Conditions for Presidential Success: The Key is Political Mobilization!

In response to the evolving demands of the era following South Korea's democratization, EAI has, through projects such as "Conditions for Presidential Success" in 2002 and "Conditions for Successful Presidential Transition" in 2007, sought institutional measures for the desirable role, authority, and responsibilities of the president in the post-democratization era. Now, amidst the changing political landscape due to the spread of social media technologies, there is an urgent need to establish stable institutional frameworks for increasing political participation and communication demands.

Therefore, EAI has planned "Conditions for Presidential Success 2013" to examine the performance and methods of state administration by past governments and to explore the conditions for forming governability and successfully fulfilling the presidential role in line with the new political environment.

On April 5, 2012, we held the 3rd roundtable, inviting Lee Dong-kwan, former Senior Secretary to the President, who served sequentially as Presidential Spokesperson, Senior Secretary for Public Relations, and Special Advisor for Media Relations at the Blue House during the Lee Myung-bak administration. The main points of the presentation are summarized as follows.

A Political Force Sharing the Same DNA is Necessary

For the successful performance of the presidential duties, the support of a "proper political force" is indispensable. A proper political force refers to a "group that shares political DNA, that is, political values or ideology." The most crucial factor determining whether a president becomes successful is the extent to which they possess a supporting group, like differentiated somatic cells, that shares this DNA.

Since democratization, during the presidencies of Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Roh Moo-hyun, successive governments received support from their own political forces that shared their DNA. However, the Lee Myung-bak administration failed to effectively build such a political support base. The election of President Lee Myung-bak was supported by the 'New Right' group, which emerged as a reaction to the Roh Moo-hyun administration's excessive left-leaning stance. The values advocated by this group, such as neoliberalism, the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea, globalization, educational liberalization, North Korean human rights, and noblesse oblige, were reflected in various policies of the Lee Myung-bak administration. However, they ultimately failed to form a political force and occupy key positions in state administration, thus failing to support the direction of state administration.

The Absence of a Political Force: What is the Problem?

Above all, the absence of a political force supporting the president makes it difficult to overcome the limitations of the single five-year term system. No matter how prepared a president may be, without a political support base, they cannot push forward initiatives and persuade the public. In a situation where there is no political force sharing the president's DNA, it is difficult to overcome initial policy implementation errors. Furthermore, during the president's term, various mid-term elections are held, during which intense political attacks are launched under the banner of "judging the incumbent government." Without a strong political force, it is difficult to counter these attacks, and the direction of state administration ultimately falters. This is also why the current government could not respond effectively to various issues, from candlelight protests to political surveillance.

Another reason why the president's leadership cannot break through major issues is that the solutions pursued by the government can be frustrated in the National Assembly. This is because political parties are not homogeneous, unified political forces, but rather heterogeneous political forces with different DNA coexisting based on their interests. In particular, within the Grand National Party, the political dynamics between the pro-Lee and pro-Park factions acted as an obstacle to state administration. Debates surrounding personnel appointments also occurred because, instead of a cohesive force sharing political values, there was only a loosely connected aggregate centered on interests. In other words, various interest groups centered around candidate Lee Myung-bak entered the power core through different affiliations, making effective utilization of talent difficult. Therefore, the development of a healthy political force that can contribute to national and social development is necessary. A political force that supports the president's state administration agenda is an absolute condition for the sustainability and evolution of presidential leadership during the term. Considering this, the Presidential Transition Committee needs to focus on preparing the human infrastructure that can support governance for the next five years, rather than on policy.

Initial image management and national communication are important

In the Lee Myung-bak administration, the failure in initial image management, despite unprecedented public support, acted as an obstacle to efficient state administration. The values advocated by the Lee Myung-bak administration were "pro-common people, pragmatic pragmatism," and a "reformist conservative" character, meaning "progressive socially and conservative in terms of national security." This characteristic is also evident in President Lee Myung-bak's ideologically flexible stance presented in the middle of his term: "Whether left or right, if it benefits the people, that policy should be used." Nevertheless, the strong impression of a pro-chaebol, pro-rich government was largely due to the failure in initial image management and public relations.

There is an aspect of misunderstanding in the criticism that the Lee Myung-bak administration was biased towards chaebols, as it was not properly evaluated. In fact, South Korea is cited as a success story for overcoming the global financial crisis that swept through at the beginning of the Lee Myung-bak administration. In this process, a crisis-resolution strategy centered on exports and large corporations was an unavoidable choice. Subsequently, measures were taken to compensate for the negative side effects that could arise from it. However, the frustration of follow-up policies, such as creating new jobs or bold educational liberalization, bears significant responsibility on the part of the Grand National Party's populism. Although the Lee Myung-bak administration initially had a policy of "leaning right on security, leaning left on welfare," it could not be properly implemented due to a lack of political support. Opposition from within the ruling party, in particular, made policy implementation even more difficult.

Ultimately, the underestimation or distortion of the Lee Myung-bak administration's moderate reform policies is due to the absence of a political force that shares the same DNA, proactively promotes these policies, and acts as an "apostle Paul" to disseminate them. The problem of insufficient communication can also be interpreted in this context. In other words, the amplifying function of the political force for state public relations by the president and the Blue House was lacking. It is true that there were problems with situational management-oriented state public relations that gave the impression of "speaking when advantageous and remaining silent when disadvantageous." However, what is clear is that state public relations and image management are difficult to achieve results through the unilateral efforts of the president and the Blue House alone. Political allies such as academia, civic groups, and the media must play the role of speakers. In retrospect, the initial image of "lack of communication" was largely due to the insufficient mobilization of support from these allies.

Another issue is that under the five-year single-term system, there is little opportunity or time to correct initial mistakes arising from inexperience in state administration. In this regard, a mechanism must be established for the recycling of state administration experience at the national and social levels. The history of power transitions, which is currently characterized by repeated purges and ruptures, should not be the case. However, it is difficult to expect such productive state administration in the current political party landscape of South Korea, which shows regressive tendencies. We must learn lessons from the history of factional strife in the Joseon Dynasty, which began with ideological struggles but later devolved into "turf wars" and "slaughter," leading to national decline.

Prepared Presidents and Healthy Political Forces Must Be Nurtured Together

Communication and political leadership are being emphasized as key virtues for the next president. It is true that President Lee Myung-bak, who possesses strong administrative leadership, has some deficiencies in communication and political capabilities. As can be seen from the experience of President Carter's unsuccessful re-election in the United States, even policies with the right direction may not have the opportunity to be properly evaluated if they lack political support. This strongly suggests the importance of political leadership and a political force.

The current party politics, characterized by fragmented interests and intensified ideological confrontation, and devolving into "turf wars," does not adequately represent the centrist forces in our society. Both the ruling and opposition parties are engrossed in pursuing their own interests, leading to political regression and increasing the dissatisfaction and alienation of centrist voters. Therefore, it is necessary to absorb these forces appropriately and institutionalize them as a political force. In fact, President Lee Myung-bak was able to defeat candidate Park Geun-hye, who controlled the Grand National Party, in the presidential primary because he won the hearts of the "center." However, he failed to effectively mobilize them into a political force.

The recent Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon can also be seen as a result of this political alienation of centrist voters. In the upcoming 18th presidential election, the candidate who wins the center will be victorious. However, regardless of who becomes president, if there is no efficient and powerful political force to support them, they will not be able to lead state administration successfully. In a five-year single-term system, a president who lacks the foundation for political mobilization is likely to struggle to be evaluated as successful during their term, even if they might receive a favorable historical assessment later. Along with a prepared presidential candidate, a proper and healthy political force that shares political ideology and direction must be nurtured together.■

Lee Dong-kwan, former Special Advisor for Media Relations at the Blue House, graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in Political Science. He joined Dong-A Ilbo in 1985, serving as its Tokyo correspondent, head of the political desk, and editorial writer. He was primarily active in the fields of Korean politics and inter-Korean relations, and received awards such as the Korean Journalist Award and the Seoul Press Award. He served sequentially as spokesperson for the 17th Presidential Transition Committee, Presidential Spokesperson, and Senior Secretary for Public Relations, assisting President Lee Myung-bak in a public relations and political capacity. He served as Special Advisor for Media Relations at the Blue House from January to December 2011.

Moderator

Lee Sook-jong, President of EAI, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University

Participants

Kang Won-taek, Professor at Seoul National University

Yoon Sung-yi, Professor at Kyung Hee University

Lee Gon-soo, Head of EAI Governance Research Team

Lee Na-young, Director of EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center, Professor at Korea University

Lee Jae-youl, Professor at Seoul National University

Jang Yong-seok, Professor at Yonsei University

Jeong Won-chul, Senior Researcher at EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center

Jeong Han-wool, Deputy Director of EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center

Han Kyu-seop, Professor at Seoul National University