Changes in the Security Environment and the Rationale for Defense Reform

Following the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents, defense reform bills actively pursued by the current administration were presented to the National Assembly Defense Committee in June of last year. However, after more than seven months, they have not been properly discussed and their passage within the 18th National Assembly's term has become virtually impossible. The East Asia Institute (EAI) organized the 17th Infrastructure Vision Forum on January 27, 2012, to identify the reasons for the failure of the government's defense reform efforts and to explore desirable future directions for South Korean defense reform. The forum featured Hong Kyu-duk, Director General of the Defense Reform Bureau at the Ministry of National Defense, under the theme "Changes in the Security Environment and the Rationale for Defense Reform." Director General Hong analyzed the evolving security landscape on the Korean Peninsula, explained the objectives and necessity of defense reform, and subsequently engaged in a Q&A session with the discussants. The main points of discussion are as follows.

Background of Defense Reform

The Rapidly Changing Security Environment on the Korean Peninsula

The relative decline of the United States since the 2008 global economic crisis and China's pursuit of regional influence expansion based on its enhanced national power are bringing about structural changes in the security environment of the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea, which may launch provocations against South Korea for internal cohesion following Kim Jong-il's death in December 2011, poses the most significant threat to South Korean security.

The current situation in the National Assembly, where increasing demands for welfare and other domestic political issues such as the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, free school meals, and half-price tuition make it difficult to respond sensitively to national security issues, can also be considered a challenge facing South Korea's national security policy.

The Sinking of the Cheonan and the Bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island

The Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of South Korea's defense organization, which is divided into military administration (the function of troop recruitment, maintenance, and management of military power) and military command (the function of operational use of built military power), in the face of actual North Korean provocations.

During the Cheonan incident, the command authority lay with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in case of sinking, and with the Chief of Naval Operations in case of grounding, due to administrative authority. While confusion ensued over whether it was a sinking or grounding, the incident concluded, and South Korea did not even have an opportunity to retaliate against North Korea's provocation.

In a situation where North Korea is carrying out asymmetric provocations, there is a need to redesign the administrative defense organization to enable swift decision-making in case of emergency.

Key Contents of Defense Reform

Three Key Reform Priorities

Enhancement of Active Deterrence Capabilities: In a situation where the credibility of our military's deterrence capabilities has declined following the Yeonpyeong and Cheonan incidents, we will prioritize reinforcing forces to counter localized provocations and asymmetric threats, foster a combat-ready military, and strengthen mental preparedness to secure more active deterrence capabilities.

Strengthening Jointness: While maintaining the autonomy of each service, we will strengthen jointness and establish a rapid decision-making system by seeking ways to integrate and manage currently possessed assets.

Maximizing Efficiency: We will reorganize the military structure into an efficient one by reducing overlapping and wasteful elements among the services and reallocating them to essential areas.

Core Issue: Reform of the Upper Command Structure

Defense reform consists of a total of 73 tasks: 37 short-term tasks aimed at ensuring the full realization of existing capabilities and securing readiness against localized provocations; 20 medium-term tasks to acquire core capabilities and expand the foundation for defense modernization in preparation for the transfer of wartime operational control between South Korea and the U.S.; and 16 long-term tasks to transform the South Korean military into a military structure capable of responding to comprehensive security threats and to secure elite defense capabilities at the level of developed countries. The recently debated 'reform of the upper command structure' is one of the 37 short-term tasks.

The core of the upper command structure reform, as shown in Figure 1, is to simplify and unify the existing dual command structure where the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for military command and the chiefs of staff of each service are responsible for military administration.

Figure 1. Dual Command Structure of the South Korean Military

Specifically, the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be clarified by explicitly defining the function of operational command supervision of each service within the mission of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, allowing them to exercise limited military administrative authority. Furthermore, the chiefs of staff of each service, who have so far only exercised military administrative authority in wartime and peacetime, will be granted military command authority to exercise operational command and supervision of their respective services.

Necessity of Defense Reform

Responding to the Evolving Security Environment on the Korean Peninsula

Today, the Korean Peninsula faces comprehensive security threats. In addition to the traditional security threat of full-scale war with North Korea, we must respond to transnational security threats such as terrorism and natural disasters, as well as North Korea's localized provocation threats that maximally utilize asymmetric capabilities.

It is important to remember that efforts to strengthen defense capabilities to counter these comprehensive security threats must proceed within a domestic political context where pressure to reduce defense spending is inevitable due to increasing welfare demands.

This implies that South Korea's future defense reform must inevitably focus on dramatically increasing the military's efficiency. The urgency of reorganizing the military into a more efficient organization by strengthening jointness is evident.

Preparation for the 2015 Wartime Operational Control Transfer

A stable transfer of wartime operational control requires meticulous preparation over a considerable period. To secure the core military capabilities that the U.S. Forces Korea has been responsible for by 2015, and to complete the formation and operation of South Korea-U.S. military cooperation bodies, achieving Full Mission-Capability (FMC) requires Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2014 and Initial Operational Capability (IOC) by 2013.

This means that tasks such as organizational restructuring, planning, and operational procedure establishment for securing IOC must be completed by 2012 at the latest, and new operational plans and regulations related to the transfer of wartime operational control must be finalized. Above all, the reorganization of the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff and each service headquarters must be completed by 2012 so that exercises and training can begin in 2013 with the South Korean military taking the lead and the U.S. military providing support. Therefore, if the defense reform bill is not passed within the term of the 18th National Assembly, the plan to transfer wartime operational control by 2015 will be significantly disrupted.

Global Trends

Most of the world's 31 major countries have integrated military administration and command. Germany pursued defense reform to establish a unified command system by integrating military administration and command and elevating the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the highest military commander. The United Kingdom and France have also included the chiefs of staff of each service in the chain of operational command of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transforming their respective service headquarters into combat mission-oriented systems.

South Korea has maintained its current dual command structure to ensure interoperability with the U.S. command system, with which it has a military alliance. The U.S. military has a unique structure where each service headquarters is responsible for military administration (recruitment, training, operational support) from the homeland to support unified commands performing missions worldwide. However, even the U.S., learning from the Vietnam War, enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 to promote military jointness and is currently aiming to build a 'smaller, lighter, faster, and more flexible joint force.'

Repeated Failures in Defense Reform

The attempt to reform the upper command structure by integrating dual military administration and command is not the first undertaken by this administration. From the Park Chung-hee administration, which attempted to reorganize each service headquarters into a combat command with integrated military administration and command after the January 21 incident in 1968 by dispatching a special inspector to Israel, to the Roh Tae-woo administration, which sought to grant each service command authority to the chiefs of staff to enhance independent national defense capabilities, the Kim Young-sam administration, which drafted a plan for integrating military administration and command through the 21st Century Committee, and the Roh Moo-hyun administration, which pointed out the inefficiencies of the dual military administration and command through the Defense Policy Review Committee, the reform of the upper command structure has been a long-standing aspiration of the South Korean military. Defense reform, which has been thwarted each time due to political issues and strong opposition from certain segments of society, should no longer be neglected.

Conclusion

Defense reform aims to achieve a structural transformation that reflects the lessons learned from the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents, by unifying the command structure and shortening the decision-making process to enable the most efficient response in crisis situations, and by implementing a Korean-style efficiency initiative that drastically reduces redundant positions through the integration of each service headquarters and operational command.

Although the bill's passage is currently being blocked in the 18th National Assembly for political reasons, the U.S. case, where the National Assembly led the passage of defense reform legislation through bipartisan agreement, offers significant implications for us. ■

Hong Kyu-duk, Director General of the Defense Reform Bureau at the Ministry of National Defense, graduated from the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Korea University and holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of South Carolina. He has served as a government representative to the UN Disarmament Commission and the First Committee of the General Assembly, an official in charge of international organizations and a treaty advisor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, an advisor to the Policy Planning Bureau at the Ministry of National Defense, a member of the Committee for Promotion of Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation, an advisor to the Policy Planning Bureau at the Ministry of Unification, and Director of the Institute for International Policy Studies and Dean of the College of Social Sciences at Sookmyung Women's University.

Moderator

Chun Jae-sung, Director of the EAI Center for Asian Security Studies; Professor at Seoul National University

Discussants

Kim Gwi-geun, Reporter, Yonhap News Agency

Kim Kun-sik, Professor, Kyungnam University

Kim Young-ho, Professor, National Defense University

Park In-hwi, Professor, Ewha Womans University

Baek Seung-joo, Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

Shin Sung-ho, Professor, Seoul National University

Lee Sang-hyun, Director of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade