[EAI Opinion Review] 2012 Agenda: The 2012 Outlook Through Its Agendas

The 2012 Outlook Through Its Agendas

The 2012 general election and presidential election are fast approaching. In the preliminary battle, the October 26 Seoul mayoral by-election, independent candidate Park Won-soon was elected mayor of Seoul, albeit as a unified opposition candidate. Considering the emergence of a new situation where the previously silent centrist and unaffluent voter segments are expressing their voices, triggered by the 'Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon,' it is difficult to predict the outcome of 2012 in advance.

However, by examining the agendas that are currently highlighted in public opinion, it is possible to predict the overall structure of the election, the strengths and weaknesses of each camp, and the paths each party should take. Elections are a battle for who can first seize the core agendas that encapsulate the demands and expectations of the majority of the public, and the voters' evaluation of who can best realize these agendas is one of the biggest variables determining voting behavior.

Characteristics of Past Election Agenda Competition: Dominated by the Dichotomy of Democracy vs. Anti-Democracy

Agenda competition in past elections exhibits several characteristics.

First, until the 17th presidential election, which led to the election of President Lee Myung-bak, political agendas primarily dominated election campaigns. From the 13th presidential election after the constitutional amendment for direct elections until the 15th presidential election, the confrontation between democracy and anti-democracy was the core political agenda. In the 16th presidential election, the agendas of reform and conservatism clashed. It was only in the 17th presidential election, which elected President Lee Myung-bak, that a policy agenda of economic revitalization, in addition to the political agenda of judging the participatory government, proved effective.

Second, agenda competition in past elections fundamentally unfolded under a dichotomous confrontational structure of democracy versus anti-democracy, or reform versus conservatism. Although the democracy versus anti-democracy structure weakened, and social and political fragmentation intensified, leading to the occasional emergence of third forces like Chung Ju-yung, Park Chan-jong, and Lee In-je, and the progressive camp's efforts to form an independent force became visible, these were insufficient to fundamentally alter the existing dichotomous structure.

Third, broadly speaking, it was an agenda competition within the framework of the existing political and economic system established after the democratization of 1987. Third forces either emerged from the internal power struggles of existing parties, or the Democratic Labor Party, which advocated for progressive politics, aimed for institutional party status, neither of which fundamentally rejected the existing system and order.

Despite overall changes in the social environment and voter attitudes, the agendas of past elections until the 17th presidential election in 2007 did not significantly deviate from the democracy versus anti-democracy structure formed during the 1987 democratization process. Particularly, until the end of the era of the 'three Kims,' the strong regionalist voting behavior dominated, making the influence of agenda competition on election outcomes quite limited.

Conflicting Agenda Competition in 2012

Looking at public opinion, the agenda competition structure in 2012 is signaling a significant change that transcends the dichotomous competition of democracy versus anti-democracy that dominated past elections. At the center of this change are the smart (Swing, Middle, Ambivalent, Responsive, Tricky) voters who make flexible political choices without leaning towards a specific ideology. Smart voters are not merely subjects of mobilization by a particular party or passive entities as in the past; they are voters who actively respond to issues and situations, and freely make political choices, oscillating between progressive-conservative ideologies and between ruling and opposition parties. Given that they constitute the majority of the electorate and that the direction of recent elections has been determined by their choices, agendas that align with their political and policy preferences will emerge as the core agendas of 2012. Let us examine what the core agendas that will shape 2012 will be, divided into political and policy agendas.

Three Major Political Agendas: Regime Change vs. Political Power Shift vs. Political System Change

In terms of political agendas, unlike the 2007 presidential election, which was dominated by the participatory government's judgment, 2012 is expected to see a complex competition with multidimensional agendas clashing with each other.

Firstly, as the Lee Myung-bak administration enters its latter half, with the global financial crisis and the domestic economic sentiment rapidly worsening, public sentiment for judging the regime is escalating, comparable to 2007. In a survey by the East Asia Institute in April 2007, 58.4% agreed with the 'participatory government judgment론,' and five years later, in April 2011, 61.9% agreed with the 'MB judgment론.' There is a possibility that the regime change agenda, similar to 2007, will emerge as the core agenda of the 2012 political landscape. This puts the Grand National Party in a tense situation. Consequently, the current opposition is fully committed to a strategy of creating an agenda structure of regime extension versus regime change through early candidate unification.

However, the agenda competition next year will not be unilaterally favorable to the opposition. This is because, alongside the sentiment for judging the current administration, there is strong public skepticism about viewing the current opposition parties as viable alternatives. Taking Seoul as an example, support for the 'check the ruling party and support the opposition candidate' argument was 51.8% in the June 2, 2010, local elections, but it dropped to 40.8% in a September 2011 survey. Nationwide, while the participatory government judgment론 in 2007 led to a Grand National Party approval rating of 45-50%, the current MB judgment론 has not translated into a rise in opposition party approval ratings. The Democratic Party's approval rating remains stagnant in the low 20% range. Distrust in all existing parties is precisely the background for the emergence of the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon. This distrust in party politics as a whole sends a strong warning message to both ruling and opposition parties to hasten self-reflection and internal reform, and externally, it calls for the emergence of a third force. A majority of the entire public identified 'self-reflection and internal reform' as the most urgent tasks for both the ruling and opposition parties, and in Seoul, as many as 59.5% agreed with the 'political power shift론' of 'supporting a new political force.'

[Figure 1] Perception of Regime Judgment and the Need for a Third Party

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Source: East Asia Institute, YTN, JoongAng Ilbo, Korea Research Regular Surveys

What is noteworthy is the demand for a change in the political and economic system underlying the 'regime change' and 'political power shift' agendas. Triggered by the global financial crisis, fundamental questions are being raised domestically and internationally about the current socio-economic system that institutionalizes unfair competition and polarization. The Occupy Wall Street movement, advocating for a second social contract, is spreading globally, and domestically, various proposals for system reform, such as 'Capitalism 4.0,' 'The Society of Anger,' and 'The Second Social Contract Theory,' are being put forth. Notably, neither the ruling nor opposition parties can find alternatives within the current party system, and voters' voices are not being channeled through traditional political participation methods using parties and existing political institutions. Instead, they are erupting through unconventional participation methods like candlelight vigils and Hope Buses. While this is currently a latent agenda, not yet politicized by any political force, it has the potential to emerge as a explosive agenda given the intensity of distrust in the current system.

Three Major Policy Agendas: Economic Polarization, Economic Growth, Quality of Life

As uncertainties in the macroeconomic environment grow and the perceived economic conditions of the populace become severe, it will be difficult to expect voter support in the 2012 political landscape without presenting a vision for policy agendas. These signs were already evident in the June 2 local elections held shortly after the Cheonan incident in 2010. Despite the ruling party's agenda of national security issues and the 'North Korea card,' what truly influenced voters' choices were free school meals and the Four Major Rivers Project. According to the National Agenda survey, which the East Asia Institute has been continuously tracking since 2006, public opinion overwhelmingly identifies economic polarization and economic growth as the top national agenda priorities.

[Figure 2] Top National Task for the Next Government

Source: East Asia Institute, YTN, JoongAng Ilbo, Korea Research Regular Surveys, December Survey

What is noteworthy is that while the 'progressive = polarization, conservative = growth first' ideological dichotomy operated until the Roh Moo-hyun administration, this boundary is weakening under the current administration. There is a broad consensus on the need to expand welfare to alleviate polarization. However, at the same time, a majority of public opinion expresses concern and caution regarding the universal welfare advocated by the opposition. Furthermore, until the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the frame for economic agendas was primarily formed at the national and societal levels. Both the progressive 'welfare expansion first' and the conservative 'growth trickle-down first' approaches are 'national-level economic agendas.' In early 2011, with the worsening housing crisis, inflation crisis, and outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, voices demanding national measures for individual 'quality of life' have rapidly increased.

Meanwhile, surveys immediately following the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents showed increased public interest in agendas for strengthening national security and inter-Korean relations. However, this interest has since waned. Unless a special tension is created between North and South Korea, the issues of 'economic polarization, economic growth, and quality of life' will likely emerge as the most significant policy agendas for 2012.

2012 Should Not Be Reduced to Their Own League

Currently, the ruling party is focusing on reform efforts to dispel the escalating regime change sentiment by transitioning to a committee system led by former representative Park Geun-hye. The opposition is forming the Democratic United Party, centered around the Democratic Party, the Civic Unity Party, and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, and the Unified Progressive Party, composed of the Democratic Labor Party, the People's Participation Party, and defectors from the 진보신당 (Progressive New Party). They have completed their organizational restructuring and are finding vitality by opening the path for voter participation in the selection of their next leadership. However, both ruling and opposition parties have yet to fully engage in the agenda competition that public opinion expects.

Most importantly, the ruling Grand National Party, in the October 26 Seoul mayoral by-election, dismissed the socio-economic stability and welfare expansion demands of the majority public as 'welfare populism,' consistently resorting to negative attacks under the guise of 'policy debate.' They seem to fail to understand the public's disappointment and anger towards the current ruling power. However, following the election, the political criticism and cynicism towards the President and the ruling party have rapidly intensified due to the DDoS attack on the National Election Commission website, which involved the ruling party's parliamentary offices during the election, and the successive revelations of corruption involving close associates and relatives of the President.

Representative Park Geun-hye and the Grand National Party's Emergency Response Committee are attempting to reorganize their agenda competition by shifting their policy stance towards 'welfare expansion and tailored (selective) welfare' to gain majority public support, and by preempting the agenda of 'self-reflection and reform' before the opposition. The question is whether this willingness to change can extend beyond the boundaries of conservative and Grand National Party supporters to gain the support of the centrist bloc. The ruling party's biggest challenge will be overcoming the distrust in the 'sincerity' of the current administration and the potential for conflict and division between the pro-Lee and pro-Park factions ahead of the next election.

In contrast, the main opposition Democratic Party has been significantly impacted by the sentiment for a shift in political power. However, despite experiencing an identity crisis to the extent that it cannot field its own candidate, voices of self-reflection and fierce internal reform within the party are hard to find. The Democratic Party urgently needs to devise a plan to restore trust in party politics through 'self-reform' and to present a vision for 'system change.' However, politically, the Democratic Party is reverting to the outdated 'democracy versus anti-democracy' agenda, which has long passed its expiration date, and policy-wise, it remains stuck at the 'universal welfare line' established during the referendum process. In particular, the loosening of the party's support base appears more serious than expected, as a significant portion of existing opposition party supporters have been absorbed by support for Ahn Cheol-soo. The key will be to prepare for self-reflection and reform, a vision for system reform that can counter the 'political power shift' sentiment, and policy alternatives that go beyond the inertial universal welfare line.

Meanwhile, support for Ahn Cheol-soo, who has rapidly emerged as a leading contender for the next presidential election by inheriting the warning against existing political forces and the expectations for new politics, continues to maintain strong momentum. The trend towards a third force, represented by the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon, also faces several dilemmas. While Ahn Cheol-soo stated at a press conference in early December that he had 'no intention of running in the general election or forming a third new party,' he left open the possibility of running for president, and recent news of him taking classes on national affairs has fueled curiosity about his actions. In a Korean society that values political decision-making and the will for power as important leadership virtues, the accumulation of voter fatigue due to his political stance, which neither affirms nor denies, is expected.

Second, as was somewhat confirmed during Park Won-soon's campaign, focusing solely on an anti-Grand National Party front risks alienating those who desire a new politics and a shift in power. Conversely, adhering strictly to the sentiment for a power shift invites backlash from the Democratic Party and the regime change advocates. Second, due to the conflicting nature of these two agendas, the decision is being postponed, and the initial advantage is not being capitalized upon. If Ahn Cheol-soo decides to run in the next presidential election, he will face the same dilemma that Park Won-soon encountered.

In this dilemma-ridden situation, the presidential election is just one year away for the political sphere. As examined so far, the 2012 general election and presidential election will be characterized by exceptionally complex and multi-layered voter expectations compared to past elections. Each political force must accurately read the complex agenda demands of voters during the preparation for the October 26 by-election and the upcoming general election, and dedicate themselves to developing visions through self-reflection and decisive action. Success in developing new agendas that align with public opinion and presenting alternatives will be crucial not only for the election but also for gaining the full support and backing of voters in subsequent national administration. If they remain detached from public opinion and are reduced to their own league, whoever wins may face the burden of governing amidst strong public distrust and scrutiny from the outset of their term. We expect greater effort and self-reform from the political sphere to ensure that 2012 becomes an election where both the public and politicians emerge victorious. ■

* This article is a revised and supplemented version of a manuscript published in <Hot Issue Current Affairs 2012> (compiled by Sisa Journal, 2011), published with the permission of Sisa Journal.