[EAI Opinion Review] ROK-US FTA Through Public Opinion: The Emergence of Cautious Views on the Timing of National Assembly Ratification

1. ROK-US FTA Ratification in the August Extraordinary Session and Public Opinion

25.8% support ratification in August, 46.3% support ratification after renegotiation, 9.4% oppose ratification itself.

Only 26.2% believe ratification should precede the US Congress.

One of the issues anticipated to cause friction between the ruling and opposition parties as the August extraordinary session of the National Assembly approaches is the ROK-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The Grand National Party (GNP) holds the position that the ROK-US FTA ratification bill should at least pass through the relevant standing committee. In contrast, the Democratic Party is countering by proposing the '10+2 Plan' (see Appendix 1), demanding renegotiation of the ROK-US FTA agreement terms. If even one of the items in the Democratic Party's 10+2 Plan is accepted by the National Assembly, it would effectively make it difficult for the ROK-US FTA ratification bill to pass during the August extraordinary session, as it could lead to revisions of the FTA agreement document concluded between Korea and the United States, which began in June 2006 and concluded in February 2011. However, as revealed in the Ministry of Strategy and Finance's analysis report <Analysis of the Impact of ROK-US FTA Additional Negotiations> released on July 22, the results of the additional negotiations, from an economic perspective, did indeed involve significant concessions from the Korean side (see Appendix 2). In this context, it is inevitable that the GNP would face considerable political pressure to push for the ratification of the ROK-US FTA. This is due to public dissatisfaction and distrust, stemming from the perception that the benefits of the ROK-US FTA, contrary to the government's initial claims, have increasingly involved only Korean concessions during the negotiation process (see Appendix 3).

Indeed, public sentiment regarding the ratification of the ROK-US FTA in the August extraordinary session is negative. Only 25.8% of respondents expressed support for the ratification of the ROK-US FTA in the August extraordinary session. In contrast, the opinion that ratification should occur after renegotiation was held by 46.3%, which is 20.5 percentage points (P) higher than the proportion supporting ratification in the August extraordinary session. The proportion of respondents who opposed ratification itself was 9.4%, indicating that outright opposition to the ROK-US FTA is a minority view. However, the 18.4% rate of 'Don't Know/No Answer' warrants attention, as it signifies a considerable number of citizens who lack sufficient knowledge or information about the ROK-US FTA.

Among the 577 respondents (72.1% of the total) who did not oppose ratification itself, i.e., those who supported ratification in August or after renegotiation, their views were examined in comparison to the timing of ratification by the US Congress. The largest proportion, 41.5%, responded that the timing should be the same as the US Congress. Those who responded that it should be after the US Congress's ratification were 21.5%. The proportion responding that it should precede the US Congress was 26.2%. 'Don't Know/No Answer' accounted for 10.8%. This indicates that even among citizens who support the ratification of the ROK-US FTA itself, 63.0% hold a negative view regarding the Korean National Assembly ratifying the ROK-US FTA before the US Congress.

[Figure 1] Attitudes toward ROK-US FTA Ratification in August and Perceptions of Ratification Timing (%)

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Answering that the ROK-US FTA should be ratified in the August extraordinary session did not necessarily mean supporting ratification before the US Congress. Only 30.3% of those supporting ratification in August responded that it should be ratified before the US Congress. Among those supporting ratification in August, 46.6% indicated the same timing as the US Congress, and 14.4% indicated after the US Congress's ratification. This means that even among those who answered that the ROK-US FTA should be ratified in the August extraordinary session, 61.0% chose the same timing as the US Congress or after the US Congress's ratification. A similar trend was observed among those who responded that ratification should occur after renegotiation. The proportion supporting ratification before the US Congress was 24.0%, the same timing as the US Congress was 38.5%, and after the US Congress's ratification was 25.3%.

[Figure 2] Comparison of Ratification Timing: August Ratification vs. Ratification After Renegotiation (%)

Considering the current situation, the GNP's stance of seeking to pass the ROK-US FTA ratification bill during the August extraordinary session lacks sufficient public consensus. Public opinion calls for revisions and improvements through renegotiation to eliminate unfavorable terms for Korea. Furthermore, there is no need to rush the ratification timing ahead of the United States.

Spread of Cautious Views Regardless of Political Stance

No Differences in Perception Based on Ideology, Government Performance Evaluation, Party Affiliation, or Preferred Presidential Candidate

[Figure 3] ROK-US FTA Ratification Perception by Socio-Political Characteristics (%)

The response patterns did not change even when analyzed by widely used background variables for socio-political perceptions, such as ideological orientation, evaluation of government performance, party affiliation, and support for major presidential candidates. Firstly, regarding ideological orientation, the proportion supporting ratification in August was 19.1% among progressives, lower than the 34.4% among conservatives. However, considering that 41.1% supported ratification after renegotiation, it indicates that even among conservatives, a significant number hold negative views on the August ratification of the ROK-US FTA. Regardless of whether government performance was evaluated positively or negatively, opinions favoring ratification after renegotiation were more prevalent than support for August ratification. Moreover, both among GNP supporters and supporters of Park Geun-hye as a potential presidential candidate, the proportion supporting ratification after renegotiation was higher than that for August ratification.

[Figure 4] ROK-US FTA Ratification Perception by Socio-Demographic Characteristics (%)

No Distinct Differences Based on Age, Education Level, Income, or SNS Usage

The spread of negative perceptions regarding the processing of the ROK-US FTA ratification bill during the August extraordinary session was consistent across comparative analyses based on socio-demographic characteristics and socio-political perceptions. First, age, education level, and household income, which are representative socio-demographic background variables, were compared with ROK-US FTA ratification perceptions. Analysis was also conducted including SNS (Social Networking Service) usage.

The comparative analysis revealed that among age groups, the 50s showed the highest proportion of respondents regarding the August extraordinary session ratification. 40.6% of those in their 50s expressed support. Those aged 60 and above showed the second highest proportion at 30.2%. Other age groups showed response rates below 20%. In contrast, for ratification after renegotiation (29.2%), only those aged 60 and above showed a higher rate than August ratification; all other age groups exhibited relatively high response rates in the 40-50% range. In terms of education level, support for ratification after renegotiation was higher than support for August ratification across all education levels. Similarly, in terms of average monthly household income, there were no cases where the response rate for August ratification support exceeded that for ratification after renegotiation. Regarding SNS usage, there were no significant differences in response rates whether individuals used SNS or not.

Spread of Cautious Views Since the May Survey

23.9% support ratification within the current session, 34.5% within the current administration's term, 8.8% postpone to the next administration.

Domestically, concessions in additional negotiations related to the Agent Orange controversy and delays in FTA ratification in the United States appear to be reasons for the spread of cautious views. In fact, public opinion favoring prompt ratification of the ROK-US FTA began to weaken as early as the May survey conducted immediately after the Agent Orange controversy (EAI Opinion Briefing No. 88). Public support for prompt ratification, which reached 63.8% in October 2010 and 65.8% in the February 2011 survey, had fallen to 57.8% in the May EAI Public Opinion Barometer survey. Furthermore, the survey conducted in May regarding the timing of ratification also indicated a cautious public stance. In that survey, only 23.9% supported ratification within the June session. Another 27.9% suggested ratification in the latter half of 2011. The largest proportion, 34.5%, believed it should be ratified within the current administration's term, and an additional 8.8% advocated for postponing it to the next administration.

[Figure 3] May Survey Results on ROK-US FTA Ratification (%)

2. Historical Trends in Public Opinion on the ROK-US FTA

Since the Roh Moo-hyun Administration's pursuit of the FTA, the ROK-US FTA has become a fait accompli.

However, this does not mean that the Korean public holds a negative view of the ROK-US FTA itself. In the current survey, only 9.4% opposed ratification itself. Furthermore, in past surveys conducted by EAI in July 2006 and February 2008, support for the ROK-US FTA negotiations exceeded 50%. First, looking at the survey results conducted immediately after the second round of ROK-US FTA negotiations in Seoul in July 2006, support was 54.4%, higher than the 42.1% opposition. In February 2008, after the ROK-US FTA agreement was signed in Washington in June 2007 and public attention had waned for a period, the proportion of respondents supporting it reached 75.4%, more than three times the 22.3% opposition rate.

[Figure 6] ROK-US FTA Negotiation Support/Opposition Perceptions in 2006 and 2008 (%)

* The July 2006 survey was part of the EAI-CCGA External Perception Survey.

** The February 2008 survey was part of the EAI-CCGA East Asia Soft Power Survey.

Analysis by Age, Income, and Ideology Also Shows Higher Support Than Opposition

Similar to the current survey, the 2006 and 2008 surveys also show that the trend in response rates did not significantly differ based on socio-demographic or socio-political background variables. Even considering only age, average monthly household income, and ideological orientation, the proportion supporting the ROK-US FTA negotiations was higher than the proportion opposing it in both years surveyed.

Furthermore, it is evident that the proportion of support increased from 2006 to 2008 across all background variables. In fact, calculating the difference between the 2008 and 2006 survey results shows that the proportion supporting the ROK-US FTA negotiations consistently yielded positive values, while the proportion opposing it consistently yielded negative values. This implies that support for the ROK-US FTA negotiations increased from 2006 to 2008. These analytical results demonstrate that a national consensus on the ROK-US FTA itself has existed since the commencement of negotiations in 2006.

[Table 1] ROK-US FTA Negotiation Support/Opposition Perceptions by Age, Income, and Ideology in 2006 and 2008 (%)

* Don't Know/No Answer excluded from analysis.

Majority Support for ROK-US FTA Ratification Itself

Concerns Regarding Concessions that Disrupt the Balance of Benefits for FTA Ratification

The public's positive stance towards the ROK-US FTA itself has continued since 2006 and 2008, extending into 2010 and beyond. Examining only the results of the EAI Public Opinion Barometer surveys, which were conducted four times in total (twice in 2010 and twice early this year) with questions related to the ROK-US FTA, reveals the public's perspective on the ROK-US FTA. In both surveys in 2010, support/opposition regarding the ROK-US FTA negotiations was assessed, and in the February and May surveys this year, support/opposition regarding the ratification of the ROK-US FTA by the National Assembly was assessed. In all four survey results, positive opinions (support) constituted the majority. In contrast, negative opinions (opposition) peaked at 35.8% in the December 2010 survey and have since remained between 20% and 30% without further increase.

[Figure 7] ROK-US FTA Perception (%)

Based on the analysis above, it is clear that the public's approach to the ROK-US FTA is one of support, i.e., recognizing its necessity. Concerns about renegotiations that disrupt the balance of benefits between Korea and the US, or about Korea moving too far ahead before US ratification, appear to be the main drivers behind the spread of cautious views. Consequently, to pass the ROK-US FTA ratification bill in the August extraordinary session, it is necessary to secure sufficient public understanding and support for the agreement's terms, rather than engaging in verbal sparring between the ruling and opposition parties. ■