[EAI Opinion Review] The New Mayor of Seoul Will Be Decided by SMART Voters

Swing, Middle, Ambivalent, Responsive, Tricky Voter

<Prospects for the October 26 Seoul Mayoral By-election>

1. Fluctuating Public Opinion and the October 26 Seoul Mayoral Election

Since the failure of the referendum in August 2011, the media headlines have been changing daily. Following the referendum on August 24, the resignation of Mayor Oh Se-hoon was followed by the appointment of Education Superintendent Kwak No-hyun in 2010. Just two days after the referendum, on August 26, Professor Park Myung-ki, who had been a candidate for unification with Kwak during the superintendent election, was arrested. On September 9, before the Chuseok holiday, Education Superintendent Kwak, who had provided 200 million KRW to Professor Park, was arrested.

The atmosphere within the Grand National Party, which had been experiencing internal strife due to Mayor Oh Se-hoon's resignation, was instantly reversed. In contrast, the Democratic Party, which had seen a rush of preliminary candidates declare their intention to run for the Seoul mayoral election after the failure of the free school lunch referendum, appeared flustered by the sudden turn of events and the worsening public opinion. A poll of 400 Seoul citizens conducted by Hankyoreh and the Korea Society Opinion Institute (KSOI) on August 27 showed that public support for voting for the ruling party candidate in the by-election (40.0%) outpaced support for the opposition party candidate (32.9%). However, news that would normally have dominated the political agenda for a considerable period was completely overshadowed on September 1 by reports of "Ahn Cheol-soo's potential independent candidacy for mayor."

The political landscape was turbulent. The Grand National Party, initially pleased by the prospect of a divided opposition vote, was stunned by Ahn Cheol-soo's anti-Grand National Party stance. The Democratic Party and progressive parties, which had been tense about the "Ahn Cheol-soo effect," seemed to breathe a sigh of relief as the unification process led to Park Won-soon's candidacy. For a week, every move of Ahn Cheol-soo dominated the attention of the political sphere and the media, and public opinion swayed with his every action. A poll of 1,006 Seoul citizens conducted by JoongAng Ilbo and Gallup Korea on September 4 showed Ahn Cheol-soo comfortably leading in a hypothetical three-way race with 50% support, compared to Na Kyung-won's 23.6% and Park Won-soon's 10.0%. In a two-way race between Na Kyung-won and Park Won-soon, should Ahn Cheol-soo not run, Na Kyung-won led 41.2% to 28.9%. However, on September 6, Ahn Cheol-soo announced a surprise unification of candidacy with Park Won-soon and withdrew. A poll of 500 Seoul citizens conducted by Chosun Ilbo on September 7 showed 51.1% of Seoul citizens would vote for Park Won-soon and 32.5% for Na Kyung-won. This indicates that the center of public opinion is once again shifting towards the opposition. Furthermore, Ahn Cheol-soo's performance in various opinion polls, competing with Park Geun-hye, who had been the frontrunner for the next presidential election for four years, empirically demonstrated the possibility of cracks in the "Park Geun-hye consensus."

At the heart of this unpredictable political climate lies the "Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon." However, as Ahn Cheol-soo himself has stated, the essence of this phenomenon is not in Ahn Cheol-soo himself, but in the fluctuating public sentiment that is being expressed through him. Without a proper understanding of the reality and trajectory of this fluctuating public sentiment, it will be difficult to predict the direction of the next general election, the next presidential election, and even the outcome of the Seoul mayoral by-election, which is less than 50 days away.

2. The Eye of the Storm of Fluctuating Public Sentiment: The Ambivalent Voter

The Eye of the Storm: Ambivalent Voters in the Middle Ground

Alarmed by the "Ahn Cheol-soo syndrome," the political establishment and media began to focus on "middle-ground voters" who are not aligned with existing party structures, voters who are "anti-Grand National Party and anti-Democratic Party." This shift in focus was driven by opinion polls showing strong support for Ahn Cheol-soo among these middle-ground voters. While Ahn Cheol-soo emphasized the historical trend of being anti-Grand National Party and leaned towards opposition unity, his subsequent clarification that this assessment was limited to the "free school lunch" issue and his expression of respect for former representative Park Geun-hye appear to be strategic moves aimed at these anti-Grand National Party and anti-Democratic Party middle-ground voters. Without considering the backlash from the political middle ground against the existing political system, it is impossible to explain the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon or predict future political developments. To understand the political mobilization of these voters, a new understanding of their political characteristics is necessary.

In the past, mainstream academia and political circles in the West generally understood these middle-ground voters as ignorant voters (ignorant voter) who lacked party affiliation or had inconsistent ideological and policy stances, and were politically apathetic. From this perspective, they were seen as passive and peripheral figures with weak political interest and participation, merely targets for mobilization and enlightenment. However, there is growing doubt as to whether they can be viewed as passive subjects to be mobilized. Overseas, the emergence of phenomena such as "conservative Democrats" and "liberal Republicans" in the United States in the 2000s, and the issue of the "unrepresented middle class" becoming a core issue in electoral research, are representative examples.

The theory of the ambivalent voter (ambivalent voter) highlights the need for a new perspective on middle-ground voters. Attempts are increasingly being made to conceptualize them as ambivalent voters (ambivalent attitude) who simultaneously hold diverse, and even seemingly contradictory, values, rather than blindly supporting a particular value or faction within a dichotomous black-and-white framework. Ambivalent attitudes refer to the coexistence of love and hate towards a single object, or the simultaneous acceptance or rejection of contradictory values or attitudes. While existing theories view such ambivalent attitudes as negative phenomena indicating ideological and political inconsistency, the theory of ambivalent attitudes considers them a normal political phenomenon and an expression of ideological flexibility, thus not viewing them negatively.

Ambivalence in Electoral and Party Support

My interest in the ambivalence of Korean voters emerged around the 2007 presidential election. As shown in [Figure 1], a significant number of voters deviated from traditional ideological consistency, with support for the Grand National Party surging not only among conservatives but also among moderates and progressives during the 2007 presidential election. In a poll conducted in January 2003, immediately after the 16th presidential election that brought Roh Moo-hyun to power, 45.0% of progressives stated they supported the Millennium Democratic Party, while only 11.7% supported the Grand National Party. However, in a poll conducted about two months before the 2007 presidential election, support for progressive parties such as the United Democratic Party and the Democratic Labor Party among progressives remained at a similar level (45.0%) as in 2002, but support for the Grand National Party had nearly tripled to 32.4% compared to 2002. Currently, support for the Grand National Party has fallen back to 21.8%, while support for Democratic/progressive parties has reached 49.6%, showing a trend of restoring ideologically consistent voting behavior. At the very least, the rise in support for conservative parties and candidates among progressives in 2007 prompted consideration of ambivalence in ideology and party attitudes.

The change in party support patterns among moderates is even more noteworthy. In the January 2003 poll, demonstrating the power of the "Roh wave," support for the Millennium Democratic Party, which had successfully secured another term, and the progressive Democratic Labor Party among moderates was 41.5%, while support for the Grand National Party was only 21.7%. However, in the poll just before the 2007 presidential election, when Lee Myung-bak maintained a dominant lead, support for the Grand National Party among moderates surged to 43.0%, while support for progressive parties (United Democratic Party, Democratic Labor Party, Democratic Party, Creative Korea Party combined) was a mere 15.5%. They had been judged by the middle-ground voters. Four years later, support for conservative parties (Grand National Party, Liberty Forward Party, Future Hope Alliance) and progressive parties (Democratic Party, Democratic Labor Party, Creative Korea Party, 진보신당, People's Participation Party) among moderates is nearly neck and neck at 35.4% versus 40.2%. I believe the direction of power realignment in 2012 will be determined by how this balance is broken. However, the emergence of the "Ahn wave," which does not belong to either camp, has necessitated a complete revision of existing predictive frameworks.

[Figure 1] Comparison of Party Support Rates by Ideology Before and After the 16th and 17th Presidential Elections and Current Party Support Rates

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Note 1. Support for the Grand National Party/conservative parties includes support for the Grand National Party in the January 2003 and October 2007 polls, and includes the Grand National Party, Liberty Forward Party, and Future Hope Alliance in the August 2011 poll.

Note 2. Support for the Democratic Party/progressive parties includes support for the Millennium Democratic Party and the Democratic Labor Party in the January 2003 poll; support for the United Democratic Party, Democratic Labor Party, Democratic Party, and Creative Korea Party in the 2007 poll; and the combined support for the Democratic Party, Democratic Labor Party, Creative Korea Party, 진보신당, and People's Participation Party in the 2011 poll.

Note 3. Data: The January 2003 poll data is from the Korean Political Science Association's 16th Presidential Election survey; the October 2007 poll data is from the EAI-SBS-JoongAng Ilbo-Korea Research Presidential Panel Survey; the August 2011 poll data is from the EAI-YTN-JoongAng Ilbo-Korea Research Regular August Survey.

Ideological Ambivalence: The Rise of Progressive Pro-Alliance with the US and Conservative Pro-Welfare Advocates

Furthermore, the increase in ambivalent voters in terms of policy and ideological attitudes is also prominent in Korean society. The tendency to hold diverging views on values that have been major ideological battlegrounds in Korean society, such as 'growth versus welfare,' 'pro-US versus anti-US,' 'pro-North Korea versus anti-North Korea,' and 'conservative parties versus progressive parties,' rather than choosing one side, is increasing.

With the end of the Cold War and the advancement of democratization, the dichotomous perception structure of 'progressive = pro-North Korea = anti-US = welfare first' versus 'conservative = anti-North Korea = pro-US = growth first' is weakening at the voter level. Changes in inter-Korean relations are also providing a significant turning point. A prime example is the shift in perception regarding the importance of the ROK-US alliance following the Cheonan incident and the Yeonpyeong shelling in 2010, with a growing voice, particularly among progressives, emphasizing the ROK-US alliance. In [Figure 2] (1), in the 2006 survey, 41.1% of those with progressive tendencies preferred diplomacy for ROK independence from the US, but this figure significantly decreased to 26.7% in the November 2011 survey. Conversely, the response advocating for prioritizing the ROK-US alliance, which was only 30.2% in the 2006 survey, increased to 45.3% in the 2011 survey, similar to the overall average.

On the other hand, a significant characteristic is the increase in conservative voters who believe welfare should be prioritized over growth due to the spread of social polarization and economic stagnation. In [Figure 2]-(2), looking at the responses from conservatives, the proportion favoring growth first was the majority opinion at 61.5% in the 2006 survey, but it fell to 49.1% in the 2010 survey, while the proportion favoring welfare first rose from 38.5% to 50.9%. In other words, based on the 2010 survey results alone, nearly half of progressives can be considered pro-ROK-US alliance progressives, and conversely, a majority of conservatives have become pro-welfare conservatives. While it is impossible to deny the possibility of public opinion shifting again with changes in circumstances, the emergence of different attitude patterns in the ROK-US relations and the growth-welfare debates, which have been the biggest ideological issues among the public, increases the possibility of ideological and political convergence compared to the past. This suggests that if political parties remain confined to the existing dichotomous ideological confrontation, they are likely to fail in capturing the support of voters with these ambivalent attitudes.

[Figure 2] Changes in Perception of ROK-US Relations among Progressives and Changes in Perception of Growth-Welfare among Conservatives (%)

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Source: EAI · Hankook Ilbo Data (December 2006), EAI · Korea Research Public Opinion Barometer Survey (October/November 2010)

3. Middle-Ground Voters = SMART (Swing, Middle, Ambivalent, Responsive, Tricky) Voters

So, who are these middle-ground voters whose voting processes and policy attitudes are being strengthened, and how do they differ from the middle class of the past?

Ambivalence is the key concept for understanding middle-ground voters and the resulting dynamism of the political process. Recent opinion poll results show an increase in ambivalent attitudes among Korean voters, and their opinions are influencing election outcomes and party support distributions. The most significant characteristic of ambivalent voters' voting behavior is their simultaneous distrust of both the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party (opposition). In the June 2 local elections in Seoul and Gyeonggi Province last year, approximately half of the voters in the Seoul metropolitan area expressed ambivalent responses, simultaneously holding a positive view of President Lee Myung-bak's administration while believing the government should be judged in the local elections, or conversely, agreeing with the need to judge the administration while holding critical views of the opposition party.

A key characteristic of ambivalent voters' political preferences and voting choices is their aversion (Middle) to extreme support for any particular party or ideology. Therefore, if the election process becomes excessively focused on ideological confrontation or partisan competition, a significant portion of these ambivalent voters will remain undecided, unable to choose either side. In the June 2 local elections in 2010, most middle-ground voters had not decided on their preferred candidate until a week before the election, and more than half of them decided on their candidate on election day or 2-3 days prior.

However, unlike the passive middle class who were indifferent to politics, ambivalent voters tend to be active (Responsive) in reacting to the socio-economic conditions of Korea and their personal circumstances when making voting decisions. In my observation, they tend to be highly sensitive to factors such as the economic situation or the unilateral dominance of a particular force, rather than "partisan factors" like a candidate's ideology or party affiliation. In other words, they exhibit a strong tendency towards pragmatic economic voting psychology (economic voting), considering who would benefit the household or national economy, and a balancing voting psychology (balancing voting) to check the unilateral dominance of a particular force.

Consequently, the candidate choices of ambivalent voters are much more fluid and dynamic. They exhibit a "swing voting" tendency, crossing party lines between the ruling and opposition parties, and left and right, in their voting choices and party support. This is because they tend to vote based on pragmatic checks and balances, rather than being bound by ideological consistency or partisanship towards a particular party. In other words, these middle-ground voters can support the Grand National Party today and the Democratic Party tomorrow based on their own judgment.

To summarize the above discussion, middle-ground voters are no longer passive beings of the past, nor are they easy targets for unilateral mobilization by political parties. In short, they are alienated by appeals to ideological or partisan unity, and their support can be gained by presenting a pragmatic vision while demonstrating a sense of harmony and balance with the opposition. From the perspective of the existing political establishment, a very fickle and tricky (Tricky) voter base has emerged, making political mobilization difficult.

I propose to combine the initial letters of the concepts that characterize these middle-ground voters to coin the term "SMART voter." They cross party lines in their voting choices (Swing), exhibit ideological flexibility through aversion to political extremism (Middle) and ambivalence (Ambivalence), and are sensitive to economic conditions and political checks and balances (Responsive). Therefore, from the perspective of the existing political establishment, they are tricky (Tricky) voters who are difficult to mobilize politically. The concept of the SMART voter effectively captures the distinct characteristics of the current middle class compared to the past.

4. The Yellow Card from SMART Voters in the "Ahn Wave"

The 2011 "Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon" served as a strong yellow card to the existing party system, which failed to properly read the characteristics of SMART voters and remained mired in the old politics of progressive versus conservative, and Grand National Party versus Democratic Party confrontations. In the context of the free school lunch referendum under Mayor Oh Se-hoon, the opposition's boycott, and the allegations of vote-buying against Education Superintendent Kwak No-hyun, what did the existing political establishment misread, and why did they inevitably face the backlash of SMART voters? These are unavoidable questions for accurately understanding the meaning of the "Ahn wave" and forecasting the future direction of the Seoul mayoral election and the next presidential election.

Oh Se-hoon's Misjudgment: Lack of Understanding of Ambivalence Favoring Welfare Expansion and Selective Welfare

Regarding the free school lunch referendum and welfare policies, public opinion clearly favored selective welfare over the universal welfare advocated by the opposition. A survey by the East Asia Institute in August showed that support for selective school lunches was 55.7%, exceeding the 44.3% support for universal school lunches. This was due to concerns about the stigma effect and tax increases associated with implementing universal welfare. However, voters simultaneously expressed concern about the welfare deficit in Korean society. The demand for welfare expansion was overwhelmingly high (66.8%). This suggests that while voters desired welfare expansion, they preferred selective welfare as the method.

Mayor Oh Se-hoon's misjudgment stemmed from his failure to recognize the ambivalent element among proponents of selective welfare, more than half of whom desired welfare expansion rather than fearing welfare populism. Let's examine this in more detail. In [Figure 3], by crossing the axis of the need for welfare expansion (maintenance/reduction vs. expansion) with the axis of preferred welfare approach (universal vs. selective), respondents can be categorized into four types: 'Welfare Expansion/Universal Welfare,' 'Welfare Expansion/Selective Welfare,' 'Welfare Reduction/Maintenance/Universal Welfare,' and 'Welfare Reduction/Maintenance/Selective Welfare.' The distribution of responses for each type shows that the 'Welfare Expansion/Universal Welfare' stance, advocated by the opposition and progressive forces, was the largest single category at 36.2% of all respondents, but it was insufficient to secure a majority. Mayor Oh Se-hoon and the traditional conservative bloc's stance was 'Welfare Overload/Selective Welfare,' accounting for 22.9%. On the other hand, the number of voters who shared Mayor Oh Se-hoon's view on selective welfare but agreed with the ambivalent stance that welfare expansion is necessary rather than a direct confrontation with welfare populism in Korean society accounted for 32.8% of all respondents. Finally, the position of reducing welfare while pursuing a universal welfare approach is logically and practically untenable, garnering only 8.1% support.

In a situation where no single type constitutes a majority, the outcome of the welfare debate between the ruling and opposition parties depends on which axis forms the basic framework of the debate. In this context, the side that preempts the ambivalent stance has a significant advantage in forming a majority coalition and achieving victory. If Mayor Oh and the Grand National Party had declared their support for welfare expansion and framed the debate as a confrontation between 'Welfare Expansion/Universal Welfare' and 'Welfare Expansion/Selective Welfare,' voters with the traditional 'Welfare Reduction/Selective Welfare' perspective would have been more likely to be absorbed into the 'Welfare Expansion/Selective Welfare' group, which differed only in the welfare approach, rather than the opposition party, which differed in both welfare attitude and method. Ultimately, Mayor Oh Se-hoon pushed the voters who preferred welfare expansion and selective welfare into the anti-populism camp.

[Figure 3] Scale of Respondents by Welfare Perception Type and Political Power (%)

Source: EAI·YTN·JoongAng Ilbo·Korea Research Regular August Survey Data

Provoking Backlash from the Middle and Lower Classes, Reinforcing the Grand National Party's Image as an Establishment Party

The defeat in the free school lunch referendum and the loss of initiative in the Seoul mayoral election led voters to doubt the sincerity of the government and the Grand National Party's pro-common people policies, resulting in a decline in support for the Grand National Party among the middle and lower classes. In [Figure 4], regarding growth-welfare perceptions by class, particularly among the middle class (52.2%) and lower class (49.8%), the majority favored prioritizing distribution, while the call for prioritizing growth fell short of a majority among the middle class (41.0%) and lower class (40.8%). Among the middle and lower classes, public opinion favoring welfare is strong. Looking at party support rates by class, the Democratic Party, although trailing the Grand National Party, received consistent support across all classes, whereas the Grand National Party showed a support pattern of an establishment party representing the upper class. Support for the Grand National Party was 31.5% among the lower class and 39.5% among the middle class, but it garnered nearly a majority of 47.5% among the upper class. The image of the Grand National Party as a party representing vested interests is solidifying, and if a force emerges to represent the interests of the lower and middle classes, it could be interpreted as a sign of class politics becoming a reality in Korea.

[Figure 4] Is Class Politics Being Realized? Differences in Economic Perceptions and Party Support Rates by Social Strata (%)

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Source: EAI·YTN·JoongAng Ilbo·Korea Research August Regular Survey Data

Democratic Party's Misjudgment: Referendum Fails, "No Winner" 74.2%, "Cannot Sympathize with Boycott" 60%

Although the Democratic Party appears to have won superficially with the failure of the referendum, smart voters sent a strong warning message to the party. When asked to evaluate the referendum results in the August survey, divided by ideological orientation, only a minority responded that the Grand National Party had won. Responses indicating the Democratic Party had won were also limited to 31.3% among progressives, 21.2% among moderates, and 23.1% among conservatives. The largest response was that neither party could be declared a winner. Notably, as many as 74.2% of moderates responded that no party had won, indicating the strongest backlash against both parties among smart voters.

More directly, when asked to evaluate the Democratic Party's boycott campaign and its overall response to the referendum, 56.8% of moderates, where smart voters are concentrated, responded that they did not sympathize with the boycott campaign, and a significant 69.5% gave a negative evaluation of the Democratic Party's response as incorrect. There was considerable resentment towards the Democratic Party's choice of an extreme measure, a referendum boycott, after failing to respond effectively during the signature campaign to halt the free universal school lunch program, which began in February.

Nevertheless, immediately after the election, the rush of Democratic Party Seoul mayoral preliminary candidates and the suspicion of bribery involving Superintendent of Education Kwak No-hyun appear to have sharply increased dissatisfaction not only with the Grand National Party but also with the Democratic Party and opposition parties. The news of Professor Ahn Cheol-soo's candidacy, who has earned respect for his social standing and leadership beyond the conservative-progressive divide, can be interpreted as having ignited the dissatisfaction and distrust of existing political parties among these smart voters and led to political mobilization.

[Figure 5] Evaluation of Referendum Results by Ideological Orientation (%)

[Figure 6] Evaluation of Referendum Boycott and Democratic Party's Response by Moderates (%)

Source: EAI·YTN·JoongAng Ilbo·Korea Research August Regular Survey Data

5. Smart Voters' Choice in the October 26 Seoul Mayoral Election and the 2012 Presidential Election?

Ahn Cheol-soo, who received enthusiastic support from smart voters, supported Park Won-soon, a standing director generally classified as pro-opposition, relative to the Grand National Party, resigned, and a significant portion of Ahn Cheol-soo's support transferred to Director Park. Consequently, in the October 26 Seoul mayoral by-election, the situation was undoubtedly favorable to Park Won-soon and the opposition. Fundamentally, the discontent accumulated against the current government and ruling party has broadly spread a sentiment of judgment against the administration among voters, which is also an unfavorable condition for the ruling party. However, considering the characteristics of ambivalent voters examined so far, it is not easy to predict future political trends based on the current situation, whether for the ruling or opposition parties.

First and foremost, the primary variable in forecasting the political climate is the response of the current political establishment, which has received a strong yellow card from voters. Above all, a correction in perspective towards centrist voters is necessary. In fact, the government and the Grand National Party have achieved some success in discerning the preferences of these centrist voters by presenting lines such as the "pragmatic middle-ground" and the "fair society theory." This can be considered the secret to maintaining high approval ratings and remaining the leading party despite numerous political crises. Former Representative Park Geun-hye, who is pursuing expanded customized welfare tailored to Korea despite backlash from traditional conservatives, also appears to have some awareness of the changes among these voters.

However, the problem is that these smart voters no longer trust the government and ruling party's pragmatic middle-ground approach or their fair society theory. Politically, the government and ruling party's unilateral and high-handed politics during the initial stages of their administration, such as the Grand Canal project, the push for the Sejong City revision, and the Four Major Rivers Project, had already significantly amplified the smart voters' desire for checks and balances. Furthermore, President Lee Myung-bak expressed empathy with Mayor Oh Se-hoon's anti-populism offensive, which directly contradicted the expansion of welfare that smart voters desire, and encouraged voter participation. This is a signal contrary to pro-commoner pragmatism. The worsening of the perceived economy and livelihood economy due to the abnormal housing crisis and inflation this year has turned away smart voters who are sensitive to economic issues. While some within the conservative camp are attempting to transform by proposing new ideas that align with voter changes, such as "Capitalism 4.0," if they resist this trend of change, the smart voters' sentiment for judging the ruling conservative party is likely to intensify.

However, the current opposition parties are in a situation as serious as the ruling party. Although the opposition parties performed well in the June 2, 2010, local elections and the April 27 by-elections this year, and the "Ahn wind" offered hope for cracks in the prevailing narrative of former Representative Park's inevitable victory, it has been confirmed that smart voters do not trust the current opposition as an alternative force. In the 2007 presidential election, the desire to judge the participatory government's mismanagement led to support for the then-opposition Grand National Party. At that time, the Grand National Party maintained high party support rates, fluctuating between 45-50% even among the centrist demographic. However, the Democratic Party's current support rate does not even reach that of the Grand National Party, which is the target of judgment. They are in a situation where they must rely on alliances with minor progressive parties with only about 5% support. The "Ahn wind" transferred to standing director Park Won-soon, who advocated for "new politics," but it is difficult for this to translate into support for the Democratic Party or existing progressive parties.

Moreover, even if an opposition coalition is successful, voters will not readily cast their ballots for a superficial unified candidate lacking proper individuals and content. This is evidenced by the warning signs that smart voters have already sent regarding the opposition's complacency in the Gimhae-eul constituency during the April 27 by-elections and the July 28 by-elections held just one month after the June 2 local elections. The Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon also highlighted the vulnerabilities of the opposition's favored strategies for future power, namely "unification," "universal welfare," and a "leftward shift." They were powerless against the slogan of "independent new politics" without concrete content. It has become absolutely urgent to develop new strategies that meet the demands of dynamic smart voters, breaking away from unification without self-reform and the habitual leftward shift in welfare policy. If these efforts are neglected, the Democratic Party could be relegated to a third party, depending on the ruling party's reform process or the independent consolidation of power in a third zone.

The final variable, of course, lies with Director Ahn Cheol-soo, the main driver of the "Ahn wind," and the third zone itself. As Director Ahn Cheol-soo himself has acknowledged, the full support for him and the third zone is not so much a testament to their political capabilities and leadership, but rather a messenger conveying a warning message to the existing order. Although he has temporarily left the field due to his resignation, he will be called back at any time if voters judge that the current political establishment has not sufficiently heeded their message. This is why the emergence of a second or third Ahn Cheol-soo cannot be ruled out. However, the dilemma is that, considering the current electoral system, Director Ahn Cheol-soo's personal reputation and image have limitations, and ultimately, the establishment of an electoral organization is necessary. It will be difficult to achieve this independently due to the lack of organizational and financial support, and allying with existing organizations would contradict the smart voters' expectations for new politics. This appears to be a common dilemma faced by previous third-party candidates.

In the inevitable transition from a political messenger to a leader, questions about Director Ahn's will to power as a leader and his ability to manage a political organization will continue to arise. If he intends to pursue new politics, it is best to confront these questions head-on, and the sooner the better. The lesson from previous third-party candidates is that the longer he delays, the lower the expectations voters place on him will become, and the greatest harm will befall the public if they choose an unverified leader. A responsible politician should not avoid this for the sake of the public.

Ultimately, it is difficult to predict even a month from now at this point. This is because public opinion has become so dynamic in recent elections that it is difficult to capture even with opinion polls. This is even more true in elections held immediately after the emergence of the unexpected "Ahn wind." The choices of smart voters inflict the pain of defeat on parties that have strayed from the flow of public sentiment, yet they do not grant unilateral victory to the opposing side. They demonstrate a considerable sense of balance. Behind this exquisite flow of public sentiment lies the smart voting choices of smart voters.

Nevertheless, the fact that the ruling and opposition parties have been bickering over whether to prioritize mobilizing their core supporters ("house rabbits") or expanding support among centrists ("mountain rabbits") shows that they do not view smart voters as anything more than targets for mobilization. Smart voters do not place their full trust in any political force that remains within the existing dichotomy. They are not prey that can be easily caught at will, but rather voters who are very difficult to handle and have actively punished the political establishment.

They are sensitive to the economy and to checks and balances when a particular political force attempts to dominate excessively. The smart voting that protected the participatory government during the 2004 impeachment recognized the participatory government as a target for judgment within two years due to its failure to respond to the economic crisis theory. As a result, they voted to empower the Grand National Party in three national elections from 2006 to 2008. However, with the advent of the Lee Myung-bak administration, they demonstrated a new sense of balance. As distrust in communication-less, high-handed politics deepened, they favored the opposition in the 2010 local elections. However, as the opposition became complacent in victory and failed to show innovation, they exemplified "balancing voting" by granting victory to the ruling party in the July 27 by-elections. In 2011, they brought about revolutionary results for Representative Sohn Hak-kyu's gamble, which advocated for the role of the middle class in the April 27 by-elections, but they delivered a stern reprimand for the unification in Gimhae-eul, which lacked both justification and capability. This was followed by the free school lunch referendum and boycott. Smart voters are sending a strong warning message through the Ahn Cheol-soo phenomenon regarding all of these events. It remains uncertain who they will support and who they will give a red card to in the Seoul mayoral election, which marks the beginning of the 2012 general and presidential elections. For smart voters, it depends on who makes the effort. The real start is now.■

* This article is a revised and supplemented version of the manuscript published in the October issue of <Monthly Chosun>.