[The 21st Presidential Election and Korean Democracy: Crisis, Division, and Realignment] ③ Voters in Their 20s in the 21st Presidential Election

I. Introduction

One of the prominent phenomena in the 20th presidential election was the divergent candidate choices based on gender within the young demographic of their 20s and 30s. According to the exit poll results from the three major broadcasting networks immediately after the 2022 presidential election, approximately 58.7% of men in their 20s supported Yoon Suk-yeol of the conservative People Power Party, while about 58% of women in their 20s supported Lee Jae-myung of the progressive Democratic Party of Korea, revealing a distinct gender difference in voting choices. This difference in political orientation based on gender within the youth demographic was also repeated in the rallies calling for the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol following the state of emergency declared on December 3, 2024. While women in their 20s and 30s actively led the atmosphere at the rallies alongside the older generations in their 40s and 50s, men of the same age group showed passive participation. What about the 21st presidential election, held due to the vacancy caused by President Yoon Suk-yeol's impeachment verdict?

Figure 1 and Table 1 show that the divergent voting intentions of men and women in their 20s were reproduced in the 21st presidential election. Examining the figures and tables, men in their 20s voted in the order of Kim Moon-soo (43.3%), Lee Jun-seok (34.4%), Lee Jae-myung (20%), and Kwon Young-guk (2.2%), while women in their 20s chose in the order of Lee Jae-myung (66%), Kim Moon-soo (21.3%), Lee Jun-seok (8.5%), and Kwon Young-guk (4.3%), indicating a difference in voting choices based on gender. Overall, the tendency for men in their 20s to concentrate their votes on conservative candidates and women in their 20s on progressive candidates was repeated.

Let us look again at Figure 2 and Table 2. Approximately 77.8% of men in their 20s voted for conservative candidates such as Kim Moon-soo and Lee Jun-seok, while only 22.2% cast their votes for progressive candidates Lee Jae-myung and Kwon Young-guk. In contrast, women in their 20s allocated about 70.2% of their votes to progressive candidates, with support for conservative candidates being only about 29.8%.

This gender differentiation within the youth demographic showed a tendency to diminish as the age group increased. In their 30s, men supported conservative candidates with 51.6% and women supported progressive candidates with 66.7%. Furthermore, the gender gap significantly narrowed among middle-aged and older adults. In their 40s and 50s, both men and women supported progressive candidates regardless of gender, and in their 60s and 70s and above, both men and women leaned towards conservative candidates. In summary, the 21st presidential election revealed a phenomenon where the difference in voting choices based on gender became more pronounced in younger age groups.

Figure 1: Voting Choice Differences by Generation and Age Group

Table 1: Voting Choice Differences by Generation and Age Group

<Figure 2> Voting Choice Differences by Generation-Age (Pro-Progressive Bloc VS. Pro-Conservative Bloc)

<Table 2> Voting Choice Differences by Generation-Age (Pro-Progressive vs. Pro-Conservative)

II. Ideological Tendencies and Party Identification Differences Between Men and Women in Their 20s

One of the strong explanatory factors influencing voting choices is the voter's political ideological tendency and party identification. It can be observed that the distinct candidate choices among men and women in their 20s significantly overlap with the patterns of ideological tendencies in <Figure 3> and party identification in <Figure 4>. When examining the subjective ideological tendencies (progressive, moderate, conservative) in <Figure 3> and party identification in <Figure 4> by generational and gender demographic groups, it is confirmed that the ideological differences based on gender are much more pronounced among voters in their 20s than in other age groups. For reference, voters' ideological tendencies were measured on an 11-point scale, asking respondents to self-assess their ideological tendency, and then categorized into three groups: progressive (0-4), moderate (5), and conservative (6-10). Party identification is the result of asking respondents about the party they usually support or feel close to.

1. Ideological Tendencies of 20s Differ by Gender: Men in their 20s are Conservative, Women in their 20s are Progressive

As shown in <Figure 3>, 51.9% of male respondents in their 20s identified themselves as "conservative," followed by "moderate" (27.8%) and "progressive" (20.4%). In contrast, 42.1% of women in their 20s chose "progressive," followed by "moderate" (38.6%) and "conservative" (19.3%), showing a clear contrast. Thus, within the 20s age group, men are more than half (approximately 52%) inclined towards conservatism, while women, at about 42%, choose progressive tendencies, indicating a stark divergence in ideological experiences based on gender. This difference in ideological tendencies by gender is not significantly observed in middle-aged and older adults. This pattern is very similar to the characteristics of generational and gender demographic groups in voting choices observed earlier.

2. Party Identification: Men Rally Around the Reform Party or the People Power Party, Women Around the Democratic Party

Looking at <Figure 4>, the party most frequently identified as supported or felt close to by men in their 20s was the 'Reform Party' (44.7%). This was followed by the 'People Power Party' (30.6%), and then the 'Democratic Party' (21.2%). Other parties (e.g., Cho Kuk Innovation Party, Progressive Party) accounted for around 4% in total. On the other hand, among women in their 20s, the response for the party they identified with was overwhelmingly the 'Democratic Party' at 66.7%, significantly outpacing other supporting parties. This was followed by the 'People Power Party' (13.1%), the 'Cho Kuk Innovation Party' (9.5%), the 'Reform Party' (7.1%), and the 'Progressive Party' (3.6%). Overall, there was a clear difference, with men in their 20s relatively rallying around the broadly conservative parties (Reform Party, People Power Party), and women in their 20s overwhelmingly coalescing around the Democratic Party. This gender gap in ideological tendencies and party identification within the younger generation is not as pronounced in age groups 30 and above. For example, both men and women in their 50s generally show a high proportion of self-identifying as 'progressive,' and support for the Democratic Party exceeds half. Conversely, men and women in their 70s commonly show a prevalence of conservative tendencies, with the People Power Party garnering more than half of the support.

In summary, the generational and gender demographic characteristics in voting choices, ideological tendencies, and party identification observed earlier exhibit very similar patterns. This gender difference in ideology and party identification within the youth generation suggests not merely a difference in voting choices, but also the potential for the cleavage lines in Korean politics to be reorganized around gender, at least within the youth demographic, in the future.

<Figure 3> Ideological Tendencies by Generation and Age Group

<Figure 4> Party Support Differences by Generation and Age Group

III. Ideological Differences Between Men and Women in Their 20s are Greatest on Gender Equality Policies

As discussed earlier, men in their 20s tend to be generally classified as conservative in their subjective ideological tendencies, while women in their 20s tend to be classified as progressive. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the specific aspects in which they express conservative or progressive stances. Even if one defines oneself as 'conservative,' economic conservatism (opposition to government market intervention and redistribution policies) differs in nature from socio-cultural conservatism (upholding patriarchalism and traditional order). Thus, when voters in their 20s define themselves as progressive or conservative, an analysis of the core values they use as criteria is required.

<Table 3> lists six statements. Respondents are asked to rate these statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). For statements 2, 4, and 5, a higher score indicates a 'conservative attitude.' Conversely, for statements 1, 3, and 6, a higher agreement score indicates a progressive tendency, as seen in the content: 'Need to guarantee the rights of homosexuals and minorities' (Statement 1), 'Actively promote response to the climate crisis' (Statement 3), 'Resolve gender discrimination' (Statement 6). Therefore, for consistent interpretation in one direction, statements 1, 3, and 6 were reverse-coded to assign scores such that a higher score indicates a more conservative tendency.

Support for the rights of socially vulnerable groups such as homosexuals, foreign workers, and the disabled is related to progressive and liberal stances that emphasize 'social equality' and 'respect for diversity.' Conversely, challenging this can be interpreted as a conservative tendency that prioritizes 'traditional values' or 'social stability.' Next, the stance that North Korea is an enemy, emphasizing security threats and the need to strengthen military power, is traditionally classified as conservative in Korean politics and is characterized by a preference for 'strong state and authoritarian control.' In contrast, those who prefer social and cultural exchange and peaceful approaches toward North Korea are classified as traditionally progressive. Furthermore, in terms of responding to the climate crisis, the argument for enduring personal inconvenience reflects a progressive and environmentalist attitude that emphasizes 'communal responsibility' and prioritizes 'sustainability.' In contrast, the stance that emphasizes the logic of a free market economy and opposes environmental regulations as government intervention and regulation of economic activities can be considered a conservative perspective.

The position that corporate competitiveness and market flexibility are more important than improving labor rights is closer to a conservative attitude, contrasting with the left-wing, social democratic stance that emphasizes welfare states and worker protection. The view that accepts merit-based rewards as natural and accepts resulting inequality is a conservative perspective, while the attitude that denies excessive disparities and advocates for equal outcomes or redistribution is considered a progressive perspective. Finally, the argument that the government should actively intervene to resolve gender discrimination is a feminist stance that emphasizes 'resolving structural inequality' and 'social justice,' and is closer to a progressive attitude. Conversely, if one believes the government should minimize intervention, it can be seen as a conservative view that places more trust in 'autonomy and individual responsibility' and free-market solutions.

<Table 3> Ideological Attitudes (5-point scale; higher scores indicate stronger conservative tendencies)

Figures 5 and 4 visualize these results, allowing for a quick understanding of which items show particularly large differences in values between men and women in their 20s. First, the statement that shows the largest ideological attitude difference between men and women in Figures 5 and 4 is the gender equality statement, "The government should strive to resolve the disadvantages and discrimination faced by women in society." For this item, men in their 20s scored 3.73 (after reverse coding), and women in their 20s scored 2.03 (after reverse coding), with a gap of 1.71 between genders, the largest difference found across all age groups. Comparing the remaining five graphs with the last graph in Figure 5, it can be confirmed that the opinions diverge the most between men and women in their 20s. Unlike the 20s, the gender gap in gender equality issues decreased with increasing age, in the order of 30s (+1.06), 40s (+0.60), and 50s (+0.49).

Meanwhile, excluding gender issues, the next items with the largest attitude differences between men and women in their 20s were the guarantee of rights for the socially vulnerable, perceptions of North Korea, and perceptions of response to the climate crisis. For all three items, the gender gap within the 20s is significant compared to other age groups ( +1.08, +1.01, and +0.75 respectively). As can be seen from the graphs in Figure 5, these gaps rapidly shrink in age groups from the 30s onwards (gaps in the three items are +0.52, +0.59, and +0.35). For example, the gap for the socially vulnerable item decreases from +1.08 in the 20s to +0.52 in the 30s and +0.12 in the 40s, and reverses to -0.25 from the 60s onwards (women's conservative tendency is actually higher than men's).

Meanwhile, the items where the ideological attitude differences between men and women in their 20s were relatively smallest were economic attitudes and attitudes toward meritocracy. Economic attitudes represent the level of agreement with the statement, "Corporate competitiveness and market flexibility are more important than improving labor rights and working conditions." Meritocracy attitudes represent the level of agreement with the statement, "It is important to be rewarded according to individual performance and ability, and the resulting gaps and inequalities should be accepted." For these items, the gender difference is very small across all age groups (20s +0.19, +0.54; 30s +0.09, +0.43; 40s +0.07, +0.15, etc.). In other words, for "Corporate competitiveness vs. labor rights" and "Meritocracy," the response distributions are generally similar, from moderate to conservative, without distinction between generations or genders. Unlike socio-cultural issues, there is not a large difference in opinion between generations and genders on economic and meritocracy items. While political and socio-cultural issues differ by generation and gender, there is a consensus on economic and meritocracy ideological attitudes, even between men and women in their 20s.

Figure 5: Differences in Ideological Attitudes by Generation and Age

Table 4: Differences in Ideological Attitudes by Generation and Age (Gender Gap)

Synthesizing the analysis results, we confirmed that the greatest differences in voting choices, ideological orientation, and party support occurred between men and women in their 20s among all age groups. These gaps were particularly pronounced on socio-cultural issues such as gender, the environment, and the socially vulnerable, whereas relatively common views were maintained on economic issues and attitudes related to meritocracy.

IV. How Do Young Men and Women in Their 20s Differ in Political Participation Behavior?

As examined above, while clear differences in voting choices exist between men and women in their 20s, significant differences also emerge in their non-institutionalized forms of political participation.

The East Asia Institute survey asked about the extent of participation in street protests or rallies calling for the impeachment of Yoon Suk-yeol or opposing it, following the state of emergency declared on December 3rd. Participation was scored as follows: 0 points for never attending or wanting to attend but not being able to; 1 point for attending once; 2 points for attending twice; and 3 points for attending three or more times. For voting participation, a score of 1 was given if the individual participated in early or regular voting in the presidential election, and 0 otherwise.

As shown in <Figure 6> and <Table 5>, the participation level of women in their 20s in rallies calling for impeachment was approximately 0.5, about six times higher than that of men in their 20s (0.08), and represented the highest level of participation in impeachment rallies across all age groups. This gender gap within the 20s age group is most starkly evident in impeachment rallies. Interestingly, the level of participation in rallies opposing impeachment was also higher among women than men. This indicates that women in their 20s, compared to men in the same age group, tend to voice their political opinions more actively and engage more deeply with current issues, beyond differences in ideological orientation or party support.

Internal political efficacy is defined as “a belief in one’s own ability to understand and effectively carry out political tasks or participation activities,” while external political efficacy is defined as “a belief in the environment’s responsiveness to one’s opinions and demands, and its ability to effect change, such as political institutions, leaders, and public agencies.” Both concepts are important psychological factors explaining political participation behavior.

Let us examine the levels of internal and external political efficacy for men and women in their 20s in <Table 6>, <Figure 7>, and <Figure 8>, respectively. First, regarding internal political efficacy (“I am well aware of the important political issues in our society.”), men in their 20s scored 3.74 and women in their 20s scored 3.57, showing similar levels. However, external political efficacy is higher among women in their 20s compared to men in the same age group. Evaluating the agreement level with the statement “Politicians or public officials do not care about what people like me think” in <Table 7> in reverse, a lower score for “politicians do not care” implies that “politicians do care (external efficacy is high).” Therefore, women in their 20s feel that politicians pay more attention to their opinions than men in the same age group.

Notably, women in their 20s are the only demographic group across all ages and genders whose score for external political efficacy is the lowest (feeling that politicians care more about them), demonstrating significantly greater confidence in the political sphere than all other groups. This result suggests that the political behavior of women in their 20s extends beyond mere participation in rallies or voting, with the majority sharing the belief (external efficacy) that “the political sphere will listen to their voices.” In contrast, men in their 20s participate less in rallies and have lower external efficacy compared to women, indicating a somewhat diminished sense of political influence.

In summary, men in their 20s show a somewhat lower enthusiasm for deep engagement with political issues compared to other groups and may feel a sense of alienation, believing their voices are unlikely to be reflected in politics. Conversely, women in their 20s not only demonstrate active participation in rallies and voting but also possess the confidence, compared to men in the same age group, that political actors will heed their demands. Thus, the differences in political attitudes and efficacy between men and women in their 20s carry significance beyond mere participation levels.

<Figure 6> Political Participation Behavior by Generation and Age Group

<Table 5> Political Participation Behavior by Generation and Age Group

<Table 6> Political Efficacy by Generation and Age

Figure 7. Political Efficacy by Generation and Age: I am well aware of the important political issues in our society.

Figure 8. Political Efficacy by Generation and Age: Politicians and public officials do not care about what people like me think.

IV. Conclusion

To summarize the analysis thus far. Similar to the 20th presidential election, the 21st presidential election also showed distinct voting choices by gender within the young adult demographic. Approximately 78% of young adult males voted for conservative candidates (Kim Moon-soo, Lee Jun-seok), while approximately 70% of young adult females voted for progressive candidates (Lee Jae-myung, Kwon Young-guk), demonstrating a clear difference. This gender gap is evident not only in voting choices but also multidimensionally in ideological orientation, party identification, ideological attitudes, and political participation behaviors. Compared to other age groups, there is a distinct gender difference in political attitudes within the 20s age group.

Generally, young adult males identify themselves as conservative, while young adult females identify themselves as progressive. Examining where this ideological orientation is most clearly manifested, the greatest attitudinal difference appears on issues concerning discrimination against women and the necessity of government intervention for its rectification. Specifically, looking at the ideological gap within the 20s age group, significant differences between genders, ranging from 0.75 to 1.71 points, are evident in socio-cultural issues such as addressing gender discrimination (+1.71 points), guaranteeing the rights of the socially vulnerable (+1.08 points), perceptions of North Korea (+1.01 points), and responding to the climate crisis (+0.75 points). In contrast, economic and meritocracy-related attitudes, such as corporate competitiveness vs. labor rights (+0.19 points) and meritocracy (+0.54 points), showed minimal differences, within 0.5 points. These results are noteworthy as they suggest that while gender conflict is particularly pronounced in the socio-cultural domain among young adults, there is considerable common ground in the economic and meritocracy domains.

Furthermore, in non-institutional participation behaviors, not only institutional participation such as voting choices, young adult females were more active than their male counterparts in the same age group, and they also reported higher external political efficacy, believing that political circles would listen to their demands.

The phenomenon of gender division within the 20s age group, repeatedly observed in major political junctures since the late 2010s, is likely to continue in the future. This gap is a result that only becomes clearly apparent upon reaching adulthood in one's 20s, and in-depth research is required to identify its origins and mechanisms of persistence. In particular, it is necessary to more systematically investigate the process of political socialization, which has a decisive influence on the formation of an individual's political values. In addition to the political socialization process during adolescence, in-depth follow-up research is needed to clarify the pathways through which media consumption, online community activities, and social network interactions shape and operate gender-specific political attitudes and participatory behaviors.■

■ Author: Kim Hanna _Professor of Moral Education, Jinju National University of Education.

■ Contact and Editing: Lim Jae-hyun_EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 209) | jhim@eai.or.kr