[Global NK Commentary] North Korea's Strategic Culture and the Hostile Two-State Doctrine

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There are various ways to infer how North Korea will respond to South Korea's North Korea policy. Understanding North Korea's strategic culture is one of them, and it can provide insights particularly related to the possibility that North Korea formulates its policies based on fundamentally different thinking from South Korea. Such insights offer a crucial starting point for preventing misjudgments and risks that may arise from the assumption that North Korea also formulates and pursues strategies based on the same hierarchy of value preferences (e.g., protecting peace, economic growth, public welfare) as South Korea.

Defining Strategic Culture

“Strategic culture” remains a contested concept. Here, it is defined as "the enduring ideas and habitual patterns of behavior regarding the role and efficacy of the use of military force in interstate political relations."[1]Strategic culture acts partly as a lens for policy decisions and partly as a lens for situational perception and judgment, shaping and providing a menu of policy choices available to actors in various situations. [2]North Korea's strategic culture was formed over the past 80 years through the process of doctrinalizing lessons learned from inter-Korean security competition, blending them with internal political necessities and North Korean elements, and shaping them into a popular narrative, based on the influence of Soviet/Russian and Chinese strategic cultures.[3]

Basic Framework: Hard Realpolitik

The core of North Korea's strategic culture is the ideology of hard realpolitik. Summarizing the content of various North Korean security-related documents from the perspective of forming an ideal type of strategic culture, North Korea's hard realpolitik strategic culture can be summarized in the following narrative.

The nature of the South Korean and US states is extremely greedy and threatening, thus the state of belligerence between the two Koreas is perpetual. The security threats posed by South Korea and the US cannot be resolved without destroying or forcing the surrender of the enemy states, South Korea and the US. In other words, North Korea's security is guaranteed only through superior military preparedness, the use of violence, and the destruction or surrender of the enemy states, South Korea and the US. These ultimate objectives can only succeed when strategic conditions are ripe. North Korea's security strategy must be conceived and executed with extreme flexibility to create these conditions. In particular, flexible strategies must be employed by calculating the opportunities and risks arising from changes in the nature of the South Korean and US regimes and the relative power balance between North Korea and the US. The best approach is to subdue South Korea and the US through a coercive strategy based on superior power and the offensive use of military force. However, if North Korea is at a disadvantage in the relative power balance (as a provisional measure until its strength is restored), it should pursue a less coercive and compromising strategy.

Five Implications of North Korea's Strategic Culture

First, in the North Korean logic framework, the distinction between offense and defense is meaningless, and all actions are justified as defensive. North Korea's basic logic is: 'We do not attack unless attacked. However, if attacked, we will inevitably counterattack.' The underlying logic supporting this claim is to attribute responsibility for reaching a 'state of war' to the other party by extremely exaggerating the aggressiveness of the relative enemy. Under these prior assumptions, offensive use of force, including preemptive strikes, and aggressive warfare are justified as defensive. Ultimately, North Korea's concept of defense is highly offensive. The hostile two-state doctrine serves as an example. According to the hostile two-state doctrine, the root cause of security instability on the Korean Peninsula is the US's aggressive war-mongering, and therefore, the peninsula has already reached a pre-war situation. This situational setting justifies North Korea's preemptive strikes and its nuclear annihilation and subjugation of South Korea in the event of an 'accidental war outbreak.'

Second, when a crisis occurs, North Korea maximizes the other party's fear of war by extremely exaggerating the risk of accidental war outbreak and its resolve to endure war, thereby inducing the other party's capitulation. North Korea has accumulated extensive experience and is well-trained in exaggerating threats and the risk of war outbreak. This belligerent tendency of North Korea, combined with the tendency of the ROK-US alliance to avoid armed conflict and war, and the partial inclination of some towards peace at all costs, creates an environment favorable for North Korea's control of the situation. Considering that crises between nuclear states fundamentally involve 'risk-taking competition,' this can serve as an advantage for North Korea in future nuclear crisis bargaining. This behavior is habitually repeated in North Korea's so-called 'brinkmanship' policy.

Third, North Korea engages in negotiations for two purposes. On a short-to-medium-term tactical level, it engages in negotiations as a means to buy time to alleviate external pressure and build strength until the situation becomes favorable, particularly when its own strength is weak and external pressure is strong. On a medium-to-long-term strategic level, negotiations and agreements aim to institutionalize the improved strategic position acquired through struggle up to that point, with the opponent's approval, thereby structuring a superior position in future conflicts with adversarial states. For example, from North Korea's perspective, various documents that emerged during the North Korean denuclearization negotiation process over the past 30 years were concluded with this objective. In reality, the nuclear-related agreements between the two Koreas and between North Korea and the US have been progressively structured in North Korea's favor over time, reflecting North Korea's advancements in nuclear capabilities.

Fourth, strategic deception and manipulation of perception. Strategic deception aims to foster the adversary's perception, morale, and policy choices by disseminating distorted images of reality and manipulating perceptions, thereby accelerating the achievement of its own objectives. Perception manipulation is one method of strategic deception. Perception manipulation, or reflexive control in Russian terminology, involves making the other party act favorably towards oneself based on a distorted perception of reality manipulated by oneself, without the other party realizing that its perception has been manipulated and while considering its actions based on the manipulated perception to be harmless to itself. For example, according to North Korea, the Korean War was an invasion by South Korea. Kim Il-sung stated in external remarks in 1992 and 1994 that North Korea was not developing nuclear weapons. Subsequently, a series of major South Korean political leaders claimed for a time that 'North Korea has no intention or capability to develop nuclear weapons' or 'North Korean nuclear weapons are for defense.' Furthermore, the Juche ideology has had a significant influence on progressive students and intellectuals in South Korea, particularly in the late 1980s and 1990s, and continues to do so, albeit weakened.

Fifth, absolute flexibility in strategy formulation and execution. Leaders select policies by calculating the nature of the adversarial opponent, changes in the balance of power, and the resulting continuous shifts in risks and opportunities. During periods of disadvantage in relative power, North Korea pursues cautious and careful policies of non-provocation and non-confrontation, akin to a calm sea. However, this non-confrontational stance is purely for tactical convenience. The non-confrontational posture during unfavorable periods is pursued to avoid excessive pressure from the opposing side while buying time to build strength. When the balance of power becomes favorable, North Korea's policies take on a confrontational and offensive character. For instance, for a long time in the 1990s and beyond, many Western experts believed North Korea's ultimate strategic goal was regime survival. However, from North Korea's perspective, the paramount policy objective was to avoid pressure and gain time and funds through moderate external policies until the acquisition of nuclear deterrence. This strategic conception was central to the 'military-first' policy (1995-2011). A significant background for North Korea's shift to a confrontational policy toward South Korea and the US around 2008/09 and its open acceleration of nuclear and missile development was the acquisition of credible nuclear weapons, i.e., nuclear deterrence, through the second nuclear test in 2009. One of the important backgrounds for North Korea's raising of the 'hostile two-state' doctrine is its acquisition of at least basic tactical nuclear war capabilities around 2023. Otherwise, threats of complete destruction, annihilation, and subjugation of South Korea would lack credibility.

The Hostile Two-State Doctrine and the Strategic Cultures of South and North Korea

Viewed through the lens of strategic culture theory, South and North Korea possess vastly contrasting strategic cultures. North Korea's 'hostile two-state doctrine in a state of belligerence' and the South Korean government's response to it illustrate how each political culture influences the policies of South and North Korea toward their respective adversaries in the current phase.

Regarding the North Korean side, first, the 'hostile two-state' doctrine is constructed by utilizing various conventional factors that constitute North Korea's strategic culture, as mentioned above. Second, North Korea's 'hostile two-state doctrine in a state of belligerence' can fundamentally be seen as a 'stonewalling' strategy toward South Korea. According to Russell J. Leng, 'stonewalling' is a rare, but available, option for states pursuing realist security policies. The core of this strategy is to reject all inducements offered by the other party while refraining from any attempts at influence oneself. [4]

A party that adopts 'stonewalling' maintains an unyielding stance while making no attempts, either coercive or compromising, toward the other party. The 'stonewalling' strategy is chosen when, on one hand, the other party stubbornly maintains a hostile stance and makes unacceptable excessive demands, and on the other hand, one lacks the means to influence the other party to change such behavior. National leaders may face only unacceptable choices and decide to do nothing rather than choose the lesser of evils. The 'stonewalling' strategy is chosen when one waits without doing anything, perhaps hoping for a situational improvement including third-party intervention, or is paralyzed by indecision, or dismisses the other party's proposals as insufficient for negotiation and prepares solely for war. [5]... States adopting such a strategy exhibit a very low level of external activity for a long time, their actions are primarily conflictual, and their responses are not swift. [6]States that adopt the 'stonewalling' strategy are generally those that are superior in military power and satisfied with the status quo. [7]

The 'stonewalling' strategy is passive in foreign policy but active in domestic policy. In short, it is about creating peace by "reducing contact with competitors"[8]and thus being able to pay more attention to internal development. In North Korea's case, it can perfect its society (in line with 'Our Nation First'), develop its economy, and strengthen its political order. Furthermore, in relative peace, North Korea can focus on developing its nuclear weapons indefinitely with reduced interference from South Korea. If pursued effectively, the 'stonewalling' strategy can completely terminate contact between conflict parties. As Waltz states regarding the 'withdrawal' strategy (from international relations), "the existence of conflict is deeply felt, but if the connection between the parties to the conflict is severed, it becomes impossible for the conflict to escalate into violence."[9]

In light of this, the four main positions in South Korea regarding the 'hostile two-state' doctrine are misjudgments. First, that the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's hardline policy toward North Korea was the most significant background for the emergence of the 'hostile two-state' doctrine, and therefore, if South Korea changes its North Korea policy to be more favorable, North Korea will also abandon the 'hostile two-state' doctrine. Second, by focusing on statements such as 'annihilation, complete destruction, and subjugation of South Korea,' the 'hostile two-state' doctrine is a manifesto and foreshadowing for escalating (nuclear) offense and threats against South Korea. [10]Third, by focusing on the rejection of 'compatriots' and 'unification' and a policy of masking hardline stances toward South Korea, the 'hostile two-state' doctrine is a product of fear of South Korea-led unification by absorption. [11]Fourth, Kim Yo-jong's statement toward South Korea on July 28 and toward the US on the 29th are products of an active intention to 'attempt to secure initiative by shaking the chessboard.' [12]

If the 'stonewalling' strategy is an uncommon choice, then South Korea's North Korea policy also represents an uncommon choice. Many countries have multiple strategic cultures, and South Korea's current North Korea policy reflects one of them. Its core is based on the principle of 'first action, then reward,' assuming North Korea is a benign status quo state and demonstrating South Korea's benignity toward such a North Korea, with the aim of establishing an incrementally cooperative relationship between the two. In the terminology of international politics, this policy is one of appeasement. This policy can succeed if North Korea's demands are limited and South Korea can meet them without incurring significant costs. The pitfalls inherent in this policy are twofold. First, if one party takes the other's appeasement for granted, it may lead to the assumption that even major provocations will go unpunished, or it may attempt to deliberately escalate tensions to gain greater concessions. In other words, this policy can provide an incentive for the other party to provoke even more. Second, while this policy may lower the tension level between the two parties in the short term, it can aid the other party in enhancing its future provocative capabilities during its implementation without external pressure. If North Korea's 'hostile two-state' doctrine is a 'stonewalling' strategy, it is highly likely that the second scenario will unfold, given North Korea's non-responsiveness to South Korea's calls for resuming inter-Korean relations. In any case, South Korea's appeasement policy toward North Korea creates an unexpectedly optimal environment for achieving the intended goals of North Korea's 'stonewalling' strategy. Although the possibility is low, North Korea might exercise 'strategic flexibility,' i.e., attempt to gain tactical advantages by responding to calls for resuming inter-Korean and inter-Korean-US relations. ■

References

Johnston, Alastair Iain. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Leng, Russell J. Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises: The Soviet-American, Egyptian-Israeli, and Indo-Pakistani Rivalries. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000.

———. Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816-1980: Realism versus Reciprocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Scobell, Andrew. “China`s Real Strategic Culture: A Great Wall of the Imagination.” Contemporary Security Policy 35, no. 2 (2014).

Snyder, Jack L. The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1977.

Waltz, Kenneth. Realism in International Politics. New York: Routledge, 2008.

Kim Jin-ha et al., *Analysis of the Kim Jong Un Regime's Shift in North Korea Strategy*. Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2024.

Jeong Yong-soo, “Kim Yo Jong Breaks 111-Day Silence... Is It a Cut-off or a Proposal?” *JoongAng Ilbo*, July 31, 2025.

Cheon Young-woo, “The Dilemma of the Lee Jae-myung Administration's North Korea Policy.” *Chosun Ilbo*, July 21, 2025.

[1] Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University 1995), p. 36.

[2] Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 8.

[3] Andrew Scobell, “China`s Real Strategic Culture: A Great Wall of the Imagination,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2014), p. 213.

[4] Russell J. Leng, Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816-1980: Realism versus Reciprocity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 143.

[5] Ibid., p. 143.

[6] Ibid., p. 145

[7] Russell J. Leng, Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises: the Soviet-American, Egyptian-Israeli, and Indo-Pakistani Rivalries (Ann Arbor: the University of Michigan Press, 2000), p. 29

[8] Kenneth Waltz, Realism in International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 35.

[9] Ibid., p. 31.

[10]Kim Jin-ha et al., *Analysis of the Kim Jong Un Regime's Shift in North Korea Strategy* (Korea Institute for National Unification, 2024).

[11]Cheon Young-woo, “The Dilemma of the Lee Jae-myung Administration's North Korea Policy,” *Chosun Ilbo*, 2025.7.21.

[12]Jeong Yong-soo, “Kim Yo Jong Breaks 111-Day Silence... Is It a Cut-off or a Proposal?” *JoongAng Ilbo* 2025.7.31.

■ Park Hyung-joong_Independent Researcher on North Korean Affairs.

■ Responsible Editor: Oh In-hwan_Senior Research Fellow, EAI; Jeong Jong-hyuk _Research Fellow, KNDA.

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