[Global NK Commentary] Inter-Korean Confidence-Building and North Korea's Strategy: Implications and Limitations

■ Go to Global NK Zoom&Connect Original

In his congratulatory speech for the 80th Liberation Day, President Lee Jae-myung presented the new administration's North Korea policy, stating that this year is the opportune moment to end the era of confrontation and hostility and jointly usher in a new era of peaceful coexistence and common growth on the Korean Peninsula.[1] He added that as it is natural to start with restoring trust and resuming dialogue between South and North Korea rather than pursuing unification in the distant future, consistent measures for substantial tension reduction and trust-building will be taken. Furthermore, since confidence-building requires action rather than words, he announced that, with patience towards North Korea, following the cessation of leaflet distribution, suspension of loudspeaker broadcasts, and dismantling of loudspeakers immediately after taking office, the September 19th Military Agreement would be preemptively and gradually restored.

However, the Lee Jae-myung administration's North Korea policy and preemptive measures for confidence-building stand in stark contrast to the statements made by Deputy Director Kim Yo Jong on July 28, stating, “Relations between the two Koreas have completely moved beyond the timeframe of the concept of being compatriots,”

[2] and on August 14, stating, “The hope for Seoul is nothing but a foolish dream.”[3]

Dialogue and peace for inter-Korean confidence-building are neither new concepts nor policies that emerge with each change of government. Because confidence-building has not yet been achieved between South and North Korea, no past administration's North Korea policy has omitted peace and confidence-building. The difference lies in strategy, as confidence-building has not accumulated despite numerous dialogues and agreements over such a long period. The objective of North Korea policy is to achieve a free and peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula through stability and peace on the peninsula.

However, changes in the security environment alter the strategies for achieving policy objectives. The stagnation of inter-Korean confidence-building on the Korean Peninsula is also largely due to a lack of strategic development in response to changes in the security environment. If preemptive confidence-building measures are pursued without considering the changes in North Korea's military capabilities, the surrounding security environment, and South Korea's security strategy, the desired policy outcomes cannot be achieved. This is because North Korea is pursuing strategic changes that reflect the deepening strategic relationship between North Korea and Russia, changes in North Korea's security environment, and changes in South Korea's security environment for a potential second Trump administration. Therefore, this paper will briefly examine how North Korea has demonstrated strategic changes in its pursuit of South Korea policy, focusing on Kim Yo Jong's statements, and explore its implications.

Kim Yo Jong's Statements and North Korea's Strategic Changes

Although Kim Yo Jong had been active in public, accompanying Kim Jong Un on major events and field guidance tours since the early days of his rule, she began issuing statements only after the Hanoi summit's breakdown in 2020. North Korea has used Kim Yo Jong's statements to convey the official position of the Kim Jong Un regime in areas of external relations, including those with South and North Korea and the United States. Starting with her first statement on March 3, 2020, Kim Yo Jong has issued a total of 63 statements up to August 14, 2025. Although two of these are titled 'position statements,' they differ little from regular statements. As seen in Table 1, Kim Yo Jong's statements can be broadly categorized into four areas.

Table 1 reveals several characteristics of Kim Yo Jong's statements. First, by category, there are 25 statements on inter-Korean affairs, 21 on military matters, 8 on US affairs, and 9 on general foreign affairs, with statements on inter-Korean affairs being overwhelmingly numerous. The topics of inter-Korean statements range from criticism of North Korea policy to the scattering of leaflets, trash balloons, drone infiltration, and the demolition of inter-Korean roads and railways. In contrast, statements on military matters mostly consist of criticism and demands for the cessation of ROK-US combined exercises, deployment of strategic assets, and ROK-US-Japan combined air exercises, as well as propaganda for North Korea's nuclear capabilities, military exercises, nuclear state status, and test-fired strategic weapons, showing a relative repetition in content.

Table 1: Fields and Frequency of Kim Yo Jong's Statements by Year (March 2020 - August 2025)[4]

Second, the years with the most discourse in the military sector were 2021 with 5 statements and 2024 with 6 statements. The statements released in 2021 and 2024 alone account for over 50% of the total military sector discourse. Kim Yo Jong's first statement regarding the ROK-US combined exercises was on March 16, 2021, titled "The spring day of three years ago may not return," and since then, Kim Yo Jong has issued statements around March and August each year, coinciding with the ROK-US defensive theater-level combined exercises that assume a full-scale war scenario on the Korean Peninsula.[5]North Korea is not interested in adjusting the combined exercises through changes in their scale or format, stating that trust-building measures can only be resumed if the combined exercises are suspended, thus placing the choice between hope and despair for inter-Korean relations in South Korea's hands.[6]Notably, Kim Yo Jong's statements related to ROK-US combined exercises, including the scattering of leaflets towards North Korea, contain threats and warnings, and were sometimes followed by substantive actions such as the demolition of the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office, the abolition of South-North dialogue organizations, and the severance of inter-Korean communication lines.[7]Furthermore, it is noteworthy that since the 8th Party Congress in 2021, the number of statements concerning the military sector by Kim Yo Jong has been equal to or greater than those directed at South Korea, with the exception of 2024.

Third, following the war in Ukraine, Kim Yo Jong's statements directed at the U.S. and external entities have increased. Notably, 2023 was an exceptional year with three statements directed at the U.S. and four external statements, marking the beginning of Kim Yo Jong's external statements supporting Russia. In a statement on January 27, 2023, she strongly condemned the U.S. support of tanks for Ukraine, and in a statement on April 1, she defended Russia by stating that if President Zelensky entered the U.S. nuclear umbrella, he would become a target of Russia's nuclear aim. Meanwhile, in a statement on April 29, 2023, she criticized President Biden and the ROK-U.S. Washington Declaration as the epitome of the most hostile and aggressive anti-North Korea policy. In a statement on July 17, she explained why North Korea refused the U.S. offer for dialogue. The second test launch of the Hwasong-18 solid-fuel ICBM on July 12 may have been influenced by the confidence gained from the significant improvement in performance compared to the first test launch in April.[8]In the statement on July 17, she argued that the U.S. claims of "dialogue without preconditions" and "the door for diplomacy is open" are tactics to stop what the U.S. fears, and that even if North Korea-U.S. dialogue were to open, denuclearization under CVID would undoubtedly be on the negotiating table.[9]The suspension of the deployment of U.S. strategic assets can be reversed in 10 hours, the temporary suspension of ROK-U.S. combined exercises in 20 days, and even the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea can be reversed in 15 days.[10]Therefore, these measures cannot persuade North Korea. She emphasizes that because all these actions are reversible, the irreversible 폐기 (disposal) of nuclear weapons, which are North Korea's sovereign right, is not a compatible calculation, and that the U.S. can never find a solution.

Finally, Kim Yo Jong's statements, which began in 2020, numbered 7 in 2020, 10 in 2021, 5 in 2022, 14 in 2023, 21 in 2024, and 6 as of August 2025. In 2021, 2023, and 2024, Kim Yo Jong's statements exceeded double digits. These years also saw an increase in plenary meetings due to changes in North Korea's domestic and external environment, and a surge in Kim Jong Un's public activities in the military sector.[11]A total of 12 meetings have been held as of August, prior to the Party Congress. Four meetings were held in 2021 and three in 2023. Kim Jong Un's public activities also exceeded 100 in 2023, with public activities in the military sector surging to 60 in 2023 and 82 in 2024.[12]Furthermore, an unprecedented four expanded meetings of the Party Central Military Commission were held in 2023. North Korea is actively leveraging the war in Ukraine as an opportunity to change its strategy towards South Korea and the U.S. Following the war in Ukraine, the consecutive North Korea-Russia summits in 2023 and 2024, the deployment of North Korean troops under the "Strategic Comprehensive Partnership Agreement" between Russia and North Korea, and the summit between President Putin and President Trump on August 15 to end the war in Ukraine in 2025, Kim Yo Jong's statements reflect changes in North Korea's domestic and external security environment and corresponding strategic shifts.

Implications and Significance

North Korea's closer ties with Russia and strengthened strategic cooperation following the war in Ukraine have not only expanded its strategic space vis-à-vis South Korea and the U.S. but have also relatively increased North Korea's strategic value compared to the past. The prolonged war in Ukraine has provided North Korea with opportunities for the conclusion of a new North Korea-Russia treaty and increased exchanges and cooperation with pro-Russian countries in Eastern Europe and Global South nations. Furthermore, the combination of a potential second Trump administration, which emphasizes dialogue by highlighting personal ties with Kim Jong Un, and a potential Lee Jae-myung administration, which emphasizes proactive measures for dialogue and trust-building, reduces the cost burden for North Korea's "strong-against-strong" approach towards South Korea and the U.S.[13]This is because the North Korea policies of the Lee Jae-myung administration in South Korea and a potential second Trump administration in the U.S. share several commonalities. First, given the emphasis on dialogue, the use of coercive measures is highly unlikely. With two ongoing wars in Europe and the Middle East, and preparations for a potential Taiwan contingency in 2027 in the Indo-Pacific region, stability on the Korean Peninsula is even more crucial. Second, they emphasize stability on the Korean Peninsula. The Lee Jae-myung administration prioritizes current stability and peace over distant unification, and has announced plans to gradually reinstate the September 19 North-South Military Agreement, which was completely suspended during the previous administration, as a trust-building measure. Third, they use ambiguous language regarding terms that could provoke North Korea or hint at policy changes. The term 'Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization (CVID)' of North Korean nuclear weapons is being replaced by 'Complete Denuclearization (CD)' of the Korean Peninsula, omitting the sensitive expressions 'Verifiable and Irreversible.'

Fourth, principles and implementation methods of North Korea policy are being conflated, with North Korea policy principles becoming means for pursuing dialogue resumption. Lastly, both South Korea and the U.S. are focusing their North Korea policies solely on 'the audience,' namely Kim Jong Un.[14]Moreover, the U.S. report on North Korean human rights has omitted criticism of the Kim Jong Un regime and has been halved in length, and the Lee Jae-myung administration is also considering not publishing the 2025 North Korean human rights report. Fourth, principles and implementation methods of North Korea policy are being mixed, with North Korea policy principles becoming tools for dialogue resumption. Finally, both South Korea and the U.S. are focusing their North Korea policies on 'the audience,' Kim Jong Un.

These common attitudes of South Korea and the U.S. regarding North Korea policy could lead to the Korean Peninsula issue developing in a direction neither side desires. For North Korea, the current situation is an optimal time to exert pressure on South Korea and the U.S.[15]They can present their demands to the fullest extent, including the suspension of ROK-U.S. combined exercises, the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea, the recognition of North Korea's nuclear status, and the lifting of sanctions. On the other hand, even if South Korea and the U.S. shift from a dialogue phase to a pressure phase, North Korea has nothing to lose by continuing the 'strong-against-strong' status quo it has maintained.[16]This is the stance of North Korea.

While resuming dialogue is necessary for stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula, we must not overlook the past history of inter-Korean relations, where dialogue resumption itself did not guarantee stability and peace, nor did it foster trust-building between the two Koreas. It is a time when the Russian proverb, 'Trust, but verify,' is needed. ■

References

Kim Jong-won. 2022. "Analysis of North Korean Statements by Kim Yo Jong." . December.

President Lee. 2025. "Restoration of the September 19 Military Agreement... will consistently take tension-easing measures." <Policy Briefing>. August 15.https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148947640

Lee Ho-ryeong. 2025. "Evaluation and Implications of the 12th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of North Korea." . July 4.

Lee Ho-ryeong and Jeon Kyung-joo. 2025. "North Korea's Negotiation Strategy and Our Response Direction as Seen Through Kim Yo Jong's Statements." <Security Strategy FOCUS>. August 5.

<Rodong Sinmun>. 2021. "The spring day of three years ago may not return." March 16.

<Rodong Sinmun>. 2023. "The projectile rose to a maximum altitude of 6,648.4 km and flew 1,001.2 km for 4,291 seconds, hitting the target area in the high seas of the East Sea." July 13.

<KCNA>. 2021. "Statement by Kim Yo Jong." August 1.

<KCNA>. 2023. "Statement by Kim Yo Jong." July 17.

<KCNA>. 2025. "The relationship between South Korea and North Korea has completely moved beyond the timeframe of the concept of compatriots." July 28.

<KCNA>. 2025. "Statement by Kim Yo Jong." July 28.

<KCNA>. 2025. "The hope of Seoul is a foolish dream." August 14.

Baek Yoon-mi. 2025. "Second Trump Administration's First North Korea Human Rights Report, Length Halved... Omission of Political System Criticism." <Chosun Ilbo>. August 13.

Cho Young-bin. 2025. "'CD Instead of CVID' 'Korean Peninsula Instead of North Korea'... ROK-U.S. Exchange Views on Dialogue with North Korea." <Hankook Ilbo>. July 13.

Jeong Young-gyo. 2025. "Government Considering Not Publishing North Korean Human Rights Report This Year... Likely Considering Inter-Korean Relations." <JoongAng Ilbo>. August 12.

[1]President Lee, “Restore the September 19 Military Agreement... will consistently take measures to ease tensions,” Policy Briefing, August 15, 2025.https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148947640

[2] “The relationship between the two Koreas has completely moved beyond the temporal scope of the concept of compatriots,” Korean Central News Agency, July 28, 2025.

[3] “Seoul's hope is nothing but a foolish dream,” Korean Central News Agency, August 14, 2025.

[4] The author directly classified and organized statements by Kim Yo Jong published by the Korean Central News Agency.

[5] “The spring day of three years ago will be difficult to return,” Rodong Sinmun, March 16, 2021.

[6] Kim Yo Jong's Statement, Korean Central News Agency, August 1, 2021.

[7] Kim Jong Won, “Analysis of North Korean Official Kim Yo Jong's Statement,” INSS Strategic Report, December 2022.

[8] Rodong Sinmun, July 13, 2023. It was announced that the projectile ascended to a maximum altitude of 6,648.4 km, flew a distance of 1,001.2 km for 4,291 seconds, and accurately hit the target waters in the high seas of the East Sea.

[9] Kim Yo Jong's Statement, Korean Central News Agency, July 17, 2023.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Lee Ho Ryung, “Evaluation and Implications of the 12th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea,” KIDA Security Strategy Focus, July 4, 2025.

[12] Ibid.

[13] North Korea shifted from the principle of 'strong against strong, preemptive against preemptive' in its policy toward South Korea and the U.S. in 2021 to 'strong against strong, head-on confrontation' from 2022, and announced its strategy of strongest response against the U.S. at the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee in December 2024.

[14] “Instead of CVID, CD; Instead of North Korea, Korean Peninsula”... U.S. and ROK Share ‘Understanding’ on Dialogue with North Korea,” Hankook Ilbo, July 13, 2025; Trump's First North Korea Human Rights Report in Second Term, Volume Halved... Criticism of Political System Removed,” Chosun Ilbo, August 13, 2025; “Government Considering Not Publishing North Korean Human Rights Report This Year... Seems to Consider Inter-Korean Relations,” JoongAng Ilbo, August 12, 2025.

[15] Lee Ho Ryung and Jeon Kyung Ju, “North Korea's Negotiation Strategy and Our Response Direction as Seen Through Kim Yo Jong's Statements,” Security Strategy Focus, August 5, 2025.

[16] “The U.S. must understand that the more it strengthens the extended deterrence system and excessively expands its military alliance system, which is a threatening entity, the further we will push it away from the negotiating table it desires,” emphasizing that the most suitable method for stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula is the superiority of power. Kim Yo Jong's Statement, Korean Central News Agency, July 17, 2023; “2025 is not 2018 or 2019... The fundamental differences in irreversible nuclear state status and capabilities, as well as the geopolitical environment, must be acknowledged,” demanding that North Korea be approached with a new mindset that presupposes its status as a nuclear-armed state. Kim Yo Jong's Statement, Korean Central News Agency, July 28, 2025.

■ Author: Lee Ho Ryung _Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

■ Responsible Editor: Oh In-hwan_Senior Fellow, EAI; Jeong Jong Hyuk_Research Fellow, Korea National Diplomatic Academy

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 202) | ihoh@eai.or.kr