[The 21st Presidential Election and Korean Democracy: Crisis, Division, and Realignment] ⑥ Determinants of Perceptions of Election Fraud and Their Impact on Voting Behavior

I. Introduction

In December 2024, Korean society experienced an unprecedented political crisis. Allegations of election fraud, raised alongside the declaration of an unconstitutional state of emergency, questioned the fundamental nature of democratic institutions beyond mere political conflict. Notably, these allegations rapidly spread through YouTube and online communities, taking on conspiratorial characteristics. Various discourses of election fraud emerged, including theories of early voting manipulation, server hacking, and Chinese interference, which were eventually simplified and disseminated among some conservative groups as the perception that "early voting = election fraud."[1] Differences in early voting rates by region and changes in actual voting behavior have been observed. [2]This signifies that perceptions of election fraud are not merely a difference of opinion but are undermining trust in the electoral system, a core institution of Korean democracy.

Questions about electoral legitimacy can pose a fatal risk to a democratic system. Linz (1978) pointed out that the loss of electoral legitimacy is one of the core risks leading to the collapse of democracy. The spread of election fraud discourse and the resulting 'politics of distrust' pose a significant threat to the future of democracy. When trust in the electoral system collapses, voters feel alienated from the political process, which can lead to political apathy, such as abstention from voting, or manifest as radical behavior that rejects existing democratic procedures. The recent case in the United States clearly illustrates this. Former President Trump's persistent claims of election fraud went beyond mere challenges to election results, leading to violent political acts, including the forceful occupation of the U.S. Capitol by election fraud proponents. It also practically resulted in a decrease in voter turnout among Republican supporters. This serves as an empirical example of how election fraud discourse can weaken the foundation of democratic participation and lead to the collapse of the democratic system itself. [3]Therefore, a systematic and empirical analysis is urgently needed to understand what makes voters believe that elections are unfair and how these perceptions specifically affect their political participation.

Based on this problem awareness, this study aims to answer the following two questions through the specific case of the 21st presidential election. First, what factors influence voters' perceptions of election fraud? Focusing on perceptions of electoral integrity, we will analyze the roles of trust in the electoral system, political polarization, and socioeconomic background in shaping perceptions of election fraud. Second, what is the impact of perceptions of election fraud on voting behavior? Specifically, focusing on the three choices of early voting, general voting, and abstention, we will analyze how perceptions of election fraud lead to changes in actual voting behavior. This is important for understanding the concrete impact of election fraud discourse, which goes beyond mere expression of opinion, on actual democratic participation. Through empirical analysis of the research questions above, this paper aims to grasp the reality of the election fraud discourse that has emerged as a sharp political issue in recent Korean society and diagnose the nature of the threat it poses to Korean democracy. Furthermore, it seeks to explore academic and policy implications for restoring electoral trust and overcoming the 'politics of distrust.'

This study differentiates itself from existing research through the following academic contributions. First, it contributes methodologically by systematically analyzing the independent contributions of institutional trust, political polarization, and demographic factors using hierarchical logistic regression analysis. Second, it aims to contribute theoretically by elucidating the complex determinants of perceptions of electoral integrity through an analytical framework that integrates theories of institutional trust and political polarization. Finally, it seeks to extend research on electoral integrity beyond the perceptual level to behavioral outcomes by examining the relationship between perceptions of election fraud and actual voting behavior (choice of voting method, participation).

This paper is structured to answer the two research questions posed above sequentially. Chapter II reviews the literature on electoral integrity, institutional trust, and political polarization to establish research hypotheses. It then presents and interprets the results of the hierarchical logistic regression analysis for the research questions. Chapter III analyzes the results of a cross-tabulation analysis addressing the second research question regarding the impact of perceptions of election fraud on voting behavior. Finally, the conclusion discusses the policy implications and limitations of the research findings.

II. Electoral Integrity, Institutions, and Polarization

Electoral integrity is the most crucial component determining the legitimacy of a democratic system. In democracies, the legitimacy of power is ultimately secured through free and fair elections; thus, if trust in the electoral process erodes, the legitimacy of the entire political system is shaken (Norris, 2017). As Linz (1978) emphasized, perceptions of election fraud can lead citizens to abandon institutionalized conflict resolution and resort to radical actions outside the system or political non-participation. The events in the 2025 Korean presidential election vividly demonstrated that such concerns could materialize.

Existing research on electoral integrity has primarily approached the issue from the perspective of administrative efficiency or institutional reform (Kim Yong-chul et al., 2013; Cho Jin et al., 2015), with relatively less focus on the integrated analysis of voter perception structures and their political consequences. In particular, there have been few studies that systematically analyze the interactive effects of institutional trust and political polarization on perceptions of electoral integrity within the Korean context (Lee Han-soo, 2017). Perceptions of electoral fairness by voters, i.e., perceptions of electoral integrity, have emerged as an important research topic because they are influenced not only by objective electoral realities but also by various external factors (Norris, 2013a; Carreras & Irepoglu, 2013). These perceptions are a key determinant of the quality of democratic governance, and when elections are perceived as rife with fraud or lacking integrity, they can undermine political trust and legitimacy, reduce voter turnout and participation, and ultimately lead to regime instability, violence, and even civil war (Norris, 2013b).

Voters' perceptions of electoral integrity are influenced by complex and multi-layered factors. Previous studies have identified various factors such as the Winners/Losers effect, political identity, socioeconomic background, media exposure, institutional trust, and political efficacy as influencing perceptions of electoral integrity. However, considering the specific context of the 2025 Korean presidential election, it is necessary to focus on two factors. First, institutional trust: distrust in electoral management bodies was used as a core basis for allegations of election fraud, making institutional trust a significant factor. Second, political polarization: people perceive the electoral process differently based on their political orientation. Therefore, perceptions of election fraud are inevitably influenced by political polarization. Trust in the electoral system and political polarization can be considered important factors in perceptions of election fraud.

1. Theory of Institutional Trust

Easton's (1965) theory of political support, related to institutional trust, posits that the level of legitimacy in a democracy depends on the proportion of citizens who consider the government's actions legitimate, explaining that trust in political institutions is a crucial factor in determining the legitimacy and stability of the political system. In particular, trust in election-related institutions directly affects the acceptance of election results and trust in the democratic process. Norris (2014) argues that trust in key institutions involved in the electoral process, such as electoral management bodies, political parties, and the judiciary, determines perceptions of electoral fairness and transparency. Furthermore, for elections to be conducted fairly in a democracy, the existence and role of independent and professional electoral management bodies are essential (Pastor, 1999; Bjornlund, 2004; Elklit & Reynolds, 2001, 2002). Trust in electoral management bodies is the most important determinant of perceptions of electoral integrity, a finding also confirmed in studies on Korea (Cho Jin-man et al., 2015). Voters tend to focus on the direct activities and functions of electoral management bodies when judging electoral integrity. Based on these theoretical discussions, the first hypothesis of this study is formulated as follows:[4]

Hypothesis 1 (Institutional Trust Hypothesis): The higher the trust in the National Election Commission, the lower the perception of election fraud.

2. Political Polarization and Partisan Bias

Political polarization, political party affiliation, and ideology have been analyzed as strong and consistent factors influencing perceptions of electoral fairness (Sances & Stewart, 2015). The fact that supporters of a particular party exhibit significantly higher perceptions of election fraud compared to supporters of the opposing party demonstrates the powerful influence of political identity on the perception of objective facts. This illustrates the operation of 'motivated reasoning' and signifies that political polarization has extended beyond mere policy differences to differences in the perception of reality (Kriška & Kováčik, 2024). In recent Korean society, not only political polarization but also affective polarization has deepened (Kim Ki-dong & Lee Jae-mook, 2021; Jang Seung-jin & Seo Jung-gyu, 2019), and this trend of polarization is exacerbating disputes over election fraud and non-acceptance of results.

Election outcomes have a profound impact on voters' perceptions of electoral integrity. According to the 'Winner/Loser Effect' theory, voters who support the losing candidate or party are more likely to be less satisfied with electoral integrity and less likely to accept the election results compared to voters who support the winning candidate or party (Anderson et al., 2005; Birch, 2008; Cantú & García-Ponce, 2015; Nadeau & Blais 1993). Considering the specific political circumstances of the 21st presidential election, it can be predicted that opposition party supporters and conservative voters will hold more critical perceptions of the electoral process. Accordingly, the second hypothesis is formulated as follows:

Hypothesis 2 (Political Polarization Hypothesis): There will be a significant difference in perceptions of election fraud based on political orientation.

• Hypothesis 2-1: The more conservative the political orientation, the higher the perception of election fraud.

• Hypothesis 2-2: The stronger the support for the opposition party (People Power Party), the higher the perception of election fraud.

3. The Need for Integrated Analysis and Research Hypotheses

Existing research on electoral integrity in Korea has either focused on institutional aspects or, when analyzing voter perceptions, has rarely examined the effects of institutional trust and political polarization in an integrated manner. However, these two factors can influence each other closely. Therefore, this study aims to examine these two factors within an integrated analytical framework to elucidate the independent impact of each variable. In particular, confirming whether the pure effect of institutional trust remains statistically significant after controlling for the strong effect of political polarization is crucial for deriving policy implications. To verify this, the third hypothesis is formulated:

Hypothesis 3 (Integrated Hypothesis): The effect of institutional trust will remain significant even after controlling for political orientation.

4. Analysis Method and Results

Voter perceptions of electoral integrity were analyzed through a public opinion survey. A total of 1,509 individuals were surveyed, and the analysis was conducted on 1,101 respondents (73.0%) after excluding missing values, with weights (WT) applied. The dependent variable, perception of election fraud, was recoded into a dichotomous variable based on the response to the question, "Do you believe there was 'election fraud' or 'election manipulation' in this presidential election?" (0=No, 1=Yes). Considering that the dependent variable is dichotomous, logistic regression was applied. Hierarchical logistic regression was performed to systematically identify the relative importance of various factors influencing the perception of election fraud. The hierarchical approach has the advantage of allowing the independent contribution of each variable group to be assessed by entering variables in stages based on theoretical grounds.

The analysis was conducted using a three-step hierarchical approach. The three steps are as follows:

Block 1: Basic Control Variables (Demographic Variables) - Demographic variables such as gender, age, region of residence, education level, and household income. These variables are fundamental socioeconomic background factors that influence political attitudes and perceptions, and they need to be controlled first to accurately measure the effects of the main variables entered in subsequent blocks.

Block 2: Main Independent Variables (Institutional Trust) - Trust in the National Election Commission, trust in the party nomination process, and trust in the judiciary were used as variables for institutional trust. These variables are intended to test the main hypothesis of this study: "The higher the institutional trust, the lower the perception of election fraud."

Block 3: Political Control Variables (Political Orientation) - Political orientation variables such as ideological orientation and party support are entered. Political orientation is known to be a strong predictor of perceptions of election fraud, and by controlling for it, we aim to measure the pure effect of institutional trust by confirming whether its effect is maintained.

The results of the hierarchical logistic regression analysis are as follows. The final analysis model was statistically highly significant (p<.001) and explained approximately 41.4% (Nagelkerke R²) of the variance in the dependent variable, perception of election fraud, indicating a considerably high explanatory power for social science research. The predictive accuracy of the model was also excellent at 80.5%. The hierarchical analysis revealed distinct independent contributions from each variable group. In Step 1, demographic variables explained 15.6% of the variance in perceptions of election fraud. In Step 2, when institutional trust variables were added, the model's explanatory power (Nagelkerke R²) increased by 15.6 percentage points to 31.2%, suggesting that institutional trust is a very important predictor. Finally, in Step 3, when political orientation variables were added, the explanatory power increased by another 10.2 percentage points to 41.4%, confirming that political orientation is also a strong independent variable. The main determinants of perceptions of election fraud, as revealed by the final model of hierarchical logistic regression analysis (see Table 1), are as follows:

<Table 1> Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis Results for Perceptions of Election Fraud (Final Model)

Note: Analysis sample: 1,101 (73.0% of 1,509 total) *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

(Reference Group: Gender (Male), Age (18-29), Region (Seoul), Ideological Orientation (Progressive), Party Support (Democratic Party), Weighted (WT) applied)

1) Institutional Trust with Overwhelming Influence: The National Election Commission

Among all analyzed variables, trust in the National Election Commission (NEC) was the strongest predictor of perceptions of election fraud. Voters who perceived the NEC's election management as unfair were approximately 5.8 times more likely (OR=5.843) to believe there was election fraud compared to those who perceived it as fair. This indicates an enormous effect size, with distrust in the NEC increasing the probability of perceiving election fraud by 484%. For instance, if the perception rate of election fraud is 20% in the group that trusts the NEC, it is predicted to approach 60% in the group that distrusts it, assuming all other conditions are equal. In contrast, the influence of other institutional trust variables was negligible. Perceptions of fairness in party nomination processes or the judiciary did not have a statistically significant impact on perceptions of election fraud. This suggests that voters overwhelmingly focus on the role of the NEC, which directly oversees elections, when judging electoral integrity.

2) Strong Division in Reality Perception: Political Polarization

Political orientation variables also had a very strong and consistent impact on perceptions of election fraud. In terms of party support, supporters of the People Power Party were approximately 4.1 times more likely (OR=4.144) to perceive election fraud compared to supporters of the Democratic Party. This is a significant difference, estimating that if the perception rate of election fraud among Democratic Party supporters is 15%, it reaches about 45% among People Power Party supporters. Regarding ideological orientation, respondents with conservative (OR=2.034) and moderate (OR=2.402) orientations showed significantly higher perceptions of election fraud compared to progressive orientations. This suggests that 'motivated reasoning' is strongly at play, with the same electoral process being perceived entirely differently depending on political identity and affiliation.

3) Notable Finding: High Distrust Among Moderates and Generational Gap

One of the most notable findings in this analysis is the perception of moderate voters. Their probability of perceiving election fraud was 2.4 times higher than that of progressive voters, and even higher than that of conservative voters. This is a warning sign indicating that election fraud discourse is not confined to a specific political camp but has spread widely across the political spectrum.

Analysis by age group also revealed a distinct generational gap. Respondents in their 60s showed approximately 70% lower probability of perceiving election fraud (OR=.308) compared to young adults (18-29 years old), exhibiting the strongest suppressing effect. This is a significant gap, with the perception rate of election fraud among young adults estimated at 45% and among those in their 60s at about 15%. While those in their 50s also showed a significant suppressing effect, there was no significant difference for those in their 30s, 40s, and 70s and older compared to young adults. Considering that older adults tend to be more conservative, this is a very interesting result. It can be speculated that those aged 60 and above, having actually experienced election fraud during past authoritarian regimes, may perceive the electoral process under democracy as relatively transparent and fair.

4) Limited Influence of Demographic Variables

Gender, region of residence, and household income did not have a statistically significant impact on perceptions of election fraud. In terms of education level, higher education tended to slightly decrease perceptions of election fraud, but the statistical significance was not clear. This suggests that perceptions of election fraud are primarily shaped by institutional trust and political identity rather than by individual socioeconomic background.

III. Perceptions of Election Fraud and Voting Method

This section analyzes how 'perceptions of election fraud,' as identified in the first research question, influence voters' specific methods of political participation. The aim is to measure the actual impact of the 'politics of distrust' on the democratic process by confirming whether election fraud discourse leads to changes in actual voting behavior beyond mere differences in perception.

The early voting system in Korea was introduced through an amendment to the Public Official Election Act in 2012, first piloted nationwide in the April 24, 2013, by-elections, and early voting was also conducted in the 21st presidential election. Although early voting in this presidential election recorded the second-highest turnout rate in history, some conservative groups expressed concerns about the integrity of early voting (Chosun Ilbo, 2025/05/29). [5]Furthermore, incidents of inadequate management of early voting by the National Election Commission caused controversy. In this context, it is expected that there will be differences in voting methods between those who believe election fraud occurred and those who do not, and this study aims to identify such trends. A total of 1,509 individuals were asked Question 1: "Did election fraud occur?" (Answer: Yes/No), and Question 2: "How did you vote?" (Answer: Early voting/General voting/Did not vote). Among them, 1,378 respondents (91.3%) provided valid answers, while 131 respondents (8.7%) answered "Don't know" or refused to answer and were excluded from the analysis.

A cross-tabulation analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between perceptions of election fraud and voting participation methods. The results are presented in Table 2 below. The percentages (%) in the table represent the proportion of voting method choices within each group of perception of election fraud (column).

<Table 2> Cross-tabulation of Voting Participation Methods by Perception of Election Fraud

Approximately 31.6% of all respondents perceived that there was fraud in the election, while the remaining 68.4% answered that there was no election fraud. The analysis revealed a distinct difference in the choice of voting method between the two groups. First, in the group that perceived no election fraud ('Not so'), the proportion who chose early voting was 55.3%, which was higher than the proportion who chose main voting (42.0%). This suggests that this group tends to prefer early voting, which offers greater convenience, without particular distrust in the voting method. Second, the opposite pattern was observed in the group that perceived election fraud ('So').

In this group, the proportion who chose main voting reached 67.4%, overwhelmingly exceeding the proportion who chose early voting (27.3%). It can be said that people who believe there was election fraud tend to vote in person rather than early. Third, the rate of non-participation in voting was also higher in the group that perceived election fraud. The non-participation rate in the group that did not perceive election fraud was only 2.7%, but it was nearly twice as high at 5.3% in the group that perceived it. This indicates that among those who perceive election fraud, the proportion who choose main voting or non-participation rather than early voting is high. In fact, in the group that perceived election fraud, the combined proportion of main voting (67.4%) and non-participation (5.3%) was 72.7%, significantly higher than the proportion of early voting (27.3%).

To confirm whether the association between the two variables is statistically significant, a chi-square test was conducted. The Pearson chi-square value was 94.624 (degrees of freedom=2), and the significance probability (p) was less than .001, showing very high statistical significance. This indicates that there is a statistically significant association between the perception of election fraud and the choice of voting method. Furthermore, Cramer's V, which indicates the strength of the association, was calculated as .262, which can be interpreted as a 'moderate' association in social science research. In other words, there is a non-negligible relationship between the perception of election fraud and the voter's choice of voting method.

The results above suggest, first, that the perception of election fraud can act as a factor that induces changes in actual voting behavior, going beyond mere political attitudes. In particular, it shows that distrust in the early voting system is directly leading to avoidance of its use. This is concerning, as it indicates that when trust in the electoral system erodes, it can lead to behavior where voters intentionally avoid or exclude certain systems. Second, the polarization of perceptions of election fraud and voting method preferences can deepen political divisions. If voters supporting a particular party or candidate share the perception of election fraud, and if their common preference for main voting intensifies, there is a risk of solidifying a false frame such as 'early voting = advantage for a certain party' and 'main voting = advantage for another party'.

This can trigger debates about the advantages and disadvantages of voting methods when election results are announced, leading to non-acceptance of results and social conflict. In conclusion, the analysis results highlight the need for election management bodies to make more proactive efforts to ensure transparency and reliability throughout all voting methods, especially the early voting system. Accurate information about the management, transportation, storage, and counting of ballots must be transparently disclosed to voters, and unnecessary misunderstandings and distrust should be resolved through communication based on scientific and objective evidence in response to allegations. Restoring trust in the electoral system is an essential task for enhancing voters' political efficacy, preventing social conflict surrounding election results, and ultimately maintaining the health of democracy.

IV. Conclusion

This study empirically analyzed the formation mechanism of perceptions of election fraud among Korean voters and its impact on voting behavior, focusing on the 21st presidential election amidst the unprecedented political crisis of the declaration of an unconstitutional state of emergency in December 2024. The analysis results for the two core research questions that initiated the study clearly demonstrate the reality and risks of 'politics of distrust' facing Korean democracy.

Regarding the first research question, "What factors influence voters' perceptions of election fraud?", the most significant finding was that trust in the National Election Commission (NEC) is an overwhelmingly strong predictor. Voters who perceive the NEC as unfair are 5.8 times more likely to perceive election fraud than those who do not. This confirms that the election management body is a core pillar of democratic legitimacy and the most direct and important benchmark for voters to judge the fairness of an election.

The influence of political polarization also appeared very strong. Supporters of the People Power Party were 4.1 times more likely to perceive election fraud than supporters of the Democratic Party of Korea. In terms of ideological orientation, both centrist and conservative voters showed significantly higher perceptions of election fraud compared to progressive voters. The fact that even centrist voters showed 2.4 times higher perceptions of election fraud than progressive voters is a dangerous signal indicating that this discourse has spread widely beyond specific political camps. Generational gaps were also evident. Those in their 60s showed about 70% lower perceptions of election fraud compared to younger generations, reflecting the difference in institutional trust between generations who directly experienced the democratization process and those who did not. Conversely, the influence of traditional demographic variables such as gender, region of residence, and household income was limited.

The cross-tabulation results for the second research question, "What is the impact of perceptions of election fraud on voting participation?", show that perceptions of election fraud can lead to changes in actual voting behavior, going beyond mere political attitudes. Voters who perceived election fraud overwhelmingly preferred main voting over early voting (67.4% vs 27.3%). Furthermore, their rate of non-participation in voting was also relatively high (5.3% vs 2.7%), suggesting the risk that perceptions of election fraud can lead to political apathy.

The policy implications suggested by the research findings are as follows. First, strengthening the credibility of election management bodies is the top priority. Considering the overwhelming impact of trust in the NEC on perceptions of election fraud, ensuring the transparency and reliability of election management bodies is a key element in maintaining democratic legitimacy. Institutional trust should be enhanced through measures such as expanding real-time disclosure of the vote counting process and establishing a public verification system for the technical aspects of election management. Especially in a situation where suspicions about the early voting system are continuously raised, accurate information about the management, transportation, storage, and counting of ballots must be transparently disclosed to voters, and communication must be based on scientific and objective evidence to resolve allegations and alleviate unnecessary misunderstandings and distrust.

Second, a comprehensive approach is needed to mitigate political polarization. The very high perception of election fraud among supporters of the People Power Party and the widespread distrust extending to the centrist group indicate that political polarization has progressed to a fundamental divergence in perceptions of reality. An objective and scientific election verification system should be established, political circles should refrain from extreme discourse, and a culture of accepting election results should be fostered. Additionally, media literacy education and strengthening fact-checking systems are necessary to prevent the spread of disinformation through digital media. Third, a systematic approach is required to bridge the generational trust gap. The high perception of election fraud among younger generations raises concerns about the future development of democracy. Systematic democracy education and media literacy education should be strengthened, and intergenerational political communication programs should be developed. In particular, it is necessary to understand the information dissemination mechanisms on digital platforms primarily used by younger generations and to develop appropriate communication strategies.

Fourth, measures to restore trust in the electoral system as a whole must be established. In a situation where perceptions of election fraud are affecting the choice of voting method, it is important to ensure equal trust in all voting methods. Artificial distinctions or polarization of preferences between early voting and main voting should be prevented, and the perception that all voting methods are equally safe and reliable should be disseminated.

This study has several important limitations. First, the difficulty in establishing causality due to the limitations of cross-sectional research. This study is based on a cross-sectional survey that measured perceptions and behaviors at a specific point in time, making it unclear whether the relationship between institutional trust and perceptions of election fraud is unidirectional or reciprocal. It is difficult to definitively determine whether distrust in the NEC causes perceptions of election fraud, or vice versa. Furthermore, given that the study is set against the backdrop of the highly specific and contentious situation of the 21st presidential election, caution is needed in generalizing the findings. It is also difficult to precisely identify the causal mechanism through which perceptions of election fraud affect the choice of voting method. Future longitudinal research using panel data that tracks changes in perceptions before and after elections is needed to address these limitations. This will allow for a more in-depth understanding of the process of change in perceptions over time and its causes.■

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[1]Yoon, Han-seul, and Kim Moon-soo presidential candidates, "We will abolish the early voting system and the non-arrest warrant." (Hankook Ilbo, 2025/05/03)https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2025050316000005061

[2]Choi, Kyung-ho, et al. "Came out as soon as I opened my eyes... Why was Daegu, the lowest early voting rate, the highest main voting rate?" (https://electioninnovation.org/press/new-polling-data-confirms-the-negative-effects-of-election-denial-on-republican-voters/).

[3]According to a 2021 survey published by the U.S. Center for Election Innovation and Research, approximately 16% of Republican and Trump supporters who did not accept the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential election results stated that they would be less likely to vote in future elections if measures to resolve doubts, such as forensic audits, were not taken. This result suggests that conspiracy theories of U.S. election fraud may damage electoral trust and potentially have a negative effect of weakening the will to vote among groups promoting election denial.https://electioninnovation.org/press/new-polling-data-confirms-the-negative-effects-of-election-denial-on-republican-voters/.

[4]To examine institutional trust, a survey was conducted on the fairness of the National Election Commission, political parties, and the courts. Questions were asked regarding the degree of 'fairness of the National Election Commission,' the degree of 'fairness of the candidate nomination process' by political parties, and the degree of 'fairness of the courts' in relation to the presidential election. Responses of 'generally fair' and 'very fair' were coded as 'fair,' while 'not at all fair' and 'generally not fair' were coded as 'unfair' for analysis (don't know/no response were treated as missing values).

[5]Kim Tae-jun. 2025. “Will 40% vote in this presidential election… Reasons for record-high early voting rate.” Chosun Ilbo, May 29 (accessed June 12, 2025).https://www.chosun.com/politics/election2025/2025/05/29/5WMNBJFTNBGE5LITBU4AV3UXLU/.

■ Author: Lim Seong-hak _Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Seoul.

■ Editor: Lim Jae-hyun_EAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhim@eai.or.kr