to reconsider its cooperation with the United States. Given the public support for President Trump in the United States,

at the end of his term. Do you think Trumpist American foreign policy will continue? Is there pressure on allies like South Korea? Regarding post-Trump tensions, Donald Trump engages in excessive public diplomacy. This causes two problems.

First, we see him flip-flopping. Isn't that bad for America's reputation? Yes, but second, it exposes America's differences with China. I believe this level of public diplomacy will end with the next president. Issues concerning technology and rare earths will continue, but they will be negotiated quietly, and deals will be announced that show progress, rather than short-term solutions to long-term problems. So we

have the possibility of improved diplomacy within three years. That would be a good thing. Moving on to China, I know that China recently strengthened its export controls on rare earths. That is a well-prepared and well-coordinated response to current pressures. How do you assess China's intentions in dealing with American pressure?

First of all, the new regulations in China are simply regulations for approval. They do not automatically impose greater restrictions, deterrents, or controls on exports. They give the Chinese government greater ability to control those exports if they wish.

China uses this leverage not only on the United States but also on other countries to persuade them to reduce cooperation with American policies. For many countries, I think they will decide that cooperation with China is important for their economic security. Since the United States is an unreliable partner and is pursuing economic protectionism itself, they will have no choice but to manage their relationship with China to maintain access to the Chinese market. And to maintain access to Chinese rare earths and exports.

This will require South Korea to deal with how to cooperate with American tariffs, how to deal with the shipbuilding industry, and how to deal with science and technology restrictions, all while not jeopardizing access to the Chinese market. I don't think the rare earths issue is decisive because China will manipulate it. So basically, it tells other countries, including South Korea, that we can be flexible. Everyone is wondering.

The Possibility of a Taiwan Strait Crisis and China's Strategy

Is there a growing sense of urgency in Washington recently regarding the views of the US policy community on a potential Taiwan emergency? I think the think tank community in Washington is increasingly captured by the dominant narrative coming from the State Department or the White House. There is very little debate among think tank analysts, which is unfortunate. There are a few things to consider about Taiwan. Both the Secretary of Defense and the former Chief of Naval Operations

have stated clearly that China will not have the capability to invade Taiwan until 2027. So we have at least two years left. Second, the Secretary of Defense, as he was leaving, said it would probably be 2028. He said he wasn't sure they would want to invade even if they had the capability.

So the Department of Defense leadership has made it clear that this is not a war that China wants. I understand their perspective. Imagine China starting a war over Taiwan. First, they have to land on the beaches on the east coast of Taiwan.

Then they have to fight the Taiwanese military. Then they have to march through Taiwan's cities and suburbs. They will have to fight suburban households all the way. Then they have to engage in urban warfare in Taiwan's major cities. The United States is selling Taiwan equipment that is perfect for a long and protracted war. I think about this in one way. We say that Xi Jinping wants to realize the Chinese Dream.

He may want to, but what if he doesn't realize the Chinese Dream and remains the weakest Chinese leader in history? He doesn't want that. Moreover, China is still winning. The balance of power in the Taiwan Strait continues to shift from the United States to China. Ultimately, it's important to step back and recognize that, with the exception of Japan, the three East Asian countries with inconsistent policies for managing China's rise are all democracies.

South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Over time, democracies will also have to deal with the rise of China. The rest of East Asia has said, 'We will not take sides.' Ultimately, I think China will understand that Taiwan will be forced to adopt a similar perspective. The Kuomintang continues to talk about the 1992 Consensus. They have a very good chance of winning the next election. In such a situation, why would China want to use force?

Rather, I think China's strategy is to continue to exert great pressure on Taiwan through its military, coast guard, air force, and navy. This is probably similar to what they are doing to Taiwan in the hope that Taiwan will initiate a crisis. In the same way as the view that Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan was a mistake, or the view that the Philippines was wrong in the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012.

Discussions on Modernizing the ROK-US Alliance and South Korea's Geopolitical Constraints

This could lead China to announce two weeks of military exercises to blockade Taiwan's trade space, which would leave the United States responding helplessly. Therefore, I don't think China wants war. They want a crisis. This would be a way to minimize conflict with South Korea, minimize tensions with Australia, and achieve its objectives regarding Taiwan, thereby undermining US-Taiwan cooperation. From South Korea's perspective, there is a discussion about so-called 'alliance modernization.'

Here, the United States is asking South Korea to play a role in preparing for a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan. However, given South Korea's geopolitical constraints, the likelihood of Seoul participating in direct military intervention in such a scenario is very low.

Therefore, I try to understand whether Washington realistically understands these limitations and how expectations are being adjusted. For the past 20-30 years, South Korea has maintained a clear policy that the US military and ROK military exist to defend North Korea, and that US military bases cannot be used for 'out-of-area contingencies.' The Yoon Suk-yeol administration has begun to somewhat weaken these commitments, but I believe the United States clearly understands this as a problem. Strategic flexibility for the United States has not been popular in South Korea. We understand this.

And frankly, regarding South Korea's geopolitical considerations, I recently heard a former Chinese military leader say during a visit to China that it would take 20 hours to destroy all US military facilities in the Philippines.

The same applies to South Korea. This is part of the problem the United States faces. We are doubling down on cooperation against China, even though South Korea's strategic utility is decreasing due to China's rise. This is a contradiction. If you are a US security planner, there is a problem if the US commitment to South Korea is increasing, even though South Korea's contribution to US defense is decreasing. That is why I say there is considerable uncertainty in the direction of US alliance policy in the next administration.

Therefore, we understand this fully, and part of US policy is designed to secure the contributions of these countries. Therefore, if a conflict with China arises, cooperation will be more certain through close cooperation than it would be otherwise. This is certainly the purpose of wargaming, and the purpose of the US deployment to the island chain south of Japan.

Strengthening North Korea-China-Russia Solidarity and Prospects for China's North Korea Policy

The last question is about North Korea. Given Kim Jong Un's participation in multilateral meetings with leaders such as Xi Jinping and Putin in early September and his attendance at the Chinese military parade, there appears to be a historically strong relationship between these three countries. Therefore, as North Korea strengthens its relationship with Russia, it is necessary to assess China's recent North Korea policy.

Do you think this authoritarian solidarity will be further strengthened, putting North Korea in a better position? We have seen increasing cooperation between Russia and South Korea. We must question what significance this has. That is, if Russia cannot repel the Ukrainian army, it is unclear what contribution it can make to North Korea's security or its offensive capabilities.

Therefore, I see this primarily as a diplomatic relationship. Russia is isolated, North Korea is isolated, and they are coming together. China has been much more cautious. We often hear about how North Korea wants to develop cooperation with China. We have not seen China say that. China has responded much more quietly to cooperation with South Korea. Now, I think China would be willing to encourage North Korea to negotiate with this government and ease restrictions.

Whether it is economic relations or summit meetings, this is certainly in China's interest. That is, as far as China can help South Korea, it is good for China. Second, if tensions on the Korean Peninsula decrease, the United States will have fewer opportunities to expand its influence.

This is good for China. Therefore, I think that despite everything we see, China can tell North Korea that now is the time to compromise. Of course, we have seen North Korea accept the current state of inter-Korean relations. They have abandoned at least the declarative policy of unification. They have blocked various access routes to the South. They have mentioned opposition to unification. Certainly, China will not pressure North Korea for unification. However, we believe that North Korea is more willing to accept the status quo, and China will clearly pressure them through improved relations with South Korea. Therefore, I also see a view that this axis is exaggerated.

They blocked various approaches to the South. They mentioned opposition to unification. Certainly, China will not pressure North Korea for unification. However, we believe that North Korea is more willing to accept the status quo, and China will clearly pressure them by improving relations with South Korea. Therefore, there is also a view that this axis is exaggerated.

South Korea will have to make significant compromises in its relationship with North Korea in many respects. We see this from the Lee Myung-bak administration. Therefore, South Korea can be confident in its relationship with North Korea, and China can certainly help in this regard by pressuring North Korea to pursue economic cooperation, summit meetings, trade, etc.

Excellent. I have many clients, but thank you very much. Excellent. Inside.

■ Go to English Video & Transcript

Q1: Your overall opinion on President Trump's foreign policy

Jeongseong Chun: The first question is your overall opinion on President Trump's foreign policy, and the second question is about relations with China.

Ross: I think it's important to emphasize that it's very difficult to find a grand strategy from Donald Trump. I think we all understand that Trump's economic policies conflict with the achievement of his security policy objectives. Trump is now undermining cooperation with Japan, undermining cooperation with India, and undermining cooperation with South Korea, countries that the U.S. Department of Defense sees as key allies needed to counter the rise of China. So we don't see interagency coordination here, but rather Trump prioritizing coercive economic policies. The result is an erosion of confidence in American security policy.

Furthermore, within the Department of Defense, there are those who believe that the United States must counter China with India, Japan, and Australia through its Indo-Pacific strategy, but Trump has little respect for these so-called 'non-great powers.' Whether it's European countries, Taiwan, Ukraine, South Korea, or even Japan, Trump's overall foreign policy is undermining US security in East Asia.

However, we are witnessing the Department of Defense continuously pushing back against the President's economic policies and trying to remind the President of the importance of security issues. Therefore, we can confirm a push and pull, a tug-of-war between Trump's economic instincts and security imperatives. Currently, the United States is in a very difficult situation, trying to break free from Donald Trump's economic policies and his general indifference to allies. Even though the Department of Defense is trying to pull the President back into line.

Q2: What is the desirable direction for South Korean diplomacy amidst current US-China relations?

Ross: Nations do not like uncertainty, because they are afraid of being abandoned at a crucial moment. The only way for South Korea to adapt to this uncertainty is to improve its relations with China. If you cannot count on American support and you cannot count on the stability of future economic agreements, you may pay a heavy price for Chinese retaliation without American support. Therefore, the real risk is that you enter into agreements with the United States that appear helpful or helpful, but in reality, they are constantly renegotiated, security commitments are weakened, and at the same time, Chinese pressure increases. It is difficult to imagine a worse situation for South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and other countries in East Asia. These are the actions President Trump has taken, and there is no evidence that he is reconsidering them.

US allies lack confidence in future US policies. For example, we see moves in Canada to strengthen cooperation with China and other countries. We also see Australia expanding cooperation with China. We also observe South Korea making efforts to strengthen cooperation with China.

China will gladly exploit the growing distrust among American allies to its advantage. South Korea is caught between an "unreliable and unpredictable United States" and "China, which is attempting to force South Korea to reconsider its cooperation with the United States by mobilizing coercive policies."

Q3: Will the "America First" policy continue after President Trump's term ends?

Jeongseong Chun: Given the public support for President Trump in the United States, do you think President Trump's "America First" policy will continue after his term ends, and that pressure on allies like South Korea will be maintained?

Ross: Regarding the post-Trump era, it is worth noting that Trump engages in excessive "public diplomacy." This has two problems. First, Trump flip-flops on his positions. This cannot be good for America's reputation.

And second, he widely publicizes the extent of the rift between the US and China. I believe this level of public diplomacy will end with the inauguration of a new president. Conflicts surrounding technology or rare earth issues will continue, but they will be negotiated quietly, and agreements that are considered progress—not short-term remedies for long-term grievances—will be announced. Therefore, I believe there is a possibility that US diplomacy will improve in three years. That would be a good thing.

Q4: Given the recent export control measures on rare earths, how do you assess China's intent in responding to US pressure?

Jeongseong Chun: Turning to China, China recently strengthened export controls on rare earth raw materials, which is a thoroughly prepared and meticulously calculated response to President Trump's pressure. How, then, do you assess China's intentions in responding to American pressure?

Ross: First of all, the new regulations from China are simply regulations for approval. These regulations do not automatically impose greater restrictions or controls on exports. These regulations give the Chinese government discretion to control exports only when they wish. China uses this leverage not only on the United States but also on other countries, often to induce them to reduce cooperation with the United States.

And many countries will judge that cooperation with China is important for their economic security. Since the United States is not only an unreliable partner but is also implementing American economic protectionism, they will have no choice but to manage their relationship with China to maintain access to the Chinese market and to Chinese rare earths and exports. This means that South Korea must deal with how to cooperate with American tariff measures, how to resolve issues in the shipbuilding industry, and how to handle science and technology restrictions, all while not jeopardizing access to the Chinese market. I do not see the rare earths issue as a decisive factor, as China will not hesitate to exploit it. Therefore, these Chinese regulations tell countries like South Korea how China can be flexible.

Q5: What is the possibility of a military conflict in Taiwan?

Jeongseong Chun: How does the U.S. political establishment view the possibility of a military conflict in Taiwan? Has there been any recent shift in the sense of urgency in Washington?

Ross: I feel that the U.S. think tank community, often referred to as the "Washington Beltway," is increasingly being co-opted by the dominant narrative emanating from the State Department or the White House. It is unfortunate that there is very little debate among think tank analysts. There are a few points to consider regarding Taiwan. Both the former Secretary of Defense and the former Chief of Naval Operations have clearly stated that China will not have the capability to invade Taiwan until 2027. So that's at least two more years.

Second, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense said it might actually be 2028. He added that he was not sure that China would want to invade even if it had the capability. So the Department of Defense leadership has made it clear that this is not a war that China wants. I understand this perspective. Imagine China initiating a war over Taiwan. First, they would have to land on the beaches on the east coast of Taiwan. And they would have to fight their way through the Taiwanese military, and then march across Taiwan's cities and suburbs. The Chinese military would have to fight across all the suburbs. Then they would have to engage in urban warfare in Taiwan's major cities. The United States is selling Taiwan materiel that would enable it to engage in a protracted war of attrition against China.

One perspective on this issue might be that Xi Jinping wants to realize the Chinese Dream. But if he fails to achieve the Chinese Dream and is remembered as the most incompetent Chinese leader in history, he will not want such an outcome. Moreover, China is still winning the competition. The balance of power in the Taiwan Strait continues to shift from the United States to China.

Ultimately, stepping back, I think it's important to recognize that three of the countries with inconsistent policies toward the rise of China in East Asia, excluding Japan, are all democracies. These are South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. However, over time, democracies will also have to confront the rise of China. The rest of East Asia has stated that they will not choose sides, and eventually, Taiwan will also have to adopt a similar stance (though China is aware of this). The Kuomintang continues to refer to the 1992 Consensus, and it is highly likely to win the next election. In such a situation, why would China want to use force?

Rather, I think China's strategy is to continue to exert great pressure on Taiwan through its military, coast guard, air force, and navy, in a way that is similar to what they are doing to Taiwan in the hope that Taiwan will initiate a crisis. This is the same logic as the view that Pelosi's visit to Taiwan was a mistake, or the view that the Philippines was wrong in the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012. This would allow China to announce two weeks of military exercises to blockade Taiwan's trade space. Just two weeks. The United States would not be able to respond in that timeframe. Therefore, China does not seem to want war; it seems to want a crisis. This would be a way to minimize conflict with South Korea, minimize tensions with Australia, and achieve its objectives regarding Taiwan, thereby undermining U.S.-Taiwan cooperation.

Q6: Your opinion on the "modernization" of the ROK-US alliance?

Jeongseong Chun: As you know, from South Korea's perspective, there is a discussion about "alliance modernization." The United States is asking South Korea to play a greater role in deterring possible Chinese actions targeting Taiwan. However, given South Korea's geographical and strategic constraints, the likelihood of South Korea participating in direct military intervention in such a scenario is very low. Therefore, I wonder if the United States realistically understands these limitations and how expectations are being adjusted accordingly.

Ross: For the past 20-30 years, South Korea has maintained a clear policy that the U.S. Forces Korea are stationed for the purpose of defending against North Korea. U.S. military bases in South Korea cannot be used for contingencies in areas outside the Korean Peninsula. However, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has somewhat weakened this policy. But I think the United States clearly recognizes this as a problem.

Strategic flexibility for the United States has never been welcomed in South Korea. We understand that. It is true that South Korea has geographical and political considerations. Let's think about this issue somewhat bluntly. When I visited China recently, a former Chinese military leader said it would only take 20 hours to destroy all U.S. military facilities in the Philippines. South Korea is not much different. This is one of the problems the United States faces. Despite the decreasing strategic utility of South Korea due to China's rise, the United States is further strengthening U.S.-South Korea cooperation against China. This is a contradiction. From the perspective of a U.S. security planner, there is a contradiction. South Korea's contribution to U.S. defense is decreasing, yet U.S. commitments to South Korea are increasing. Therein lies the problem. There is considerable uncertainty in U.S. alliance policy for the next administration. We clearly understand this. Part of U.S. policy is designed to secure the contributions of these countries. Therefore, if a conflict with China arises, we will have established a cooperative relationship with close coordination, making cooperation more certain than it would be otherwise. This is the purpose of AUKUS. This is also the purpose of the U.S. deployment to the island chain south of Japan.

From the perspective of U.S. security planners, there is a contradiction. While South Korea's contribution to U.S. defense is decreasing, U.S. commitments to South Korea are actually strengthening. There lies the problem. There is considerable uncertainty in U.S. alliance policy. We understand this point clearly. Part of the U.S. policy is designed to lock in U.S. support for these countries. Therefore, if a conflict arises with China, cooperation will be more certain than in other cases because we have established a cooperative relationship with aligned partners. This is the purpose of AUKUS. This is also the purpose of deploying U.S. forces to the southern Japanese archipelago.

Q7: Prospects for China's role in inter-Korean relations

Jeongseong Chun: The last question is about North Korea. Given Kim Jong Un's participation in multilateral meetings with leaders such as Xi Jinping and Putin in early September and his attendance at the Chinese military parade, there appears to be a historically strong bond between North Korea, China, and Russia. Therefore, particularly as North Korea strengthens its ties with Russia, it is necessary to assess China's recent North Korea policy. Do you then foresee this authoritarian solidarity becoming more entrenched? Will this put North Korea in a more advantageous position?

Ross: We are seeing close cooperation between Russia and North Korea. I cannot help but ask if there are practical implications to this. That is, if Russia cannot even defeat the Ukrainian army, it is unclear what contribution Russia can make to North Korea's security or offensive capabilities. Therefore, I see this primarily as a diplomatic relationship. Russia is isolated, and North Korea is also isolated, so they are joining hands. China has shown a much more cautious attitude. Therefore, we can glimpse North Korea's intention to advance cooperation with China.

However, we have not seen China express such intentions either. China has shown a much quieter reaction to cooperation between South Korea and China. Now, China appears willing to actively encourage North Korea to negotiate with the Lee Jae-myung administration to ease sanctions. This applies to economic relations as well as summit talks. This clearly serves China's interests.

First, it is advantageous for China if it can help South Korea, and second, it is advantageous for China if tensions on the Korean Peninsula are eased, reducing opportunities for the U.S. military presence. Therefore, despite all outward appearances, I believe China can tell North Korea, "Now is the time to compromise." Of course, it is a confirmed fact that North Korea accepts the status quo in inter-Korean relations. At least, it has abandoned unification as a declared policy. It has blocked various avenues of approach to South Korea and has spoken of "unification impossibility." Of course, China will not pressure North Korea over the issue of unification. However, I believe that North Korea is showing a greater willingness to accept the status quo, and China will exert pressure on North Korea in that direction through improved relations with South Korea.

Therefore, I believe the concept of an "axis," as some call it, is somewhat exaggerated. South Korea will have to make considerable concessions in various aspects when dealing with North Korea, and we can observe this trend in the Lee Jae-myung administration. Therefore, I believe South Korea can be confident in dealing with North Korea, and China can certainly help by pressuring North Korea to attempt cooperation, economic balance, trade, and so on.

Chun: Alright. I have many additional questions, but thank you very much. These are excellent insights. ■

■ Robert S. Ross, Professor of Political Science, Boston College; Research Associate, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Lee Sang-jun, EAI Research Fellow
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr