[EAI Issue Brief] Modernization of the ROK-US Alliance and Public Opinion: South Korean Public Perception and Attitudes Toward Expanding the Role of USFK in the Context of the 1st ROK-US-Japan Public Perception Survey

1. The Debate on Modernizing the ROK-US Alliance

Since the 21st century, the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region has undergone fundamental changes. China's economic rise and military modernization, North Korea's advancement of its nuclear capabilities, and the deepening of US-China strategic competition pose structural challenges to the existing regional security order. In this changed security environment, the traditional bilateral alliance structure is required to adapt and innovate to effectively respond to new threats. Alliance modernization essentially aims to improve and strengthen the existing alliance system to cope more effectively with the changing security environment and new challenges. In this context, the discussion on the modernization of the ROK-US alliance aims to expand the operational scope and strategic role of the alliance from a Korean Peninsula-centric system to the Indo-Pacific region in response to the changing regional security environment. This signifies not a mere quantitative expansion of the existing alliance relationship, but a qualitative transformation of the alliance's strategic horizon and operational domain. Specifically, the modernization of the ROK-US alliance encompasses the following key areas (Min Jeong-hoon 2025). First, securing strategic flexibility through the adjustment of USFK's size and role. Second, expanding the proactive role of the ROK military in the defense system against North Korea and increasing defense expenditures accordingly. Third, establishing a joint response system to military threats beyond the Korean Peninsula to the region.

There is a dominant analysis that the core of the modernization of alliances pursued by the United States is to secure the strategic flexibility of USFK to contain China. This implies that USFK should transition from its traditional role of defending the Korean Peninsula to a system capable of performing broader regional security missions. Perceptions and evaluations of the modernization of the ROK-US alliance among political elites in South Korea show significant differences depending on political affiliation (Yang Ji-ho 2025). The conservative camp maintains the position that strategic flexibility for containment of China should be accepted within the framework of the ROK-US alliance. They cite Article 3 of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, presenting the possibility of South Korea's automatic participation if the United States is attacked in the Indo-Pacific region, and argue that the very presence of USFK in South Korea includes not only deterrence against North Korea but also containment of neighboring countries. On the other hand, the progressive camp insists that the ROK-US alliance is essentially formed around the Korean Peninsula. They believe that the purpose of USFK's stationing is to provide a deterrent and defense capability against attacks from North Korea, and they express the view that strategic flexibility of USFK, deployed for North Korean deterrence, is difficult to accept.

The security strategy of the second Trump administration, which prioritizes the containment of China, suggests the possibility of changes in the size and role of USFK. Under the new strategic framework, USFK is expected to shift its focus to containing China, with South Korea expected to take a more proactive role in responding to North Korean threats (Yang Wook and Lee Gyeong-seok 2025). In this regard, The Wall Street Journal published an article raising the possibility of a reduction in the 4,500 Stryker brigade soldiers deployed rotationally in South Korea (Youssef, Ward, and Martin 2025), and within Washington, there are arguments for significantly reducing the size of USFK to about 10,000 troops (Kavanagh and Caldwell 2025).

As the modernization of the ROK-US alliance has emerged as a key agenda item for South Korea and the United States, systematically analyzing the perceptions and attitudes of the South Korean public towards these changes holds significant policy importance. The democratic legitimacy and sustainability of alliance policies must be based on public consensus and support, which requires accurate understanding and analysis of public opinion. Therefore, this report utilizes the latest public opinion survey data conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in August 2025 to comprehensively analyze the perceptions of South Koreans regarding the change in the role of USFK. In particular, by identifying the key factors driving changes in perception, we aim to contribute to finding a more stable and sustainable direction for alliance development by deriving ways to build public consensus on the modernization of the ROK-US alliance and policy implications.

2. South Korean Perceptions of Changes in the Roles of USFK and the ROK-US Alliance

[Figure 1]: South Korean Perceptions of Changes in USFK's Role

Since the signing of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953, the core mission of USFK stationed in South Korea has been deterrence against North Korea, defending South Korea from North Korea's military threats. This traditional role has formed the foundation of the ROK-US alliance for over 70 years and has served as the central pillar of the Korean Peninsula's security structure. However, as discussed earlier, in the context of the changing security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, the discussion on modernizing the alliance, which suggests expanding the mission of USFK from deterring North Korea to containing China, is continuously being raised in Washington. What are the perceptions of the South Korean public regarding this potential policy change? The results of the public opinion survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in August 2025 provide interesting insights.

As can be seen in [Figure 1], 58.5% of the South Korean public agreed with the expansion of USFK's role to strengthen containment of China (40.5% agree, 18% strongly agree). In contrast, 35.6% opposed (29.6% disagree, 6% strongly disagree), and only 5.9% held a neutral stance. These results show that more than half of the South Korean public holds a positive perception of expanding the role of USFK. This is interpreted as a shift in perception, with the South Korean public moving away from the traditional stance of limiting USFK's role to the defense of the Korean Peninsula and showing forward-looking support for the new role of containing China.

[Figure 2]: South Korean Perceptions of the ROK-US Alliance's Role

Following this line of thought, what are the public perceptions of the role of the ROK-US alliance? According to [Figure 2], 40.1% of respondents believed that the ROK-US alliance should be limited to its traditional role of responding to military threats from North Korea (10.3% strongly agree, 29.8% generally agree). On the other hand, 55.8% of respondents believed that the ROK-US alliance should play a more active and broader role, such as responding to China's challenges in the Indo-Pacific region (24.4% strongly agree, 31.4% agree), and only 4.1% expressed a neutral opinion.

The analysis results from [Figure 1] and [Figure 2] present significant implications for the discussion on modernizing the ROK-US alliance. It indicates that a structural shift is occurring in public perceptions of the ROK-US alliance's role. The fact that nearly 60% of the South Korean public perceives that the role of USFK and the ROK-US alliance should extend beyond the traditional defense of the Korean Peninsula (deterrence against North Korea) to the entire Indo-Pacific region is noteworthy. This is interpreted as a willingness of South Koreans to accept comprehensive security cooperation at the regional level, moving beyond a limited, Korean Peninsula-centric framework in their view of the ROK-US alliance.

3. Perceptions of USFK's Role Change: Theoretical Discussion of Driving Factors

What, then, are the factors that trigger changes in the perceptions of the South Korean public regarding the strengthening of USFK's role in containing China? This report aims to analyze the influence of specific factors within three broad categories: (1) perceptions of US policy, (2) perceptions of security threats, and (3) perceptions of China policy.

3.1. Perceptions of US Policy and Views on the Change in USFK's Role

The expansion of USFK's role in containing China is a result of changes in the US strategy toward China. In the context of strategic competition between the US and China, which has intensified with China's growing national power, the US has defined China as a key competitor and is pursuing a strategy of denial to block China's expansion of influence in the region (Jeon Gyeong-ju 2025). This is based on the strategic objective of maintaining US global leadership by preventing China from establishing military dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. As China's economic growth leads to military buildup, China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region have significantly improved. As China's military power develops to a level that poses a substantial challenge to the United States, the US is significantly adjusting its military deployments in the region to prevent China from establishing military dominance within the first island chain. Amidst these strategic changes, the modification of USFK's role to contain China is directly linked to the defense of Taiwan by the US and is connected to the US's core objective of deterring China within the first island chain (Jeon Jae-seong 2025).

It is predicted that basic trust in the United States will serve as the most fundamental and important factor in shaping South Koreans' perceptions of the change in USFK's role to contain China. According to the August 2025 survey results, 66.5% of respondents perceive the US as a reliable partner for South Korea, while 30.2% responded otherwise. This suggests that the higher the trust in the US, the greater the possibility of public support for changes in US security strategy to contain China. Furthermore, trust in the US's extended deterrence capability for South Korea's defense could also be influential. The traditional role of USFK was that of a tripwire force to deter military provocations from North Korea. If a portion of USFK is converted to a mission of containing China, concerns about the weakening of deterrence against North Korea may arise. With North Korea's continued advancement of its nuclear and missile capabilities posing a serious threat to South Korea's security, the US nuclear umbrella is a cornerstone of South Korea's security policy for deterring North Korea. In the August survey, 56.5% of respondents believed that the US nuclear umbrella could ensure South Korea's security against North Korean security threats, while 34.1% evaluated it negatively. In this context, it is expected that higher trust in the US's extended deterrence will lead to greater acceptance of the change in USFK's role to contain China.

South Koreans' perceptions of US foreign policy are shaped not only through security but also through economic channels. Amidst intensifying US-China strategic competition, the US is focusing on rebuilding its economic base to strengthen its competitiveness. Since the 2008 financial crisis and the pandemics of the 2020s, the US economy has been continuously burdened by a dual deficit of fiscal and trade deficits (Kim Hak-gyun 2025). Simultaneously, China's low-cost production structure and manufacturing competitiveness have become a major cause accelerating the relative decline of US manufacturing (Kim Soo-eon 2025). In response to these structural changes, the second Trump administration is pursuing the revitalization of the US economy through tariff policies, and these protectionist measures are also being applied to its ally, South Korea. Despite the ROK-US Free Trade Agreement, the second Trump administration announced the imposition of high tariffs on South Korea, and on August 1, 2025, adjusted the mutual tariff rate from 25% to 15% conditional on South Korea's commitment to invest $350 billion in the US. Survey analysis results show that 81% of respondents evaluated the US's high tariff policy on South Korean exports as inappropriate. Negative perceptions of the US tariff policy by South Koreans are expected to reduce support for the US strategy of containing China through the change in USFK's role.

Furthermore, regarding the reduction of high US tariffs, 55.6% of respondents evaluated South Korea's $350 billion investment commitment to the US negatively, while only 32.8% perceived it positively. This shows the resentment of South Koreans towards US policies that impose economic burdens on allies for the sake of its own economic interests. Moreover, the US is restricting South Korea's trade and investment related to science and technology with China to gain an advantage in the technology competition with China in advanced technology fields. Regarding the US-led export control policy toward China, 57.6% of respondents evaluated it negatively. Overall, it can be seen that South Koreans have a negative perception of the US's unilateral economic policies and economic pressure on its ally, South Korea. In this context, negative perceptions of the US's large-scale investment pressure using tariffs as a weapon and the US's export control policy toward China to maintain its hegemony are expected to increase opposition to the change in USFK's role for containing China.

3.2. Perceptions of Security Threats and Views on the Change in USFK's Role

South Koreans' perceptions of security threats are also considered an important factor in shaping the public's views on the change in USFK's role. In the August 2025 survey, South Koreans selected North Korea as the most threatening country militarily, with 83.6% of respondents perceiving North Korea as a threat to South Korea's security. South Korea remains the world's only divided nation, and with the Korean War not fully concluded, North Korea has continuously advanced its nuclear and missile capabilities under the Kim Jong-un regime. Following North Korea's adoption of the Law on the State Policy for Nuclear Force in September 2022, the possibility of preemptive use of nuclear weapons by North Korea has increased. South Koreans' perception of the security threat from North Korea is expected to weaken support for the change in USFK's role to strengthen containment of China. As mentioned earlier, since USFK has performed the core mission of deterring North Korea, there is a high possibility of weakening the deterrence posture against North Korea if its role is changed to containing China.

Meanwhile, the August survey results confirm that perceptions of China's threats are also quite widespread among the South Korean public, not just North Korea's security threats. 84% of respondents perceived China's military expansion as a threat. In particular, military tensions between South Korea and China have recently escalated in the West Sea as China unilaterally installed structures in the provisional fishing zone. It is reported that when the South Korean maritime research vessel Onnuri approached the structures installed by China in the West Sea, Chinese coast guard vessels systematically obstructed its approach (Noh Seok-jo 2025). Furthermore, the incursions of Chinese military aircraft into South Korea's Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) are also continuously increasing. China is repeatedly violating the KADIZ under the pretext that it is international airspace (Lee Seong-hoon 2024). In this context, the increasing perception of security threats from China among the South Korean public is likely to lead to support for strengthening USFK's role in containing China. It can be assumed that there is an underlying perception that USFK should be utilized more actively to respond to China's military expansion and security threats.

3.3. Perceptions of China Policy and Views on the Change in USFK's Role

The last category concerns South Koreans' perceptions of China policy. As the US strengthens its tariff policies and pressure for investment in the US under the second Trump administration, the importance of economic relations between South Korea and China is being re-emphasized. Traditionally, China has been a major export destination for South Korea and has played a significant role in its economic growth. However, following the THAAD incident and changes in China's internal economic structure due to its rise, China has emerged as a major competitor in key industrial sectors for South Korea, leading to a somewhat weakened economic cooperation between South Korea and China compared to the past. Nevertheless, as US economic pressure intensifies, the importance of economic cooperation with China is resurfacing. The August survey results show that 53% of respondents believe the current level of economic cooperation between South Korea and China is appropriate, while about 33% perceive that economic cooperation between South Korea and China should be strengthened. The perception that prioritizes economic cooperation with China could be expected to weaken the support for strengthening USFK's role in containing China. On the other hand, the public may perceive economic cooperation with China and China's security threat as separate issues. In other words, the public may hold the perception that while cooperating economically with China, its military threat must be deterred. From this perspective, it can be expected that perceptions of strengthening economic cooperation with China will not significantly affect perceptions of strengthening USFK's role in containing China.

Another important factor shaping South Koreans' perceptions of China policy is the possibility of China invading Taiwan. Concerns have been raised about the possibility of Xi Jinping unifying Taiwan by force. It is analyzed that Xi Jinping may consider the possibility of invading Taiwan as he needs a strong justification to quell domestic political opposition for his long-term rule. It is generally assessed that the possibility of China invading Taiwan will have a direct and indirect impact on the security environment of the Korean Peninsula. If China engages in armed conflict with Taiwan, the US is likely to intervene to defend Taiwan, and South Korea, as a US ally, is also likely to be involved in the Taiwan conflict. Furthermore, there is a view that China may induce military provocations from North Korea in coordination with its invasion of Taiwan to minimize South Korea's and USFK's intervention in case of a contingency. While the possibility of China invading Taiwan could have a significant impact on South Korea's foreign and security policy, a majority of South Koreans perceive a high likelihood of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the near future. Nearly 72% of respondents predicted the possibility of military provocation by China toward Taiwan. Moreover, 88% of respondents agreed that military tension and conflict in the Taiwan Strait are important to South Korea's national interests. In this context, considering South Koreans' perception of the possibility of China's military unification of Taiwan by force and the importance of the Taiwan Strait to South Korea, it is expected that support for the change in USFK's role to contain China will increase.

4. Empirical Analysis of Driving Factors for Perceptions of USFK's Role Change

To analyze the empirical impact of the factors that can drive changes in South Koreans' perceptions of USFK's role, this report uses quantitative analysis methods.[1]The dependent variable was set as the degree of support among South Koreans for the change in USFK's role to strengthen containment of China, as explained earlier. The independent variables were set as elements belonging to the three categories explained above: (1) perceptions of US policy, (2) perceptions of security threats, and (3) perceptions of China policy. Independent variables related to perceptions of US foreign policy included the credibility of the US as a partner for South Korea, the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella for South Korea's defense, perceptions of US tariff policies imposed on South Korea, perceptions of US pressure for investment in the US conditional on tariff reduction, and perceptions of US export controls toward China. Independent variables related to perceptions of security threats included the security threat levels from North Korea and China. Finally, independent variables related to perceptions of China policy included the perceived importance of ROK-China economic cooperation, the possibility of China invading Taiwan, and the impact of a Taiwan Strait crisis on South Korea's national interests. These are summarized in the table below.

[Table 1]: Setting of Empirical Analysis Variables

Statistical Analysis Results[2]show the following main findings ([Figure 3]). First, examining the influence of independent variables related to US policy, the coefficients of all independent variables, except for the perception of US pressure for investment in the US conditional on tariff reduction, are statistically significant. Among these, the coefficients for US credibility and the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella are both positive (+), while perceptions of US tariff policy and export controls toward China are both negative (-). These empirical results suggest the following: The more South Koreans trust the US as an important partner for South Korea, the more they support the change in USFK's role to strengthen containment of China. In the same vein, the more they trust the US nuclear umbrella for South Korea's defense, the more they support the change in USFK's role. Conversely, the more negatively South Koreans perceive the US's high tariff policy imposed on South Korea, the more they oppose the change in USFK's role, and the stronger the perception that US export controls toward China are inappropriate, the more they oppose the utilization of USFK for containing China. These analysis results provide empirical evidence supporting the theoretical discussion explained earlier. One exception is that the perception of US pressure for investment in the US does not affect the perception of change in USFK's role.

Second, examining the influence of variables related to perceptions of security threats, the coefficients for the North Korean threat perception variable and the Chinese threat perception variable are both statistically significant, with negative (-) and positive (+), respectively. First, as the perception of the North Korean threat increases, opposition to the role change for containing China increases, and as the perception of the Chinese threat increases, support for the role change of USFK for containing China increases. These empirical results support the theoretical explanation discussed earlier. Third, examining the influence of independent variables related to China policy, only the coefficient for the possibility of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is positive (+) and statistically significant. This result shows that the more citizens perceive a high possibility of China's armed invasion, the more they support the change in USFK's role. However, contrary to the theoretical discussion above, perceptions of ROK-China economic cooperation and the impact of a Taiwan Strait military crisis on South Korea's national interests did not significantly affect the change in perceptions of USFK's role.

[Figure 3]: Analysis of Determinants of Perceptual Change Variables

Finally, among the demographic variables of respondents, the coefficients for gender and party support showed statistical significance. Men were more likely to support the change in USFK's role, and respondents showed bipartisan support for the change in USFK's role. The bipartisan support for the change in USFK's role is a result that sharply contrasts with the clear differences in positions among political elites based on partisanship.[3]

While we have confirmed the statistical significance of the impact of each variable on the perception of change in USFK's role so far, what is the actual impact of each variable? First, for every one-unit increase in public trust that the US is an important partner for South Korea, support for the change in USFK's role increased by 3.6 percentage points. Furthermore, as public trust in the US nuclear umbrella for South Korea's defense increased, support for the change in USFK's mission to contain China increased by 4.8 percentage points. Conversely, as public perception of unfair US tariffs became more negative, support for the change in USFK's role decreased by 8 percentage points, and as the perception of US export controls toward China became more negative, support for the change in USFK's role to contain China also decreased by 4.4 percentage points. Regarding US foreign policy, the most influential factor on the perception of change in USFK's role was US tariff policy. If the US wishes to increase public consent as it pursues the change in USFK's role in the future, it must seriously reconsider economic pressure policies on South Korea for its own benefit.

Regarding perceptions of security threats, the impact of Chinese threat perception on support for the change in USFK's role was much greater than that of North Korean threat perception. As Chinese threat perception increased, support for the change in USFK's role to contain China increased by 8 percentage points, while as North Korean threat perception increased, support for the change in USFK's role decreased by 3 percentage points. It was analyzed that as concerns of South Koreans about the possibility of China's military unification of Taiwan increase, not only the security threat posed by China to South Korea but also support for strengthening USFK's role in containing China to ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait increases by 5.2 percentage points.

5. Policy Implications and Recommendations

The discussion on changing the role of USFK to strengthen containment of China is emerging as a key issue between South Korea and the United States. Within the framework of the US-China hegemonic competition, the modernization of the ROK-US alliance is being discussed under the US's grand strategy to deter China's military rise in the Indo-Pacific region, with the change in USFK's mission at its center. For over 70 years since the Korean War, USFK has played a crucial role in the defense of South Korea. As a tripwire force, it has performed the critical mission of deterring North Korea's military provocations. Due to this importance, a comprehensive revision of South Korea's security policy is inevitable if USFK changes its mission to contain China. What is noteworthy is that as the US-China hegemonic competition continues, China's military expansion in the Indo-Pacific region will accelerate, and the US is likely to demand more active roles from its regional allies to deter this. This is precisely why public perception of the change in USFK's mission, which could have enormous ripple effects on South Korea's security policy and diplomacy as a whole, is important.

In this structural context, this report analyzed the general views of the South Korean public regarding the change in USFK's role and examined the specific factors driving these views. According to the latest public opinion survey conducted by the East Asia Institute among 1,585 adults, nearly 60% of respondents supported the change in USFK's mission to strengthen containment of China. Even more noteworthy is the fact that the South Korean public supports USFK's role in containing China in a bipartisan manner.

These survey results can be seen as reflecting the South Korean public's awareness of the geopolitical realities explained earlier. In particular, it is evident that the public feels the security threat posed by China's military expansion. The perception of China's security threat and concerns about China's military unification of Taiwan are key factors driving the South Korean public's support for strengthening USFK's role in containing China. As China's military influence expands in the Indo-Pacific region and the West Sea, support for the change in USFK's role among the South Korean public is expected to continuously increase.

For the South Korean public to agree that the ROK-US alliance should contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region beyond the Korean Peninsula in line with the geopolitical changes of intensifying US-China strategic competition, the role of the United States is crucial. In a situation where the change in USFK's mission is being discussed within the context of the US's evolving grand strategy, the US must resolve several key tasks to secure the support of the South Korean public. First, in the face of the growing threat of North Korean nuclear missiles, the US must provide a more robust and reliable nuclear umbrella to South Korea. Despite the Washington Declaration announced by the ROK and the US in 2023 to strengthen the credibility of US extended deterrence, the issue of trust in the US nuclear umbrella has continuously been raised. If the US intends to utilize US forces stationed in South Korea for deterrence against China, it must present more credible extended deterrence measures. Second, the US must seriously reconsider the tariff policies targeting its allies pursued by the second Trump administration. The US must recognize that its tariff policies, pursuing only its own interests, severely undermine trust in the US as both a hegemonic power and an ally. Furthermore, it must be aware that US foreign policies that restrict exports and investments by allies toward China to curb China's rise in science and technology actually increase the opposition of the South Korean public to the change in USFK's role.

Ultimately, for the US to continuously secure the support of the South Korean public for strengthening USFK's role in containing China, it must simultaneously pursue enhanced credibility in security matters and policy adjustments that consider mutual benefits in economic matters. This can be considered an essential condition for the ROK-US alliance to effectively respond to the era of US-China strategic competition while achieving sustainable development. ■

References

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Приложение

[Приложение Таблица 1]: Таблица логистической регрессии

Значения в скобках обозначают робастные стандартные ошибки.

*** p<.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[Приложение Таблица 2]: Описательная статистика

[1]Зависимая переменная — степень согласия корейского населения с изменением роли американских войск в Корее. Ответы «согласен» (согласен, полностью согласен) были закодированы как 1, а ответы «не согласен» (не согласен, полностью не согласен) и «нейтрален» — как 0. Поскольку зависимая переменная в данном анализе является фиктивной (dummy), использовался логистический регрессионный анализ с применением робастных стандартных ошибок. При одновременном использовании множества независимых переменных в статистическом анализе, мультиколлинеарность (multicollinearity) между независимыми переменными может привести к неточным результатам. Для проверки того, что проблема мультиколлинеарности не оказывает существенного влияния на статистический анализ, был рассчитан коэффициент инфляции дисперсии (VIF: Variance Inflation Factor). В результате среднее значение VIF для всех переменных составило 1.35. Значение VIF 1.35 означает низкий уровень мультиколлинеарности и указывает на то, что результаты оценки статистической модели можно считать достоверными.

[2]Если 90% или 95% доверительный интервал определенной независимой переменной не включает 0, то можно считать, что данная переменная оказывает статистически значимое влияние на зависимую переменную. Если 90% или 95% доверительный интервал определенной независимой переменной располагается справа от 0, то можно считать, что он оказывает статистически значимое положительное (+) влияние на зависимую переменную. Напротив, если 90% или 95% доверительный интервал определенной независимой переменной располагается слева от 0, то можно считать, что он оказывает статистически значимое отрицательное (-) влияние на зависимую переменную.

[3]Однако коэффициент для переменной «сторонники консервативных партий» находится в 90% доверительном интервале

■ Автор: Ли Гён Сок _доцент кафедры политологии и международных отношений Инчхонского национального университета.

■ Ответственный за выпуск и редактор: Ли Сан Джун_научный сотрудник EAI
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