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[EAI Issue Briefing] The Future of Korea-Japan Relations Driven by the 2030 Generation: New Public Opinion Landscape in Korea-Japan Relations Revealed by the 1st Korea-U.S.-Japan Public Opinion Poll
Editor's Note
Eun-mi Choi, Research Fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, analyzes that while Korea's younger generation, who approaches Japan from a ‘cultural’ perspective, is driving favorable sentiment toward Japan, Korea's older generation views Japan as a source of conflict from a ‘historical relationship’ perspective, based on the results of the 1st Korea-U.S.-Japan Public Opinion Poll and the 12th Korea-Japan Public Opinion Poll. Dr. Choi interprets this difference as positive impressions of Japanese culture outweighing the negative impact of Korea-Japan conflicts on the perceptions of the 2030 generation. Accordingly, the author recommends strengthening the institutional foundation for youth exchanges between Korea and Japan, as well as making efforts to bridge the gap in perceptions of Japan between different generations in Korea.
The “1st Korea-U.S.-Japan Public Opinion Poll / 12th Korea-Japan Public Opinion
Poll,” released on August 28 based on a joint poll by EAI, API, and KEI,
serves as a barometer showing shifts in the public opinion landscape
surrounding Korea-Japan relations. Amidst rising favorability toward Japan,
notable trends include the spread of cultural exchanges centered on younger
generations, increased interest in practical cooperation, and a strong will to
establish a future-oriented relationship. These results suggest a turning point
in Korea-Japan relations and point to the direction the relationship should
take going forward. This study analyzes these changing patterns and presents
policy recommendations for sustainable Korea-Japan cooperation.
Shift in Public Opinion Landscape Regarding
Korea-Japan Relations: Favorable Views Toward Japan Led by the 2030 Generation
Traditionally, South Korea's perception of Japan has been negative. In
polls of South Korea's perception of Japan conducted over the past 30 years
since the 1990s, negative perceptions consistently outnumbered positive ones,[1] and these results were long taken for granted. However, with the major shift in
Korea-Japan relations in 2023, mutual perceptions between the two countries
also began to change positively. And at the center of this change is the 2030
generation.
This trend is even more
pronounced in the latest EAI opinion poll. Figures 1 and 2 below graphically
illustrate mutual perceptions between Korea and Japan from 2013, when EAI first
began conducting these polls, to the present year of 2025.
[Figure 1] South Koreans'
Impressions of Japan (2013-2025)
Source: EAI. Prepared by the author based on the
results of the “Korea-Japan Public Opinion Poll (2013-2025)”.
[Figure 2] Japanese Impressions of Korea (2013-2025,
2024 not conducted)
Source: EAI. Prepared by the author based on the
results of the “Korea-Japan Public Opinion Poll (2013-2025)”.
As shown in [Figure 1],
South Korea's perception of Japan has steadily improved since 2023, with this
year's poll marking the first occurrence of a ‘golden cross’ phenomenon where
positive perceptions (52.4%) surpassed negative perceptions (37.1%).
Conversely, [Figure 2] shows that Japan's perception of South Korea has
deteriorated compared to the 2023 poll: positive views dropped from 37.4% to
24.8%, while negative views rose from 32.8% to 51.0%. This decline is believed
to reflect domestic instability stemming from last December's 12.3 martial law
incident and concerns over South Korea's recent change in administration.
Considering the poll period was August 19-20, it is reasonable to conclude
that the effects of President Lee Jae-myung's recent visit to Japan (August
23-24) and the Korea-Japan summit meeting with Prime Minister Ishiba have not
yet been reflected.
Meanwhile, a notable
aspect of the shift in South Korea's perception of Japan is that this change is
not a temporary phenomenon but a structural shift rooted in generational perceptions.
Analysis of a public opinion poll conducted by the Asan Institute for Policy
Studies has also revealed this structural change in South Koreans' perception
of Japan,[2]
and this poll once again confirmed this pattern of change.
[Figure 3] Koreans' Impressions of Japan (2025) (by
Age Group)
Source: EAI. Prepared by the author based on the results of the
“Korea-Japan Public Opinion Poll (2025)”.
[Figure 3] shows
Koreans' impressions of Japan broken down by age group. The 18-29 age group exhibited
the highest favorability rating (62.7%) among all age groups, followed by the
30-39 age group (57.9%). Notably, in terms of unfavorable impressions, this age
group also showed the lowest unfavorable ratings across all age groups (18-29:
22.3%, 30-39: 26%). These results indicate that the rising favorability
toward Japan in Korea is being driven by the 2030 generation. So, where
does this high favorability toward Japan among the 2030 generation originate?
The younger
generation's ‘Japan through the lens of culture’, the older generation's 'Japan
within historical relations'
What do people in their 20s and 30s think of first when they see Japan?
The following [Figure 4] shows responses to what comes to mind first when
thinking of Japan (up to 3 items), broken down by age group. Overall, responses
frequently mentioned Japanese culture and historical conflicts. Younger
generations tend to associate Japan with ‘cultural consumption, hobbies, and
sources of enjoyment’ like culture and sports, while older generations more
often see Japan as a ‘source of conflict in Korea-Japan relations’ tied to
issues like the Dokdo dispute and historical grievances.
[Figure 4] Things that come to mind first when thinking of Japan (Up to 3
selections) (By age group)
Source: EAI. Prepared by the author based on the results of the
“Korea-Japan Public Opinion Poll (2025)”.
Generations in their
20s and 30s show significantly higher differences than older generations in
cultural elements such as Japanese food culture (sushi, ramen, okonomiyaki,
etc.) (70.8%) and popular culture (J-POP, manga, anime, etc.) (50.1%). Looking
at the difference between the highest and lowest percentages of images
associated with Japan by the younger and older generations, the gap reaches
44.6 percentage points for food culture and 45.3 percentage points for popular
culture. While it is true that members of the 2030 generation also frequently
recalled conflict issues such as the Dokdo dispute and historical issues, the
fact that the age-group differences based on cultural elements are much more
pronounced is highly significant.
This indicates that while
conflicts between Korea and Japan significantly influence the perceptions of
Japanese culture among the 2030 generation, the impact of human and cultural
exchanges with Japan is overwhelmingly greater. This also demonstrates the
effectiveness of cultural and human exchanges that began in earnest following
the 1998 ‘Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration’. Younger generations, born
after the opening of Japanese popular culture or who spent their childhood
after Japanese culture became established in Korea, inevitably hold different
perceptions of Japanese popular culture compared to older generations who grew
up during a period when Japanese culture was considered taboo. Indeed, as shown
in [Figure 5], examining the degree to which Japanese popular culture is
enjoyed by age group reveals that the percentage increases significantly with
younger age groups.
[Figure
5] Level of Enjoyment of Japanese Popular Culture (by Age Group)
Source: EAI. Prepared by the author based on the results of the
“Korea-Japan Public Opinion Poll (2025)”.
In fact, such cultural
preferences lead to favorable impressions of the other country. Looking at
[Table 1] below, we can see that for the 20s and 30s generation, the primary
reason for having a favorable impression of Japan is “Japanese food culture, shopping,
popular culture, etc.” In contrast, as age increases, the emphasis shifts
away from cultural factors toward national identity—such as national character,
shared values of liberal democracy, and other universal and normative aspects.
[Table 1] Reasons for Having a Favorable Impression
of Japan (by Age Group) (Select 2)
| High standard of living | Sharing the Values of Liberal Democracy | Kind/Sincere National Character | Popular Culture | Food Culture/ Shopping | Traditional Culture | Quality of Products | Exchange with Japanese people | |
| Ages 18-29 | 29.6 | 16.0 | 30.4 | 39.1 | 43.5 | 8.3 | 15.9 | 6.8 |
| Ages 30-39 | 28.1 | 24.1 | 30.5 | 28.1 | 41.9 | 5.4 | 19.6 | 8.4 |
| Ages 40-49 | 19.0 | 16.6 | 34.0 | 32.2 | 35.5 | 6.5 | 16.7 | 5.9 |
| Ages 50-59 | 20.5 | 24.6 | 48.7 | 13.7 | 33.5 | 4.9 | 24.7 | 7.2 |
| Ages 60-69 | 20.3 | 33.3 | 62.0 | 2.6 | 20.4 | 6.1 | 24.1 | 8.6 |
| Ages 70 and above | 16.8 | 38.8 | 72.8 | 5.6 | 15.9 | 4.1 | 21.3 | 16.2 |
Source: EAI. Excerpted and reorganized from the
“Korea-Japan Public Opinion Poll (2025)”
Meanwhile, experiences
visiting the other country through increased people-to-people exchanges also
lay the groundwork for forming such positive perceptions. The following [Table
2] shows the experience of visiting Japan and the number of visits to Japan
over the past five years, broken down by age group.
[Table 2] Experience of Visiting Japan and Number of
Visits in the Past Five Years (by Age Group)
| Experience of Visiting Japan | No. of Visits within the Previoius 5 Years | |||||
| Yes | No | 1 | 2-4 | More than 5 | None | |
| Ages 18-29 | 59.3 | 40.7 | 37.5 | 47.8 | 5.3 | 9.5 |
| Ages 30-39 | 59.4 | 40.6 | 36.7 | 36.0 | 12.8 | 14.5 |
| Ages 40-49 | 56.2 | 43.8 | 44.3 | 34.6 | 7.4 | 13.7 |
| Ages 50-59 | 55.8 | 44.2 | 34.0 | 40.0 | 11.9 | 14.2 |
| Ages 60-69 | 69.0 | 31.0 | 30.3 | 40.1 | 8.8 | 20.8 |
| Ages 70 and above | 65.3 | 34.7 | 40.1 | 30.9 | 6.7 | 22.3 |
Source: EAI. Prepared by the author based on the results of the
“Korea-Japan Public Opinion Poll (2025)”.
While the presence or
absence of Japan visit experience shows little difference across age groups, it
is noteworthy that the 2030 generation has accounted for the highest proportion
of repeat visits over the past five years compared to other age groups.
Specifically, over the past five years, the 18-29 age group recorded the
highest number of 2-4 visits, while the 30-39 age group recorded the highest
number of 5 or more visits compared to other age groups.
In this way, younger
generations, relatively free from historical burdens, freely visit each other
and naturally embrace each other's cultures, leading to increased favorability
toward the other country. This shift in perception among future generations is
interpreted as an important signal heralding positive changes in future
Korea-Japan relations. So, what kind of Korea-Japan relationship do future
generations desire?
The 2030 Generation Seeking
Balance Between the Past and the Future
While
the younger generation, which shows high favorability toward Japan, may appear
to be neglecting historical issues, their awareness of these matters is no less
than that of older generations. Although their sensitivity to historical issues
may be lower than that of older generations, their recognition of the
seriousness of the issues and the necessity of resolving them is not
significantly different. As shown in [Figure 6], when asked about the most
important goal for Korea-Japan relations, the 2030 generation cited ‘resolving historical issues between the two
countries’ as the top priority.
[Figure
6] Goals South Korea and Japan Should Aim For in Their Relationship (2
Responses) (By Age Group)
Source: EAI. Prepared by the
author based on the results of the “Korea-Japan Public Opinion Poll (2025)”.
Similarly,
as shown in [Figure 7], the most frequently cited measures needed to advance
Korea-Japan exchanges were “expanding exchanges among the younger generation”
and “civilian dialogue between Korea and Japan to reduce differences in
historical perception.” The established generations should take note of the
significance revealed by this result: the 2030 generation, who are most aware
of the positive effects of cultural and people-to-people exchanges, hope not only for a quantitative increase
in exchanges but also for a qualitative improvement in them.
[Figure 7] Measures Most Needed
to Promote Korea-Japan Exchange (Up to 3, Multiple Responses)
Source: EAI. Prepared by the
author based on the results of the “Korea-Japan Public Opinion Poll (2025)”.
The
vision of Korea-Japan relations held by the 2030 generation seeks a balance
between the past and the future. While expressing a thirst for more exchanges
through the numerous interactions already taking place with the youth
generation, it also carries the meaning that qualitative exchanges for mutual
understanding are needed, rather than a simple quantitative increase. Taking a
step further, this can also be seen as the younger generation's resolve to
confront the uncomfortable historical issues between the two countries
directly, without evasion or postponement. This aligns with the aspiration of
future generations, echoing the 1998 promise made by the Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi
summit between South Korea and Japan to move forward in a future-oriented
manner while facing the past. Amid the sustained expansion of vibrant cultural and
people-to-people exchanges, a structural shift is emerging that demands a
parallel approach to historical issues.
Future
Korea-Japan Relations: Measures for a Better Tomorrow
The growing favorability toward
Japan among Korea's 2030 generation and the revitalization of cultural exchange
suggest a new turning point in Korea-Japan relations. Amid this shifting public
opinion landscape, what must be done to ensure the continued development and
stable maintenance of Korea-Japan relations?
First, it is necessary to establish
a direction based on accurate understanding and analysis of the changing public
opinion landscape, grounded in data. The high level of favorable sentiment toward Japan
currently demonstrated by the 2030 generation can be seen as the accumulated
result of over 20 years of cultural and people-to-people exchanges. However, it
is difficult to guarantee that this high level of favorable sentiment will
persist even as they enter their 40s and 50s. Furthermore, despite active
bilateral exchanges, it is also necessary to explore why the perceptions of the
40s and 50s generation, who are now the backbone of both societies, have not
significantly changed. Tracking shifts in the evolving landscape of public
opinion amid changing times requires the task of clearly grasping the meaning
behind the numbers. This necessitates in-depth analysis not only of Korea's
perceptions but also of Japan's perceptions of Korea.
Second, the institutional foundation for
exchanges must be strengthened. Despite the current level of youth
exchanges between Korea and Japan, the voices of young people hoping for
expanded exchanges indicate that the current level of bilateral exchanges is
not satisfactory. Therefore, not only must youth exchanges be expanded, but they
must also be institutionally supported. Particularly, as the cultural affinity
among the 2030 generation is driving the improvement of Korea-Japan relations,
youth exchanges should be increased through programs like training,
internships, and youth camps. Institutional support for joint cultural events,
arts, and sports exchange projects involving both countries must be
significantly strengthened. Furthermore, policies are needed to increase direct
experience opportunities. These include the continued simplification of entry
and exit procedures between Korea and Japan, youth support for aviation and
tourism infrastructure, support for study abroad and short-term visits
targeting young people, and the expansion of employment training programs.
Third,
efforts must be made to bridge the generational perception gap amid increased
exchanges among younger generations. To reduce generational differences in
perceptions of Korea-Japan relations, diverse exchanges, balanced education,
and sustained dialogue platforms are essential. We must establish generational
integration exchange programs that expand Korea-Japan exchanges, currently
skewed toward the younger generation, to include exchanges between youth and
established generations. For example, we need to organize Korea-Japan history
and culture camps, trips, and joint forums where both youth and established
generations can participate together. We must also create platforms for
intergenerational dialogue to increase communication and foster greater mutual
understanding across generations.
Fourth, we must establish ways for the
younger generations of both countries to deepen mutual understanding on
historical issues and engage in open discussion. As the youth take
historical matters seriously, we must also consider how to meet their needs.
This process should be elevated into one of harmony and reconciliation, not
conflict and discord. For example, the stories of Joseon Dynasty potters—whose
work, though born from the tragic history shared by both nations, contributed
to the revitalization of Japanese ceramic culture—can provide a valuable
opportunity to naturally learn about and internalize the history between Korea
and Japan. Through such objective and balanced historical and cultural
education, we can foster greater mutual understanding between the two
countries.
Finally, I propose identifying
collaborative projects centered on young people from both countries, based on a
cultural common ground between Korean and Japanese youth. Popular culture,
food culture, and travel are areas where the younger generation positively
embraces each other. We must move beyond these being merely personal hobbies
and develop ways for mutual cooperation. For instance, joint planning and
production projects between the next generation of Korea and Japan could be
implemented across diverse broadcast content like animation, comics, games,
music, and dramas. In this process, establishing an online content platform
jointly operated by both countries could increase accessibility to cultural
content in the digital space. Furthermore, exploring ways to monitor
unauthorized use of popular culture content and fostering talent in related
fields could also be pursued.
A new turning point in Korea-Japan relations
necessitates expanding diverse and multi-layered exchange channels and
experimenting with new cooperation models. Substantial progress in Korea-Japan
relations can be achieved when open social discussions centered on the 2030
generation—who are shaping the new public opinion landscape—are conducted in
parallel to find a balanced point between the past and the future. We
anticipate that the structural shift in perception among the 2030 generation,
signaling a ‘new normal’ in Korea-Japan relations, along with the influence of
cultural exchanges, will form the foundation for sustainable Korea-Japan
cooperation. ■
[if !supportFootnotes]
[endif]
[1] Choi Eun-mi. 2022. "Korea and Japan: What Do We Mean to Each Other?" ASAN Report. The Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
[2] Choi Eun-mi & Ham Geon-hee. 2024. "Koreans' Perceptions of Japan (2014-2024)." ASAN Report. Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
■ Eun-mi Choi is a Research Fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
■ Translated and Edited by Sangjun Lee, EAI Research Associate
For inquiries: 02-2277-1683 (ext. 211) leesj@eai.or.kr