[EAI Opinion Review] The Swing Voter's Choice in the 2012 Presidential Election?

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1. An Election Without Undecided Voters? The Problem is a Lack of Momentum for Change

A three-way balanced structure has persisted for a long time. There are diagnoses that this is an election without undecided voters. Compared to past elections, the proportion of undecided voters who state they have no preferred candidate has indeed decreased. However, does this mean there are no undecided voters? If so, it would imply this election will conclude with the current structure, but that is not the case. First and foremost, the direction of unification has not yet been decided, and a month of campaigning remains. The key factor to consider is the choice of swing voters, those who currently support a candidate but may switch their support later. We must consider the loyalty of current supporters and the strength of their commitment to their chosen candidate. Typically, once a candidate is chosen, voters rationalize their decision, and their support intensifies as election day approaches. Campaigning primarily focuses on reinforcing these support tendencies, while also incorporating strategies to convert undecided voters or supporters of opposing candidates into one's own base.

The current strength of support for the candidates and its trend indicate that there is a considerable number of swing voters who will determine the election's outcome. According to the second presidential panel survey (KEPS) conducted by EAI, SBS, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research on October 27, 79.6% of respondents reported strong support for their current candidate, while the remaining 20.3% indicated weak support. Furthermore, only 40.2% of all respondents felt their support for their current candidate had strengthened compared to September. The order of candidates by the size of their loyal support base is Park Geun-hye (83.0%) > Ahn Cheol-soo (79.1%) > Moon Jae-in (75.0%). In terms of strengthening support over the past month, the order is Park Geun-hye (44.7%) > Moon Jae-in (40.9%) > Ahn Cheol-soo (34.1%). Considering the approximately 10% undecided voters who have not yet chosen a candidate and the approximately 20% of potential swing voters with weak support, there are a total of about 30% undecided voters. Despite this, the reason the current election structure persists is not the absence of undecided voters, but rather the failure of the three candidates to provide incentives that would shift the preferences of these undecided voters. In other words, it is a result of a lack of incentives for changes in voter preference.

2. A Balance of Deficiencies

Candidate Park Geun-hye shows clear signs of indecision. Candidate Ahn Cheol-soo maintains an advantage in hypothetical matchups but is gradually losing ground to candidate Moon Jae-in in the race for a unified candidacy. Candidate Moon Jae-in, capitalizing on the simultaneous slump of candidates Park Geun-hye and Ahn Cheol-soo after his nomination, has secured an advantageous position in the race for a unified candidacy, but his victory in the general election is not guaranteed.

Park Geun-hye's Stumbling Steps

Although candidate Park Geun-hye has halted her continuous decline in approval ratings since the "September shock," the situation where she held an advantage against anyone in one-on-one hypothetical matchups before August now feels like a distant memory. She trails behind candidate Ahn Cheol-soo and is in a close race within the margin of error against candidate Moon Jae-in. Ahead of the April 11 general election, when the Saenuri Party was considered unlikely to win even 100 seats and 121 seats were deemed a victory, the party achieved an unexpected result of a solo majority by advocating "self-reflection and self-reform" and "restoration of trust." This reversed a trend where she trailed candidate Ahn Cheol-soo by about 15 percentage points. In this process, Kim Chong-in, a symbol of economic democratization sought after by the opposition, took the lead in the election campaign, spearheading revisions to party bylaws. The young emergency committee members, Lee Jun-seok and Son Soo-jo, conveyed the Saenuri Party's will for reform, going beyond mere token representation. Although she lost the lead due to internal conflicts and noise during the party's nomination process, her "wide-ranging campaign" in August and subsequent activities garnered public support, securing her advantage over other candidates.

That was the extent of it. Subsequently, a confluence of three misfortunes—a belated apology regarding the May 16th incident, side-dish corruption during the April 11 nomination process, and the clumsy negative campaigning by spokesperson Jung Jong-gil—led to a renewed decline in approval ratings. Results showed her trailing both candidate Ahn Cheol-soo and candidate Moon Jae-in. The appointment of Kim Moo-sung as the Saenuri Party's chief campaign manager and efforts to improve relations with candidate Chung Mong-joon helped stabilize the situation and prevent further decline, but her subsequent actions have been entirely different from her "broad campaign" in August. Lee Jun-seok and Son Soo-jo have disappeared, while figures like former party leader Han Kwang-ok from the Donggyodong faction, and conservative politicians such as Lee In-je, the leader of the Progressive United Party, and Lee Hoi-chang and Shim Dae-pyung, have come to the forefront. This raises suspicions of a return to the theory of conservative unity. The "female president" narrative, which should only be a secondary theme, has become the core campaign strategy for candidate Park Geun-hye's camp. In short, it is difficult to discern a consistent concept that runs through her recent actions. The issue of "NLL" (Northern Limit Line), which should showcase her administrative and security capabilities, has been reduced to a moral attack regarding the existence of secret records. As first raised in our August issue, it is a natural strategy to seek the mobilization of the 50-60 age group, which has increased by 5.7 million voters compared to a decade ago, and the conservative base, which has not yet fully coalesced. However, if the core of national unity and reformist conservatism, which she has consistently advocated and which has been proven by public support, is shaken, her path to victory through her own strength will likely become distant. The conservative base in South Korea does not constitute a majority.

Ahn Cheol-soo's Precarious Lead

Candidate Ahn Cheol-soo, who has maintained a leading position in approval ratings for over a year since the "Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon" in September 2011, without making any official statements, still holds significant support in multi-candidate races and maintains the lead in one-on-one matchups. This reflects the public's deep yearning for new politics and their profound distrust of the existing political establishment.

However, since declaring his candidacy for president just before the Chuseok holiday, Ahn Cheol-soo has had to witness the defection of some of his supporters, rather than solidifying the "Ahn wind" that had supported him for over a year into a strong political foundation. According to the results of the first (August) and second (October) KEPS presidential panel surveys by EAI, SBS, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research, which included 1,317 participants, 128 out of 410 respondents who supported Ahn Cheol-soo in the August survey had defected, representing 31.2%. His approval rating dropped from 31.1% to 27.6%. Candidate Moon Jae-in saw only 26 out of 186 supporters from the August survey defect (14.0%), and candidate Park Geun-hye had 85 defectors out of 533 supporters (15.9%). Among those who left Ahn Cheol-soo's support base, 33.9% cited concerns about his administrative capabilities, followed by 17.3% who cited concerns about his electability. While many citizens supported Ahn Cheol-soo's ideas, questions were raised about his administrative competence and practical strength.

The most significant issue is that the "political integration" and "politics of consensus" that represented the political reform direction, which had garnered public support during his presidential primary announcement, have not been concretely realized in subsequent political reform proposals and campaign activities. Instead, the subsequent concrete political reform proposals have focused on reducing the power and authority of political parties and the presidency, such as abolishing central party nominations, relocating the presidential office, and reducing the number of National Assembly members. However, no follow-up measures have been proposed to address the negative politics, factionalism, and polarization that the public finds tiresome. Lee Hun-jae, former Minister of Finance and Economy, who was highly anticipated at the time of his candidacy announcement and expected to complement Ahn Cheol-soo's perceived lack of administrative experience, was relegated to an advisory role due to criticism from the opposition and progressive camps. This contrasts with the firm defense of former Minister Yoon Yeo-joon's recruitment by the Moon Jae-in camp. Furthermore, the anxiety about candidate Ahn Cheol-soo is primarily concentrated among voters in their 40s and older (50s-60s), yet the campaign activities have been limited to lectures and rallies centered around voters in their 20s and 30s. This has been a decisive factor in losing ground to candidate Moon Jae-in among the increasingly influential 50-60 age group and the pivotal 40s demographic.

Moon Jae-in: Falling Short by 2% Despite Rising Momentum

During August-September, when both other candidates experienced a plateau in their approval ratings, candidate Moon Jae-in closed the gap, nearly catching up to candidate Ahn Cheol-soo, and demonstrated considerable competitiveness in one-on-one matchups against candidate Park Geun-hye. With stable campaign management, a consistent approach to unification, and decisive actions such as forgoing 15 billion won in state subsidies, he currently holds an advantage in the ongoing campaign. However, he is still 2% short. The issue arises when considering his potential candidacy in the general election after winning the unified candidacy race. Compared to candidate Ahn Cheol-soo, he faces a veto from centrist undecided voters and a negative reaction from the Honam region. A cross-analysis of one-on-one matchups between Park vs. Ahn and Park vs. Moon reveals the following voter types: ① Non-Moon/Non-Ahn supporters (41.8%), ② Ahn supporters/Non-Moon supporters (10.6%), ③ Moon supporters/Non-Ahn supporters (6.3%), and ④ Ahn supporters/Moon supporters (41.2%). While the proportion of voters who will not support either Ahn or Moon, and those who will support either Ahn or Moon, are similar, the group that will support Ahn Cheol-soo as the unified candidate but vote for someone else if Moon Jae-in is the candidate is 4.3 percentage points larger than the group that supports Moon Jae-in but not Ahn Cheol-soo. In a situation where even the 1-2% support for progressive parties like the Unified Progressive Party and the People's Party is predicted to influence the outcome, a 4.3% veto margin against candidate Moon Jae-in represents a significant handicap.

This veto group exceeds the average of 10.6%, with 23.9% among undecided voters, 14.7% among centrist voters, 15.1% among voters in their 20s, and 16.0% among voters in their 30s. Notably, in the Honam region, it reaches 18.5%, appearing to reflect antipathy towards the pro-Roh Moo-hyun image. In fact, during a focus group discussion with voters in their 40s in the Seoul metropolitan area, commissioned by a media outlet, the most significant weakness identified for candidate Moon Jae-in was his "pro-Roh" image. There is a prevailing perception that he has failed to offer unique alternatives and visions that transcend the economic polarization and the deterioration of livelihoods, which worsened during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, and the unproductive conflicts between ruling and opposition parties. Excluding the Honam region, where relative deprivation increased during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, a significant portion of centrist undecided voters and those in their 20s and 30s, who harbor distrust towards both the Saenuri Party and the Democratic Party, exhibit a relatively strong veto sentiment against candidate Moon Jae-in. To overcome this barrier, bold reforms for the comprehensive renewal and trust-building of the Democratic Party are essential. However, instead of the resignation of nine pro-Roh figures from the election committee, the issue of having leaders Lee Hae-chan and Park Jie-won step back has been left to him, with no further developments.

Source: EAI·Korea Research Regular Survey (2012.10.27)

3. Election Variables Through the Lens of Swing Voter Groups: Prospects for the 40s and Metropolitan Area Vote

Can Park Geun-hye Limit the Gap to Within 8 Percentage Points in the 40s?

The current strategy of the Park Geun-hye camp, which focuses on consolidating conservative support primarily among the 50-60 age group, aims to offset the deficit in the 20-30s and 40s demographics by leveraging the advantage in the 50-60s cohort, which has increased by 5.7 million voters compared to a decade ago. Considering the relatively high voter turnout among the 50-60s, this strategy may not be entirely flawed, and recent media reports have presented simulation results supporting this view. Indeed, there have been reports suggesting that even if the opposition candidates unify and Park Geun-hye trails slightly in current approval ratings, she would still hold an advantage. These reports are not entirely incorrect.

However, the issue lies with the 40s demographic. The 50-60s and 20-30s age groups exhibit relatively small fluctuations in their support ratings. The dominant support structure remains: the 50-60s overwhelmingly support candidate Park Geun-hye, while the 20-30s support candidates Ahn or Moon. These simulations, similar to the method first attempted in our August issue, calculate results by applying the generational voting rates from past elections to the generational approval ratings from current surveys. They serve as a simplified model to illustrate how outcomes can vary depending on generational approval ratings and turnout, rather than providing precise estimations. Specifically, generational voting rates can be simplified into two models: the low turnout of the 2007 presidential election and the high turnout of the 2002 presidential election. However, generational approval ratings differ across survey institutions, and particularly for the 40s, a key swing voter demographic, significant variations exist not only between institutions but also depending on the survey timing.

Source: EAI·Korea Research Regular Survey (2012.10)

Comparing major institutional surveys released from October to early November, the approval rating gap between candidate Park Geun-hye and candidate Ahn Cheol-soo generally ranges from a minimum of 2.6 percentage points (SBS/TNS, Oct 17-18) to a maximum of 9.8 percentage points (EAI/Korea Research, Oct 27). The gap in voter turnout among the 40s ranges from a minimum of 1.2 percentage points (SBS/TNS, Oct 17-18) to a maximum of 15.6 percentage points (KBS/Media Research) (Table 2). Based on the approval ratings of the 40s, let's compare the simulation results using the generational voting rates from the 16th presidential election, considering the SBS October survey, which showed the smallest gap in approval ratings for the 40s between Park Geun-hye and the unified candidate (here, we use Ahn Cheol-soo's ratings, as he has higher relative support and absorption capacity), the KBS/Media Research October 28-29 survey, which showed the largest gap, and the KBS/Media Research October 5-6 survey, which showed an intermediate gap in the 40s approval ratings. While the differences between these three surveys are not significant for overall approval ratings and the 50-60s and 20-30s demographics, the substantial difference in the 40s approval ratings helps in roughly estimating the vote share differences between candidate Park Geun-hye and the unified candidate based on changes in the 40s approval ratings.

First, when applying the generational voting rates from the 16th presidential election, which had high turnout, to the generational approval ratings from the SBS October survey, where the approval rating gap in the 40s was smallest, the calculation for the vote share between candidate Park Geun-hye and the unified candidate shows Park trailing in overall approval ratings at 44.7% versus 47.3%. However, in terms of total votes, Park Geun-hye leads by approximately 469,000 votes. This outcome is attributed to the increase in the 50-60s demographic and the reduced approval rating gap in the 40s. Conversely, based on the KBS/Media Research late October survey, where the approval rating gap in the 40s widened to 15.6 percentage points, and applying the generational voting rates from the 16th presidential election, Park Geun-hye trails by 5.2 percentage points in overall approval ratings (43.1% vs. 48.3%), and the unified candidate wins by approximately 308,000 votes.

What, then, is the inflection point that determines the outcome between candidate Park Geun-hye and the unified candidate? The KBS/Media Research early October survey, where the unified candidate led by 8.7 percentage points in the 40s, shows an overall approval rating of 44.8% for Park Geun-hye and 48.1% for the unified candidate, a 3.7 percentage point lead for the unified candidate. However, applying the generational voting rates from the 16th presidential election reveals that the unified candidate leads by approximately 38,000 votes. This indicates that when the gap in the 40s is less than 9%, the vote difference between the two candidates is nearly equal. Assuming other generational approval ratings remain constant at this point, candidate Park Geun-hye must narrow the gap in the 40s to at least within 8.7 percentage points. Looking at candidate Park Geun-hye's approval ratings in the 40s in [Figure 4], she maintained equivalent approval ratings with candidate Ahn Cheol-soo in the May survey that led to the Saenuri Party's victory in the April 11 general election. However, during the period of intensified internal party conflict in the Saenuri Party's nomination process, the approval rating gap in the 40s widened. During the "integration campaign" in August, it narrowed to about 2.2 percentage points. But subsequently, as candidate Park Geun-hye's integration and reform efforts became erratic and she focused on consolidating the conservative base, the approval rating gap in the 40s widened to double digits. Ultimately, the recent campaign strategy centered on consolidating the conservative base risks widening the approval rating gap among the 40s, who desire integration and reform, thereby increasing the possibility of victory for the unified candidate despite overwhelming support from the 50-60s demographic.

Variable 2: Can the PK Vote Offset the Gap in the Metropolitan Area?

The second remaining variables are the voter preferences in the metropolitan area, the largest swing region, and the PK (Busan-Gyeongnam) region, which is expected to show the most significant change in the 2012 presidential election compared to previous elections. First, looking at the regional composition of the electorate in [Table 6], the metropolitan area, with nearly half of the total population (Seoul 20.9%, Incheon-Gyeonggi 28.5%), generally favors candidates Ahn Cheol-soo and Moon Jae-in and is a representative swing region where the leading candidate has changed in every election. Chungcheong, Daegu-Gyeongbuk, and the entire Honam region each constitute about 10%. Gangwon-Jeju accounts for about 4.2%. Current approval ratings show the opposition candidates leading in the metropolitan area and Honam, while candidate Park Geun-hye leads in Chungcheong, Daegu-Gyeongbuk, Gangwon, and Jeju. In the Honam region, although the population proportion is similar to Daegu-Gyeongbuk, it shows overwhelming support for opposition candidates and the highest voter turnout based on the 16th presidential election voting rates. Conversely, in the Daegu-Gyeongbuk region, candidate Park Geun-hye has overwhelming support, but voter turnout is relatively low, and the vote share for opposition candidates exceeds that of candidate Park Geun-hye in the Honam region. Therefore, assuming the vote difference in the Honam region can be compensated for in the Daegu-Gyeongbuk, Chungcheong, and Gangwon/Jeju regions, the final outcome is likely to be determined by the vote counts in the metropolitan area and the Busan/Gyeongnam region. Crucially, the extent of support variation in these two regions is relatively large depending on whether candidate Ahn Cheol-soo or candidate Moon Jae-in becomes the unified candidate. In regional analyses with a sample size of 1,000, regions with an electorate share of about 10% require analysis with only about 100 samples, leading to excessively large margins of error. To view regional public opinion more accurately, surveys with larger sample sizes must be utilized. Therefore, we will examine the results of the 3,000-person survey conducted by SBS/TNS on November 2-3.

In other regions, whether Ahn Cheol-soo or Moon Jae-in becomes the unified candidate, Ahn Cheol-soo generally holds a slight advantage, but the overall difference is not significant. However, a substantial difference emerges in the metropolitan area. First, in the Seoul region, both Ahn Cheol-soo and Moon Jae-in lead candidate Park Geun-hye. In the Gyeonggi-Incheon region, candidate Ahn Cheol-soo leads candidate Park Geun-hye, but candidate Moon Jae-in trails behind candidate Park Geun-hye. To examine the difference more intuitively, we calculated the vote counts by weighting the regional approval ratings from the SBS survey with the regional voting rates from the 16th presidential election, which had relatively high turnout, according to the number of electors in each region. In a Park Geun-hye vs. Ahn Cheol-soo contest, Ahn Cheol-soo leads by 2 million votes in Honam and, after offsetting Park Geun-hye's advantage in Daegu-Gyeongbuk, Chungcheong, and Gangwon-Jeju, has a surplus of approximately 300,000 votes. Conversely, combining Seoul and Gyeonggi-Incheon, Ahn Cheol-soo has an advantage of over 1.7 million votes, but Park Geun-hye only recovers about 600,000 votes in the Busan-Gyeongnam region, resulting in an overall advantage of about 1.4 million votes for Ahn Cheol-soo.

On the other hand, if candidate Moon Jae-in runs, he holds a 1.95 million vote advantage in Honam, while Park Geun-hye maintains a slight advantage of about 130,000 votes by leading in Daegu-Gyeongbuk (1.6 million votes), Chungcheong (280,000 votes), and Gangwon-Jeju (200,000 votes). In the metropolitan area, Seoul favors Moon Jae-in by about 300,000 votes, but Gyeonggi-Incheon favors Park Geun-hye by about 180,000 votes, nearly eliminating the vote gap in the metropolitan area. Consequently, in this scenario, Park Geun-hye gains an advantage equivalent to her lead in the Busan-Gyeongnam region. Ultimately, if the opposition unifies behind candidate Ahn Cheol-soo, the strategy of regional vote distribution is highly advantageous in the metropolitan area and Busan-Gyeongnam. If they unify behind candidate Moon Jae-in, the primary challenge becomes fully absorbing the supporters of candidate Ahn Cheol-soo in the metropolitan area and Busan-Gyeongnam. Conversely, for candidate Park Geun-hye, if the opposition unifies behind candidate Ahn Cheol-soo, failing to narrow the support gap in the metropolitan area, particularly in Gyeonggi-Incheon, to a comparable level and allowing a gap of over 10% would lead to a highly pessimistic situation, regardless of the margin gained in Busan-Gyeongnam. On the other hand, if the opposition unifies behind candidate Moon Jae-in, given the current regional support structure, the votes from the PK region are more than sufficient to offset the deficit in the metropolitan area, placing her in a relatively advantageous position.

4. Conclusion

Although the three-way race has continued intensely for a month following candidate Ahn Cheol-soo's announcement of his candidacy and the rise of candidate Moon Jae-in, the analysis that undecided voters have decreased and the current structure has solidified is not valid. While the number of undecided voters who have not yet decided on a candidate is not large, the number of swing voters who have changed their preferred candidate during the past process is considerable. Furthermore, approximately 15-25% of current supporters for each candidate have low support intensity, making them potential undecided voters. Moreover, the process of unification involves the potential for voter fluidity as supporters of the losing candidate shift their allegiance. Conversely, if unification is successfully achieved, there is a possibility of defections among candidate Park Geun-hye's supporters with weak loyalty.

In particular, the 40s demographic and the swing voters in the metropolitan area, which have shown the greatest fluctuations compared to other groups in past elections and the current election, retain the potential for significant shifts depending on the range of approval rating changes and who is selected as the unified candidate. Candidate Park Geun-hye is faltering, having lost consistency in her campaign strategy, while the opposition faces the major event of candidate unification. However, supported by the "Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon" and maintaining a lead for over a year, candidate Ahn Cheol-soo has failed to alleviate voters' concerns about his administrative capabilities since the official campaign began. Candidate Moon Jae-in, who surged due to the backlash against others, has shown relative stability during the campaign, laying the groundwork for a comeback, but has seen his momentum wane due to a failure to expand support among centrist undecided voters. No one candidate has the strength to secure victory independently; it is a state of balanced deficiencies. Above all, the impending unification is the first major test likely to break this balance. If the current balance persists even after that, the 2012 presidential election will ultimately be decided by the final choice of undecided voters, who will confirm their preferred candidate only as the election approaches, and by their decision to vote. In such a scenario, we may witness a nail-biting, unpredictable contest until the vote count is complete. ■