Conditions for a Successful Presidency: Experiences and Lessons

In response to the evolving demands of the era following democratization in Korea, EAI has, through projects such as "Conditions for a Successful Presidency" in 2002 and "Conditions for a Successful Presidential Transition" in 2007, sought institutional measures concerning the desirable roles, powers, and responsibilities of the president. Currently, there is an urgent need to establish stable institutional frameworks for the increasing political participation and communication demands arising from the changing political environment due to the spread of SNS technology.

Accordingly, EAI has planned "Conditions for a Successful Presidency in 2013" to examine the performance and methods of state administration by past governments and to explore the conditions for forming governability that aligns with the new political environment and for successfully fulfilling the presidential duties.

On July 27, 2012, we held the 7th roundtable, inviting Professor Sung Kyung-ryung (Hallym University), who served as the Chief Policy Advisor to the President during the Participatory Government. The main points of the meeting are summarized as follows.

Currently, the presidential election process is underway in our society. Most people focus solely on the election process to win power, neglecting state administration after taking office. However, the five-year presidential term is by no means a simple matter. It requires a blueprint for state administration and a capable team of individuals. State administration involves significant changes and internal conflicts that cannot be managed solely by the fervor of an election campaign. Furthermore, under a single term system, all governments inevitably experience trial and error due to a lack of experience. This implies that a new government must consider numerous factors to successfully carry out its duties. So, what is required to become a successful president? While a clear answer is difficult to find, we can draw several important lessons from past experiences.

Presidential Philosophy of Governance and the Spirit of the Times

To be historically evaluated as a successful president, regardless of who holds the office, a strong belief in universal human values must be a prerequisite. These universal values include freedom, equality, solidarity, peace, and coexistence, with varying emphasis depending on the individual. President Lee Myung-bak's approach appeared to lean towards freedom, market principles, competition, and realism, while President Roh Moo-hyun emphasized freedom, equality, and solidarity. Moving forward, progressive democracy can be presented as a future direction. This approach is based on democracy, aiming ultimately for coexistence through social solidarity and peace. Coexistence has both short-term and long-term aspects.

Achieving coexistence necessitates higher taxes and expanded welfare, which inevitably entails conflict. As American history demonstrates, Republican administrations' policies of tax cuts, deregulation, and market-oriented approaches inevitably lead to unequal distribution. Before the Great Depression, 50% of wealth was concentrated in the top 10%; this decreased and then increased again after Reagan, reaching 50% by 2008. Such severe inequality threatens the sustainability of society. While beneficial for the upper class in the short term, it is detrimental to everyone in the long run.

Therefore, achieving coexistence will make overcoming short-term conflicts a critical political challenge. The state must intervene when the market excessively increases inequality and creates a structure that makes long-term societal sustainability difficult. If the state fails to manage distribution issues effectively through policy, severe risks will inevitably arise in the future. Regardless of which party takes office, the next administration will have to address issues of distribution and ideological identity, which entail extreme conflict, making the president's philosophy of governance even more crucial. The president must accurately discern the spirit of the times by understanding historical circumstances, socioeconomic conditions, and public demands. The most significant issues at present are inequality, inter-Korean confrontation, and security anxieties; thus, the direction of the spirit of the times should be set towards equality, peace, and coexistence.

Presidential Election Process and Transition Preparation

The presidential election process and the transition preparation period are crucial for a successful presidency. Presidential candidates and their campaign teams face a significant learning curve. Capturing the spirit of the times or presenting policy directions is insufficient; extensive preparation is required to establish policy lines and concretely design core policies. During the election campaign, campaign teams are formed, and the framework for the state administration system for the early stages of the government is effectively established. Campaign teams are composed of highly fluid and variable political groups, a mix of hierarchy, networks, and market dynamics. A campaign team is a complex entity comprising the presidential candidate, political and policy lines, and diverse personal networks. Notably, numerous individuals flock to campaign teams, and heterogeneous forces strive to implement their ideas, while members of political alliances demand compensation for their contributions. This process involves expansion, division, and re-expansion of political forces, and this chaotic process continues even after the presidential election. Since individuals from the campaign team enter the Presidential Transition Committee and the Blue House, the capabilities, loyalty, public service ethos, and sense of mission of the talent pool formed during the election campaign are of paramount importance.

Ultimately, the success of the government in its initial phase hinges on how wisely the president-elect selects and places individuals in appropriate positions and clarifies policy directions. Often, during the election process, candidates form political alliances with various political forces and social groups to expand their political base. However, the more excessive promises are made or heterogeneous elements are incorporated for victory, the more likely conflicts over ideology and interests are to arise after taking office. Therefore, it is essential to form a minimum winning coalition during the election process and to exercise restraint in forming a maximum winning coalition.

Presidential Transition Committee Stage

During the presidential transition phase, a rigorous re-examination of the numerous policy pledges made during the election campaign must be conducted. It is necessary for the president-elect at this stage to coolly determine which tasks will be pursued after taking office, which will be abandoned, and which new tasks will be undertaken. It is advisable to distinguish between what can be done and what cannot, considering the demands of the times and feasibility, and to finalize a policy package within an appropriate scope.

Furthermore, since the first appointments of the new government shape the policy framework for five years, early appointments are extremely important. However, in Korea, the pool of talent possessing value orientation, public service ethos, and expertise is very limited, whether within the progressive or conservative camps. Consequently, bureaucrats tend to be heavily utilized in early appointments, as utilizing bureaucrats with administrative expertise offers the advantage of minimizing major policy implementation errors. However, excessive reliance on the bureaucratic group poses a challenge in realizing the new president's philosophy of governance or policy direction. In this regard, appropriate personnel principles regarding the bureaucratic group are required, and it is necessary to appoint ministers from outside the bureaucracy for approximately one-half to two-thirds of the positions in the initial appointments.

To implement the core policies of the new government, structural designs, including budget planning, must be established early in the administration. For instance, expanding welfare or education policies requires difficult fiscal expenditure restructuring, such as reducing infrastructure spending. This process is fraught with conflicts due to intertwined interests within and outside the government. Therefore, if a precise plan is not prepared and implemented swiftly in the first half of the first year of the administration, difficulties will arise. The Participatory Government's "Vision 2030," formulated in 2006, the fourth year of its term, was not actually realized. For the successful implementation of presidential agendas, the framework must be clearly established during the election campaign, and the plan must be finalized during the transition committee period. In this respect, the organizational structure of the early Blue House is also very important, and thorough preparation for this must be made during the transition committee stage.

Blue House Organizational Structure

The core mission of the Blue House organization is to execute the historical mandate (so-called presidential projects) that a specific government must fulfill, to plan and coordinate overall state affairs, and to prevent and respond to national crises. In this regard, the Blue House advisory organization must consider the following points.

First, for the Blue House to function as a control tower for state affairs, its organizational design must focus on the overall planning and coordination of state administration. In today's increasingly layered and complex governance environment, a vertical and fragmented command-and-control style of state administration, proceeding from the president to senior secretaries and then to administrative ministries, is highly risky. Planning requires information sharing above all else, and it is crucial to note that horizontal information sharing is difficult in a vertical and fragmented command-and-control structure. Since information is power, if it is left to the bureaucratic group, the necessary information sharing will not occur properly. As each ministry attempts to plan independently, the Blue House becomes overwhelmed with information, leading to obstacles. The e-Governance system of the Participatory Government facilitated smooth information sharing and effective coordination.

Second, it is desirable to establish the Blue House organization as a dual system of a Secretariat and a Policy Office, or a tri-part system of Secretariat-Policy Office-National Security Office. This is because the scope of policy that the Blue House must handle is very broad, making it difficult for an individual or a single organization to manage. Furthermore, a system of coordination and cooperation must be established among the Blue House, the Prime Minister's Office, and administrative ministries. From the perspective of administrative ministries, having both the Blue House and the Prime Minister's Office responsible for coordination can lead to dual messages being conveyed. Therefore, the Blue House should only handle the strategic aspects of state administration. Important consultations and coordination occur during the weekly meetings between the president and the prime minister, where an appropriate division of roles can be determined. Coordination between the Blue House Policy Office and the Prime Minister's Office's Ministry for Government Policy Coordination is also important. The issue of dual messaging arises because these coordination and consultation systems do not function properly.

Third, it is necessary to utilize the principles of matrix organization to handle inter-ministerial joint tasks. Within a matrix linkage connecting the Blue House Policy Office, National Task Force Committees, and administrative ministries, the Policy Office would be responsible for overall management, while separate National Task Force Committees would jointly plan core national tasks with multiple ministries and monitor their progress. Each ministry functions independently, but multiple ministries would jointly consult, plan, share information, and pursue joint tasks that transcend individual ministries through committees. However, committees have their drawbacks, so wisdom is needed to utilize them effectively. Considering the experience of the Participatory Government, which was criticized as a "committee republic," it would be advisable to establish approximately three to five core presidential committees for national tasks. Committees related to specific policies could be established within individual ministries.

Fourth, actively consider adopting a "collective team management system" for key policy areas. Examples include the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Economic Council (NEC) of the White House in the United States. The NEC, established during the Clinton administration, is considered because, similar to foreign affairs and national security, the economic domain is highly complex, requires rapid information sharing, and necessitates a team-based response in emergencies. Even economic experts find it difficult to successfully perform the roles of ministers and vice ministers in economic affairs. Today's national economic issues require comprehensive handling of finance, foreign exchange, credit, exports, and energy, demanding accurate information and experience. It also requires the ability to cooperate swiftly with financial institutions when necessary, which is challenging for one person to manage entirely. Consequently, the economic bureaucracy tends to take the lead, and the government's intended economic management direction may be lost. Therefore, there is a need to consider a collective management system like the NEC.

Fifth, the assistant system proposed by the East Asia Institute (EAI) needs to be thoroughly re-examined. While separating secretaries and assistants may be theoretically desirable, applying it directly to our current reality presents difficulties, necessitating the search for new alternatives.

Government Organization Reform

Government organization reform should be undertaken to create an organization that aligns with the new government's state administration goals and reflects the demands of governmental functions in response to changing times. The next administration needs organizational reform to address the dysfunctions of government organizations, such as the tendency towards large ministries, inter-ministerial departmentalism, and the absence of horizontal policy coordination. Organizational reform for integrated and collective management by policy area can also be considered. However, to prevent administrative chaos and maintain continuity in state affairs, government organizational reform should be conducted within the minimum necessary scope. Specifically, areas requiring organizational reform at present include education and science/technology, finance/planning/monetary policy, small and medium-sized enterprises, knowledge economy and information/communication, and energy/environment. A decision must be made on whether to combine education and science/technology into a single ministry. The finance/planning/monetary policy sector is too large and requires separation or readjustment. The small and medium-sized enterprise sector needs strengthening to foster economic democratization and create new drivers for economic growth.

Furthermore, the knowledge economy and information/communication sectors should be separated due to their distinct nature. Debates are ongoing regarding whether the energy sector should remain within the Ministry of Knowledge Economy as it is now, or be separated and combined with the environment. Additionally, the need for collective management at the cabinet level is increasing. In particular, it is necessary to consider reviving the Deputy Prime Minister system, focusing on economic policy, social policy, science/technology/energy/environment, and security/safety, or introducing a senior minister system by sector to ensure cooperation among related ministries.

Points to Note

For the successful execution of presidential duties, attention must be paid not only to institutional aspects but also to the following practical issues.

First, the reality of a "sub-government" operating must be taken into account. In almost all policy areas, powerful interest alliances have formed, connecting government bureaucrats, large conglomerates, National Assembly members, and interest groups. For successful state administration, it is necessary to be aware of and guard against the fact that policy processes are frequently and significantly influenced by these sub-governments.

Second, emphasis must be placed on conflict prevention and management. As policy can be defined as conflict, almost all policies involve conflict. When strong political and social resistance arises against policies that the government intends to pursue vigorously, not only is the implementation of those policies threatened, but obstacles also arise for the implementation of other policies. Therefore, with the understanding that "the core of policy implementation is conflict management," concentrated efforts must be made to prevent, minimize, and resolve conflicts. From the planning stage of a policy, serious consideration must be given to what conflicts may arise, how to prevent them, and how to respond. In this regard, the "three- 협 (cooperation) strategy" of collaboration, consultation, and agreement was successfully applied to the Participatory Government's policy of relocating public institutions, which contained extreme potential for conflict, and this can serve as a reference.

Third, control over corruption by high-ranking officials and close associates is essential. The failure of state administration or public distrust in past governments has largely stemmed from corruption among high-ranking officials and their close associates. In this regard, the establishment of a "Special Prosecutor's Office for Corruption Investigations of High-Ranking Officials," independent of political power, should be actively pursued.

Fourth, a system of consultation and cooperation between the ruling party and the government must be established. The relationship between the ruling party and the government inherently possesses a duality of cooperation and confrontation, making the effective management of this relationship by no means easy. In the case of ideological parties, autonomous adjustment and control occur due to ideological homogeneity; however, Korean political parties lack strong ideological characteristics. Consequently, discord between the party and the government frequently arises, often disrupting state administration. In particular, under a five-year single-term presidential system, if rivals from the election campaign or competing forces seize party leadership, serious conflicts between the current power and future power often emerge starting from the third year of the administration. While managing the party-government relationship is difficult, it is an indispensable condition for successful state administration.

Conditions for the Success of the Next Administration

The future direction of state administration should be the formation of a coexistent society and coexistent inter-Korean relations through the improvement of inequality and the promotion of peace. While there appears to be a broad consensus on the general direction, with both the ruling and opposition parties promising economic democratization, expanded welfare, and improved inter-Korean relations, significant conflicts will arise when delving into specific policies, regardless of which party takes office. This is because the central issues the next administration must address are distribution/redistribution and ideological values/identity, which inevitably involve conflict and confrontation. In this context, based on the preceding discussion, the conditions for the success of the next administration can be summarized as follows:

First, establish a clear historical consciousness and distinct state administration goals. Fundamentally, the foundation for a coexistent society and coexistent inter-Korean relations should be formed through the promotion of equality and peace.

Second, secure a rich talent pool that possesses a thorough understanding and capability in democracy and public service.

Third, maximize the government's joint planning and coordination capabilities.

Fourth, effectively manage the bureaucratic apparatus. It is important not only to guide bureaucrats to respond to public demands and the president's policy direction but also to provide them with various educational and training opportunities to enhance their integrity and innovative capacity.

Fifth, build national consensus. Broad public consensus on the legitimacy and necessity of reforms must be formed through close dialogue with the public, civil society, and stakeholders.

Sixth, minimize conflict. Conflict arising during the reform process must be minimized by persuading the public that reforms will ultimately contribute to the sustainable and coexistent development of Korean society.

Of course, fulfilling all the above conditions is not easy, nor does it guarantee success. These are necessary but not sufficient conditions for successful state administration. It is clear that for the success of the next president, the systemic and operational issues of past governments must also be resolved. However, in our political reality, the recurring discontinuity between the current and future powers makes it highly likely that any president will fall into various trial-and-error situations due to a lack of state administration experience. In this regard, it is hoped that the next administration will demonstrate a mature attitude by moving beyond factional logic and confrontational politics that completely negate the previous government, and maintain continuity in state affairs based on objective evaluation from the transition committee stage. Such efforts will not only prevent the waste of unnecessary national energy but also bring us one step closer to a more successful presidency. ■

Professor Sung Kyung-ryung holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from Stanford University and is currently a professor in the Division of Social Sciences and Director of the Institute for Social Sciences at Hallym University. During the Participatory Government, he served as the Chairman of the National Balanced Development Committee and the Chief Policy Advisor to the President.

Moderator

Lee Sook-jong, President of EAI, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University

Participants

Park Hyung-joon, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University

Yoon Sung-yi, Professor at Kyung Hee University

Lee Gon-soo, Senior Researcher at EAI

Lee Na-young, Professor at Korea University

Lee Jae-youl, Professor at Seoul National University

Jang Yong-seok, Professor at Yonsei University

Jeong Won-chil, Senior Researcher at EAI

Jeong Han-wool, Senior Researcher at EAI

Han Kyu-seop, Professor at Seoul National University