[Global NK Commentary] From Victory Day to APEC: New Explorations and Challenges in North Korea-China Relations

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1. New Explorations in North Korea-China Relations

The relationship between North Korea and China appears to be rapidly advancing, with high-level exchanges actively taking place around the Victory Day event on September 3rd. Following the North Korea-China summit and Kim Jong Un's attendance at the Victory Day ceremony on September 3rd, high-level exchanges have continued sequentially: Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui's visit to China and foreign ministerial talks on September 28th, and Chinese Premier Li Qiang's visit to North Korea and participation in the Workers' Party of Korea founding anniversary event on October 9th. These exchanges demonstrate not just an improvement but a deepening intimacy between the two nations. The leaders of both countries also exchanged congratulatory messages on the 77th anniversary of North Korea's regime establishment on September 9th and the 76th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1st, emphasizing the 'strengthening of strategic communication'.

Although high-level exchanges between North Korea and China have been unusually frequent, they have largely occurred on the occasion of regular major events, leaving room to consider them as part of established practice rather than having special significance. Nevertheless, recent consecutive high-level exchanges between North Korea and China have included some unusual moments beyond mere practice, warranting a more detailed examination of their implications.

China presented two particularly noteworthy scenes during the Victory Day event on September 3rd. The first was the unprecedented sight of the leaders of North Korea, China, and Russia standing side-by-side to observe the military parade, a scene not witnessed in 66 years. Given that all three nations are currently facing pressure and assertiveness from the United States, the image of the three leaders standing together inevitably sparked controversy, suggesting an intention to display trilateral solidarity aimed at the U.S. The second scene involved President Xi Jinping holding a separate summit meeting with Kim Jong Un over dinner, offering an unusually high level of state reception typically reserved for state visits. Kim Jong Un's 4-day, 5-night visit to Beijing for the Victory Day celebrations marked his first trip in 6 years and 8 months since his fourth visit in January 2019, and the North Korea-China summit was the first since President Xi's visit to Pyongyang in June 2019, over 6 years and 2 months prior. Furthermore, in the North Korea-China summit, President Xi Jinping, seemingly considering North Korea's position, avoided any mention of 'denuclearization'.

Additionally, China reciprocated Kim Jong Un's attendance at the Victory Day event by having Premier Li Qiang attend the 80th anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea founding on October 10th. This was a step up in protocol compared to the 70th-anniversary event in 2015, where Liu Yunshan, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and ranked fifth in the party hierarchy, attended. Understanding why China, which has maintained a certain distance from North Korea under Xi Jinping's leadership unlike in the past, is now showing special consideration and seeking to strengthen ties with North Korea could provide crucial clues for forecasting the current unstable and uncertain geopolitical landscape on the Korean Peninsula and in the surrounding region.

2. China's Calculations and Strategy Regarding North Korea-China-Russia Solidarity

While President Xi Jinping's display of close ties with President Putin and Kim Jong Un at the Victory Day event likely carried a message intended for the United States, there is a third scene that warrants attention. Despite the leaders of North Korea, China, and Russia gathering together for the first time in 66 years, a trilateral summit was not held. Only bilateral summits between North Korea and China, North Korea and Russia, and China and Russia took place, and discussions on trilateral cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia were absent. In this context, China's choice may also have been influenced by its awareness of the U.S. In other words, China intentionally avoided solidifying or institutionalizing the North Korea-China-Russia alliance due to its considerations of the U.S. and Western countries.

For China, North Korea and Russia serve as a minimum safety net and allies, but they are not the optimal partners for economic and diplomatic benefits. The Xi Jinping administration prioritizes domestic development, making economic cooperation with the U.S. and Europe more crucial than political alignment with North Korea and Russia. Excessive closeness with North Korea and Russia could not only damage China's image and standing in the international community but also negatively impact relations with important economic partners like Western European countries. Particularly, while China needs to counter the U.S. amidst intense trade negotiations, it also wishes to avoid escalating conflict and confrontation by excessively provoking the U.S.

In December 2023, at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, held for the first time in five years, the Xi Jinping administration presented its global diplomatic vision of 'multipolarization of the world on an equal and orderly basis' and 'open, inclusive, and comprehensive economic globalization.' While North Korea-China-Russia solidarity may be a necessary condition for realizing the Xi Jinping government's global vision of 'world multipolarization and economic globalization,' it is not a sufficient condition. From China's perspective, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit held prior to the Victory Day celebrations and the upcoming APEC summit in Gyeongju in late October hold greater significance for the realization of its global initiatives. Under the banner of world multipolarization, China is actively pursuing cooperation with Global South countries, as well as European and Japanese nations, engaging in comprehensive diplomacy. Despite efforts to shift towards domestic consumption, China remains highly dependent on external trade, making the diversification of cooperative partners under the banner of 'economic globalization' a practical imperative. In essence, while the strategic value of North Korea and Russia for China may be influenced by the 'Trump variable,' it is likely that bilateral relations with North Korea and Russia will continue to be actively managed, with displays of solidarity. However, the possibility of the North Korea-China-Russia relationship developing into a concrete alliance against the U.S. and the West remains low.

3. China's Complex Sentiments Towards North Korea

President Xi Jinping accorded Kim Jong Un, who was visiting China, an exceptionally special reception. At the Victory Day military parade, Kim Jong Un was seated in the central position on the Tiananmen Gate Tower alongside President Xi Jinping and President Putin. At the reception, he was given a seat next to President Xi and his wife. Notably, unlike other leaders, Kim Jong Un was treated with the courtesy of a state visit and was afforded a one-on-one dinner meeting. This exceptional treatment of Kim Jong Un by China cannot be solely interpreted as a gesture of gratitude for his attendance at the Victory Day event; it appears to have been a coordinated effort between the two nations.

The first reason is that while China's large-scale Victory Day event garnered international attention, it was essentially a domestic event aimed at garnering support and solidarity for the Communist Party and the Xi Jinping regime among the Chinese populace. Kim Jong Un also actively utilized his attendance at the Victory Day event for domestic propaganda, and China effectively supported this. Indeed, North Korea unusually provided detailed, immediate reports on Kim Jong Un's schedule and activities in China, focusing on promoting him. Both leaders, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un, cooperated to actively utilize the event and the special reception as opportunities to strengthen their domestic leadership and regime stability.

Secondly, through the Victory Day event and summit, North Korea and China publicly confirmed and showcased the restoration of their previously distant relationship. However, the process of improving relations had already begun with the launch of the second Trump administration. On February 18, 2025, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong Ho made an unusual visit to the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang, expressing his desire for the continuous achievement of new and greater successes in socialist construction by both countries and hoping to promote the elevation of North Korea-China relations to a higher level through strengthened exchanges and cooperation. Ambassador Wang Yajun responded by emphasizing 'strengthening strategic communication and deepening practical cooperation.' Since then, China has consistently emphasized 'strategic communication' in official settings, signaling its intention to improve relations with North Korea.

In essence, China recognized the need to actively manage its relationship with North Korea following the launch of the second Trump administration, as pressure from tariffs on China intensified, confrontation with the U.S. escalated, and the possibility of North Korea-U.S. dialogue could not be ruled out. Bilateral trade between North Korea and China was already showing signs of revitalization, with the total trade volume reaching $1.46584 billion in January-July of this year, a 32% increase compared to the same period last year, according to China's General Administration of Customs. In short, the primary driver for the restoration of North Korea-China relations was the launch of the second Trump administration, which was confirmed during the Victory Day event.

Thirdly, both North Korea and China fundamentally share the understanding that the U.S. variable is the main driver for restoring their relationship. However, there is a strategic divergence in their specific considerations regarding this U.S. variable, which may impose constraints on a swift and comprehensive improvement of relations. Both China and North Korea experienced difficulties due to the unpredictable actions and policies of President Trump during his first term. China was taken aback by President Trump's initiative to hold a summit with Kim Jong Un in 2018 and the potential for changes on the Korean Peninsula that could result. Chairman Kim also has painful memories of being put in a difficult position due to the 'Hanoi No-Deal' outcome.

China and North Korea find themselves in a similar predicament, facing the common challenge of the 'Trump variable.' At the very least, both nations recognize the need for strategic communication in a highly uncertain environment, and thus, a consensus has formed on the necessity of restoring relations. However, beyond simply displaying anti-U.S. solidarity, North Korea and China have complex and differing strategic calculations. In its confrontation and competition with the U.S., China has been sensitive to any expansion of U.S. influence beyond South Korea to North Korea. Therefore, China anticipates the possibility of direct negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea during the second Trump administration and has judged it necessary to proactively manage its relationship with North Korea to prepare for such a scenario. In this context, it is reiterating its demand for 'strengthening strategic communication' with North Korea as a priority.

North Korea also remains wary of the possibility of a compromise between the U.S. and China regarding its own issues. Even during periods of U.S.-China conflict, both countries fundamentally agreed on the principle of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Following North Korea's sixth nuclear test in September 2017, the U.S. and China swiftly passed UN Security Council Resolution 2375, which imposed severe sanctions, leading to the ongoing economic hardship in North Korea. While the possibility of a U.S.-China compromise during the second Trump administration may not be high, it cannot be entirely ruled out.

On the other hand, North Korea also needs to restore relations with China as a contingency measure in case negotiations with the Trump administration prove difficult. Although subsequent North Korea-China summits since 2018 were led by China, North Korea also had strategic considerations, aiming to showcase China as a backing in anticipation of significant negotiations with the U.S. In essence, North Korea requires strengthened relations with China, which can serve as a backing both for driving negotiations with the U.S. and for coping with negotiation failures.

Fourth, although cooperation was showcased through the North Korea-China summit, there remains a question as to whether China can fully provide what North Korea desires and completely restore their traditional friendly relations. The most crucial demand North Korea consistently makes of China is the de facto recognition of its nuclear status and substantial economic aid in exchange for the easing of UN sanctions.

During the North Korea-China summit, Chairman Kim emphasized, 'We hope that North Korea and China will maintain close exchanges at all levels, share experiences in party building and economic development, and assist in the development of the Workers' Party of Korea and the nation's construction projects.' He added, 'We hope to deepen mutually beneficial economic and trade cooperation and achieve more results.' In essence, it is highly probable that Chairman Kim Jong Un raised issues related to exchange and cooperation with China, such as expanding trade, attracting Chinese tourists, and dispatching North Korean workers, during the summit, requesting economic assistance. The fact that North Korea included a large number of economic officials in its delegation also suggests a focus on economic cooperation.

However, it is highly unlikely that China, which emphasizes the value of the UN amidst its competition with the U.S., would undermine its own agreed-upon UN resolutions to support North Korea. Particularly, while engaged in crucial trade negotiations with the U.S., China will not risk violating sanctions to provide the specific cooperation that North Korea expects and demands. Despite witnessing the growing closeness between North Korea and Russia, China has not fully accommodated North Korea's demands. Historically, China has provided economic assistance to manage North Korea on the occasion of North Korea-China summits. However, even outside of sanction periods, China has not provided economic assistance to North Korea's satisfaction. Furthermore, under the Xi Jinping administration, the practice of regular North Korea-China summits has ceased, leading to limited support for North Korea.

Ultimately, in an uncertain situation where it is difficult to predict what negotiation and pressure tactics President Trump will employ towards China and North Korea, it will be difficult for both North Korea and China to openly prioritize anti-U.S. solidarity and strengthen bilateral cooperation. This is because it remains unclear whether strengthening North Korea-China relations will serve as an asset or a liability in their most prioritized negotiations with the U.S. The uncertainty is further amplified by the various expectations and speculations surrounding the upcoming APEC summit, compelling North Korea, China, and other relevant parties to proceed with extreme caution.

The strategies and policies of North Korea and China towards each other are also subject to change based on their relations with the U.S., making North Korea-China relations inherently fluid. For instance, if a series of summit meetings between the U.S. and China, and South Korea and China, take place on the sidelines of the APEC meeting, and new dynamics emerge on the Korean Peninsula and in the surrounding region as a result, North Korea-China relations could be influenced, leading to further changes. In essence, while both North Korea and China have the motivation to improve relations, underlying complex and divergent strategic calculations persist, making swift and comprehensive improvement difficult. The external appearance of their relationship may fluctuate in response to changes in key variables such as U.S.-China relations.

4. China's Evolving Stance on the North Korean Nuclear Issue

During the North Korea-China summit, China emphasized 'stability' instead of 'denuclearization' in relation to the Korean Peninsula issue. President Xi stated, 'Regarding the Korean Peninsula issue, China has consistently maintained an objective and fair position. Moving forward, we will strengthen coordination with North Korea and do our utmost to safeguard peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.' Chairman Kim responded, 'North Korea highly values China's fair position on the Korean Peninsula issue and wishes to continue strengthening cooperation on multilateral platforms such as the UN to protect our shared fundamental interests.'

China's omission of the North Korean nuclear issue in official talks is not entirely unprecedented. It is speculated that China's stance on the North Korean nuclear issue began to shift following the breakdown of the Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit in 2019. China's change in position was officially confirmed at the U.S.-China summit in Bali in 2022. Following the summit, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' press release no longer mentioned the 'Three Principles for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea,' which China had consistently emphasized for over 30 years. Since then, China has avoided or not publicly disclosed discussions on the North Korean nuclear issue in its dialogues with the U.S. and South Korea.

Nevertheless, there are signals suggesting that China may not be entirely supporting North Korea's position on the nuclear issue. The new phrasing in the summit, where President Xi stated that China maintains an objective and just position on the Korean Peninsula issue and Chairman Kim responded by acknowledging this, is a departure from previous North Korea-China meetings. At first glance, it appears to indirectly signal China's support for North Korea's stance on the nuclear issue. However, the fact that this statement appears only in the Chinese press release and not in the North Korean one raises doubts as to whether North Korea truly respected China's position. It is possible that China, while not publicly mentioning denuclearization, indirectly conveyed a message that it cannot unilaterally support North Korea's position on the nuclear issue.

Ultimately, the crucial question is whether China is effectively endorsing North Korea's claim to be a nuclear-weapon state. China appears to have concluded that it is unnecessary to proactively state its position when the U.S. has not articulated a clear stance on the North Korean nuclear issue. In other words, the Biden administration had adopted a passive stance on the North Korean nuclear issue, and the current stance and attitude of the Trump administration are also uncertain. Consequently, China seems to be maintaining an ambiguous and evasive position, closely observing the U.S.'s attitude. China is maintaining a vague stance, refraining from mentioning denuclearization to avoid provoking North Korea while observing the actions of the Trump administration.

China is inwardly concerned about the repercussions of officially recognizing North Korea's nuclear status. Acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state would lend credence to the U.S.'s potential redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula or arguments for developing nuclear weapons within South Korea, thereby raising serious security concerns for major Chinese regions such as Northeast China, North China, Beijing, and Tianjin.

China has recently expressed concerns about the possibility of war breaking out on the Korean Peninsula, advocating for a 'political resolution' to the issue. The 'political resolution' advocated by China implicitly places responsibility on the U.S. In the joint statement following the summit between President Xi and President Putin in May 2024, it was stated that China 'opposes military threat actions by the United States and its allies that could escalate confrontation with North Korea, leading to armed conflict and heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula,' effectively arguing that the U.S. and South Korea also bear responsibility for the tensions on the peninsula. In the Xi-Putin summit in May 2025, a joint statement was issued demanding an 'end to pressure on North Korea,' without any mention of the North Korean nuclear issue or denuclearization. In essence, while China is seriously concerned about security instability on the Korean Peninsula, it maintains the position that the responsibility for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue lies with the U.S., seeking to manage the situation through restored relations with North Korea.

5. The Time for APEC: South Korea's Strategy and Preparedness

From South Korea's perspective, the dynamics of the North Korea-China-Russia trilateral relationship are undeniably a strategically crucial issue, thus evoking significant sensitivity. It is imperative to objectively assess the situation with a cool head and prepare responses accordingly. However, there is a tendency in some quarters within South Korea to overinterpret the concerns and anxieties surrounding the North Korea-China-Russia alliance following the Victory Day event. Caution is warranted regarding analyses suggesting that the North Korea-China-Russia alliance is materializing, directly targeting South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, and that China is promoting an anti-U.S., anti-Western bloc. While interpreting the situation as a bloc confrontation is clear, there is a risk of oversimplification, leading to the loss of opportunities for developing sophisticated and diverse strategies. China may have meticulously formulated its strategies by considering various variables and proceeded with the Victory Day event within that framework; however, reducing all of this to an anti-U.S., anti-Western, and Cold War paradigm risks leading to a simplistic response, such as strengthening trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan.

It is unlikely that China's foreign policy strategy will solely revolve around being anti-U.S. and anti-West simply because it showcased advanced weaponry and brought together the leaders of North Korea, China, and Russia at the special event of Victory Day. Instead, China is actively pursuing comprehensive diplomacy beyond North Korea-China-Russia solidarity in the face of U.S. pressure and assertiveness. It is also simultaneously striving to diversify its economic cooperation partners. China is actively engaging with emerging economies and the Global South, where U.S. influence is relatively weaker, and is also pursuing diplomatic initiatives towards Europe. Furthermore, it is meticulously preparing for negotiations even while confronting the U.S.

The absence of a North Korea-China-Russia trilateral summit could signal that a series of close dialogues and negotiations among major countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula may unfold following the Victory Day event. With the APEC summit commencing after Victory Day, a period of intense negotiations and diplomatic maneuvering, including U.S.-China summit talks, will commence again. During this time, various expectations and speculations may be confirmed by reality, or new uncertainties may emerge. In essence, the focus must now shift to preparing for the new changes and uncertainties that the APEC summit will bring.

From South Korea's standpoint, the current situation, where the North Korea-China-Russia alliance is not yet structured and North Korea-China relations are recovering, and Kim Jong Un has appeared on a multilateral stage (albeit at a Chinese-hosted domestic event), offers an opportunity to be positively leveraged. It suggests the possibility that North Korea may not solely pursue reckless provocations going forward, and it could create momentum for dialogue. Therefore, while thorough preparation for the potential strengthening of the North Korea-China-Russia alliance is necessary, South Korea must also engage in sophisticated and creative preparations for the possibility of intense diplomatic negotiations.

Furthermore, while it is difficult to assume that China accepts North Korea's claim to be a nuclear-weapon state, proactive preparation for the possibility of a rapidly developing situation is necessary. The Lee Jae-myung administration must, above all, accurately ascertain the meaning of this series of changes in China's attitude and its response to North Korea's claim to be a nuclear-weapon state. Based on this understanding, strategic communication should be actively pursued to share perceptions with China regarding the implications of North Korea's claim to be a 'nuclear-weapon state' for peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula but also in East Asia.

It is necessary to prioritize enhancing communication and cooperation between South Korea and China on fundamental shared concerns regarding North Korea, such as preventing and deterring instability on the Korean Peninsula caused by North Korean provocations, and stabilizing the North Korean regime through information exchange and joint measures. Additionally, it is important to accurately understand what China's 'constructive role' in the North Korean nuclear issue entails and whether it aligns with the role expected by the South Korean government.

Furthermore, there is a possibility that China and North Korea may establish a new relationship through a compromise that avoids forcefully breaking through obstacles such as the acknowledgment of North Korea's nuclear status and the easing of UN sanctions. This could involve closely communicating and engaging in economic cooperation to strengthen their strategic understanding of the North Korean nuclear issue and achieve de facto easing of sanctions without formal modification. It is also crucial for South Korea to develop strategic preparations for how it will respond if North Korea and China, in an undisclosed manner, gradually acknowledge North Korea's nuclear status and achieve de facto easing of sanctions.

Lee Dong-ryul_Professor, Department of Chinese Studies, Dongduk Women's University.

■ Editor: Lee Sang-jun_EAI Research Fellow
Contact: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr