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[Global NK Commentary] Whom Do We Meet?: Challenges After Easing Regulations on Contact with North Korean Residents
Editor's Note
Ha Seung-hee, Visiting Research Professor at the Institute for North Korean Studies at Dongguk University, analyzes the implications of the Lee Jae-myung administration's easing of regulations on contact with North Korean residents. According to Professor Ha, the previous "Guidelines for Processing Contact Reports with North Korean Residents" effectively converted the reporting system into a de facto permit system, restricting private sector contact with North Korea. However, with the abolition of these guidelines in July, it is now possible to anticipate the revitalization of private exchanges, positive changes in academic research activities, and improvements in inter-Korean perceptions. Concurrently, the author suggests that provisions such as the "clear concern" clause in Article 9 of the Act on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation can restrict contact with residents based on situational logic and arbitrary interpretation by officials, potentially leading to conflict and distrust. Therefore, efforts are needed to replace the legal grounds for refusal with objective criteria and to raise public awareness.
■ Go to the original text of Global NK Zoom&Connect
Lowered Threshold for Contact
The Constitution of the Republic of Korea designates unification as the ultimate goal of the state, and North Korean residents are its object. Paradoxically, however, there is a procedure requiring prior notification to the Minister of Unification to meet North Korean residents. This procedure is the 'Report of Contact with North Korean Residents' system, introduced with the enforcement of the "Act on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation" on August 1, 1990. It stipulates that South Korean residents must report to the Minister of Unification in advance if they come into direct or indirect contact with North Korean residents. 'Contact' includes not only face-to-face meetings but also non-face-to-face methods such as phone calls, emails, and online messages, and it covers academic, cultural, economic exchanges as well as private meetings.[1]
On July 30, 2025, the Ministry of Unification abolished the "Guidelines for Processing Contact Reports with North Korean Residents," which served as the practical basis for the operation of this system. These guidelines contained detailed items that allowed for the refusal of reports based on the nature of the contact person or applicant. In practice, this transformed the reporting system into a de facto permit system and became a factor in solidifying the practice of restricting private sector contact with North Korea. Minister of Unification Jeong Dong-young deemed this a flawed approach that restricted the sovereignty of the people and stated, "Free contact among the people fosters mutual understanding, which leads to coexistence." He also indicated that the government would pursue revisions to related laws to ensure that the reporting system is not operated as a permit system following the abolition of the guidelines.[2] This represents a policy shift that institutionally guarantees the freedom of contact and is a symbolic measure that can promote the revitalization of private exchanges.
This change carries several important implications. With autonomous contact becoming possible in various fields such as academia, religion, culture, and arts, activities previously hindered by approval procedures can now be conducted with just a report. This could lead to an increase in inter-Korean exchanges at the private level, which in turn may bring about changes in socio-cultural perceptions between the two Koreas. However, not all changes are positive. As the threshold for contact is lowered, the expansion of legal contact could pose new risks concerning material exchange, sharing of sensitive information, and political statements. While this abolition is a declaration to revert to the original function of a reporting system by excluding de facto permit operations, it simultaneously presents the challenge of re-examining the scope and definition of 'North Korean residents' and the boundaries of contact.
Expanded Opportunities
The abolition of the "Guidelines for Processing Contact Reports with North Korean Residents" marks a significant turning point in the operation of the inter-Korean exchange and cooperation system, heralding substantial changes. The guidelines, which existed separately from the law, had restricted academic, media, and cultural exchanges due to ambiguous wording and arbitrary interpretations. Following their abolition, judgments are expected to be made solely based on the criteria set forth in the law, thereby alleviating interpretive rigidity.
The most significant change is the revitalization of private exchanges. In the past, even when South and North Korean individuals encountered each other informally at overseas academic conferences, international meetings, or multilateral cultural events, the guidelines treated these as matters requiring prior approval or ex-post facto reporting. Henceforth, contact in non-political areas can become more flexible. This can contribute to maintaining channels for non-political exchanges even during periods of strained inter-Korean relations.
Positive changes are also anticipated in academic and research activities. North Korea researchers have attempted to secure primary data by participating in events hosted by overseas academic circles or international organizations, or by attempting direct interviews with figures from the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chochongryon) or North Korean individuals, but they faced institutional constraints. After the abolition, they can follow safe and predictable procedures within the legal framework, which can contribute to academic freedom and the improvement of the research environment.
Media and NGO activities are also likely to expand. For issues requiring on-site presence and credibility, such as North Korean human rights, separated families reunions, and humanitarian aid in border areas, securing direct testimonies and records is essential for policy design and shaping international public opinion. The abolition of the guidelines lowers the institutional barriers to on-site reporting and data collection, and can also provide momentum for joint projects with international NGOs.
The "Clear Concern" Clause Still Remains
The expansion of freedom of contact also entails side effects. Informal contact in third countries can be exploited as a channel for information dissemination. In the field of humanitarian aid, structural vulnerabilities such as restricted access and monitoring lead to limitations in verification, which in turn can result in risks for aid projects to North Korea. Furthermore, private networks could become informally powerful, or certain organizations could consolidate their control over information and connections with North Korea. In humanitarian aid projects, there have been numerous cases where the actual delivery of goods provided by private organizations to North Korea could not be verified, or where project transparency was compromised, by exploiting the North Korean side's preference for informal private channels over official ones. These loopholes can serve as breeding grounds for illicit activities.
The fundamental issue is that the ambiguity of the legal provisions still leaves room for discretionary interpretation. In particular, even after the abolition of the guidelines, legal ambiguities remain, raising concerns that the absence of clear judgment criteria could lead to passive judgments by administrative agencies or avoidance of political burdens. Article 9 of the current "Act on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation" still stipulates "clear concern" as a ground for revocation of approval. This, even in special cases, is effectively no different from a restriction, and this abstraction leaves room to justify ambiguity and arbitrary judgment.
Notably, the changes in North Korea's external strategy following its adoption of the "hostile two-state policy" are also noteworthy. While North Korea previously managed the nationality and status of Korean residents in Japan (Chochongryon) relatively strictly, it has recently shown moves to encompass even South Korean nationals. This includes including South Korean nationals in delegations visiting their homeland or inviting South Korean nationals to commemorative events for Koreans residing abroad and cultural art exchange programs. These trends can be interpreted as strategic moves to expand its network of human connections based on political attitudes and activity tendencies.
These changes can become new variables in judging contact. In the past, North Korean nationality or Korean resident status was the key determining factor, but now, regardless of nationality, political stance, activity history, and affiliated networks are emerging as factors that determine the scope of legal enforcement and application. The interpretation of 'North Korean residents' is no longer confined within clear boundaries. In the context of the abolished contact reporting guidelines, these strategic changes can act as a catalyst for rapid shifts in judgment criteria, and clear legal responses are necessary to maintain the safety and transparency of inter-Korean exchanges.
Although the guidelines have been criticized for their overly broad detailed provisions, the authority to decide on revocation of approval still rests with the administrative authorities even after their abolition. The same matter could lead to different conclusions depending on the political and diplomatic situation or the interpretation of the official in charge. What is more important than the existence or abolition of the guidelines is the concretization of legal standards. The liberalization of contact can serve as an opportunity to enhance the flexibility of inter-Korean relations, but its expansion based on unclear standards can lead to new conflicts and distrust. Without a sober internal reassessment and institutional readjustment, the same problems are highly likely to recur.
For substantive institutional improvement, the legal grounds for refusal must be specified, replacing ambiguous expressions with empirical and objective criteria. By codifying judgment criteria such as the purpose, content, means of contact, and the actual role of the contact person, consistency and predictability can be enhanced. The "clear concern" criteria in Article 9, Paragraph 7, Subparagraphs 3 and 4 of the "Act on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation" are broad and ambiguous, and can be used as grounds for arbitrary interpretation and enforcement by administrative agencies, unnecessary expansion of policy discretion, and evasion of responsibility by field staff.[3] Therefore, the uncertain expression "clear concern" should be revised or deleted, and supplementary provisions to address new types of threats should be prepared. For example, it could be limited to cases where there is an existing risk of provoking armed conflict between South and North Korea, or where the contact person is identified as a spy or agent by judicial authorities or is a member of an organization prohibited by court ruling. Exceptions should be established for humanitarian aid, academic research, and religious and cultural exchanges to ensure the autonomy of private activities.
Whom Do We Meet?
To ensure the effectiveness of the reporting system, public awareness campaigns to enhance public understanding and encourage voluntary reporting are also essential. As the purpose and procedures of the system have not been sufficiently communicated, making it difficult to build social trust, consistent application and enforcement of the law, along with clear procedural guidance, are paramount. The entire society must recognize that the reporting system is not merely an administrative procedure but a mechanism that guarantees public safety and security, as well as the sustainability of private exchanges.
The abolition of the "Guidelines for Processing Contact Reports with North Korean Residents" is both a deregulation and an opportunity for institutional readjustment. To translate into tangible results, the system must be operated based on legal concretization, transparent procedures, and public outreach. Inter-Korean cooperation should not be unconditional border dismantling but a process of institutionalizing mutual trust. For the freedom of contact not to end as a short-term achievement, this change must be used as a starting point for building a new order of cooperation and an institutional safety net. If the changes stabilize into steady achievements, contact will no longer be a risk but an asset of trust and coexistence. Now that the door to inter-Korean relations is open, society must collectively find answers to the questions of whom we are meeting and why we are seeking to meet them.■
References
Kim Ye-seul, "Minister of Unification Jeong Dong-young 'Fully Allows Private Contact with North Korea... Abolishes Restrictive Guidelines'," News1, July 31, 2025, https://www.news1.kr/diplomacy/unikorea/5865009
Ministry of Government Legislation National Law Information Center, "Act on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation," https://www.law.go.kr
Ministry of Unification Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation System, "Guide to Contacting North Korean Residents," https://www.tongtong.go.kr
[1] Ministry of Unification Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation System, "Guide to Contacting North Korean Residents," https://www.tongtong.go.kr
[2] Kim Ye-seul, "Minister of Unification Jeong Dong-young 'Fully Allows Private Contact with North Korea... Abolishes Restrictive Guidelines'," News1, July 31, 2025, https://www.news1.kr/diplomacy/unikorea/5865009
[3] Ministry of Government Legislation National Law Information Center, "Act on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation," https://www.law.go.kr
■ Author: Ha Seung-hee _Visiting Research Professor at the Institute for North Korean Studies, Dongguk University.
■ Managed and Edited by: Oh In-hwan_Senior Researcher, EAI; Jonghyuk Jung_Researcher, KNDA
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 202) | ihoh@eai.or.kr
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.