Limitations of State Governance and Presidential Leadership

In response to the historical demands arising from the advancement of democratization in Korea, EAI has, through projects such as "Conditions for a Successful Presidency" in 2002 and "Conditions for a Successful Presidential Transition" in 2007, sought institutional measures concerning the desirable roles, powers, and responsibilities of the president in the post-democratization era. Now, there is an urgent need to establish stable institutional frameworks for the increasing demands for political participation and communication amidst the changing political environment due to the spread of SNS technology.

Accordingly, EAI has planned "Conditions for a Successful Presidency in 2013" to review the achievements and methods of state governance of past administrations and to explore the conditions for forming governability and successfully fulfilling the presidential duties in alignment with the new political environment.

On July 12, 2012, Professor Park Hyung-joon (Dong-A University), who served as Senior Secretary to the President for Political Affairs under the Lee Myung-bak administration, was invited to conduct the 6th Roundtable. The main points of the meeting are summarized as follows.

Fundamental Constraint: The Limits of State Capacity

Ahead of the presidential election, candidates from both ruling and opposition parties are presenting extensive pledges, some even at the level of national reform. However, their feasibility is subject to considerable doubt. This is because various factors influence the actual process of state governance, making it difficult to achieve desired levels of reform or national restructuring solely through presidential leadership or individual capabilities. Not only are there inherent limitations to state capacity under the current historical conditions, but the complex political dynamics of state governance are shaped by the role of the Blue House advisory staff, issues within the bureaucracy, side effects of inner circles of power, and dilemmas in relations with the legislature. Therefore, to create conditions for a successful presidency, appropriate diagnosis and prescription for these hindering factors are necessary.

Above all, it is crucial to recognize that the president's capacity for state governance is constrained by the limits of state capacity. The following four aspects are important in this regard:

First, as globalization progresses, the concept of national sovereignty is weakening, while the influence of markets and civil society is relatively strengthening. Consequently, it is no longer possible to expect the same level of state autonomy as in the past. In Korea, the "internalization of external affairs" has already significantly advanced, and as the importance of external affairs grows, circumstances can shape in unintended directions, regardless of the president's will or vision. For example, the global economic crisis that occurred at the beginning of the Lee Myung-bak administration forced the government to focus on crisis management strategies rather than the development strategies it had ambitiously pursued.

Second, there is the need to meet the heightened public expectations of the government following democratization. In the past authoritarian era, the government, as a "driver of development," could lead economic actors with strong leadership. However, it has become much more difficult for the government to play a leading role, and its actual scope of action is limited. Nevertheless, overestimating government capacity and pursuing unrealistic reforms that are not suited to the situation can prematurely trigger a national crisis.

Third, there is the issue of deepening polarization in our society. Our welfare system is still immature, and the government's capacity to resolve polarization has clear limitations. Despite this, because the perceived inequality by the public is greater than the actual level of inequality, policy development for resolving polarization is indispensable, whether institutionally or structurally. At the same time, the government must possess the capacity for empathy with the public. Resolving the gap between people's expectations and reality, and the resulting dissatisfaction and deprivation, is a matter of politics before it is a matter of institutions or policies.

Fourth, state capacity is reduced in terms of knowledge and information. In the past, the state positioned itself as an enlightened prophet, possessing superior knowledge and information capabilities compared to other sectors, and even held a somewhat monopolistic position. However, the state's status and capabilities have significantly weakened, and the private sector now demonstrates superior capabilities, rendering the term "knowledge-based government" hollow. Furthermore, due to the nature of the bureaucracy, even highly capable officials are reluctant to implement creative ideas and policies for the future, which hinders the government's proactive response to changing circumstances.

Obstacles to State Governance and Responses

In addition to these fundamental limitations, various obstacles arise in the president's execution of state affairs. Among these, the most critical issues can be found in the Blue House advisory staff, the control tower of state governance; the bureaucratic organization, the actual implementer of state affairs; and the relations with the legislature and political parties, partners in state governance.

Effective Operation of Blue House Advisory Staff

To successfully fulfill the presidential duties, the issue of establishing the Blue House advisory staff, who serve as the helmsman of state governance, must be addressed more seriously. In a single five-year presidential term system, the continuity of state affairs is inherently vulnerable due to frequent changes in administration. In particular, the Blue House organization, which must control the bureaucratic apparatus with its sustained continuity and long-term experience in state affairs, is composed of outsiders, leading to issues of organizational capacity. Realistically, the Blue House is often staffed by election loyalists rather than individuals with extensive experience in state affairs. Furthermore, upon a change of administration, individuals with experience in the previous administration's Blue House are completely excluded, citing political ideological differences. This results in a governance structure where amateurs manage professionals. Moreover, for a new Blue House organization to demonstrate its capabilities, a certain learning period for state governance is necessary. However, since the media, the public, and political parties do not wait, mistakes are inevitably highlighted early in the administration. This is a serious issue, as trust in the government, once eroded at the beginning of the term, is difficult to regain. Therefore, the Blue House must possess its own know-how and manuals for operational mechanisms, issue management, and relationship building with the bureaucracy. The Blue House organization must always operate within the context of emergency situations. Given that emergencies in state affairs occur frequently, almost daily, routine state management should be left to the bureaucracy, while the Blue House should function as an organization for crisis management. The effective response to the global financial crisis was possible because such a crisis management system was adequately established, with state governance centered around emergency economic policy meetings.

Strengthening the Blue House's Public Relations Function

The Blue House is fundamentally a political organization, but it must be recognized that it is practically composed of three pillars: political affairs, policy, and public relations. Today, we constantly feel that the bureaucratic organization's adaptation to the new communication environment is insufficient. They cause problems by failing to recognize that all policies are inherently political matters and by attempting to push them forward within departmental silos. Furthermore, each ministry has the weakness of not having a holistic perspective due to departmental self-interest. Therefore, the senior secretaries of the Blue House, who must control and coordinate the bureaucracy, must be proficient in political affairs, public relations, and policy functions, and serve as a control tower to facilitate smooth communication between ministries. The lack of inter-ministerial communication can lead to policy conflicts and distort the original intent during policy implementation, causing unnecessary misunderstandings. The Cheonan incident serves as a lesson on the unnecessary misunderstandings that can arise from the government's inadequate public relations function and the resulting clumsy information dissemination. Additionally, it must be understood that 'public relations' is not merely message delivery but the effective organization of policies and policy-making processes. Typically, individuals from media backgrounds, skilled in message delivery, are appointed to PR roles in the Blue House. However, since public relations and publicity differ, they often show limitations in coordinating the overall policy process. It is also problematic that while the importance of public relations has grown more than ever in the current open communication environment, including the internet, the PR organizations and functions of the Blue House and the government have weakened. Furthermore, while hardware is important for communication, software is even more critical. No matter how much information the government produces, it is meaningless if it is not effectively delivered. However, investment continues to be made in hardware, while neglecting content development or the marketing of government information. Therefore, when forming the Blue House organization for a new administration, serious consideration must be given to securing public relations capabilities, taking these issues into account.

Management of the Inner Circle of Power

Regardless of the administration, the formation of a small inner circle of power is unavoidable in a single presidential term system. This inner circle refers to a small core group deeply involved in personnel appointments and the management of investigative agencies. If the individuals in this inner circle possess a philosophy of state governance, a dynamic sense of balance, and a self-restraining ethic, the problems are less severe. However, if internal factions emerge due to power struggles, leading to unfair personnel biases, severe friction can arise within the ruling power base. In particular, if appointments are centered around specific personal networks, internal backlash within power agencies is inevitable. This can lead to problems in the relationship between the inner circle and the Blue House, and become an obstacle to normal state governance. It is crucial to remember that smooth state governance is possible only if extraordinary measures are taken at the beginning of the term to eliminate or strongly check this inner circle.

Reforming Relations with the Legislature and Political Parties

The most problematic aspect of a single presidential term is the relationship with the legislature and political parties. In a political environment reliant on extreme confrontation, the opposition party seeks to find flaws in the president from the very beginning of the new administration's term. In a political reality where various elections held during the presidential term rely on the narrative of judging the incumbent administration, it is difficult to expect cooperation from the opposition party. The ruling party also tends to distance itself from the Blue House depending on the political climate. Overcoming such confrontational politics appears difficult under the current system and political environment. In a four-year term, the president's will and the legislature's operational mechanisms are difficult to align. This leads to the logic that the president must achieve results within three years of their term, considering the reality of a lame duck in the fourth year and difficulties in state governance in the fifth. Consequently, the president inevitably becomes impatient in pursuing major national projects. President Lee Myung-bak ambitiously pursued difficult national tasks that previous administrations had failed to resolve, such as reforming the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, merging the Korea Land Corporation and Korea Housing Corporation, and integrating welfare IT systems – issues that involved significant conflicts among ministries or regional interest groups. He also strongly pushed projects like the Four Major Rivers Project, which gave the impression of unilateral imposition. Criticism can be leveled that this was due to the president's lack of political effort and the Blue House's inadequate political affairs function. However, given the opposition party's inclination to readily use the 'judgment of the incumbent administration' as a weapon in frequent elections, and the reality of strong party discipline in our system, it is extremely difficult for a president to directly persuade and negotiate with individual lawmakers. While the president's active willingness to communicate is important, a framework for 'roundtable politics' must be established beforehand. Otherwise, the next president will inevitably face similar structural obstacles.

Three Requirements for the Next President's Leadership

To be a successful president, one must fundamentally possess the political leadership to realize their pledges and policies. However, as examined above, it is important to recognize the limits of state capacity and avoid excessive ambition. Understanding the continuity of the state and learning the limitations of the presidency in advance will also be necessary. Once these prerequisites are met, the president and the Blue House can approach state affairs more cautiously and embrace dissenting opinions from other forces. Based on this, efforts must be made to move away from extreme confrontational politics and to meet public expectations of the presidency through politics of empathy and integration. A president with flexible leadership that can bridge generations and regions is urgently needed at this juncture. Furthermore, at this time, the next president is expected to possess the following three qualities:

Empathic Leadership: Above all, empathic leadership is essential for the next president's successful state governance. As state capacity has generally shrunk and the government's role has become limited, maintaining smooth external relations is challenging. In this context, with deepening polarization and social deprivation, the president's capacity for empathy to soothe the public's hearts is even more urgently required. According to studies on U.S. presidents, there have been many presidents like Johnson who achieved significant policy outcomes but lacked popularity, and presidents like Kennedy who relied more on popular appeal than policy achievements. Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Reagan are rare examples who connected policy achievements with public empathy. Now, more than ever, it is crucial to gain public empathy during the process of state governance for successful outcomes. Public empathy is not achieved through a single action; it is a complex interplay of language, character, knowledge, gestures, symbols, rhetoric, and impression. Therefore, it is important to cultivate a president with sufficient qualities in these areas.

Global Leadership: In an era of globalization, individual competence and communication skills are crucial for smooth diplomatic relations. Because national interests often clash, a president must receive a good personal evaluation to persuade foreign leaders and foster strong diplomatic ties. The reason why many successful leaders of advanced nations are former financial bureaucrats is their outstanding expertise and experience in international economics. Even the leader of a relatively small country can gain empathy and exert influence by presenting a desirable vision for the world. President Lee Myung-bak's performance in areas such as the Green Growth vision, fostering friendly relations with other countries, his role as G20 chair, and his response to the financial crisis are highly commendable for demonstrating global leadership. The next president must also possess global leadership capable of aligning South Korea's interests with global agendas.

North Korea Policy Competence: North Korea issues are increasingly significant for both South Korea's foreign and domestic affairs, making an appropriate North Korea policy more critical than ever. While the current administration has sought balance after the biased North Korea policies of the past decade of progressive governments, it has not achieved substantial changes. In the next administration, which will determine the stability of North Korea's hereditary succession and its direction of change, how North Korea policy is developed will be crucial for the future of the Korean peninsula. Therefore, effective North Korea policy implementation and the establishment of a new order on the Korean peninsula urgently require leadership that can accurately read international dynamics and engage in high-level strategic thinking. ■

Professor Park Hyung-joon earned a Ph.D. in Sociology from Korea University and is currently a professor in the Department of Sociology, College of Social Sciences at Dong-A University. He served as a member of the 17th National Assembly for the Grand National Party, and subsequently held positions as the Grand National Party's Co-Spokesperson in September 2007, Presidential Office Public Relations Planning Officer in 2008, Presidential Office Senior Secretary for Political Affairs in 2009, and Presidential Office Special Advisor for Social Affairs in 2011.

Moderator

Lee Sook-jong, President of EAI, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University

Participants

Park Hyung-joon, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University

Yoon Sung-yi, Professor at Kyung Hee University

Lee Gon-soo, Senior Researcher at EAI

Lee Nae-young, Professor at Korea University

Lee Jae-youl, Professor at Seoul National University

Jang Yong-seok, Professor at Yonsei University

Jeong Won-chil, Senior Researcher at EAI

Jeong Han-ul, Senior Researcher at EAI

Han Kyu-seop, Professor at Seoul National University