Presidents Who Struggle to Succeed: Focusing on the Cases of Future Strategy and Green Growth

Since initiating the project "Conditions for Presidential Success" in 2002, EAI has conducted the projects "Conditions for Successful Presidential Transition" (2007) and "Conditions for Presidential Success in 2013" (2012), proposing institutional measures for the desirable roles, powers, and responsibilities of the president every five years since democratization. On March 14, 2016, in anticipation of the 2017 presidential election, EAI invited Kim Sang-hyup, Chairman of the Future of Us (and Visiting Professor at the Graduate School of Green Growth, KAIST Business School), to hold the second roundtable for "Conditions for Presidential Success in 2018."

What Constitutes Success for a President? An Unclear Definition

Is a president with high approval ratings and popularity a successful president? If achievements and popularity were proportional, it would be a good metric, but is that truly the case? Is a president who, despite facing immediate hardship and difficulty, looks to the future and acts, thereby losing support and popularity, truly a failed leader? Is former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who adhered to unpopular policies through "Agenda 2010," ultimately lost the election, but is credited with curing Germany's malaise, a failed president? Surprisingly, the criteria for defining presidential success have never been properly discussed. This is due to the nature of the media and some academic circles, which have focused on the physical aspects of power and the various struggles and conflicts surrounding it. The true measure should be how much of what the president intended to achieve was accomplished, and how much it benefited the nation and its people. Furthermore, an additional criterion should be whether the achievements laid the foundation for continued development beyond the term of the administration. It is necessary to evaluate presidents based on whether they left public goods as a historical legacy.

Five Obstacles to Presidential Success

The external factors that make presidential success difficult are as follows:

First, there is a pervasive view of the president as a figure of power. This perspective is prevalent not only among the opposition party, media, and civil society but also within factions of the ruling party. This may have been true in the past. However, the position of president, as I have witnessed and experienced, is not as unconditionally powerful as it appears from the outside. The president's power, such as in personnel appointments, budget formulation, and agenda setting, was in reality exercised amidst numerous checks and balances and pressures.

Second, the rhetoric of the "imperial presidency" is a fallacy. Since the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the authority of the presidency has diminished, while the power of the National Assembly has grown to the extent that it is referred to as an "imperial congress." The so-called "National Assembly Advancement Act" has created a farce where a sitting president, having lost the ability to negotiate with the National Assembly, particularly the opposition, is forced to appeal for legislative passage by engaging in "signature politics." The influence of bureaucrats and interest groups is quietly but steadily expanding.

Third, the limitation of a term-bound administration. The single-term nature of the so-called "87 System," coupled with the abolition of the Economic Planning Board, inevitably led to "short-termism" in national policy. A peculiar network for maintaining the status quo has formed among political circles, bureaucrats, the chaebol, and labor unions, who have recognized the limitations of "transient administrations." This structure makes learning, accumulation, and progressive development in state administration realistically impossible.

Fourth, the mismatch between the terms of the president, National Assembly members, and local government heads, and their respective election cycles, further complicates the issue. According to the law, there is no limit to the consecutive terms for National Assembly members, and local government heads are guaranteed three consecutive terms, totaling 12 years. This institutionally hinders stable alliances between the president and ruling party political forces, and instead encourages centrifugal forces within the ruling party based on electoral advantages or disadvantages.

Finally, the syndrome of unconditional differentiation or denigration of the immediate past administration, regardless of its achievements or failures, is a factor that makes presidential success more difficult. Attempts at punishment even occur. By blocking or ignoring the space for former presidents' activities, respect for the presidency itself is undermined, and the experience gained in state administration is wasted. Ultimately, this compels the incumbent president to consider their post-presidency term during their tenure, thus diverting efforts from dedicated state administration.

An Uncharitable Evaluation of the Lee Myung-bak Administration, WHY?

It may be premature to objectively evaluate the Lee Myung-bak administration. However, it is true that domestic evaluations are more uncharitable than international ones. Even the achievement of overcoming the unprecedented global financial crisis in his first year in office is not properly recognized domestically. What is the reason for this? As is well known, former President Lee Myung-bak is from a business background. Upon taking office as president, he inwardly preferred the term "national management" over "state management." Entrepreneurs prioritize results over process. Overcoming difficulties through dedication to work and achieving desired outcomes is the virtue of an entrepreneur. However, as stated in "The West Wing," politics involves both "what it is" (the reality) and "what it looks like" (the perception). The Lee Myung-bak administration relatively neglected the latter aspect of state management. While perhaps an inevitable consequence of his entrepreneurial political acumen, there is a self-reflection that by focusing on results, the process management was insufficient.

Absence of Cooperative Governance Through Communication

The Four Major Rivers Project serves as a prime example. Despite its scale and importance, the Four Major Rivers Project lacked sufficient explanation of its objectives and methods, and a process for gathering opinions. Just as the construction of the Gyeongbu Expressway faced considerable controversy at the time but received proper evaluation upon completion, there was criticism that the Four Major Rivers Project was underpinned by a results-oriented mindset, assuming it would be properly evaluated by the public after completion.

In the era of authoritarian rule, efficiency and results overshadowed everything. However, in the post-87 system, where procedural democracy has become increasingly important, this is a point that warrants careful consideration. The cost paid for communication issues during the Lee Myung-bak administration was indeed substantial. Although public relations efforts were made, they were one-sided. There were also criticisms that the administration failed to achieve governance based on listening and cooperation. The abolition of the Ministry of Public Relations during the transition team's government restructuring and the failure to establish a separate civil society liaison organization at the beginning of the Blue House's tenure can be considered costly mistakes in this regard.

Insufficient Political Foundation Building Through Talent Recruitment

Another reason why the Lee Myung-bak administration received relatively unfavorable evaluations compared to its achievements is the insufficient political foundation building for "what it looks like." In other words, it neglected the cultivation of political human resources, such as National Assembly members. Although the National Assembly is the most powerful arena that can help or hinder a president's success, the Lee Myung-bak administration made absolutely insufficient efforts to nurture talent for the National Assembly. While it is important for the president to work diligently and well, building an infrastructure for persuasion and advocacy to make it appear so is equally important. In this regard, the Lee Myung-bak administration arguably brought disadvantages upon itself in the realm of perception and evaluation.

Future Strategy and Policy Sustainability: The Case of Green Growth

I would like to discuss the issue of policy sustainability using an example of work I was directly involved in. My primary task, assigned as the Special Advisor for Future Vision in the Office of the Senior Secretary for National Planning, was to establish a new national vision in 2008, the first year of the Lee Myung-bak administration, coinciding with the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Korea. To this end, in addition to establishing the 60th Anniversary of National Foundation Preparatory Committee, we created the Presidential Committee on Future Planning and a Global Advisory Committee. At the time, Korea faced three major chronic problems, which can be summarized as follows:

First, although the "Miracle on the Han River" had long ended, the nation remained stuck in the old growth paradigm, failing to find new growth engines. Second, with the deepening inter-party conflict and the entrenchment of the single-term system, short-term achievementism had become prevalent, leading to the disappearance of the foundation for mid- to long-term future strategies. Third, while Korea's hard power, including the export of manufactured goods, had reached a considerable level, its influence and standing in the international community were highly limited.

To overcome these challenges, a new development paradigm and new statecraft were needed. Climate change, which emerged as the greatest contemporary challenge, was recognized as an ideal subject for this purpose. Climate change, while undoubtedly a significant crisis, was seen as an opportunity for new growth if addressed properly. It was a bipartisan issue that transcended left-right divides, requiring mid- to long-term solutions, and offered the potential for global leadership if Korea took the lead in addressing it. This was the background against which President Lee Myung-bak, in his first year in office, transformed the negative agenda of climate change into the positive agenda of green growth in his Liberation Day address, elevating it to the highest national priority.

The international trend is green growth. However, Korea is moving in the opposite direction. With the change of government, green growth has become a near taboo. The Green Growth Committee, the core of promoting green growth, has been downgraded from a presidential committee to a committee under the Prime Minister's Office, rendering it ineffective. A report on Korea by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) stated that "policies prioritized by the previous administration are destined to become cobweb-covered" due to the current government's downgrading of green growth, evaluating it as such. As long as the current national governance system, which institutionalizes discontinuity rather than the accumulation of state affairs, persists, a successful presidency that leaves a historical legacy is impossible.

Kim Sang-hyupChairman of the Future of Us (and Visiting Professor at the Graduate School of Green Growth, KAIST Business School), previously served as Head of the Future Division at SBS, Co-Director of the Presidential Committee on Green Growth, Special Advisor for Future Vision at the Presidential Office, Special Advisor for Green Growth and Environment, and Director of Green Growth Planning at the Presidential Office.

Moderator

Lee Sook-jong, President of EAI, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University

Discussion

Kang Won-taek, Professor at Seoul National University

Kim Seok-ho, Professor at Seoul National University

Kim Jae-il, Professor at Dankook University

Kim Tae-young, Professor at Kyung Hee University

Na Tae-joon, Professor at Yonsei University

Park Won-ho, Professor at Seoul National University

Park Hyung-joon, Director of the EAI Center for Governance, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University

Lee Nae-young, Director of the EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center, Professor at Korea University

Han Gyu-seop, Professor at Seoul National University

Han Seung-joon, Professor at Seoul Women's University

Han Jeong-hoon, Professor at Seoul National University

Bae Jin-seok, Senior Researcher at EAI

Kim Bo-mi, Junior Researcher at EAI