[Global NK Commentary] From Victory Day to APEC, New Explorations and Challenges in North Korea-China Relations

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1. New Explorations in North Korea-China Relations

The relationship between North Korea and China has shown signs of rapid advancement, with high-level exchanges actively taking place around the Victory Day event on September 3rd. Starting with Chairman Kim Jong-un's attendance at the Victory Day ceremony and a North Korea-China summit on September 3rd, high-level exchanges have continued sequentially, including Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui's visit to China and a foreign ministers' meeting on September 28th, and Premier Li Qiang's visit to Pyongyang and participation in the Workers' Party of Korea founding event on October 9th, demonstrating not just improvement but close intimacy between the two countries. The leaders of both countries also exchanged congratulatory messages on the 77th anniversary of the founding of the North Korean regime on September 9th and the 76th anniversary of the founding of New China on October 1st, emphasizing the 'strengthening of strategic communication'.

Although high-level exchanges between North Korea and China have been unusually frequent, they have all taken place on the occasion of regular major events, leaving room to consider them as part of a routine. Nevertheless, recent consecutive high-level exchanges between North Korea and China have included special moments beyond routine, warranting a more detailed examination of their significance.

China presented two noteworthy and unusual scenes during the Victory Day event on September 3rd. The first scene was the leaders of North Korea, China, and Russia standing side-by-side for the first time in 66 years to observe the military parade. Given that North Korea, China, and Russia all face pressure and offensives from the United States, the scene of the three leaders standing in formation together sparked controversy, suggesting an intention to flaunt trilateral solidarity aimed at the U.S. The second scene was President Xi Jinping holding a separate summit with Chairman Kim Jong-un, including a dinner, offering an unusually special reception akin to a state visit. Chairman Kim's 4-night, 5-day visit to Beijing for the Victory Day celebrations was his first in 6 years and 8 months since his fourth visit to China in January 2019, and the North Korea-China summit was the first in over 6 years and 2 months since President Xi's visit to Pyongyang in June 2019. Furthermore, in the North Korea-China summit, President Xi Jinping, likely considering North Korea's position, avoided mentioning 'denuclearization'.

Additionally, China reciprocated Chairman Kim Jong-un's attendance at the Victory Day event when Premier Li Qiang attended the 80th anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea founding on October 10th. Compared to the attendance of Liu Yunshan, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and ranked fifth in the party hierarchy, at the 70th-anniversary event in 2015, this was a higher-level reciprocal gesture. Understanding the reasons and intentions behind China's recent special considerations and efforts to strengthen ties with North Korea, especially after maintaining a certain distance under President Xi Jinping's administration, could provide important clues for forecasting the current unstable and uncertain geopolitical situation on the Korean Peninsula and its surroundings.

2. China's Calculations and Strategy Regarding North Korea-China-Russia Solidarity

While President Xi Jinping's display of close relations with President Putin and Chairman Kim Jong-un at the Victory Day event likely carried a message intended for the United States, there is a third scene that warrants attention. Despite the leaders of North Korea, China, and Russia gathering together for the first time in 66 years, a trilateral summit was not held. Only bilateral summits between North Korea and China, North Korea and Russia, and China and Russia took place, and discussions on trilateral cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia were absent. In this context, China's choice may also have been influenced by considerations towards the U.S. That is, China intentionally avoided solidifying or institutionalizing North Korea-China-Russia solidarity, likely out of consideration for the U.S. and Western countries.

For China, North Korea and Russia serve as a minimum safety net and allies, but they are not the optimal partners for economic and diplomatic benefits. The Xi Jinping administration prioritizes domestic development, making economic cooperation with the U.S. and Europe more crucial than political solidarity with North Korea and Russia. Excessive closeness with North Korea and Russia could not only damage China's image and standing in the international community but also negatively impact relations with important economic partners like Western European countries. Especially at a time when China is engaged in intense trade negotiations with the U.S., while needing to counter the U.S., it also does not wish to excessively provoke it, leading to intensified conflict and confrontation.

In December 2023, at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, held for the first time in five years, the Xi Jinping administration proposed 'multipolarization of the world on an equal and orderly basis' and 'open, inclusive, and balanced economic globalization' as its global diplomatic initiatives. While North Korea-China-Russia solidarity may be a necessary condition for advancing the Xi Jinping administration's global initiatives of 'world multipolarization and economic globalization,' it is not a sufficient condition. From China's perspective, realizing its global initiatives requires greater emphasis on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held in Tianjin before the Victory Day event and the APEC summit to be held in Gyeongju in late October. China is actively pursuing a 'multi-pronged diplomacy' by promoting world multipolarization and actively cooperating with countries in the Global South, Europe, and Japan. Despite efforts to shift towards domestic consumption, China remains highly dependent on external trade, making diversification of cooperation partners under the banner of 'economic globalization' a practical challenge. In essence, while the strategic value of North Korea and Russia for China may be influenced by the 'Trump variable,' leading to the possibility of actively managing bilateral relations and showcasing ties with North Korea and Russia in the future, the likelihood of North Korea-China-Russia relations developing into a concrete form of solidarity based on anti-U.S. and anti-Western stances is not high.

3. China's Complex Sentiments Towards North Korea

President Xi Jinping provided Chairman Kim Jong-un, who visited China, with exceptionally special treatment. At the Victory Day military parade, Chairman Kim was seated in the center of the Tiananmen Gate Tower along with President Xi and President Putin, and was given a seat next to President Xi and his wife at the reception. Notably, unlike other leaders, Chairman Kim was afforded courtesies equivalent to a state visit and a private dinner meeting. This special treatment by China towards Chairman Kim cannot be interpreted solely as a token of gratitude for his attendance at the Victory Day celebrations; it appears to have been a coordinated effort by both countries.

The first reason is that while China's large-scale Victory Day event garnered international attention, it was essentially a domestic event aimed at garnering support and solidarity for the Communist Party and the Xi Jinping regime among the Chinese people. Chairman Kim Jong-un also actively utilized his attendance at the Victory Day event for domestic propaganda, and China effectively supported this. Indeed, North Korea unusually focused on promoting Chairman Kim by immediately reporting in detail on his schedule and activities in China. Both leaders, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un, cooperated to actively use the event of attending Victory Day and the special treatment as an opportunity to strengthen their domestic leadership and regime.

Secondly, through the Victory Day event and summit, North Korea and China publicly confirmed and showcased the restoration of their previously distant relationship. In fact, the relationship began to improve with the launch of the second Trump administration. On February 18, 2025, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong-ho unusually visited the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang and expressed his desire for improved relations, stating, "We expect the socialist construction of both countries to achieve new and greater accomplishments, and we hope to promote the development of North Korea-China relations to a higher level by strengthening exchanges and cooperation between the two countries." Ambassador Wang Yajun responded by emphasizing "strengthening strategic communication and deepening practical cooperation." Since then, China has consistently emphasized 'strategic communication' with North Korea in official settings, indicating China's intention to improve relations with North Korea.

In other words, China recognized the need to actively manage its relationship with North Korea following the launch of the second Trump administration, as pressure from tariffs on China intensified, confrontation with the U.S. escalated, and the possibility of dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. could not be ruled out. According to China's General Administration of Customs, the total trade volume between North Korea and China increased by 32% to $1.46584 billion in the first seven months of this year compared to the same period last year, indicating that exchanges between the two countries were already active. In essence, the primary driver for the restoration of North Korea-China relations was the launch of the second Trump administration, which was confirmed during the Victory Day event.

Thirdly, both North Korea and China fundamentally share the understanding that the U.S. variable is the main driver for restoring their relationship. However, there are strategic differences in their specific considerations regarding the U.S. variable, which may impose constraints on a swift and comprehensive improvement of relations. Both China and North Korea experienced difficulties due to the unpredictable actions and policies of President Trump during his first term. China was taken aback by President Trump's unexpected initiative to hold a summit with Chairman Kim Jong-un in 2018 and the potential for changes on the Korean Peninsula that could result. Chairman Kim also has painful memories of being put in a difficult position due to the 'Hanoi No-Deal'.

China and North Korea share a common predicament facing the challenge of the 'Trump variable.' At least, both countries recognize the need for strategic communication in a highly uncertain environment, and thus the need to restore relations. However, beyond simply showcasing anti-U.S. solidarity, North Korea and China have complex and differing strategic calculations. In the context of confrontation and competition with the U.S., China has been sensitive to the U.S. expanding its influence beyond South Korea to North Korea. Therefore, China believes it needs to preemptively manage its relationship with North Korea stably in anticipation of the possibility that the U.S. might pursue direct negotiations with North Korea again during the second Trump administration, and in that context, it is prioritizing the call for 'strengthening strategic communication' with North Korea.

North Korea also remains wary of the possibility that the two major powers, China and the U.S., might compromise on issues concerning its own affairs. Even when U.S.-China relations were strained, both countries fundamentally agreed on the principle of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Immediately after North Korea's sixth nuclear test in September 2017, the U.S. and China swiftly passed UN Security Council Resolution 2375, imposing severe sanctions, which North Korea has suffered from economically ever since. While the possibility of a U.S.-China compromise during the second Trump administration may not be high, it cannot be entirely ruled out.

On the other hand, North Korea also needs to restore relations with China as a contingency in case negotiations with the Trump administration prove difficult. Although North Korea-China summits have been held successively since 2018, with China taking the lead, North Korea also had strategic considerations of showcasing China as a backing before significant negotiations with the U.S. In essence, North Korea needs to strengthen relations with China, which can serve as a backing both for driving negotiations with the U.S. and for coping with negotiation failures.

Fourth, although cooperation was showcased through the North Korea-China summit, there remains a question as to whether China can fully provide what North Korea desires and completely restore their traditional friendly relations. The most crucial demand North Korea consistently makes of China is the recognition of its nuclear status, the easing of UN sanctions, and substantial economic aid on a large scale.

During the North Korea-China summit, Chairman Kim emphasized, "We hope that North Korea and China will maintain close exchanges at all levels, share experiences in party building and economic development, and assist in the development of the Workers' Party of Korea and the nation's construction projects." He added, "We hope to deepen mutually beneficial economic and trade cooperation and achieve more results." In essence, Chairman Kim Jong-un likely focused on issues related to exchange and cooperation with China, such as expanding trade, attracting Chinese tourists, and dispatching North Korean workers, during the summit, requesting economic assistance. The fact that North Korea included many economic officials in its delegation also suggests a focus on economic cooperation.

However, it is highly unlikely that China, which emphasizes the value of the UN while competing with the U.S., would undermine the UN resolutions it has agreed to in order to support North Korea. Especially at a time when China is engaged in important tariff negotiations with the U.S., it will not take the risk of violating sanctions to provide the specific cooperation that North Korea expects and demands. China has observed the growing closeness between North Korea and Russia but has not fully accommodated North Korea's demands. Historically, China has provided economic assistance to manage North Korea on the occasion of North Korea-China summits. However, even when not under sanctions, China has not provided sufficient economic aid to satisfy North Korea. Particularly since the Xi Jinping administration, the practice of regular North Korea-China summits has disappeared, and consequently, aid to North Korea has been limited.

Ultimately, in an uncertain situation where it is difficult to predict what negotiation and pressure tactics President Trump will employ towards China and North Korea, it is difficult for both North Korea and China to openly prioritize anti-U.S. solidarity and strengthen bilateral cooperation. This is because it is not yet easy to predict whether strengthening North Korea-China relations will be an asset or a liability in their most prioritized negotiations with the U.S. Especially with the APEC summit approaching and various expectations and speculations arising, the uncertainty is further increasing, forcing North Korea, China, and other relevant parties to be more cautious.

The strategies and policies of North Korea and China towards each other are also subject to change depending on their relationship with the U.S., making the North Korea-China relationship inherently fluid. For example, if the APEC meeting leads to consecutive summit talks between the U.S. and China, and between South Korea and China, creating new dynamics on the Korean Peninsula and its surrounding region, the North Korea-China relationship could also be influenced and undergo further changes. In essence, while both North Korea and China have the motivation to improve relations, underlying this are complex strategic calculations with differing objectives, making swift and comprehensive improvement difficult. The external appearance of their relationship may fluctuate depending on changes in key variables such as U.S.-China relations.

4. China's Changed Stance on the North Korean Nuclear Issue

During the North Korea-China summit, China emphasized 'stability' instead of 'denuclearization' in relation to the Korean Peninsula issue. President Xi stated, "Regarding the Korean Peninsula issue, China consistently maintains an objective and fair position. We will continue to strengthen coordination with North Korea to do our best to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula." Chairman Kim said, "North Korea highly values China's fair position on the Korean Peninsula issue and wishes to continue strengthening cooperation on multilateral platforms such as the UN to protect our shared fundamental interests."

It is not the first time that China has not mentioned the North Korean nuclear issue in official talks. China's position on the North Korean nuclear issue is presumed to have begun to change after the collapse of the Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit in 2019. China's change in position was officially confirmed at the Bali U.S.-China summit in 2022. Following the summit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' press release no longer mentioned the 'Three Principles on the Korean Peninsula,' which China had consistently emphasized for over 30 years. Since then, China has avoided or not publicly addressed the North Korean nuclear issue in discussions with the U.S. and South Korea.

Nevertheless, there are signals that China may not be fully supporting North Korea's position on the nuclear issue. The new phrasing in the summit, where President Xi stated that China maintains an objective and just position on the Korean Peninsula issue and Chairman Kim responded by saying he respects it, is something not seen in previous North Korea-China meetings. At first glance, it appears to be an indirect expression of China's support for North Korea's position on the nuclear issue. However, the fact that this content only appears in the Chinese press release and not in the North Korean press release raises suspicion that North Korea may not have actually respected China's position. Rather, it could be an indirect message from China that it cannot unilaterally support North Korea's position on the nuclear issue, even though it did not publicly mention denuclearization.

Ultimately, the crucial question is whether China is effectively approving North Korea's claim to be a nuclear-weapon state. China appears to believe that it is unnecessary to proactively state its position on the North Korean nuclear issue when the U.S. has not clearly articulated its stance. That is, the U.S. has maintained a passive stance on the North Korean nuclear issue since the Biden administration, and the position and attitude of the current Trump administration are also uncertain. Therefore, China seems to be maintaining an ambiguous and evasive stance, closely watching the U.S.'s attitude and refraining from provoking North Korea by not mentioning the denuclearization issue.

China is inwardly concerned about the repercussions of officially recognizing North Korea's claim to be a nuclear-weapon state. Recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state would ultimately lend credence to the U.S. redeploying tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula or to the calls for nuclear development within South Korea, potentially leading to serious security crises in China's northeastern, northern, Beijing, and Tianjin regions.

China has recently expressed concerns about the possibility of war breaking out on the Korean Peninsula, advocating for a 'political resolution' to the issue. The 'political resolution' advocated by China implicitly places responsibility on the U.S. In the joint statement following the summit between President Xi and President Putin in May 2024, it was announced that "China opposes military threat actions by the United States and its allies that could escalate confrontation with North Korea, leading to armed conflict and heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula," effectively arguing that the U.S. and South Korea also bear responsibility for tensions on the peninsula. In the May 2025 Xi-Putin summit, a joint statement was issued demanding "an end to pressure on North Korea" without any mention of the North Korean nuclear issue or denuclearization. In essence, China is seriously concerned about security instability on the Korean Peninsula but insists that the responsibility for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue lies with the U.S., seeking to manage the situation by restoring relations with North Korea.

5. APEC Time, South Korea's Strategy and Preparation

From South Korea's perspective, the trends in North Korea-China-Russia relations are undoubtedly a strategically crucial issue, making it highly sensitive. Therefore, it is essential to objectively assess the situation with a cool head and prepare countermeasures. However, there is a tendency in some circles in South Korea to overinterpret concerns and worries about North Korea-China-Russia solidarity following the Victory Day event. Caution is needed regarding analyses that suggest North Korea-China-Russia solidarity is materializing, directly targeting South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, and that China will promote anti-U.S. and anti-Western solidarity. While interpreting it as bloc confrontation is clear, there is a risk of excessive simplification and missing opportunities to develop sophisticated and diverse strategies. China may have actually developed its strategies by considering a wide range of sophisticated variables and proceeded with the Victory Day event within that framework; if all of this is simply equated to anti-U.S., anti-Western, and Cold War dynamics, there is a risk that responses will also be reduced to a simplistic reinforcement of South Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation.

It is unlikely that China's foreign policy strategy will become solely anti-U.S. and anti-Western simply because it showcased advanced weaponry and brought together the leaders of North Korea, China, and Russia at the special event of Victory Day. China is, in fact, pursuing multi-pronged diplomacy beyond North Korea-China-Russia solidarity in response to U.S. pressure and offensives, and is also making efforts to diversify its economic cooperation partners. China is actively engaging in diplomacy towards emerging economies and the Global South, where U.S. influence is relatively weak, and is also pursuing diplomatic initiatives towards Europe. It is even meticulously preparing for negotiations while confronting the U.S.

The absence of a North Korea-China-Russia trilateral summit could signal that close dialogue and negotiations among major countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula may take place following the Victory Day event. With the APEC summit commencing after Victory Day, a period of intense negotiations and diplomatic maneuvering, including U.S.-China summit talks, will arrive, potentially confirming various expectations and speculations or ushering in new uncertainties. In essence, the focus should now shift to preparing for the new changes and uncertainties that the APEC summit will bring.

From South Korea's perspective, while North Korea-China-Russia solidarity is not yet structured, the recovery of North Korea-China relations and Chairman Kim Jong-un's appearance on a multilateral stage, albeit at a Chinese-hosted domestic event, can be positively utilized as an opportunity, suggesting that North Korea may not solely pursue reckless provocations and potentially creating momentum for dialogue. Therefore, while thorough preparation for the possibility of strengthening North Korea-China-Russia solidarity is necessary, sophisticated and creative preparations are also needed for the possibility of intense diplomatic maneuvering, including negotiations.

Furthermore, although it is difficult to believe that China accepts North Korea's claim to be a nuclear-weapon state, preemptive preparation for the possibility of a rapidly developing situation is also necessary. The Lee Jae-myung administration must first and foremost accurately grasp the meaning of this series of changes in China's attitude and what countermeasures it is devising regarding North Korea's claim to be a nuclear-weapon state. Based on this, it should actively pursue strategic communication with China to share perceptions on the implications of North Korea's claim to be a 'nuclear-weapon state' for peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula but also in East Asia.

It is necessary to prioritize enhancing communication and cooperation between South Korea and China on fundamental common ground regarding North Korea issues, such as preventing and deterring instability on the Korean Peninsula caused by North Korean provocations, and stabilizing the North Korean regime. Additionally, it is important to accurately understand what China's 'constructive role' in the North Korean nuclear issue entails and whether it aligns with the role expected by the South Korean government.

Furthermore, it is possible that China and North Korea will establish a new relationship through a compromise that avoids the obstacles of approving North Korea's nuclear status and easing UN sanctions, opting instead for a realistic approach where they strengthen strategic understanding on the North Korean nuclear issue through close communication and economic cooperation, achieving a de facto easing of sanctions without formal modification. It is also important for South Korea to strategically prepare for how it will respond if North Korea and China, in an undisclosed manner, effectively and gradually acknowledge North Korea's nuclear status and ease sanctions.

■ Lee Dong-ryul_Professor, Department of Chinese Language and Literature, Dongduk Women's University.

■ Editor: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr