[Global NK Commentary] The Current Value of the US Forces in Korea and Our Response Strategy

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Statements emphasizing the importance of the US Forces in Korea (USFK) are repeatedly made by both South Korea and the United States. However, do South Korea and the US emphasize its importance in the same context? If they differ, how do they differ? Furthermore, are the value and role of USFK fixed and immutable? This article aims to closely examine how USFK has been adjusted amidst structural changes in the East Asian security environment by tracing its historical trajectory, particularly focusing on the process leading to the structural dilemma South Korea faces in the current US-China rivalry.

The Essence of US Alliance Policy: Realistic Strategic Priorities

Before discussing USFK, it is necessary to understand the fundamental motives driving US alliance policy. While the US outwardly espouses 'universal values' such as democracy, human rights, and free trade, its underlying objective is the paramount realist goal of maintaining its hegemonic position. Historically, the US has repeatedly allied with yesterday's enemies and competed with today's allies when it served its national interests. The most clear-cut historical example of this fluidity can be found in the trajectory of US-Japan relations.

In the early 20th century, the US tolerated and supported Japan's expansion into the Korean Peninsula to counter Russian expansion.[1]However, when Japan's expansion in the Pacific conflicted with US interests, the US chose military confrontation and dropped atomic bombs. After the war, to counter the Soviet Union, its wartime ally, the US actively supported Japan's economic reconstruction and rearmament, positioning it as a key bulwark in the Western Pacific. By the 1980s, as Japan's economic power reached 70% of US GDP, the US viewed Japan as a competitor and sought to contain it through the 'Plaza Accord.' Following the end of the Cold War and the rise of China as a formidable challenger, the US once again joined forces with Japan, elevating the US-Japan alliance to a core alliance for containing China.

Thus, for the US, alliances are strategic tools whose value and role are redefined according to perceived threats and its strategic objectives at any given time, rather than relationships based on values and norms. The ROK-US alliance is no exception.

US foreign strategy prioritizes the maintenance of its hegemony, pursued by deterring the rise of potential hegemonic rivals. From this paramount strategic perspective, USFK functions as a key instrument for achieving these US objectives on the Korean Peninsula, a geopolitical crossroads where the two Koreas and the four major powers of China, the US, Japan, and Russia intersect. Therefore, USFK has been continuously and directly influenced by the context of US hegemonic maintenance strategy and great power politics, beyond the localized context of inter-Korean relations.

The Value and Variability of USFK During the Cold War: Cases of the Nixon and Carter Administrations

Having experienced the devastation of the Korean War, South Korea signed a mutual defense treaty with the United States in 1953. From its inception, the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty contained an asymmetrical nature reflecting the differing strategic calculations of both nations. From South Korea's perspective at the time, USFK was primarily perceived as a mechanism to guarantee automatic US intervention in the event of a North Korean invasion. Conversely, from the US perspective, USFK was a geopolitical tool with multifaceted objectives. Most importantly, it was part of the US's global strategy to contain and deter the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, USFK served to prevent adventurism by both North and South Korea on the peninsula. Additionally, the ROK-US alliance was a crucial mechanism to alleviate the security concerns of Japan, which feared being exposed to conflict between nuclear-armed US and the Soviet Union, thereby ensuring the stable and long-term stationing of US Forces in Japan, a key pillar for containing Soviet expansion in the Western Pacific.

While this security architecture in East Asia during the Cold War was fundamentally maintained, the internal dynamics of USFK fluctuated sensitively in response to changes in US threat perceptions and the strategic environment. Notably, the US, depleted by the Vietnam War, felt an urgent need to ease the bipolar confrontation with the Soviet Union to some extent and pursue strategic stability based on a new balance of power. The key opportunity for this strategic shift emerged from the Sino-Soviet split, which intensified in the late 1960s. The US sought to leverage this as a 'golden opportunity' to create a favorable situation.

The Nixon administration and Henry Kissinger employed a triangular diplomacy, first normalizing relations with China to pressure the Soviet Union, and then pursuing détente with the Soviet Union, aiming to position the US as the balancing force in the Sino-Soviet conflict. This sophisticated diplomatic maneuver not only reshaped great power relations but also led to strategic linkages aimed at favorably concluding negotiations to end the Vietnam War.

This shift in US strategy also led to a readjustment of USFK. Upon successfully improving relations with China, the Nixon administration judged that the possibility of a Soviet southward advance and a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula had significantly decreased. Despite strong opposition from President Park Chung-hee, the US withdrew the 7th Infantry Division in 1971 and repositioned the 2nd Infantry Division to a rear area.

Subsequently, during the Carter administration, unilateral US decisions regarding USFK continued. Carter advocated for the withdrawal of USFK (ground troops after taking office) during his presidential campaign. While ostensibly citing issues such as human rights under the Park Chung-hee regime, the underlying structural driver was the constraints imposed by the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the political and economic turmoil in the US caused by the first oil shock.

Ultimately, although the Nixon and Carter administrations pursued outwardly divergent foreign policy lines, both attempted to alter the status quo of USFK against South Korea's wishes, based on US strategic interests. This serves as a historical precedent and lesson demonstrating that the ROK-US alliance and the posture and scale of USFK are determined not by our will, bilateral relations, or the logic of the alliance itself, but by great power politics and changes in the US strategic environment.

A Decisive Turning Point: The US Shift in Stance in 1992 and Its Background

In the late 1980s, the end of the Cold War brought about structural changes that fundamentally challenged the rationale for US alliance policies in the region, including USFK. Consequently, a re-examination of the role and scale of US forces stationed overseas took place within the US. Specifically concerning South Korea, the US sought to reduce the burden and costs of alliance management due to issues such as accountability for the May 18th Gwangju Uprising in 1980, subsequent democratization movements, and the unequal Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Internal constraints such as the US's massive twin deficits and the fact that Japan's economy had reached nearly 70% of US GDP were also cited as justifications for these discussions.

Emerging from this background was the 'East Asian Strategy Initiative (EASI).' This initiative included the gradual reduction of USFK and the phased transfer of wartime operational control. At the time, the US Congress and security experts, acknowledging South Korea's sufficient defense capabilities, strongly demanded the transfer of operational control. In the 1987 presidential election, both Roh Tae-woo, the candidate of the ruling party, and Kim Young-sam, a major opposition candidate, adopted the transfer of operational control as a key campaign pledge. In 1990, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney visited South Korea and called for the early transfer of peacetime operational control, indicating that the transfer of operational control was a prevailing trend in the early 1990s.

The EASI was concretely presented in the US Department of Defense's official report submitted to Congress in 1990, titled 'A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century.' This report outlined a gradual reduction of US forces in the Asia-Pacific region over the next decade, coupled with increased defense cost-sharing by allies such as South Korea and Japan. Consequently, the gradual reduction of USFK, the transfer of operational control, and the strengthening of South Korean military capabilities were pursued in tandem in the late 1980s.

However, these plans encountered a significant turning point in the early 1990s amidst a rapidly changing security landscape. In May 1992, then-ROK-US Combined Forces Commander Robert W. RisCassi abruptly halted the smoothly progressing discussions on the transfer of operational control. This signified an official US shift in stance, not merely an individual decision. The background to this shift involved the following complex factors:

⦁ First, the increased strategic value of the Asia-Pacific region: Following the end of the Cold War, the political and economic center of the world was shifting from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region. Ensuring free trade and hegemonic stability in this region was a core US national interest. Particularly after the withdrawal of US forces from the Philippines, the value of USFK and US Forces in Japan increased. US experts believed that the withdrawal of USFK would have a cascading effect on US Forces in Japan.

⦁ Second, the rise of China as a new hegemonic competitor: In the late 1980s, the US was wary of Japan as an economic powerhouse. However, from the early 1990s, China began to strengthen its military capabilities based on the achievements of its reform and opening-up policies. From the US perspective, China began to be perceived as a country with the potential to emerge as a new hegemonic competitor, replacing the Soviet Union. Maintaining military control and influence over the geopolitical nexus of the Korean Peninsula was essential to deter China's expansion.

⦁ Third, US concerns about North Korea's nuclear program and South Korea's independent actions: As North Korea, facing diplomatic isolation due to its establishment of relations with the Soviet Union and China and its failure to establish relations with the US, pursued nuclear development, then-Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-koo suggested a strike against North Korean nuclear facilities in April 1991. This was interpreted by the US as a potential preemptive strike by South Korea against North Korean nuclear facilities, causing significant repercussions within the US policy circles. Just as one of the fundamental reasons for the US securing operational control over the South Korean military through the ROK-US agreement in 1954 was to prevent US entanglement in unforeseen actions such as a unilateral advance by South Korea into the North, the inter-Korean relations in the early 1990s provided an opportunity to increase US control.

⦁ Fourth, the possibility of North Korea's collapse after losing its primary supporter following the dissolution of the Soviet Union: If North Korea were to collapse while operational control remained with South Korea, there was a possibility of South Korea unifying the peninsula. This would imply a weakening or disappearance of the rationale for USFK's presence on the Korean Peninsula. The US feared a situation, in conjunction with South Korea's democratization trend, where US forces would have to withdraw completely, as happened in the Philippines in 1991.

⦁ Fifth, the weakening of anti-US public sentiment in South Korea: Following the 1987 democratization movement and the establishment of presidential legitimacy through direct elections, the democratization movement in South Korea weakened, significantly reducing the US's alliance management costs and stationing burden. In fact, the US concept of separating peacetime and wartime operations in 1994 was a response to suspicions and criticisms that the US was behind the actions of units under its operational control during the December 12th incident in 1979 and the May 18th Gwangju Uprising in 1980.

These factors combined to completely abandon the original plan from the first report. Instead, the US began to re-evaluate and readjust its regional forces, including USFK, as key assets for containing China. The troop reductions and phased withdrawal planned in the first report were halted, and policy completely shifted towards re-emphasizing the importance of US presence in the Asian region. Furthermore, the US determined that if US forces were to remain stationed on the Korean Peninsula, exercising operational control over the South Korean military would be essential to maximize efficiency and control. This US shift in stance after 1992 was a decisive moment when the ROK-US alliance embarked on a trajectory deeply intertwined with US hegemonic strategy, beyond South Korea's security.

Consequently, the transfer of operational control, pursued in the late 1980s, was halted in 1992 due to the US's 180-degree change in stance. For the next decade, the US embarked on a plan to readjust the posture of USFK. As a result, the decision was made to consolidate USFK forces, dispersed throughout South Korea, at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, facing China. During this process, the US secretly pursued the establishment of a 'Northeast Asia Command (NEAC),' which aimed to integrate USFK, US Forces in Japan, and the 7th Fleet. Although it did not ultimately lead to its establishment due to South Korean opposition and conflicts of interest among different US military branches, it can be fully interpreted as the origin of concepts such as the 'integrated structure' of South Korea, the US, and Japan, the 'single theater' concept, and the issue of 'strategic flexibility' between South Korea and the US in the post-rise of China era.

The US's initiation of force realignment to contain China from the early 1990s thus marked a decisive turning point that caused a change in the nature of USFK. From this point forward, South Korea was exposed to a dual security dilemma: the risk of its security becoming entangled in the frontline of US-China conflict under the concept of 'strategic flexibility' of USFK, and the potential weakening of its inherent mission of deterring North Korea. This fundamental strategic divergence between South Korea and the US regarding the alliance's objectives and the role of USFK remains an unresolved issue despite continuous consultations between the two countries.

Some trace the origin of the discussion on 'strategic flexibility' of USFK in the early 2000s to the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001 and the so-called 'Rumsfeld Doctrine.' This explanation posits that the US needed to adjust the operational concept of USFK to respond to military intervention demands worldwide, including interventions in the Middle East, rather than directly targeting a single hegemonic competitor. In line with this trend, the discussion on strategic flexibility of USFK, which began around 2003, culminated in an agreement between South Korea and the US based on a joint statement between then-Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki-moon and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and an intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) around 2006.

However, while these origin theories and interpretations of 'agreement' are individually factual, it is important to note that attempts to create integrated models and change the nature of USFK, originating from the Far East Command (FECOM) in the 1950s, have repeatedly emerged in various forms. Among these, the adjustment phase considering the potential rise of China as a hegemonic competitor can be considered a decisive turning point, at the very least, from the early 1990s. At that time, not only were there conceptual plans, but partial adjustments to the scale of USFK and the operational control of the South Korean military had already been made.

Therefore, it is appropriate to interpret the context of USFK in the region from this point onward in conjunction with US-China strategic competition, and to consider the major issues between South Korea and the US as having persisted structurally from this time to the present. Furthermore, the 2006 case is best evaluated not as a substantive agreement, but as a diplomatic expression of mutual 'respect' or a temporary patching-up of the issue.

Conclusion: Recommendations for Our Security Strategy

The historical trajectory of USFK described above clearly reveals the limitations of some domestic discourse that attempts to reduce the function of USFK and the nature of the ROK-US alliance to the localized framework of inter-Korean relations or the Korean Peninsula, or to view them as fixed entities. It calls for a fundamental reconsideration of these perspectives. The argument by some that the transfer of wartime operational control will lead to the withdrawal of USFK and the collapse of the ROK-US combined posture is a flawed causal logic that fails to understand the realistic nature of US alliance policy. Essentially, USFK and US alliance policy are instrumental tools for implementing US global strategy. The continuation and role of US alliance policy, including USFK and the ROK-US alliance, are subordinate variables for the purpose of US national interests and strategy, and they possess situational variability rather than being fixed entities.

Currently, US alliance policy is fluid and transitional, oscillating between the integrated deterrence strategy pursued by the previous Democratic administration and the selective engagement and increased emphasis on the primary role of alliances under the 'America First' doctrine of the Trump administration. Elbridge Colby, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, has proposed a force realignment plan that would focus USFK's mission on containing China and the South Korean military's role on conventional defense against North Korea. Some US think tanks argue for a reduction in USFK based on the need for US force deployment in other regions. These trends cannot be reduced solely to policy differences between administrations; they should be interpreted as transitional phenomena arising from the more fundamental factor of deepening structural divergence.

Although the current nature of the ROK-US alliance and the changing character of USFK present a structural dilemma for South Korea, public discourse on this issue remains relatively constrained. The social atmosphere that treats the alliance as a fixed entity and a 'sanctuary,' forbidding rational discussion and critical examination, carries a significant risk of acting as an internal constraint that limits our strategic options in a changing security environment.

There have been media reports suggesting that during recent ROK-US tariff negotiations, the US requested South Korea to publicly acknowledge and support the role of USFK in deterring not only North Korea but also China. Conversely, in a press conference aboard his plane before the ROK-US summit on August 24th, President Lee Jae-myung stated that it would be difficult to easily agree to such a US request. This demonstrates that both sides recognize that the debate surrounding the scale and operation of USFK is fundamentally based on the structural factor of US-China strategic competition.

The key structural characteristics of the present, in contrast to the past, can be summarized in two points.

First, the US's primary strategic competitor has shifted from the Soviet Union to China, and China's expansionist pattern is fundamentally different from that of the Soviet Union. Soviet expansion presupposed a southward advance into the Korean Peninsula, necessitating a force posture geared towards large-scale ground warfare. South Korea's military was also primarily built with North Korean ground forces in mind. The existing ROK-US alliance and USFK were established based on these geopolitical and military-strategic understandings. In contrast, China's expansion is occurring through the projection of naval and air power in areas such as the East China Sea and the South China Sea. As a result, a strategic gap has emerged between the existing posture of South Korea and the US and China's expansion, which the US faces.

Second, there has been a change in the pattern of wartime operational control transfer. During the Cold War, the transfer of operational control and the strengthening of South Korea's independent capabilities were primarily discussed during periods of détente between great powers. In contrast, the current discussions on strengthening South Korean military capabilities and transferring wartime operational control are occurring amidst intensifying US-China competition. This is partly an effort to bridge the structural gap mentioned above and stems from the need for South Korea to more proactively secure its ability to manage the Korean Peninsula battlefield.

Therefore, South Korea needs to emphasize that it fully understands the US's structural interests and that the strengthening of South Korea's independent capabilities does not conflict with US strategic interests. In this process, there is a possibility that the US may be tempted to exercise control proportional to the increase in South Korea's military capabilities. However, considering South Korea's international standing and military capabilities, it must be persuasively conveyed that a control scheme involving the residual presence of a small number of US troops is not realistically sustainable.

Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the strengthening of the South Korean military, unlike in the past, alleviates the burden on the US, and that increased defense spending and the transfer of wartime operational control are inextricably linked. Regarding defense cost-sharing, it is also necessary to emphasize proposals that are premised on the transfer of wartime operational control. If possible, linking this to strategically valuable issues, such as the relaxation of restrictions on nuclear fuel reprocessing, could also be considered during negotiations.

Above all, all processes of redefining the alliance into a more rational partnership commensurate with our national strength and status must be supported by tireless efforts to cultivate the public's security awareness and historical understanding. ■

[1]This in itself is a historical example demonstrating that the US, which signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the US and Korea in 1882, completely reversed its previous stance towards the Korean Empire in accordance with its own interests.

■ Author: Jeon Jae-woo_Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

■ Responsible Editor: Oh In-hwan_Senior Fellow, EAI; Jeong Jong-hyuk_Research Fellow, Korea National Diplomatic Academy
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