[EAI Issue Brief] Modernizing the ROK-US Alliance and Public Opinion: South Korean Public Perception and Attitudes Toward Expanding the Role of US Forces Korea Based on the First ROK-US-Japan Public Perception Survey

1. The Debate on Modernizing the ROK-US Alliance

Since the 21st century, the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region has undergone fundamental changes. China's economic rise and military modernization, North Korea's advancement of nuclear capabilities, and the intensification of US-China strategic competition pose structural challenges to the existing regional security order. In this changed security environment, the traditional bilateral alliance structure is being called upon to adapt and innovate to effectively respond to new threats. Alliance modernization essentially aims to improve and strengthen existing alliances to more effectively cope with the changing security environment and new challenges. In this context, the discussion on modernizing the ROK-US alliance sets its core direction as expanding the operational scope and strategic role of the alliance from a Korean Peninsula-centric system to the Indo-Pacific region in response to the evolving regional security environment. This signifies not merely a quantitative expansion of the existing alliance relationship, but a qualitative transformation of the alliance's strategic horizon and operational domain. Specifically, the modernization of the ROK-US alliance encompasses the following key areas (Min Jeong-hoon 2025): First, securing strategic flexibility through the adjustment of the size and role of US Forces Korea. Second, expanding the proactive role of the ROK military in defense against North Korea and the corresponding increase in defense spending. Third, establishing a joint response system to military threats beyond the Korean Peninsula to the wider region.

There is a dominant analysis that the core of the alliance modernization pursued by the United States is to secure the strategic flexibility of US Forces Korea for deterring China. This implies that US Forces Korea must transition from its traditional role of defending the Korean Peninsula to a system capable of performing broader regional security missions. Perceptions and evaluations of the modernization of the ROK-US alliance among South Korean political elites show significant differences depending on their political affiliation (Yang Ji-ho 2025). The conservative camp maintains the position that strategic flexibility for deterring China should be accepted within the framework of the ROK-US alliance. They cite Article III of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, suggesting the possibility of South Korea's automatic participation if the United States is attacked in the Indo-Pacific region, and argue that the stationing of US Forces Korea on the peninsula inherently includes the function of deterring not only North Korea but also neighboring countries. Conversely, the progressive camp adheres to the position that the ROK-US alliance was fundamentally formed around the Korean Peninsula. They assess that the purpose of the stationing of US Forces Korea is to provide deterrence and defense capabilities against attacks from North Korea, and express the view that strategic flexibility of US Forces Korea, deployed for North Korean deterrence, is difficult to accept.

The security strategy of the second Trump administration, which prioritizes deterring China, suggests the possibility of changes in the size and role of US Forces Korea. Under the new strategic framework, US Forces Korea is expected to shift its focus to deterring China, with South Korea expected to take a more proactive role in responding to North Korean threats (Yang Wook and Lee Kyung-seok 2025). In this regard, The Wall Street Journal published an article raising the possibility of reducing the 4,500 Stryker brigade soldiers deployed rotationally in South Korea (Youssef, Ward, and Martin 2025), and within Washington, there are even arguments for significantly reducing the size of US Forces Korea to around 10,000 troops (Kavanagh and Caldwell 2025).

As the modernization of the ROK-US alliance has emerged as a key agenda item for South Korea and the United States, systematically analyzing the perceptions and attitudes of the South Korean public towards these changes holds significant policy implications. The democratic legitimacy and sustainability of alliance policies must be based on public consensus and support, which requires accurate understanding and analysis of public opinion. Therefore, this report utilizes the latest public opinion survey data conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in August 2025 to comprehensively analyze the perceptions of South Koreans regarding the change in the role of US Forces Korea. Specifically, by identifying the key factors driving these perceptual changes, we aim to contribute to finding ways to build public consensus on the modernization of the ROK-US alliance and derive policy implications for a more stable and sustainable alliance development.

2. South Korean Perceptions of the Changing Roles of US Forces Korea and the ROK-US Alliance

[Figure 1]: South Korean Perceptions of the Changing Role of US Forces Korea

Since the signing of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953, the primary mission of US Forces Korea stationed in South Korea has been deterrence against North Korea, defending South Korea from North Korean military threats. This traditional role has formed the foundation of the ROK-US alliance for over 70 years and has served as the core pillar of the Korean Peninsula's security structure. However, as discussed earlier, in the context of the evolving security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, the discussion on modernizing the alliance, which advocates for expanding the mission of US Forces Korea from deterring North Korea to deterring China, is continuously being raised in Washington. What are the perceptions of the South Korean public regarding this potential policy shift? The results of the public opinion survey conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in August 2025 offer interesting insights.

As can be seen in [Figure 1], 58.5% of South Koreans expressed agreement with the change in the role of US Forces Korea to strengthen deterrence against China (40.5% agree, 18% strongly agree). In contrast, 35.6% expressed disagreement (29.6% disagree, 6% strongly disagree), with only 5.9% remaining neutral. These results indicate that a majority of the South Korean public holds a positive perception of expanding the role of US Forces Korea. This can be interpreted as a shift in perception, moving away from the traditional stance that the role of US Forces Korea should be limited to the defense of the Korean Peninsula, and showing proactive support for the new role of deterring China.

[Figure 2]: South Korean Perceptions of the Role of the ROK-US Alliance

Extending this line of thought, what are the public perceptions regarding the role of the ROK-US alliance? According to [Figure 2], 40.1% of respondents perceived that the ROK-US alliance should be limited to its traditional role of responding to North Korea's military threats (10.3% strongly agree, 29.8% generally agree). On the other hand, 55.8% perceived that the ROK-US alliance should play a more active and broader role, such as responding to China's challenges in the Indo-Pacific region (24.4% strongly agree, 31.4% agree), with only 4.1% expressing a neutral opinion.

The analysis results from [Figure 1] and [Figure 2] offer significant implications for the discussion on modernizing the ROK-US alliance. There is a structural shift occurring in public perception regarding the role of the ROK-US alliance. The fact that nearly 60% of the South Korean public perceives that the role of US Forces Korea and the ROK-US alliance should extend beyond the traditional defense of the Korean Peninsula (deterrence against North Korea) to the entire Indo-Pacific region is noteworthy. This can be interpreted as a willingness among South Koreans to accept comprehensive regional security cooperation, moving beyond a limited, Korean Peninsula-centric framework for viewing the ROK-US alliance.

3. Perceptions of the Changing Role of US Forces Korea: Theoretical Discussion of Driving Factors

What, then, are the factors that trigger the shift in perceptions among the South Korean public regarding the strengthening of US Forces Korea's role in deterring China? This report aims to analyze the influence of specific factors within three broad categories: (1) Perceptions of US Policy, (2) Perceptions of Security Threats, and (3) Perceptions of China Policy.

3.1. Perceptions of US Policy and Views on the Changing Role of US Forces Korea

The expansion of US Forces Korea's role in deterring China is a consequence of changes in US strategy toward China. Amidst the US-China strategic competition driven by China's growing national power, the United States has defined China as its primary competitor and is pursuing a strategy of denial to block China's expanding influence in the region (Jeon Kyung-joo 2025). This is based on the strategic objective of maintaining US global leadership by preventing China from achieving military dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. As China's economic growth leads to military expansion, China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region have significantly improved. As China's military power develops to a level that poses a substantial challenge to the United States, the US is significantly adjusting its military deployments in the region to prevent China from establishing military dominance within the first island chain. Within this strategic shift, the change in the role of US Forces Korea to deter China is directly linked to the defense of Taiwan and connects to the US's core objective of deterring China within the first island chain (Jeon Jae-seong 2025).

Basic trust in the United States is predicted to be the most fundamental and important factor in shaping South Korean perceptions of the expanded role of US Forces Korea in deterring China. According to the August 2025 survey results, 66.5% of respondents perceive the United States as a reliable partner for South Korea, while 30.2% do not. This suggests that higher trust in the United States is likely to increase public support for changes in US security strategy aimed at deterring China. Furthermore, trust in the US's extended deterrence capabilities for South Korea's defense may also play a role. The traditional role of US Forces Korea was that of a tripwire force deterring North Korean military provocations. If a portion of US Forces Korea is repurposed for deterring China, concerns about weakened deterrence against North Korea may arise. With North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile capabilities posing a serious threat to South Korean security, the US nuclear umbrella is a cornerstone of South Korea's security policy for deterring North Korea. In the August survey results, 56.5% of respondents believed that the US nuclear umbrella could guarantee South Korea's security against North Korean threats, while 34.1% evaluated it negatively. In this context, higher trust in US extended deterrence is expected to increase the acceptability of the role transition of US Forces Korea to deter China.

South Korean perceptions of US foreign policy are shaped not only through security but also through economic channels. Amidst intensifying US-China strategic competition, the United States is focusing on rebuilding its economic base to enhance its competitiveness. Since the 2008 financial crisis and the pandemic of the 2020s, the US economy has been continuously burdened by a dual deficit of fiscal and trade deficits (Kim Hak-gyun 2025). Simultaneously, China's low-cost production structure and manufacturing competitiveness have acted as major drivers accelerating the relative decline of US manufacturing (Kim Soo-eon 2025). In response to these structural changes, the second Trump administration is pursuing the revitalization of the US economy through tariff policies, and these protectionist measures are also being applied to its ally, South Korea. Despite the signing of the ROK-US Free Trade Agreement, the second Trump administration announced the imposition of high tariffs on South Korea, and on August 1, 2025, adjusted the mutual tariff rate from 25% to 15% conditional on South Korea's commitment to invest $350 billion in the US. Survey analysis results show that 81% of respondents deemed the US's high tariff policy on South Korean exports as inappropriate. Negative perceptions of US tariff policies among South Koreans are expected to lower support for the US strategy of deterring China through the expanded role of US Forces Korea.

Furthermore, regarding the reduction of high US tariffs, 55.6% of respondents perceived the US pressure for South Korea's $350 billion investment in the US negatively, while only 32.8% perceived it positively. This demonstrates South Korean public resentment towards US policies that impose economic burdens on allies for its own economic interests. Moreover, the US is restricting South Korea's trade and investment related to science and technology with China to secure an advantage in the technological competition with China in advanced fields. Regarding US-led export control policies toward China, 57.6% of respondents evaluated them negatively. Overall, it can be seen that the South Korean public perceives US unilateral economic policies and economic pressure on its ally, South Korea, negatively. In this context, negative perceptions of US pressure for large-scale investment using tariffs as leverage and US export control policies toward China for maintaining US hegemony are expected to increase opposition to the change in the role of US Forces Korea for deterring China.

3.2. Perceptions of Security Threats and Views on the Changing Role of US Forces Korea

South Koreans' perceptions of security threats are also evaluated as an important factor influencing public views on the transition of US Forces Korea's role. In the August 2025 survey, South Koreans identified North Korea as the most militarily threatening country, with 83.6% of respondents perceiving North Korea as a threat to South Korean security. South Korea remains the world's only divided nation, and with the Korean War not fully concluded, North Korea has continuously advanced its nuclear and missile capabilities under the Kim Jong-un regime. Since North Korea adopted its nuclear weapons policy law in September 2022, the possibility of North Korea preemptively using nuclear weapons has increased. South Korean public perception of the North Korean security threat is expected to weaken support for the expanded role of US Forces Korea in deterring China. This is because, as mentioned earlier, US Forces Korea has performed the crucial mission of deterring North Korea, and a change in role to deterring China could lead to a weakening of the deterrence posture against North Korea.

Meanwhile, the August survey results confirm that perceptions of China as a threat are also widespread among the South Korean public, not just North Korea. As many as 84% of respondents perceived China's military expansion as a threat. In particular, recent unilateral installation of structures by China in the provisional fishing zone in the West Sea has heightened military tensions between South Korea and China in the West Sea. It is reported that Chinese coast guard vessels systematically obstructed the approach of the South Korean oceanographic research vessel Onnuri when it neared the structures installed by China (Noh Seok-jo 2025). Furthermore, the incursions of Chinese military aircraft into South Korea's Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) are also continuously increasing. China repeatedly violates the KADIZ under the logic that it is international airspace (Lee Sung-hoon 2024). In this context, the increasing perception of China as a security threat among the South Korean public is highly likely to lead to support for strengthening the role of US Forces Korea in deterring China. It can be presumed that there is an underlying perception that US Forces Korea should be utilized more actively to respond to China's military expansion and security threats.

3.3. Perceptions of China Policy and Views on the Changing Role of US Forces Korea

The final category concerns South Korean public perceptions of China policy. With the intensification of US pressure on South Korea regarding tariffs and investment under the second Trump administration, the importance of economic relations between South Korea and China is re-emerging. Traditionally, China has been a major export destination for South Korea, playing a significant role in its economic growth. However, following the THAAD incident, due to China's economic retaliation and internal economic structural changes resulting from China's rise, China has emerged as a major competitor in key South Korean industrial sectors, leading to a somewhat diminished economic cooperation between South Korea and China compared to the past. Nevertheless, as US economic pressure intensifies, the importance of economic cooperation with China is resurfacing. The August survey results show that 53% of respondents perceived the current level of economic cooperation between South Korea and China as appropriate, while approximately 33% perceived that economic cooperation between South Korea and China should be strengthened. The perception that emphasizes economic cooperation with China might be expected to weaken support for strengthening the role of US Forces Korea in deterring China. On the other hand, the public may perceive economic cooperation with China and China's security threat as separate dimensions. In other words, the public may hold the perception that while cooperating economically with China, its military threat must be deterred. From this perspective, it can be anticipated that perceptions of strengthening economic cooperation with China will not significantly affect perceptions of strengthening the role of US Forces Korea in deterring China.

Another important factor shaping South Korean public perceptions of China policy is the possibility of China invading Taiwan. Concerns about the possibility of Xi Jinping using force to unify Taiwan have been raised in various ways. It is analyzed that Xi Jinping may consider the possibility of invading Taiwan because he needs a strong justification to quell domestic political opposition for his long-term rule. It is generally assessed that China's potential invasion of Taiwan will have direct and indirect impacts on the security environment of the Korean Peninsula. There is a view that if China engages in an armed conflict with Taiwan, the United States is likely to intervene to defend Taiwan, and South Korea, as a US ally, is also likely to be involved in a Taiwan conflict. Furthermore, there is a view that China may coordinate with North Korea in advance to provoke North Korean military provocations at the time of a Taiwan invasion, in order to minimize South Korea's and US Forces Korea's intervention during such a contingency. While China's invasion of Taiwan could have a significant impact on South Korea's foreign and security policy, a majority of South Koreans perceive a high likelihood of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the near future. Nearly 72% of respondents predicted the possibility of Chinese military provocation against Taiwan. Additionally, 88% of respondents agreed that military tension and conflict in the Taiwan Strait are important to South Korea's national interests. In this context, considering the South Korean public's perception of the possibility of China's forceful unification of Taiwan and the importance of the Taiwan Strait to South Korea, support for the change in the role of US Forces Korea to deter China is expected to increase.

4. Empirical Analysis of Driving Factors for Perceptions of the Changing Role of US Forces Korea

To analyze the empirical influence of factors that can drive changes in South Korean public perceptions of the role transition of US Forces Korea, this report employed quantitative analysis methods.[1]The dependent variable was set as the South Korean public's approval rating for strengthening the role of US Forces Korea in deterring China. The independent variables were set as factors belonging to the three categories explained above: (1) Perceptions of US Policy, (2) Perceptions of Security Threats, and (3) Perceptions of China Policy. Independent variables related to perceptions of US foreign policy included trust in the US as a partner for South Korea, trust in the US nuclear umbrella for South Korea's defense, perceptions of US tariff policies imposed on South Korea, perceptions of US pressure for investment in the US following a reduction in tariff rates, and perceptions of US export controls on China. Independent variables related to security threat perceptions included the perceived threat from North Korea and China. Finally, independent variables related to perceptions of China policy included the importance of ROK-China economic cooperation, the possibility of China invading Taiwan, and the impact of a Taiwan Strait crisis on South Korea's national interests. These are summarized in the table below.

[Table 1]: Empirical Analysis Variable Settings

Statistical Analysis Results[2]shows the following main findings ([Figure 3]). First, examining the influence of independent variables related to US foreign policy perceptions, the coefficients of all independent variables, except for the perception of US pressure for investment following a reduction in tariff rates, are statistically significant. Among these, the coefficients for trust in the US and trust in the US nuclear umbrella are both positive (+), while perceptions of US tariff policy and export controls on China are both negative (-). These empirical results suggest the following: The more South Koreans trust the US as an important partner, the more they approve of the role change of US Forces Korea to strengthen deterrence against China. In the same vein, the more they trust the US nuclear umbrella for South Korea's defense, the more they approve of the role change of US Forces Korea. Conversely, the more negatively they perceive the US's high tariff policy imposed on South Korea, the more they oppose the role change of US Forces Korea, and the stronger the perception that US export controls on China are inappropriate, the more they oppose the utilization of US Forces Korea to deter China. These analysis results provide empirical evidence supporting the theoretical discussion explained earlier. One exception is the fact that perceptions of US pressure for investment in the US do not affect perceptions of the changing role of US Forces Korea.

Second, examining the influence of variables related to security threat perceptions, the coefficients for the North Korean threat perception variable and the China threat perception variable are both statistically significant, with negative (-) and positive (+) signs, respectively. First, as the perception of the North Korean threat increases, opposition to the role change for deterring China increases, and as the perception of the Chinese threat increases, approval for the role change of US Forces Korea to deter China increases. These empirical results support the theoretical explanations discussed earlier. Third, examining the influence of independent variables related to China policy perceptions, only the coefficient for the possibility of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is positive (+) and statistically significant. This result shows that the more people perceive a high possibility of China's armed invasion, the more they approve of the role change of US Forces Korea. However, contrary to the previous theoretical discussion, perceptions of ROK-China economic cooperation and the impact of a Taiwan Strait military crisis on South Korea's national interests did not show any influence on the change in perceptions regarding the role of US Forces Korea.

[Figure 3]: Analysis Variables for Perceptual Change Determinants

Finally, among the respondents' demographic variables, the coefficients for gender and party support showed statistical significance. Men were more likely to approve of the role change of US Forces Korea, and respondents perceived the role change of US Forces Korea positively in a bipartisan manner. The bipartisan support for the changing role of US Forces Korea is a stark contrast to the clear differences in positions among political elites based on party affiliation.[3]

While the influence of each variable on perceptions of the changing role of US Forces Korea has only been confirmed in terms of statistical significance so far, what is the actual impact of each variable? First, for every one-unit increase in public trust that the US is an important partner for South Korea, the approval rating for the role change of US Forces Korea increased by 3.6 percentage points. Furthermore, as public trust in the US nuclear umbrella for South Korea's defense increased, the approval rating for the mission change of US Forces Korea to deter China increased by 4.8 percentage points. Conversely, as public perception of unfair US tariff imposition became more negative, the approval rating for the role change of US Forces Korea decreased by 8 percentage points, and as negative perceptions of US export controls on China strengthened, the approval rating for the role change of US Forces Korea to deter China also decreased by 4.4 percentage points. Regarding US foreign policy, the most influential factor on perceptions of the changing role of US Forces Korea was US tariff policy. If the US wishes to increase public consent as it pursues the role change of US Forces Korea in the future, it must seriously reconsider its economic pressure policies on South Korea for its own benefit.

Regarding security threat perceptions, the impact of China's threat perception on the approval rating for the role change of US Forces Korea was found to be much greater than that of North Korea's threat perception. As China's threat perception increased, the approval rating for the role change of US Forces Korea to deter China increased by 8 percentage points, while as North Korea's threat perception increased, the approval rating for the role change of US Forces Korea decreased by 3 percentage points. In addition to the security threat posed by China to South Korea, as South Korean public concern about the possibility of China's forceful unification of Taiwan increases, the approval rating for strengthening the role of US Forces Korea in deterring China to ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait increased by 5.2 percentage points.

5. Policy Implications and Recommendations

The discussion on strengthening the role of US Forces Korea to enhance deterrence against China has emerged as a key issue between South Korea and the United States. Within the framework of US-China power competition, the modernization of the ROK-US alliance is being discussed under the US grand strategy to deter China's military rise in the Indo-Pacific region, with the change in mission of US Forces Korea at its center. For over 70 years since the Korean War, US Forces Korea has played a crucial role in the defense of South Korea. As a tripwire force, it has performed the vital mission of deterring North Korean military provocations. Due to this importance, a comprehensive revision of South Korea's security policy is expected to be inevitable if US Forces Korea changes its mission to deter China. It is noteworthy that as the US-China power competition continues, China's military expansion in the Indo-Pacific region will accelerate, and the US is likely to demand more active roles from its regional allies to deter this. This is precisely why public perception regarding the change in mission of US Forces Korea, which could have enormous ripple effects on South Korea's security policy and overall diplomacy, is so important.

Within this structural context, this report analyzed the general views of the South Korean public on the changing role of US Forces Korea and examined the specific factors driving these views. According to the latest public opinion survey conducted by the East Asia Institute among 1,585 adults, nearly 60% of respondents approved of the change in mission for US Forces Korea to strengthen deterrence against China. Even more noteworthy is the fact that the South Korean public supports the role of US Forces Korea in deterring China in a bipartisan manner.

These survey results can be seen as reflecting the South Korean public's awareness of the geopolitical realities explained earlier. In particular, it indicates that the public is experiencing the security threats posed by China's military expansion. The perception of China's security threat and concerns about China's forceful unification of Taiwan are key factors driving South Korean public support for strengthening the role of US Forces Korea in deterring China. As China's military influence expands in the Indo-Pacific region and the West Sea, the approval rating for the change in the role of US Forces Korea among the South Korean public is expected to continue to rise.

For the South Korean public to agree that the ROK-US alliance should contribute to the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region beyond the Korean Peninsula in line with the geopolitical changes of intensifying US-China strategic competition, the role of the United States is crucial. In the context of discussions on changing the mission of US Forces Korea within the framework of the US's evolving grand strategy, the US must address several key challenges to secure the support of the South Korean public. First, amidst the growing threat of North Korean nuclear missiles, the US must provide a more robust and reliable nuclear umbrella to South Korea. Despite the Washington Declaration announced by South Korea and the US in 2023 to strengthen the credibility of US extended deterrence, the issue of trust in the US nuclear umbrella continues to be raised. If the US intends to utilize US forces stationed in South Korea for deterrence against China, it must present more credible extended deterrence measures. Second, the US must seriously reconsider its tariff policies targeting allies, which are being pursued by the second Trump administration. The US must recognize that its tariff policies, which prioritize its own interests, severely undermine trust in the US as both a hegemonic power and an ally. Furthermore, it must be aware that US foreign policies that restrict allies' exports and investments to China to curb China's technological rise actually increase South Korean public opposition to the role change of US Forces Korea.

Ultimately, for the US to continuously secure South Korean public support for strengthening the role of US Forces Korea in deterring China, it must simultaneously enhance credibility in the security domain and adjust policies considering mutual benefits in the economic domain. This is an essential condition for the ROK-US alliance to effectively respond to the era of US-China strategic competition while achieving sustainable development. ■

References

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Appendix

[Appendix Table 1]: Logit Regression Table

The values in parentheses indicate robust standard errors.

*** p<.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[Appendix Table 2]: Descriptive Statistics Table

[1]The dependent variable is the Korean public's approval of changes in the role of US Forces Korea. Responses of approval (agree, strongly agree) were coded as 1, and responses of disagreement (disagree, strongly disagree) and neutrality were coded as 0. Since the dependent variable in this analysis is a dummy variable, a logit regression analysis using robust standard errors was employed. When multiple independent variables are used simultaneously in statistical analysis, accurate statistical results may not be obtained due to multicollinearity among the independent variables. To confirm that the multicollinearity problem does not significantly affect the statistical analysis, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was calculated, and the average VIF for all variables was found to be 1.35. A VIF of 1.35 indicates a low level of multicollinearity, suggesting that the statistical model's estimation results are reliable.

[2]If the 90% or 95% confidence interval of a specific independent variable does not include 0, it can be considered that the variable has a statistically significant impact on the dependent variable. If the 90% or 95% confidence interval of a specific independent variable is located to the right of 0, it can be considered to have a statistically significant positive (+) impact on the dependent variable. Conversely, if the 90% or 95% confidence interval of a specific independent variable is located to the left of 0, it can be considered to have a statistically significant negative (-) impact on the dependent variable.

[3]However, the coefficient for the supporter of conservative parties variable is within the 90% confidence interval.

■ Author: Lee Gyeong-seok _Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Incheon National University.

■ Responsible Editor: Lee Sang-jun_Research Fellow, EAI
    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr