Recommendations for a Successful Presidency

In response to the era's demands arising from the advancement of democratization in Korea, EAI has, through projects such as "Conditions for a Successful Presidency" in 2002 and "Conditions for a Successful Presidential Transition" in 2007, sought institutional measures regarding the desirable role, authority, and responsibilities of the president in the post-democratization era. Now, amidst the changing political environment due to the spread of social network technology, there is an urgent need to establish stable institutions that can accommodate the growing demands for political participation and communication.

Therefore, EAI planned "Conditions for a Successful Presidency in 2013" to review the achievements and methods of state administration by past governments and to explore the conditions for forming governability and achieving a successful presidency that aligns with the new political environment.

On March 22, 2012, we held the second roundtable with Professor Kim Byong-joon (Kookmin University), who served as Senior Secretary to the President for Policy Planning and as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education and Human Resources Development during the Participatory Government. The main points of the presentation are summarized as follows.

A successful presidential term begins with a thorough transition committee process.

The president-elect must inherit past policies and design the future from the previous administration. The successes of the previous administration should be leveraged as assets. The successes of the previous administration can be carried forward, and its failures can serve as lessons. However, the Lee Myung-bak administration did not properly inherit from the previous government. This was likely due to a negative assessment of the previous government as a failed 'amateur administration.' Nevertheless, this led to enormous costs due to policy discontinuity. For example, in inter-Korean relations, the collapse of the inter-Korean engagement channels accumulated over the past decade resulted in the waste of crucial resources for inter-Korean policy. While the president-elect's mindset is important for a successful presidential transition, it is not something the president-elect can achieve alone. The problem is that the system for taking over the government was not properly established. Although they took power, there seemed to be no plan for how to actually begin governing.

To ensure a successful presidency, it is necessary for the transition committee to create a roadmap for overall state administration and for its members to participate in actual state administration to realize it. Therefore, the composition of the transition committee is crucial. The transition committee typically includes scholars and politicians. Scholars tend to focus on analyzing reports internally. Politicians are eager to participate due to the benefits of serving on the transition committee. However, during the transition committee's activities, politicians tend to focus solely on lobbying for public office after the government's inauguration. Thus, it is desirable for the transition committee to be composed mostly of scholars or experts who are diligent in policy analysis.

Establish a Roadmap for National Governance

Becoming president is more difficult than being elected president. The president's power is like an inverted triangle, receiving great expectations from the public, but the power base to fulfill them is very narrow. Therefore, a roadmap that outlines the overall direction of state affairs is crucial. Without a roadmap, state administration is easily shaken. Presidents inevitably face numerous criticisms and attacks during their term, and without a roadmap, this can lead to national confusion. Along with setting a roadmap, the role of the Blue House staff, who can accurately grasp the president's intentions, is important. In the early period of a president's inauguration, due to an excess of compliance from the bureaucratic organization, actions may be taken differently from the president's actual will.

This is because the national direction may be set differently from the President's actual intentions due to excessive alignment from the bureaucracy. If there is no clear roadmap and the bureaucracy does not accurately grasp the President's true intentions, there is a high possibility of inefficiency in national governance. One measure to prevent these problems is to separate the Presidential Secretariat and the Policy Planning Office. This is because the typical duties of the Secretariat differ from policy matters. While a Secretary General with political experience may be suitable, politicians inherently lack expertise in policy issues. Therefore, the role of the Policy Planning Director, who possesses policy capabilities, is emphasized to ensure the President's policy intentions are not distorted and are properly reflected in national governance.

Communication Failures Are a Cause of Presidential Failure

The most critical aspect to guard against in performing presidential duties is the distortion of information. Due to the President's position and power, aides and cabinet members may not speak frankly. The phenomenon of information distortion can be exacerbated depending on the President's attitude, especially when the President expresses strong opinions. In particular, the transmission of public opinion is prone to distortion. This very distortion of information acts as a significant cause leading to presidential misgovernance.

Ensure that obstacles in the communication system do not arise. Above all, the President's intentions must be clearly conveyed to the bureaucracy. Since the President holds the power to appoint high-ranking public officials, including ministers and vice ministers, the bureaucratic community pays more attention to the intentions of the Blue House than to the directives of their ministers. This can easily lead to confusion in national governance. To prevent this, a system that strengthens ministerial responsibility or autonomy is necessary.

A Control Mechanism for the Bureaucracy is Needed

Furthermore, the President must properly lead the bureaucracy, which serves as the hands and feet of national governance. The loyalty of the bureaucracy to the President varies significantly by ministry. Economic ministries tend to place a high value on their own judgment compared to internal affairs ministries like the Ministry of Public Administration and Security. Unlike other ministries, economic bureaucrats have weak incentives for maintaining their positions. Since their post-retirement security is guaranteed by the bureaucratic community of seniors and juniors, rather than the President, their loyalty to their community is stronger than to the President. Moreover, the seniority-based culture within the bureaucracy and the compartmentalization that prevents inter-departmental personnel transfers are limitations that restrict the President's effective exercise of personnel authority. Therefore, a mechanism is required to secure the loyalty of the bureaucracy. This is not for the President to control the bureaucracy at will, but to ensure that the bureaucracy serves the national interest through the system. During the Participatory Government, reforms were initiated by introducing the Senior Civil Service Corps to resolve these issues and enable efficient personnel management, but this appears to have become defunct under the current administration.

Operate the National Coordination System Effectively

To resolve national tasks, cooperation among disconnected ministries with vertical structures must be secured. The function of the Prime Minister's Office as a system for such national coordination depends on the President. That is, the Prime Minister must be granted appropriate authority and a defined scope of responsibilities. It is also a viable approach to assign the Blue House to focus on diplomacy, defense, and the President's agenda, while the Prime Minister's Office handles current issues.

However, South Korea has historically been operated with the Blue House at its center, and the transfer of authority to the Prime Minister's Office is not easy. Due to a series of confusions in the early stages of the Participatory Government, the Blue House's Policy Planning Office became responsible for current issues. The role of the Prime Minister's Office can also vary significantly depending on who becomes Prime Minister. When a Prime Minister like Lee Hae-chan, who is knowledgeable about policy issues and responsibly fulfills the role of a coordinator, is in office, good results can be achieved. However, in our reality, due to the symbolism of the presidency and the high public expectations placed on the President, there is a limitation that the President must inevitably become involved in current issues even for minor problems.

Consideration could also be given to a system where the Prime Minister is elected by the ruling party. If the Prime Minister is elected by the ruling party, the President cannot act arbitrarily, and the ruling party can secure its responsibility for national policy. However, this would not be easy in our current political reality.

In this regard, a committee structure that transcends relevant ministries as a task force is inevitable for advancing national tasks. Although committees may become nominal organizations as they lack policy-making authority or the right to submit legislative proposals, they can secure practical effectiveness by including ministers from relevant ministries as members.

Strengthen Party-Government Management and the Ruling Party's Policy Responsibility

Various elections held during a president's term, such as local elections, general elections, and by-elections, act as significant obstacles to national governance. The three months leading up to an election and the one to two months following it are periods when conflicts arise between the government and the ruling party due to election issues. Generally, after the initial honeymoon period with high approval ratings, a president's approval rating continuously declines. Consequently, the ruling party often finds itself at a disadvantage in midterm elections. Therefore, as elections approach, presidents find it difficult to pursue policies that might burden the ruling party. After the elections, national progress is hindered by conflicts arising from the blame game between the government and the ruling party. Pursuing policies opposed by the opposition party invites public criticism.

In this context, policy consultation between the government and the ruling party is crucial. During the Participatory Government, the separation of party and government meant that the President could not exert influence over the party as they did not hold the party's personnel or nomination authority. Consequently, if party-government consultations did not proceed properly, national governance inevitably became difficult. As the president's term progresses, presidential authority rapidly weakens, and the party's influence becomes relatively stronger. In such a situation, if the ruling party differentiates itself from the president for political reasons, it is difficult to expect responsible national governance. Assuming the necessity and legitimacy of party-government separation, reforms to the system are needed to enable responsible national governance until the end of the president's term. Changes to the power structure, such as aligning the terms of National Assembly members and the president or adopting a four-year single term, need to be considered.

From a political party's perspective, policy experts must be cultivated. There is a need for policy capabilities to draw and design the grand vision of national governance after gaining power, but our current political parties do not provide adequate support for this. To enhance the president's governance capabilities and strengthen the ruling party's responsibility for national governance, party members should enter the Blue House. However, as there are no individuals with policy capabilities within the parties, they are filled by those from bureaucratic backgrounds. This consequently leads to obstacles in policy consultations between the party and the government, creating a vicious cycle where the ruling party evades responsibility for national governance. The backwardness of political parties makes national governance difficult. The lack of policy capability in political parties is the difference between our parties and Western parties.

Distinguish Between Long-Term National Tasks and Incumbent Government Tasks

The polarization in our society is a problem of extreme seriousness, extending beyond mere statistics. Although polarization was officially set as a national agenda during the Participatory Government, the issue was not resolved. Polarization is not a problem that can be easily solved. Addressing polarization through welfare is also difficult. Polarization is by no means a task that can be resolved by any specific administration; it is a generational challenge. A person who becomes president must be able to distinguish between long-term national tasks and tasks for the incumbent government within its term. Presidential ambition for significant achievements within one's term carries a high risk of massive budget waste and policy failure.

The public perception that assigns infinite responsibility to the president must also change. Policy decision-makers must abandon the complacent notion that the public will understand. Policies must be designed with the premise that people pursue their own interests and will oppose anything that deviates from their desired direction. The public judges based on outcomes, not policy intentions. Therefore, a system for pursuing the public interest is crucial. Based on the fundamental notion that individuals are inherently driven by self-interest, a system must be created where individual interests can manifest as public interest or publicness.■

Professor Kim Byong-joon holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Delaware and is currently a professor in the Department of Public Administration and Policy at Kookmin University. He previously served as the Chairperson of the Local Autonomy Special Committee of the Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice, led the policy advisory group for presidential candidate Roh Moo-hyun in the 16th presidential election, and held positions as Chairperson of the Presidential Advisory Committee on Government Innovation and Decentralization, Chief Policy Secretary to the President, and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education and Human Resources Development during the Participatory Government. He currently serves as the Chairman of the Social Design Institute and the Public Management Research Institute. He recently published <There Is No President for the 99%>(Gaemagowon, 2012).

Moderator

Lee Sook-jong, President of EAI, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University

Participants

Kang Won-taek, Professor at Seoul National University

Yoon Sung-yi, Professor at Kyung Hee University

Lee Gon-su, Team Leader, EAI Governance Research Team

Lee Nae-young, Director, EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center, Professor at Korea University

Lee Jae-youl, Professor at Seoul National University

Jang Yong-seok, Professor at Yonsei University

Jeong Won-chil, Senior Researcher, EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center

Jeong Han-wool, Deputy Director, EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center

Han Kyu-seop, Professor at Seoul National University