[EAI Opinion Review] 2012 Agenda: The 2012 Agenda Reveals Itself
The 2012 Agenda Reveals Itself
The 2012 general election and presidential election are fast approaching. In the preliminary battle, the October 26 Seoul mayoral by-election, Park Won-soon, an independent candidate, was elected mayor of Seoul, albeit as a unified opposition candidate. Considering the emergence of a new situation where the previously silent centrist and unaffluent voters are expressing their voices through the 'Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon,' it is difficult to predict the outcome of 2012 in advance.
However, by examining the agendas that are currently highlighted in public opinion, it is possible to predict the overall structure of the election, the strengths and weaknesses of each camp, and the path each party should take. Elections are a battle for who can first seize the core agenda that encapsulates the demands and expectations of the majority of the public, and the voters' evaluation of who can best realize this agenda is one of the biggest variables determining their vote.
Characteristics of Past Election Agenda Competition: Dominated by the Dichotomy of Democracy vs. Anti-Democracy
The agenda competition in past elections exhibits several characteristics.
First, until the 17th presidential election, which led to the election of President Lee Myung-bak, political agendas primarily dominated the election landscape. From the 13th presidential election after the direct election constitutional amendment to the 15th presidential election, where President Kim Dae-jung was elected, the confrontation between democracy and anti-democracy was the core agenda, especially among political agendas. In the 16th presidential election, the agendas of reform and conservatism clashed. It was only in the 17th presidential election, which elected President Lee Myung-bak, that the policy agenda of economic revitalization, in addition to the political agenda of judging the participatory government, proved effective.
Second, the agenda competition in past elections fundamentally unfolded under the dichotomous confrontation of democracy versus anti-democracy and reform versus conservatism. Although the democracy versus anti-democracy framework weakened, and socio-political differentiation intensified, leading to the occasional emergence of third forces like Chung Ju-yung, Park Chan-jong, and Lee In-je, and efforts by the progressive camp to establish an independent force became visible, they were insufficient to fundamentally alter the existing dichotomous structure.
Third, broadly speaking, it was an agenda competition within the framework of the existing political and economic system established with the democratization of 1987. Third forces emerged from internal power struggles within existing parties, or the Democratic Labor Party, which advocated for progressive politics, aimed for institutionalization within the system, and did not fundamentally reject the existing system and order.
Despite changes in the overall social environment and voter attitudes, the agendas of past elections until the 17th presidential election in 2007 did not significantly deviate from the democracy versus anti-democracy framework formed during the democratization process of 1987. In particular, until the end of the era of the three Kims, the strong regionalist voting behavior dominated, making the influence of agenda competition on election results quite limited.
Conflicting Agenda Competition in 2012
Looking at public opinion, the agenda competition in 2012 is foreshadowing a major shift beyond the dichotomous competition of democracy versus anti-democracy that dominated past elections. At the center of this change are the smart (Swing, Middle, Ambivalent, Responsive, Tricky) voters who make flexible political choices without being biased toward a specific ideology. Smart voters are not subjects of mobilization by a particular party or passive entities as in the past; they are voters who actively respond to issues and situations and freely make political choices, moving between progressive-conservative ideologies and between ruling and opposition parties. Given that they constitute the majority of the electorate and that the direction of recent elections has been determined by their choices, agendas that align with their political and policy preferences will emerge as the core agendas of 2012. Let's examine what the core agendas that will shape 2012 will be, divided into political and policy agendas.
Three Major Political Agendas: Regime Change vs. Political Power Shift vs. Political System Change
In terms of political agendas, unlike the 2007 presidential election, which was dominated by the judgment of the participatory government, 2012 is expected to see a complex competition with multidimensional agendas clashing with each other.
First, as the Lee Myung-bak administration enters its latter half, with the global financial crisis and the domestic economy worsening rapidly, public sentiment for judging the government is escalating, comparable to 2007. In a survey by the East Asia Institute in April 2007, 58.4% agreed with the 'participatory government judgment theory,' and in April 2011, five years later, 61.9% agreed with the 'MB judgment theory.' There is a possibility that the regime change agenda, similar to 2007, will emerge as the core agenda of the 2012 political landscape. This puts the Grand National Party in a tense situation. Consequently, the current opposition is seemingly going all-in on a strategy to create an agenda of regime extension versus regime change through early candidate unification.
However, the agenda competition next year will not be unilaterally favorable to the opposition. This is because, alongside the sentiment for judging the current administration, there is strong public skepticism about viewing the current opposition parties as viable alternatives. Taking Seoul as an example, support for the 'check and balance' argument, 'support the opposition candidate to check the ruling and opposition parties,' was 51.8% in the June 2, 2010 local elections, but it dropped to 40.8% in a September 2011 survey. Nationwide, the participatory government judgment theory in 2007 led to the Grand National Party's support exceeding 45-50%, whereas the current MB judgment theory has not led to an increase in opposition party support. The Democratic Party's approval rating remains stagnant in the low 20% range. Distrust in all existing parties is the very background for the emergence of the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon. This distrust in party politics as a whole sends a strong warning message to both the ruling and opposition parties to hasten self-reflection and internal reform, and externally, it calls for the emergence of a third force. A majority of the public cited 'self-reflection and party reform' as the most urgent task for both the ruling and opposition parties, and in Seoul, as many as 59.5% agreed with the 'power shift theory' that 'new political forces should be supported.'
[Figure 1] Perception of Regime Judgment Theory and the Need for a Third Party
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| Regime Judgment Theory / Opposition Unification Theory | Need for a Third Party |
Source: East Asia Institute · YTN · JoongAng Ilbo · Korea Research Regular Survey
What is noteworthy is the demand for a change in the political and economic system underlying the 'regime change' and 'political power shift' theories. Triggered by the global financial crisis, fundamental issues with the current socio-economic system that structure unfair competition and polarization are being identified domestically and internationally. The Occupy Wall Street movement, advocating for a second social contract, is spreading globally, and domestically, the need for system reform is being raised through various concepts such as 'Capitalism 4.0,' 'Society of Anger,' and 'Second Social Contract Theory.' Notably, neither the ruling nor opposition parties can find alternatives within the current party system, and voters' voices are not being channeled through traditional political participation methods using parties and existing political institutions. Instead, they are erupting through unconventional political participation methods such as candlelight vigils and Hope Buses. Although this is currently a latent agenda not yet politicized by any political force, it has the potential to emerge as a explosive agenda given the intensity of distrust in the current system.
Three Major Policy Agendas: Economic Polarization · Economic Growth · Quality of Life
As uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment increases and the perceived economic conditions of the populace become severe, it will be difficult to expect voter support in the 2012 political landscape without presenting a vision for policy agendas. These signs were already evident in the June 2 local elections held shortly after the Cheonan incident in 2010. Despite the ruling party's agenda of national security issues and the 'North Korea card,' what actually influenced voters' choices were free school meals and the Four Major Rivers Project. According to the National Agenda survey results, which the East Asia Institute has been continuously tracking since 2006, public opinion overwhelmingly ranks economic polarization and economic growth as the top national agendas.
[Figure 2] Top National Tasks for the Next Government
Source: East Asia Institute · YTN · JoongAng Ilbo · Korea Research Regular Survey, December Survey
What is noteworthy is that while the dichotomy of 'progressive = polarization, conservative = growth priority' was mainly at play until the Roh Moo-hyun administration, this boundary is weakening under the current administration. There is broad consensus on the need for expanded welfare to resolve polarization. However, at the same time, a majority of public opinion expresses concern and caution regarding the universal welfare advocated by the opposition. Furthermore, until the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the frame for economic agendas was primarily formed at the national and societal levels. Both the progressive 'welfare expansion first' and the conservative 'growth trickle-down first' approaches are 'national-level economic agendas.' In early 2011, with the housing crisis, inflation crisis, and the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak, voices demanding national measures for individual 'quality of life' have rapidly increased.
Meanwhile, surveys conducted immediately after the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island incidents showed increased public interest in agendas for strengthening national security and inter-Korean relations. However, this interest has since waned. Unless a special tension is created between the North and South, the issues of 'economic polarization, economic growth, and quality of life' will likely emerge as the biggest policy agenda disputes in 2012.
2012 Should Not Be Reduced to Their Own League
Currently, the ruling party is undergoing a transition to a committee system led by former representative Park Geun-hye, focusing on reform efforts to dispel the escalating regime change sentiment. The opposition is forming the Democratic United Party, centered around the Democratic Party, the Civic United Party, and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, and the Progressive Justice Party, formed by the Democratic Labor Party, the People's Participation Party, and defectors from the 진보신당 (Progressive New Party). They have completed their organizational restructuring and are revitalizing by opening the door for voter participation in the selection of their next leadership. However, both the ruling and opposition parties have yet to fully engage in the agenda competition that public opinion expects.
Most importantly, the ruling Grand National Party, in the October 26 Seoul mayoral by-election, dismissed the public's demand for socio-economic stability and welfare expansion as 'welfare populism' and consistently pursued a negative campaign under the guise of 'policy debate.' They seem to fail to understand the voters' disappointment and anger towards the current ruling power. However, following the election, the DDoS attack on the National Election Commission website, which involved ruling party lawmakers, and a series of scandals involving close associates and relatives of the president have rapidly intensified political criticism and cynicism towards the president and the ruling party.
Representative Park Geun-hye and the Grand National Party's Emergency Response Committee are attempting to reposition their policy stance towards 'welfare expansion and tailored (selective) welfare' to gain majority public support and are trying to preempt the agenda of 'self-reflection and reform' before the opposition, thereby reorganizing their agenda competition front. The question is whether this will to change can extend beyond the boundaries of conservatives and Grand National Party supporters to gain the support of the centrist group. The biggest challenge for the ruling party will be overcoming the distrust in the 'sincerity' of the current administration and the potential for conflict and division between the pro-Lee and pro-Park factions ahead of the next election.
In contrast, the main opposition Democratic Party has been significantly impacted by the sentiment for a shift in political power. However, despite experiencing an identity crisis to the point of being unable to field its own candidate, it is difficult to find voices of self-reflection and fierce internal reform within the party. The Democratic Party urgently needs to devise a plan to restore trust in party politics through 'self-reform' and, furthermore, present a vision for 'system change.' However, the Democratic Party is reverting to the outdated 'democracy versus anti-democracy' agenda, which has long passed its expiration date politically, and is stuck at the 'universal welfare line' established during the resident referendum process, policy-wise. In particular, with a significant portion of the existing opposition party's supporters being absorbed by Ahn Cheol-soo's support, the erosion of the party's support base appears more serious than expected. The key will be to prepare for the 'power shift theory' with self-reflection and reform, a vision for system reform, and policy alternatives that go beyond the inertial universal welfare line.
Meanwhile, support for Ahn Cheol-soo, who has suddenly emerged as a leading contender for the next presidential election by receiving warnings against existing political forces and expectations for new politics, remains strong. The trend of a third force, represented by the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon, also faces several dilemmas. In a press conference in early December, Ahn Cheol-soo stated, 'I have never considered running in the general election or forming a third new party,' but left room for discussion regarding his presidential candidacy. Recently, news of him taking classes on current national affairs has fueled curiosity about his next moves. In a Korean society that considers decisive political action and the will to wield power as important leadership virtues, voter fatigue is likely to accumulate due to his political stance of neither confirming nor denying.
Second, although somewhat confirmed during candidate Park Won-soon's campaign, focusing solely on the anti-Grand National Party front leads to the alienation of forces desiring new politics and a power shift. Conversely, adhering strictly to the power shift sentiment provokes backlash from the Democratic Party and the regime change sentiment. Second, as the two agendas conflict, the decision is postponed, and the initial advantage is not capitalized upon. If Ahn Cheol-soo runs for the next presidential election, he will face the same dilemma as candidate Park Won-soon.
In this dilemma, the presidential election is just one year away for the political sphere. As examined so far, the 2012 general election and presidential election will be elections where exceptionally complex and multi-layered voter expectations are concentrated compared to past elections. Each political force must accurately read the complex agenda demands of voters during the preparation for the October 26 by-election and the upcoming general election, and dedicate themselves to developing visions through self-reflection and decisive action. Success in developing new agendas that align with public opinion and presenting alternatives will lead to full support and backing from voters not only in the election but also in subsequent national governance. If they remain detached from public opinion and are reduced to their own league, whoever wins may face the burden of governing under strong distrust and scrutiny from voters from the outset of their term. We expect greater effort and self-reform from the political sphere so that 2012 can be an election where both the public and politicians win. ■
* This article is a revised and supplemented version of a manuscript published in <Hot Issue Current Affairs 2012> (compiled by Sisa Journal, 2011), published with the permission of Sisa Journal.
*本文为使用 AI 从韩语原文翻译而来,部分译文或语感可能存在偏差。