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[The 21st Presidential Election and Korean Democracy: Crisis, Division, and Realignment] ④ How did the Yoon Suk-yeol Support Coalition Divide in the 21st Presidential Election?
Editor's Note
Shin Jeong-seop, Professor at Soongsil University, analyzes the reasons for the division within the Yoon Suk-yeol support base in the 21st presidential election. Professor Shin finds that there was a shift towards the progressive camp as well as movement within the conservative camp due to differing stances on martial law and impeachment, generational differences, and gender issues. Furthermore, the author points out that the political crisis, by revealing internal heterogeneity within political camps, can lead to the division of support coalitions and the realignment of the political landscape, as exemplified by the 21st presidential election.
I. Introduction
The 21st presidential election was held as a snap election, two years earlier than scheduled, due to President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of emergency martial law and the subsequent impeachment (removal from office). Just three years prior, in the 20th presidential election held in 2022, People Power Party candidate Yoon Suk-yeol won with 48.56% of the total votes, narrowly defeating Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung, who secured 47.83%. However, in the snap election held amidst the aftermath of emergency martial law and impeachment, People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo garnered only 41.15%, while Democratic Party candidate Lee Jae-myung was elected the 21st president with 49.42%.
The People Power Party received 16,394,816 votes in the 20th presidential election, but only 14,395,639 votes in the 21st presidential election, a decrease of approximately 13% compared to the previous election. Considering that the voter turnout for the 21st presidential election was 79.4%, higher than the 77.08% in the 20th presidential election, a decrease in vote share of about 13% indicates that a considerable number of voters withdrew their support for the People Power Party in a short period. This phenomenon is reminiscent of the collapse of the conservative bloc in the presidential election of 2017, which followed the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in 2016. At that time, the conservative camp was divided into the Saenuri Party, the Liberty Korea Party, and the Bareun Party over the impeachment, and the impeachment significantly influenced the presidential election results.
However, the number of conservative voters who switched their support to progressive parties was not as high as expected (Kang Won-taek 2017; Song Jin-mi & Park Won-ho 2018; Jang Seung-jin 2018). This pattern was similarly observed in the 21st presidential election. The impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol had a significant impact on the election outcome, and the conservative camp contested the election in a divided state. Nevertheless, the vote share for conservative parties was higher than anticipated, and it is estimated that the number of conservative voters who switched to supporting progressive parties was not substantial.
In this context, this chapter identifies the division of the Yoon Suk-yeol support coalition (voter group) from the 20th presidential election as one of the key determinants of the 21st presidential election outcome. It analyzes who defected from the Yoon Suk-yeol support coalition and why. For this analysis, this paper utilizes data from the <2025 Korean Perceptions of East Asia Survey> conducted by Korea Research at the request of the East Asia Institute (EAI) immediately after the 21st presidential election. The survey was conducted via web from June 4 to 5, 2025, targeting individuals aged 18 and above nationwide, with sampling quotas based on region, gender, and age group. The margin of error was ±2.5%p at a 95% confidence level. The total sample size was 1,509, with a response rate of 22.5%.
II. How Many Yoon Suk-yeol Voters Defected in the 21st Presidential Election?
Before examining the characteristics of People Power Party defectors among the 20th presidential election Yoon Suk-yeol voters in the 21st presidential election, this chapter aims to ascertain how many Yoon Suk-yeol voters actually changed their voting choice. Figure 1 shows who voters eligible in the 21st presidential election voted for in the 20th and 21st presidential elections. According to Figure 1, 92.1% of voters who responded that they voted for candidate Lee Jae-myung in the 20th presidential election also responded that they voted for candidate Lee Jae-myung again. In contrast, only 76.8% of voters who responded that they voted for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election indicated that they voted for the same party's candidate, Kim Moon-soo. Given that the vote difference in the 20th presidential election was very narrow (247,077 votes, a difference of 0.73%p), the defection rates of voters from each camp can be considered to have had a significant impact on the outcome of the current election.
Figure 1. 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices by 20th Presidential Election Voter Choices
So, who did the defecting Yoon Suk-yeol supporters vote for in the 21st presidential election? Among voters who supported Yoon Suk-yeol in the last presidential election but defected from the People Power Party in the current election, 8.3% voted for Lee Jun-seok of the Future Korea Party, another conservative party, and 11.9% voted for Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party, a progressive party. The 11.9% who switched their vote to candidate Lee Jae-myung is a significantly higher figure than the combined number of voters who supported Lee Jae-myung in the last presidential election and switched to conservative candidates Kim Moon-soo (3.8%) and Lee Jun-seok (1.7%) in the current election. These figures suggest a substantial impact on reversing the election results of the close contest in the last presidential election.
However, considering the circumstances of emergency martial law and presidential impeachment, the proportion of voters who supported Yoon Suk-yeol in the last presidential election and then voted for conservative candidates Kim Moon-soo (76.8%) and Lee Jun-seok (8.3%) in the current election, totaling 85.1%, can be considered high. This proportion is particularly high when compared to the 2017 presidential election, which followed the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in 2016. Jang Seung-jin's (2018) research, analyzing panel data from 2012-2017, found that only 32.65% of voters who reported voting for Park Geun-hye in the 2012 election voted for Hong Joon-pyo in 2017, while 26.53% of those who voted for Park Geun-hye reported voting for Moon Jae-in of the Democratic Party. Therefore, in the context of a presidential election following the impeachment of a conservative president, the conservative voter defection in the 21st presidential election was relatively low compared to the 19th presidential election.
III. Did Martial Law and Impeachment Cause Defections from the Yoon Suk-yeol Support Coalition?
Although the defection rate may be lower compared to the 19th presidential election, a shift in party support by approximately 20% of a party's voters within just three years is not a common occurrence in a two-party system where the Democratic Party and the People Power Party hold dominant influence. It is clear that the political events of President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of emergency martial law and the subsequent impeachment had a significant impact. Therefore, how did President Yoon Suk-yeol's martial law and impeachment affect the defection of existing Yoon Suk-yeol voters? Figures 2, 3, and 4 show public attitudes towards President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of emergency martial law on December 3, 2024, and the subsequent decision to impeach (remove) President Yoon Suk-yeol.
Specifically, Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the responses of voters who supported candidate Lee Jae-myung and candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election regarding emergency martial law, the impeachment decision, and the ruling party's stance during the impeachment process. In all three figures, approximately 40% of Yoon Suk-yeol voters from the 20th presidential election showed a negative attitude towards President Yoon Suk-yeol and the People Power Party. Looking closer at Figure 2, approximately 40% of voters who reported voting for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election responded that the martial law was a legitimate exercise of presidential authority, while approximately 45% responded that it was an unconstitutional/illegal act.
Figure 3 shows that approximately 47% of voters who reported voting for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election responded that the impeachment was a wrong decision, while approximately 37% responded that the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol was the right thing to do. Table 4 shows that approximately 42% of voters who reported voting for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election responded that the ruling party (People Power Party) should have actively defended the president during the impeachment, while approximately 42% responded that the ruling party (People Power Party) should have reflected on and accepted the impeachment. These responses regarding martial law and impeachment indicate that the opinions of voters who supported candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election are sharply divided around the issues of martial law and impeachment.
Figure 2. Opinions on President Yoon Suk-yeol's Martial Law on December 3, 2024
Figure 3. Opinions on the Impeachment (Removal) of President Yoon Suk-yeol
Figure 4. Opinions on the Ruling Party's (People Power Party) Conduct During President Yoon Suk-yeol's Impeachment Process
Figures 2, 3, and 4 show that the attitudes of Yoon Suk-yeol voters towards martial law and impeachment are divided, and approximately 40% of Yoon Suk-yeol voters hold a negative view of President Yoon Suk-yeol's emergency martial law. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how these opposing attitudes towards emergency martial law and impeachment affected the 21st presidential election.
Figure 5. 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices of 20th Presidential Election Yoon Suk-yeol Voters by Opinion on Martial Law
Figure 5 shows who voters who supported candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election voted for in the 21st presidential election, based on their opinions on emergency martial law. Opinions on emergency martial law were asked on a 5-point Likert scale. For those who responded that it was a 'very legitimate exercise of authority,' 98.4% voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo and 1.6% for candidate Lee Jun-seok. The proportion voting for Kim Moon-soo decreased as the belief that 'emergency martial law was an unconstitutional/illegal act' increased. Among those who responded that 'emergency martial law was a very unconstitutional/illegal act,' only 46.2% voted for Kim Moon-soo, 35.2% voted for Lee Jae-myung, and 18.6% voted for Lee Jun-seok.
Figure 6. 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices of 20th Presidential Election Yoon Suk-yeol Voters by Opinion on Impeachment
This pattern is similarly observed in Figure 6 regarding attitudes towards the impeachment decision. According to Table 6, among voters who supported candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election, 98.7% of those who responded that the 'impeachment decision was a very wrong decision' voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo. However, the proportion voting for Kim Moon-soo decreased as the opinion moved towards 'the impeachment was a right decision.' For those who responded that 'impeachment was a very right decision,' only 36.4% voted for Kim Moon-soo, while 39.0% voted for Lee Jae-myung, and 24.6% voted for Lee Jun-seok.
These results indicate that the differing stances of Yoon Suk-yeol voters on martial law and impeachment led to their voting choices. Furthermore, they show that Yoon Suk-yeol voters who evaluated emergency martial law negatively and the impeachment decision positively were more likely to withdraw their support from the People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo in the current election. However, from another perspective, these results also demonstrate the existence of severe polarization between camps, as approximately 46% and 37% of voters who held very negative views on emergency martial law and very positive views on the impeachment decision, respectively, still voted for the People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo.
IV. Defectors from Yoon Suk-yeol Support by Region, Ideology, Generation, and Issue
As examined above, voters who supported candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election and defected from the People Power Party in the 21st presidential election were clearly influenced by the events of emergency martial law and impeachment. However, factors other than the emergency martial law and impeachment events may also have influenced the defection of Yoon Suk-yeol voters. Notably, unlike the 20th presidential election, the conservative camp in the 21st presidential election was divided into two parties, the People Power Party and the Future Korea Party, suggesting that voters may have made different voting choices based on various factors within the conservative camp. Considering this, this paper analyzes how Yoon Suk-yeol voter defections manifested across region, ideology, generation, and issues.
Region, ideology, generation, and issues are crucial factors that significantly influence voter choices in Korean politics. Regionalism, in particular, has been one of the most influential factors on Korean voter behavior since democratization in 1987. Although its magnitude has varied depending on the electoral context, it remains a significant factor influencing Korean voter choices (Moon Woo-jin 2017; Jang Eun-young & Uhm Ki-hong 2017; Yoon Kwang-il 2020; Yoon Ji-seong 2023). Ideology is known to be the second most important factor influencing Korean voter behavior after regionalism.
Ideology began to influence Korean voter behavior around the 2000s, and numerous studies since Kang Won-taek (2003) have consistently reported the importance of ideology in Korean voter choices (Lee Kap-yoon & Lee Hyun-woo 2008; Cho Sung-dae 2015; Kang Won-taek & Sung Ye-jin 2018). Finally, generation and issues have also gained attention since the 2000s, starting with the focus on the '386 generation' of democratization activists, who were relatively progressive compared to previous generations (Kang Won-taek 2003; Park Won-ho 2012; Noh Hwan-hee & Song Jeong-min 2013). More recently, research on the conservatism of the younger generation has been ongoing (Choi Jong-sook 2020; Woo In-beom & Jang Seung-jin 2023). Therefore, based on this existing research, this paper examines which voters defected from the Yoon Suk-yeol support coalition in the 21st presidential election based on region, ideology, generation, and issues.
From a regional perspective, Figure 7 shows the 21st presidential election voting choices of 20th presidential election Yoon Suk-yeol voters by region. The region with the highest number of defectors among 20th presidential election Yoon Suk-yeol voters was Gwangju/Jeolla, where only 52.6% of previous Yoon Suk-yeol voters voted for Kim Moon-soo. Next was Gangwon/Jeju, where 70% of Yoon Suk-yeol voters voted for Kim Moon-soo again, followed by Daejeon/Chungcheong, where 75.5% of Yoon Suk-yeol voters voted for Kim Moon-soo again. Interestingly, in the traditional conservative strongholds of Daegu/Gyeongbuk and Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam, approximately 20% of Yoon Suk-yeol voters from the last election did not vote for the People Power Party candidate in the 21st presidential election; this proportion was similar to that in Seoul and Incheon/Gyeonggi.
These results can be interpreted as a high defection rate among conservative party voters in the Yeongnam region in this election. However, conversely, it can also be interpreted that the defection rate of conservative party voters in Seoul and Gyeonggi Province was relatively not high compared to those in Honam, Chungcheong, and Gangwon.
Figure 7. 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices of 20th Presidential Election Yoon Suk-yeol Voters by Region
Figure 8 shows the 21st presidential election voting choices of 20th presidential election Yoon Suk-yeol voters by ideology. As expected, the highest proportion of defectors among 20th presidential election Yoon Suk-yeol voters came from the group who identified themselves as progressive. Among voters who supported Yoon Suk-yeol in the last election and identified as progressive, 56.3% voted for Kim Moon-soo, and 40.6% voted for Lee Jae-myung. In contrast, 86.5% of voters who identified as conservative voted for Kim Moon-soo, with only 5.8% voting for Lee Jae-myung and 7.7% for Lee Jun-seok. Among moderates, 61.9% voted for Kim Moon-soo, 25.4% for Lee Jae-myung, and 12.7% for Lee Jun-seok. Lee Jun-seok received the highest support among moderates who were Yoon Suk-yeol voters. In other words, as generally expected, the more conservative the Yoon Suk-yeol voter, the higher the probability of choosing the People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo in the 21st presidential election. Conversely, the more progressive the voter, the higher the probability of defecting in the 21st presidential election.
Figure 8. 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices of 20th Presidential Election Yoon Suk-yeol Voters by Ideology
Figure 9. 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices of 20th Presidential Election Yoon Suk-yeol Voters by Generation
Figure 9 shows the 21st presidential election voting choices of 20th presidential election Yoon Suk-yeol voters by generation. A notable point is that among voters who supported Yoon Suk-yeol in the last presidential election, the proportion of defectors was higher among younger generations. Conversely, the proportion of voters who voted for Kim Moon-soo again was higher among older generations. Furthermore, younger generations were more likely to defect from the People Power Party and vote for Lee Jun-seok. As age increased, the proportion of voters who switched their support to the progressive candidate Lee Jae-myung rather than Lee Jun-seok increased. This indicates that while Lee Jun-seok, a conservative candidate, receives significant support from younger generations within the conservative camp, he receives little support from middle-aged and older generations. In other words, this demonstrates the existence of generational division within the conservative camp.
Next, this chapter focuses on the issues of election fraud and gender as key issues influencing the defection of Yoon Suk-yeol voters. The issue of election fraud can be seen as a dividing line between the far-right and moderate conservatives within the conservative camp, while the gender issue can be seen as a dividing line between the Future Korea Party and the People Power Party. Figure 10 shows the 21st presidential election voting choices of 20th presidential election Yoon Suk-yeol voters based on their attitudes towards the statement, 'I believe there was election fraud or manipulation in this presidential election.' Among 20th presidential election Yoon Suk-yeol voters, the higher the belief that there was election fraud or manipulation in this election, the higher the proportion who voted for Kim Moon-soo. Conversely, the more they believed there was no such fraud, the higher the proportion who voted for Lee Jae-myung and Lee Jun-seok.
Meanwhile, Figure 11 shows the 21st presidential election voting choices of 20th presidential election Yoon Suk-yeol voters based on their attitudes towards the statement, 'The government should strive to resolve the disadvantages and discrimination faced by women in society.' A noteworthy point is that the more respondents disagreed with this statement, the higher the proportion who voted for Lee Jun-seok. Conversely, the more they agreed, the higher the proportion who voted for Lee Jae-myung. The proportion voting for Kim Moon-soo remained around 80% with little variation, except for those who responded 'strongly disagree.'
Figure 10. 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices of 20th Presidential Election Yoon Suk-yeol Voters by Attitude Towards Election Fraud
Figure 11. 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices of 20th Presidential Election Yoon Suk-yeol Voters by Attitude Towards Gender Issues
V. Multivariate Statistical Analysis
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze which voters among those who supported candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election defected in the current election. The key factors examined above were attitudes towards martial law and impeachment, region, generation, ideology, and attitudes towards election fraud and gender issues. While the individual impact of each variable on the 21st presidential election voting choices of Yoon Suk-yeol voters was examined above, a statistical analysis model including all these variables was estimated for a more rigorous analysis. Considering the characteristics of the dependent variable, a multinomial logit model was used for the statistical verification model. Table 1 shows the results of this statistical model.
In Table 1, the sample consists of voters who supported candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election, and the reference group for the multinomial logit model is the voting choice for candidate 'Kim Moon-soo.' The regression coefficients in the 'Lee Jae-myung' column show the characteristics of voters who voted for Lee Jae-myung compared to those who voted for Kim Moon-soo, and the regression coefficients in the 'Lee Jun-seok' column show the characteristics of voters who voted for Lee Jun-seok compared to those who voted for Kim Moon-soo. First, examining the characteristics of voters who voted for Lee Jae-myung, a more negative stance on martial law led to voting for Lee Jae-myung rather than Kim Moon-soo, and a more progressive self-identified ideology also led to voting for Lee Jae-myung rather than Kim Moon-soo. Furthermore, regarding the stance on election fraud, the belief that there was no election fraud in the current election increased the probability of voting for Lee Jae-myung rather than Kim Moon-soo. In contrast, regionally, when Daegu/Gyeongbuk is the reference group, voters residing in Seoul had a higher probability of voting for Kim Moon-soo than for Lee Jae-myung.
Table 1. Model of 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices of 20th Presidential Election Yoon Suk-yeol Voters (Multinomial Logit Model)
| Model 1 | |||
| Lee Jae-myung | Kim Moon-soo | ||
| Stance on Martial Law | 0.903 (.213)*** | 0.889 (.204)*** | |
| Ideology | -0.651 (.131)*** | 0.005(.141) | |
| Generation | 18-29 | Reference Group | Reference Group |
| 30-39 | 0.216 (.812) | -1.428 (.603)* | |
| 40-49 | -.004 (.783) | -2.109 (.696)** | |
| 50-59 | -.051 (.788) | -2.083 (.711)** | |
| 60 and over | -.759 (.754) | -3.615 (.764)*** | |
| Residential Region | Seoul | -1.423 (.680)* | .075 (.764) |
| Incheon/Gyeonggi | -.654 (.628) | .080 (.733) | |
| Daejeon/Chungcheong | -.365 (.767) | -.155 (1.061) | |
| Gwangju/Jeolla | .620 (.987) | 1.786 (1.223) | |
| Daegu/Gyeongbuk | Reference Group | Reference Group | |
| Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam | -.843 (.698) | .117 (840) | |
| Gangwon/Jeju | -.827(.892) | -.199 (1.228) | |
| Stance on Election Fraud | -.925 (.254)* | -.476 (.228)* | |
| Stance on Gender Issues | -.230 (.185) | .378(.191)* | |
| Male | .200 (.377) | .612 (.522) | |
| Constant | 2.041 (1.836) | -4.237 (2.041) | |
| N | 476 | ||
| McFadden's R2 | .414 |
Note: The reference group for the logit model is "Kim Moon-soo." *P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001
Meanwhile, for candidate Lee Jun-seok, the more negative the stance on martial law, the higher the probability of voting for Lee Jun-seok compared to Kim Moon-soo. By generation, voters in their 20s were more likely to vote for Lee Jun-seok than Kim Moon-soo compared to other generations. On the other hand, ideology and region were not significant factors in choosing between Lee Jun-seok and Kim Moon-soo. Regarding issues, the more one believed there was no election fraud in this election, the higher the probability of choosing Lee Jun-seok over Kim Moon-soo. In terms of gender issues, the less one agreed with the statement that the government should make efforts to resolve gender discrimination, the higher the probability of voting for Lee Jun-seok over Kim Moon-soo.
These results indicate that the reasons why voters who defected from supporting Yoon Suk-yeol changed their voting choices to candidates Lee Jae-myung and Lee Jun-seok differ. In common, Yoon Suk-yeol voters who were negative about martial law and did not believe the election fraud claims were more likely to choose Lee Jae-myung or Lee Jun-seok rather than the People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo. However, these defectors appear to have chosen Lee Jae-myung and Lee Jun-seok differently based on their attitudes toward gender issues and their generational cohort.
VI. Conclusion
This chapter analyzed the fragmentation patterns and political defection factors of the Yoon Suk-yeol support coalition (voter bloc) in the 21st presidential election, which was held amidst the unprecedented political environment of emergency martial law and presidential impeachment. The analysis revealed that approximately 20% of voters who supported Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election changed their voting choice in the 21st presidential election, with only about 12% moving to the progressive camp. This demonstrates that political polarization between conservative and progressive camps continues to operate strongly in Korean politics. However, considering that recent presidential elections are decided by narrow margins in a two-party system, the phenomenon of 12% of the total electorate completely switching camps in just three years cannot be overlooked.
This scale of defection signifies a political realignment capable of completely altering election outcomes, suggesting a certain degree of fractured cohesion within the Yoon Suk-yeol support coalition. This defection of Yoon Suk-yeol supporters can be seen not as a result of simple political fatigue or temporary strategic voting, but as stemming from value and ideological rifts triggered by the political crisis of President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of emergency martial law and the subsequent impeachment. Statistical analysis showed that voters who were negative about martial law and positively evaluated the impeachment decision showed a distinct tendency to withdraw their support for the People Power Party candidate.
Meanwhile, the direction of voters who defected from Yoon Suk-yeol's support was largely divided into two streams. The group that moved to the progressive candidate Lee Jae-myung exhibited characteristics of strong progressive leanings and disbelief in election fraud claims. The group that moved to the similar conservative candidate Lee Jun-seok consisted mainly of young voters in their 20s and displayed anti-feminist attitudes on gender issues. This indicates that even among "Yoon Suk-yeol defectors," the paths of political repositioning are diverse, and each path is intertwined with different political and social agendas.
These findings have important political implications. First, political crises such as impeachment reveal the diversity of interpretations and reactions within a single political camp, which can directly lead to the dissolution of the support coalition during elections. Second, since the patterns of realignment differ based on the underlying motivations and value orientations of the same defection phenomenon, political parties must go beyond simple "defection prevention" strategies and develop differentiated response strategies tailored to segmented voter groups.
However, this study is based on single-time survey data, limiting its ability to fully grasp long-term trends or potential rift factors prior to the event. Therefore, future research should utilize panel data to track changes in political loyalty longitudinally and analyze the long-term impact of high-intensity political events such as martial law and impeachment on voter identity and the party system. In conclusion, the fragmentation of the Yoon Suk-yeol support coalition observed in the 21st presidential election was not merely a defeat in the election but a structural event where political crisis and value rifts overlapped. This will be recorded as a significant case study demonstrating how crisis situations expose internal heterogeneity within a camp and ultimately trigger the realignment of the political landscape.■
VII. References
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■ Author: Shin, Jeong-seop _Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Soongsil University.
■ Contact and Editing: Lim, Jae-hyun_EAI Research Fellow
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhim@eai.or.kr
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.