← Atrás · ← Inicio · ← Volver al listado
[The 21st Presidential Election and Korean Democracy: Crisis, Division, and Realignment] ④ How did the Yoon Suk-yeol support coalition split in the 21st presidential election?
Nota del editor
Professor Shin Jeong-seop of Soongsil University analyzes the reasons for the division of the Yoon Suk-yeol support base in the 21st presidential election. Professor Shin finds that there was a shift to the progressive camp as well as movement within the conservative camp due to opposing stances on martial law and impeachment, generational differences, and gender issues. Furthermore, the author points out that the 21st presidential election served as an opportunity to reveal the heterogeneity within political camps, potentially leading to the division of support coalitions and the realignment of the political landscape.
I. Introduction
The 21st presidential election was held as an early election, two years earlier than scheduled, due to President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of martial law and the subsequent impeachment (dismissal). Just three years prior, in the 20th presidential election held in 2022, Yoon Suk-yeol, the candidate from the People Power Party, won against Lee Jae-myung, the candidate from the Democratic Party, by obtaining 48.56% of the total votes compared to Lee's 47.83%. However, in the early election held amidst the aftermath of martial law and impeachment, Kim Moon-soo, the candidate from the People Power Party, only secured 41.15% of the votes, while Lee Jae-myung, the candidate from the Democratic Party, was elected the 21st president with 49.42%.
The People Power Party received 16,394,816 votes in the 20th presidential election, but only 14,395,639 votes in the 21st presidential election, a decrease of approximately 13% compared to the previous election. Considering that the voter turnout in the 21st presidential election was 79.4%, higher than the 77.08% in the 20th presidential election, a decrease of about 13% in the number of votes compared to the previous election can be interpreted as a significant number of voters withdrawing their support for the People Power Party in a short period. This phenomenon is reminiscent of the collapse of the conservative camp in the 2017 presidential election, which was held following the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in 2016. At that time, the conservative camp was divided into the Saenuri Party, the Liberty Korea Party, and the Bareun Party over the impeachment, and the impeachment had a significant impact on the presidential election results.
However, the number of conservative voters who switched their support to progressive parties was not as high as expected (Kang Won-taek 2017; Song Jin-mi & Park Won-ho 2018; Jang Seung-jin 2018). This phenomenon was similarly observed in the 21st presidential election. The impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol had a very significant impact on the election results, and the conservative camp contested the election in a divided state. However, the vote share of the conservative party was higher than expected, and it is estimated that the number of conservative voters who switched to supporting progressive parties was not large.
In this context, this chapter views the division of the Yoon Suk-yeol support coalition (voter group) from the 20th presidential election three years ago as one of the key determinants of the 21st presidential election and analyzes who defected from the Yoon Suk-yeol support coalition and why. For the analysis, this paper uses data from the <2025 Korean Perceptions of East Asia Survey> conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) immediately after the 21st presidential election, commissioned to Korea Research. The survey was conducted via web from June 4 to 5, 2025, targeting general citizens aged 18 and over nationwide through stratified sampling by region, gender, and age group. The sampling error at a 95% confidence level was ±2.5%p. The total sample size was 1,509, and the response rate was 22.5%.
II. How many Yoon Suk-yeol voters defected in the 21st presidential election?
Before examining the characteristics of the defecting People Power Party voters among the 20th presidential election Yoon Suk-yeol voters in the 21st presidential election, this chapter aims to determine how many Yoon Suk-yeol voters actually changed their voting choice in the 21st presidential election. Figure 1 shows who voters eligible to vote in the 21st presidential election voted for in the 20th and 21st presidential elections. According to Figure 1, 92.1% of voters who responded that they voted for candidate Lee Jae-myung in the 20th presidential election responded that they voted for candidate Lee Jae-myung again, while only 76.8% of voters who responded that they voted for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election responded that they voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo, a candidate from the same party. Considering that the results of the 20th presidential election were very close (a difference of 247,077 votes with a 0.73%p margin), the defection rate of voters from each camp can be said to have had a significant impact on the results of this election.
Figure 1. 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices by 20th Presidential Election Voter Choices
So, who did the defecting Yoon Suk-yeol supporters vote for in the 21st presidential election? Among voters who voted for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the last presidential election but defected from the People Power Party in this election, 8.3% voted for candidate Lee Jun-seok of the Reform Party, a conservative party, and 11.9% voted for candidate Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party, a progressive party. The 11.9% who switched their vote to candidate Lee Jae-myung is a figure that far exceeds the combined number of voters who voted for candidate Lee Jae-myung in the last presidential election and switched their vote to conservative candidates Kim Moon-soo (3.8%) and Lee Jun-seok (1.7%) in this election. These figures can be said to have greatly influenced the reversal of the election results from the close race of the last presidential election to this one.
However, considering the circumstances of martial law and presidential impeachment, the proportion of voters who voted for Yoon Suk-yeol in the last presidential election and voted for conservative candidates Kim Moon-soo (76.8%) and Lee Jun-seok (8.3%) in this election is 85.1%, which can be considered high. This proportion is particularly high compared to the 2017 presidential election held after the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in 2016. According to the research by Jang Seung-jin (2018), who analyzed panel data from 2012-2017, only 32.65% of voters who responded that they voted for candidate Park Geun-hye in the 2012 election voted for candidate Hong Joon-pyo in 2017, and 26.53% of voters who responded that they voted for candidate Park Geun-hye responded that they voted for candidate Moon Jae-in of the Democratic Party. Therefore, in terms of being an election held after the impeachment of a conservative president, the defection of conservative voters in the 21st presidential election was relatively small compared to the 19th presidential election, which had a similar context.
III. Did martial law and impeachment cause defection from the Yoon Suk-yeol support coalition?
Although the defection rate may be lower compared to the 19th presidential election, in a two-party system context where the Democratic Party and the People Power Party exert dominant influence, it is not common for about 20% of supporters of a particular party to change their party affiliation within three years. It is clear that political events such as President Yoon Suk-yeol's martial law and the subsequent impeachment had a significant impact. So, how did President Yoon Suk-yeol's martial law and impeachment affect the defection of existing Yoon Suk-yeol voters? First, Figures 2, 3, and 4 show voters' attitudes towards President Yoon Suk-yeol's martial law declared on December 3, 2024, and the subsequent decision to impeach (dismiss) President Yoon Suk-yeol.
Specifically, Figures 2, 3, and 4 show the responses of voters who voted for candidates Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election regarding their views on the state of emergency martial law, the impeachment decision, and the ruling party's stance during the impeachment process. In all of Figures 2, 3, and 4, it is evident that approximately 40% of Yoon Suk-yeol voters showed a negative attitude towards President Yoon Suk-yeol and the People Power Party. Specifically, looking at Figure 2, about 40% of voters who responded that they voted for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election answered that martial law was a legitimate exercise of presidential authority, while about 45% responded that martial law was an unconstitutional/illegal act.
Looking at Figure 3, about 47% of voters who responded that they voted for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election answered that the impeachment was a wrong decision, while about 37% responded that the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol was the right thing to do. Looking at Table 4, about 42% of voters who responded that they voted for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election answered that the ruling party (People Power Party) should have actively defended the president during the impeachment, while about 42% responded that the ruling party (People Power Party) should have reflected on and accepted the presidential impeachment. These responses regarding martial law and impeachment indicate that the opinions of voters who voted for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election are sharply divided around the issues of martial law and impeachment.
Figure 2. Opinions on President Yoon Suk-yeol's martial law on December 3 last year
Figure 3. Opinions on the impeachment (dismissal) of President Yoon Suk-yeol
Figure 4. Opinions on the ruling party's (People Power Party) conduct during President Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment process
Figures 2, 3, and 4 show that the attitudes of Yoon Suk-yeol voters towards martial law and impeachment are divided, and that about 40% of Yoon Suk-yeol voters hold a negative view of President Yoon Suk-yeol's emergency martial law. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how these opposing attitudes towards martial law and impeachment affected the 21st presidential election.
Figure 5. Voting choices in the 21st presidential election by 20th presidential election Yoon Suk-yeol voters' opinions on martial law
Figure 5 shows who voters who voted for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election voted for in the 21st presidential election, based on their opinions on emergency martial law. Opinions on emergency martial law were asked on a 5-point Likert scale. In cases where respondents answered 'It was a very legitimate exercise of authority,' 98.4% voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo and 1.6% voted for candidate Lee Jun-seok. The proportion of votes for candidate Kim Moon-soo decreased as the belief that 'emergency martial law was an unconstitutional/illegal act' became stronger. Among voters who responded that 'emergency martial law was a very unconstitutional/illegal act,' only 46.2% voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo, 35.2% voted for candidate Lee Jae-myung, and 18.6% voted for candidate Lee Jun-seok.
Figure 6. Voting choices in the 21st presidential election by 20th presidential election Yoon Suk-yeol voters' opinions on impeachment
This phenomenon is similarly observed in attitudes towards the impeachment decision in Figure 6. According to Table 6, among voters who responded that the 'impeachment decision was a very wrong decision' in the 20th presidential election, 98.7% voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo. However, the proportion of votes for candidate Kim Moon-soo decreased as the opinion moved towards the impeachment decision being a correct one. Among voters who responded that 'impeachment was a very correct decision,' only 36.4% voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo, 39.0% voted for candidate Lee Jae-myung, and 24.6% voted for candidate Lee Jun-seok.
These results show that the difference in opinions among Yoon Suk-yeol voters regarding martial law and impeachment led to different voting choices. They also indicate that Yoon Suk-yeol voters who evaluated martial law negatively and the impeachment decision positively tended to withdraw their support for the People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo in this election. However, from another perspective, it shows that up to 46% and 37% of voters who evaluated martial law very negatively and the impeachment decision very positively, respectively, still voted for the People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo, indicating the existence of severe polarization between camps.
IV. Defectors from the Yoon Suk-yeol vote analyzed by region, ideology, generation, and issues
As examined above, voters who voted for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election were clearly influenced by the events of emergency martial law and impeachment, leading to their defection in the 21st presidential election. However, factors other than martial law and impeachment may also have influenced the defection of Yoon Suk-yeol voters. In particular, unlike the 20th presidential election, the conservative camp competed as two parties, the People Power Party and the Reform Party, in the 21st presidential election, suggesting that voters within the conservative camp may have made different voting choices based on various factors. Considering this, this paper analyzes how the defection of Yoon Suk-yeol voters manifested according to region, ideology, generation, and issues.
Region, ideology, generation, and issues are very important factors that significantly influence voters' voting choices in Korean politics. In particular, regionalism has been one of the most influential factors on the voting behavior of Korean voters since democratization in 1987. Although its magnitude has varied slightly depending on the context of the election, it remains a significant factor influencing the voting choices of Korean voters (Moon Woo-jin 2017; Jang Eun-young & Uhm Ki-hong 2017; Yoon Kwang-il 2020; Yoon Ji-sung 2023). Ideology is known to be the second most important factor influencing the voting behavior of Korean voters after regionalism.
Ideology began to influence the voting behavior of Korean voters around the 2000s, and since Kang Won-taek (2003), numerous studies have consistently reported the importance of ideology in the voting choices of Korean voters (Lee Kap-yoon & Lee Hyun-woo 2008; Cho Sung-dae 2015; Kang Won-taek & Sung Ye-jin 2018). Finally, generation and issues have also gained attention since the 2000s, starting with attention to the democratization movement generation, the relatively progressive 386 generation compared to previous generations (Kang Won-taek 2003; Park Won-ho 2012; Noh Hwan-hee & Song Jeong-min 2013), and recently, research on the conservatism of the younger generation has been continuously conducted (Choi Jong-sook 2020; Woo In-beom & Jang Seung-jin 2023). Therefore, based on these previous studies, this paper examined which voters defected from the Yoon Suk-yeol support coalition in the 21st presidential election based on region, ideology, generation, and issues.
First, from a regional perspective, Figure 7 shows the voting choices in the 21st presidential election of Yoon Suk-yeol voters from the 20th presidential election by region. The region with the highest number of defectors among Yoon Suk-yeol voters from the 20th presidential election was Gwangju/Jeolla, where only 52.6% of previous Yoon Suk-yeol voters voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo. Next were Gangwon/Jeju, where 70% of Yoon Suk-yeol voters voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo again, followed by Daejeon/Chungcheong, where 75.5% of Yoon Suk-yeol voters voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo again. Interestingly, in Daegu/Gyeongbuk and Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam, traditional regions of support for conservative parties, about 20% of Yoon Suk-yeol voters from the last election did not vote for the People Power Party candidate in the 21st presidential election; this proportion is similar to that in Seoul and Incheon/Gyeonggi.
This result can be interpreted as a high defection rate of conservative party voters in the Yeongnam region in this election, but conversely, it can also be interpreted that the defection rate of conservative party supporters in Seoul and Gyeonggi Province was relatively not high compared to those in Honam, Chungcheong, and Gangwon.
Figure 7. 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices of 20th Presidential Election Yoon Suk-yeol Voters by Region
Figure 8 shows the voting choices in the 21st presidential election of Yoon Suk-yeol voters from the 20th presidential election, by ideology. As expected, the highest proportion of defectors among Yoon Suk-yeol voters from the last election was found in the group of respondents who identified themselves as progressive. Among voters who voted for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the last election, 56.3% of those who identified themselves as progressive voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo, and 40.6% voted for candidate Lee Jae-myung. In contrast, 86.5% of those who identified themselves as conservative voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo, with only 5.8% voting for candidate Lee Jae-myung and 7.7% voting for candidate Lee Jun-seok. Among moderates, 61.9% voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo, 25.4% for candidate Lee Jae-myung, and 12.7% for candidate Lee Jun-seok. Candidate Lee Jun-seok received the highest proportion of votes among moderates who were Yoon Suk-yeol voters. In other words, as is generally expected, the more conservative the Yoon Suk-yeol voter, the higher the probability of choosing the People Power Party candidate Kim Moon-soo in the 21st presidential election. Conversely, the more progressive the voter, the higher the probability of defecting in this 21st presidential election.
Figure 8. 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices of 20th Presidential Election Yoon Suk-yeol Voters by Ideology
Figure 9. 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices of 20th Presidential Election Yoon Suk-yeol Voters by Generation
Figure 9 shows the voting choices in the 21st presidential election of Yoon Suk-yeol voters from the 20th presidential election, by generation. Notably, among voters who voted for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the last election, the proportion of defectors was higher among younger generations. Conversely, the proportion of voters who voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo again was higher among older generations. Furthermore, younger generations showed a higher proportion of votes for candidate Lee Jun-seok after defecting from the People Power Party, whereas older generations were more likely to switch their support to the progressive candidate Lee Jae-myung rather than Lee Jun-seok. This indicates that while candidate Lee Jun-seok, classified as conservative, receives significant support from younger generations within the conservative camp, he receives little support from middle-aged and older generations. In other words, it shows that a generational division exists within the conservative camp.
Next, as major issues influencing the defection of Yoon Suk-yeol voters, this chapter focuses on the issue of election fraud and the gender issue. The issue of election fraud can be seen as an issue that divides the far-right from the moderate conservatives within the conservative camp, and the gender issue can be seen as an issue that divides the Reform Party and the People Power Party. Figure 10 shows the voting choices in the 21st presidential election of Yoon Suk-yeol voters from the 20th presidential election, based on their attitudes towards the statement, 'I believe there was election fraud or manipulation in this presidential election.' Among Yoon Suk-yeol voters from the 20th presidential election, the proportion who voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo was higher among those who believed there was election fraud or manipulation in this election, while the proportion who voted for candidates Lee Jae-myung and Lee Jun-seok was higher among those who believed there was absolutely no such thing.
Meanwhile, Figure 11 shows the voting choices in the 21st presidential election of Yoon Suk-yeol voters from the 20th presidential election, based on their attitudes towards the statement, 'The government should make efforts to resolve issues of disadvantage or discrimination faced by women in society.' Notably, the proportion of votes for candidate Lee Jun-seok increased as respondents disagreed with the statement. Conversely, the proportion of votes for candidate Lee Jae-myung increased among those who agreed. The proportion of votes for candidate Kim Moon-soo, excluding the 'strongly disagree' opinion, remained around 80% with no significant difference.
Figure 10. 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices of 20th Presidential Election Yoon Suk-yeol Voters by Attitude Towards Election Fraud
Figure 11. 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices of 20th Presidential Election Yoon Suk-yeol Voters by Attitude Towards Gender Issues
V. Multivariate Statistical Analysis
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze which voters among those who voted for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election defected in this election. The main factors examined above were attitudes towards martial law and impeachment, region, generation, ideology, and attitudes towards election fraud and gender issues. While the influence of each variable on the voting choices of Yoon Suk-yeol voters in the 21st presidential election was examined individually above, a statistical analysis model including all these variables was estimated for a more rigorous statistical analysis. Considering the characteristics of the dependent variable, a multinomial logit model was used for the statistical verification model. Table 1 shows the results of this statistical model.
In Table 1, the sample consists of voters who voted for candidate Yoon Suk-yeol in the 20th presidential election, and the reference group for the multinomial logit model is the voting choice for candidate 'Kim Moon-soo.' The regression coefficients in the 'Lee Jae-myung' column show the characteristics of voters who voted for candidate Lee Jae-myung compared to those who voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo, and the regression coefficients in the 'Lee Jun-seok' column show the characteristics of voters who voted for candidate Lee Jun-seok compared to those who voted for candidate Kim Moon-soo. First, examining the characteristics of voters who voted for candidate Lee Jae-myung, the more negative their stance on martial law, the more likely they were to vote for Lee Jae-myung rather than Kim Moon-soo, and the more progressive their self-identified ideology, the more likely they were to vote for Lee Jae-myung rather than Kim Moon-soo. Furthermore, regarding their stance on election fraud, the more they believed there was no election fraud in this election, the higher the probability of voting for Lee Jae-myung rather than Kim Moon-soo. On the other hand, regionally, when Daegu/Gyeongbuk is the reference group, voters residing in Seoul were more likely to vote for Kim Moon-soo than Lee Jae-myung.
Table 1. Model of 20th Presidential Election Yoon Suk-yeol Voters' 21st Presidential Election Voting Choices (Multinomial Logit Model)
| Model 1 | |||
| Lee Jae-myung | Kim Moon-soo | ||
| Stance on Martial Law | 903 (.213)*** | .889 (.204)*** | |
| Ideology | -.651 (.131)*** | .005(.141) | |
| Generation | 18-29 | Reference Group | Reference Group |
| 30-39 | .216 (.812) | -1.428 (.603)* | |
| 40-49 | -.004 (.783) | -2.109 (.696)** | |
| 50-59 | -.051 (.788) | -2.083 (.711)** | |
| 60 años o más | -.759 (.754) | -3.615 (.764)*** | |
| Región de residencia | Seúl | -1.423 (.680)* | .075 (.764) |
| Incheon/Gyeonggi | -.654 (.628) | .080 (.733) | |
| Daejeon/Chungcheong | -.365 (.767) | -.155 (1.061) | |
| Gwangju/Jeolla | .620 (.987) | 1.786 (1.223) | |
| Daegu/Gyeongbuk | Grupo de referencia | Grupo de referencia | |
| Busan/Ulsan/Gyeongnam | -.843 (.698) | .117 (840) | |
| Gangwon/Jeju | -.827(.892) | -.199 (1.228) | |
| Postura sobre fraude electoral | -.925 (.254)* | -.476 (.228)* | |
| Postura sobre temas de género | -.230 (.185) | .378(.191)* | |
| Hombres | .200 (.377) | .612 (.522) | |
| Constante | 2.041 (1.836) | -4.237 (2.041) | |
| Tamaño de la muestra | 476 | ||
| McFaddem’s R2 | .414 |
Nota: El grupo de referencia para el modelo logit es “Kim Moon-soo”. *P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001
Por otro lado, en el caso del candidato Lee Jun-seok, cuanto más negativa era la postura sobre el estado de sitio, mayor era la probabilidad de votar por Lee Jun-seok en comparación con Kim Moon-soo, y por grupos de edad, los veinteañeros mostraron una mayor probabilidad de votar por Lee Jun-seok en comparación con otros grupos de edad. Por el contrario, la ideología o la región no fueron factores significativamente importantes en la elección entre Lee Jun-seok y Kim Moon-soo. En cuanto a los temas, cuanto más se creía que no hubo fraude electoral en estas elecciones, mayor era la probabilidad de elegir a Lee Jun-seok en lugar de Kim Moon-soo, y en cuanto a los temas de género, cuanto menos se estaba de acuerdo con la afirmación de que el gobierno debe esforzarse para resolver la discriminación contra las mujeres, mayor era la probabilidad de votar por Lee Jun-seok en lugar de Kim Moon-soo.
Estos resultados demuestran que las razones por las que los votantes que se han alejado del apoyo a Yoon Suk-yeol cambiaron su elección de voto a los candidatos Lee Jae-myung e Lee Jun-seok son diferentes. En común, los votantes de Yoon que son negativos sobre el estado de sitio y no creen en las afirmaciones de fraude electoral tuvieron una mayor probabilidad de no elegir al candidato Kim Moon-soo del Partido del Poder Popular, sino a los candidatos Lee Jae-myung o Lee Jun-seok. Sin embargo, parece que estos votantes descontentos eligieron a los candidatos Lee Jae-myung y Lee Jun-seok de manera diferente según su actitud hacia los temas de género y su grupo de edad.
VI. Conclusión
Este capítulo analiza las tendencias de división del bloque de apoyo al presidente Yoon Suk-yeol (grupo de votantes) y los factores de desviación política en las 21ª elecciones presidenciales, celebradas en un entorno político sin precedentes de estado de sitio y destitución presidencial. Los resultados del análisis indican que aproximadamente el 20% de los votantes que apoyaron al candidato Yoon Suk-yeol en las 20ª elecciones presidenciales cambiaron su elección de voto en las 21ª elecciones presidenciales, y solo alrededor del 12% de ellos se movieron hacia el campo progresista. Esto demuestra que la polarización política entre los campos conservador y progresista todavía opera fuertemente en la política coreana. Sin embargo, dado que las elecciones presidenciales recientes se estructuran de tal manera que el resultado se decide por una estrecha diferencia de votos en un sistema bipartidista, el fenómeno de que el 12% del electorado total cambie completamente de campo en solo tres años no puede ser ignorado en absoluto.
Esta escala de desviación representa una reorganización política que podría cambiar completamente el resultado electoral, lo que sugiere que la cohesión dentro del bloque de apoyo a Yoon Suk-yeol se ha agrietado hasta cierto punto. Esta desviación de los partidarios de Yoon no es el resultado de la simple fatiga política o del voto estratégico temporal, sino que puede verse como originada por una fisura de valores e ideologías provocada por la crisis política del anuncio de Yoon Suk-yeol de un estado de sitio y la consiguiente destitución. Los resultados del análisis estadístico mostraron que los votantes que eran negativos sobre el estado de sitio y positivos sobre la decisión de destitución tendían claramente a retirar su apoyo al candidato del Partido del Poder Popular.
Por otro lado, el destino de los votantes que se desviaron del apoyo a Yoon Suk-yeol se dividió en dos ramas principales. El grupo que se movió hacia el candidato Lee Jae-myung, del campo progresista, mostró características de ser fuertemente progresista y no estar de acuerdo con las afirmaciones de fraude electoral. El grupo que se movió hacia el candidato Lee Jun-seok, del campo conservador similar, estaba compuesto principalmente por jóvenes de veinte años y mostró una actitud anti-feminista en los temas de género. Esto demuestra que, incluso entre los 'votantes descontentos de Yoon', las rutas de reubicación política son diferentes, y cada ruta está vinculada a diferentes agendas políticas y sociales.
Estos resultados tienen importantes implicaciones políticas. En primer lugar, demuestran que las crisis políticas como la destitución revelan la pluralidad de interpretaciones y reacciones incluso dentro de un único campo político, lo que puede conducir directamente a la disolución del bloque de apoyo en las elecciones. En segundo lugar, dado que el mismo fenómeno de desviación tiene diferentes patrones de reorganización según las motivaciones subyacentes y las orientaciones de valores, los partidos políticos deben ir más allá de una estrategia de 'prevención de la desviación' y desarrollar estrategias de respuesta diferenciadas adaptadas a los grupos de votantes segmentados.
Sin embargo, este estudio se basa en datos de encuestas de un solo punto en el tiempo, por lo que tiene limitaciones para comprender completamente las tendencias a largo plazo o los factores de fisura latentes antes de que ocurrieran los eventos. Por lo tanto, la investigación futura deberá utilizar datos de panel para rastrear longitudinalmente los cambios en la lealtad política y analizar el impacto de eventos políticos de alta intensidad como el estado de sitio y la destitución en la identidad del votante y el sistema de partidos desde una perspectiva a largo plazo. En resumen, la división del bloque de apoyo a Yoon Suk-yeol observada en las 21ª elecciones presidenciales no fue simplemente una derrota electoral, sino un evento estructural que superpuso crisis políticas y fisuras de valores. Esto quedará registrado como un importante caso que demuestra cómo las situaciones de crisis exponen la heterogeneidad dentro de un campo y, en última instancia, desencadenan la reorganización del panorama político.■
VII. Referencias
Kang, Won-taek. 2003. *Korean Election Politics: Ideology, Region, Generation, and Media*. Seoul: Purungil.
______. 2017. “Elecciones presidenciales de 2017 y la política conservadora: ¿colapso o fragmentación?” *Revista de Estudios de Partidos Políticos de Corea* 16(2), 5–191.
Kang, Won-taek y Sung, Ye-jin. 2018. “Ideología y generación en las elecciones presidenciales de 2017: centrándose en los votantes conservadores.” *Estudios de Política Coreana* 27(1), 205–240.
Noh, Hwan-hee y Song, Jeong-min. 2013. “Una reflexión sobre la brecha generacional: ¿efecto de cohorte o efecto de edad?” En Park, Chan-wook y Kang, Won-taek (eds.), *Análisis de las elecciones presidenciales de 2012*, 139–184. Seúl: Nanam.
Moon, Woo-jin. 2017. “Características y cambios del voto regionalista: debates teóricos y análisis empírico” *Estudios Legislativos* 23(1), 82–111.
Park, Won-ho. 2012. “La evolución de la brecha generacional: la desaparición de la generación 386 y el surgimiento de los votantes de treinta y tantos años” En Park, Chan-wook, Kim, Ji-yoon y Woo, Jeong-yeop (eds.), *La elección del votante coreano 1: Elecciones generales de 2012 - Serie de estudios electorales del Instituto Asan de Políticas 1*, 185–218. Seúl: Instituto Asan de Políticas.
Song, Jin-mi y Park, Won-ho. 2018. “El preludio de la deserción partidista: centrándose en las elecciones presidenciales de 2012 y 2017” Conferencia de verano de la Asociación Coreana de Ciencias Políticas y la Asociación Coreana de Política Internacional de 2018. Seúl. Junio.
Yoon, Kwang-il. 2020. “Mantenimiento y cambio de la brecha regional: un análisis empírico de las 19ª elecciones presidenciales” En la Asociación Coreana de Estudios Electorales (ed.), *Elecciones de Corea 8: Las 19ª elecciones presidenciales y las 7ª elecciones locales simultáneas*, 53–88. Seúl: Oreum.
Yoon, Ji-seong. 2023. “¿Ha cambiado el voto regionalista?: centrándose en las elecciones presidenciales de la 14ª a la 20ª” *Revista de Metodología de Investigación* 8(1), 1–26.
Woo, In-beom y Jang, Seung-jin. 2023. “¿Meritocracia y la derechización de los votantes jóvenes?” *Estudios de Paz* Otoño 2023, 5–44.
Lee, Kap-yoon y Lee, Hyun-woo. 2008. “Análisis de la influencia del voto ideológico” *Estudios de Política Contemporánea* 1(1), 137–166.
Jang, Seung-jin. 2018. “La fragmentación de los votantes conservadores de 2012-2017: ¿está realmente inclinado el campo de juego (al revés)?” *Estudios Legislativos* 24(3), 30–54.
Jang, Eun-young y Um, Ki-hong. 2017. “Un análisis empírico del comportamiento de voto regionalista en Corea: centrándose en las elecciones presidenciales desde la democratización” *Revista de Estudios Políticos del Siglo XXI* 27(1), 1–20.
Cho, Seong-dae. 2015. *La política de la ideología y las elecciones coreanas: Elecciones presidenciales coreanas vistas a través de la teoría espacial*. Seúl: Oreum.
Choi, Jong-sook. 2020. “Una nueva mirada al fenómeno de los hombres en sus veinte: centrándose en la comparación de la orientación ideológica y la conciencia de género de los veinteañeros y los treinta-cuarentaañeros” *Economía y Sociedad* 125, 189–224.
■ Autor: Shin, Jeong-seop _Profesor de Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales, Universidad Soongsil.
■ Coordinación y Edición: Lim, Jae-hyun_Investigador de EAI
Contacto: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhim@eai.or.kr
*Este texto es una traducción mediante IA de un original escrito en coreano. Pueden existir errores de traducción o matices imprecisos.