[EAI Opinion Review] Factors Influencing Public Opinion on the Free Lunch Referendum and Future Prospects

Comparison of Survey Results from D-30 and D-4

1. Why Did Mayor Oh Se-hoon Link the Referendum to His Position?

On August 12, Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon announced his withdrawal from the presidential race, and on August 21, he declared that he would stake his mayoral position on the outcome of the referendum scheduled for August 24. This linkage of the referendum to his mayoral post is interpreted as an attempt to boost voter turnout and secure active support from the lukewarm Grand National Party.

Following the Seoul Metropolitan Government's convening of the Referendum Deliberation Committee on July 20 and its subsequent official proposal of the referendum after reviewing the signatures submitted by the 'Committee to Eradicate Welfare Populism' (hereinafter referred to as the 'Committee') opposing free school lunches, the opposition parties responded by pursuing legal actions, including an injunction to halt the referendum, and adopting a stance of boycotting the vote. However, on August 16, the Seoul Administrative Court dismissed the injunction request and the lawsuit seeking nullification of the referendum proposal acceptance filed by the Democratic Party and other opposition parties. Consequently, the future direction of free school lunches in Seoul was ultimately determined by the referendum results.

Various opinion polls conducted since the beginning of the year have shown a majority preference for Mayor Oh Se-hoon's 'selective lunch' proposal. The Seoul Metropolitan Government and the 'Committee to Eradicate Welfare Populism,' advocating for selective lunches for the bottom 50% of households, have transitioned into a 'Committee for Referendum Participation' to encourage turnout exceeding the 33.3% threshold required for the referendum to be valid. In response, the opposition parties, advocating for universal free lunches for all students, have launched a 'Campaign Committee to Reject the Bad Referendum' to encourage a boycott. This strategy is likely based on the assessment that exceeding the 33.3% turnout threshold, the minimum requirement for the referendum to be valid as stipulated in Article 24, Paragraph 2 of the Referendum Act (which states that the referendum will not be counted if the total number of votes is less than one-third of the eligible voters), will be difficult. The free lunch referendum issue has evolved beyond a policy debate over the scope and implementation of free lunches, becoming a contest between mobilizing voters and boycotting the vote, with both ruling and opposition parties keenly focused on whether the 33.3% turnout threshold will be surpassed.

D-30 to D-4: Media Reports Indicate Active Voter Intentions at 32.7% to 38.3%

While various forecasts and predictions are emerging regarding the current voter turnout, it is difficult to predict this referendum's turnout based on empirical data alone, given that it is the first referendum held in Seoul and the unprecedented opposition boycott by the opposition parties. Unlike public official elections where candidates compete, there is extremely limited experience and data from referendums concerning voter preferences for policy proposals, making the establishment of predictive models using past data practically impossible.

However, most media outlets and public opinion experts are making predictions based on the empirical observation that the proportion of 'actively intending to vote' individuals closely approximates the actual voter turnout. Recent reports indicate that the size of the actively intending to vote segment ranges from 32.7% to 38.3%, hovering around the 33.3% threshold. Viewed solely from this perspective, the situation is not entirely pessimistic for Mayor Oh Se-hoon. A survey conducted by EAI, YTN, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research on August 20 (D-4), targeting 700 Seoul citizens using a landline RDD method, found that 38.3% responded they would 'definitely vote.' This figure is comparable to the 34.6% reported in a Chosun Ilbo survey conducted a month before the election, the 37.0% in a Dong-A Ilbo survey conducted ten days prior, and the 32.7% in a Realmeter survey conducted eight days prior, considering the margin of error. Excluding the Realmeter survey, which is close to the minimum threshold, the other surveys indicate turnout exceeding 33.3%.

[Table 1] Changes in Key Results Regarding Free School Lunches: 700 Seoul Citizens

Typically, questions about voting intention are phrased with options such as 'definitely vote,' 'probably vote,' 'probably not vote,' and 'definitely not vote.' The 'definitely vote' respondents are classified as the actively intending to vote segment. The reason why the size of the actively intending to vote segment, excluding those who 'probably vote,' closely resembles actual turnout is due to the tendency for respondents to provide 'socially desirable responses' (Singleton and Straits 1999), as voting is considered a civic duty. While it is reasonable to refer to this as an empirical rule for estimating the approximate level of turnout, given its similarity to actual turnout in various elections, it is problematic to use the actively intending to vote segment as the sole criterion for predicting turnout, as not only those who actively intend to vote will necessarily go to the polls, nor will those who passively intend to vote necessarily abstain.

Even with the actively intending to vote segment currently in the mid-to-high 30% range, it is not guaranteed that the 33.3% turnout threshold will be met in the August 24 referendum. This is because factors that could decrease turnout are more prominent in this referendum compared to previous elections. Of course, the extent to which Mayor Oh Se-hoon's August 21 announcement linking the referendum to his mayoral position will boost turnout remains a final variable. Based on the results of EAI, YTN, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research's opinion polls on free school lunches in Seoul conducted on July 23 (D-30) and August 20 (D-4), this paper aims to predict the potential impact of this referendum on the future political landscape by examining changes in policy preferences regarding free school lunches and identifying variables that explain the turnout level, grounded in voting turnout theories. It should be noted in advance that these survey results were obtained prior to Mayor Oh Se-hoon's announcement linking the referendum to his mayoral position.

2. Factors Contributing to Declining Referendum Turnout: Stagnant Interest and Weakened Intention to Participate

Stagnation in voter interest: Support for holding the referendum decreased from 63.3% to 55.8%, and intention to participate decreased from 60.9% to 53.5%.

Although some voices predict the possibility of the referendum's success given that the proportion of actively intending to vote exceeds the mid-to-high 30% range, as reported by many media outlets, achieving the 33.3% turnout threshold, as anticipated by most experts, appears difficult. The public sentiment towards the referendum has been deteriorating, to the extent that Mayor Oh Se-hoon felt compelled to announce the linkage to his mayoral position just three days before the election. Examining the trend of public opinion, the sentiment regarding the legitimacy of holding the referendum and the intention to participate, surveyed by EAI, YTN, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research on August 20 (D-4), has become more negative compared to the survey results from one month prior, on July 23. Generally, individual voting decisions are influenced by factors such as interest in the election and intention to participate, which typically increase as an election approaches. However, in the case of this referendum, as shown in [Figure 1], voter interest remained largely unchanged compared to a month ago (77.1% → 76.5%). Support for the legitimacy of the free lunch referendum decreased from 63.3% in the D-30 survey to 55.8% in the current survey. Furthermore, when asked about the general intention to participate in this referendum, the results showed a clear downward trend, falling from 60.9% a month ago to 53.2%.

[Figure 1] Changes in Public Opinion Regarding Participation in the Free Lunch Referendum: D-30 to D-4

Larger declines observed among opposition party supporters and moderate voters.

Notably, these changes are primarily concentrated among opposition party supporters and moderate segments advocating for universal free lunches, showing results below the average. In the past month, negative sentiment towards holding the referendum has significantly increased within these groups. With the Democratic Party and progressive factions boycotting the vote, the participation of moderate voters, in addition to Grand National Party supporters or Mayor Oh Se-hoon's supporters, is crucial for the referendum to succeed. The declining intention to participate among these groups suggests that the turnout may be even lower than currently predicted, despite the limited time remaining.

Let's first examine the changes in public opinion regarding the legitimacy of holding the referendum in [Table 2]. Support for the referendum's legitimacy is primarily decreasing among progressive/Democratic Party supporters. In the July survey, a majority in all age groups supported the referendum. However, in the current survey, while 58.8% of those in their 50s and 61.4% of those aged 60 and above supported the referendum, the figures for those in their 20s (52.0%), 30s (48.1%), and 40s (47.9%) have decreased by approximately 7-15 percentage points over the past month. In terms of ideological orientation, even among progressives, 55.0% agreed on the necessity of the referendum in the July survey. Moderates showed 57.9% agreement, and conservatives showed the highest agreement at 67.3%. However, in the August survey, while there were no significant changes among moderates and conservatives, the figure for progressives dropped by 13 percentage points to 37.2%. In terms of party support, the proportion of supporters favoring the referendum remained unchanged among Grand National Party supporters. However, it decreased from 56.4% to 32.5% among Democratic Party supporters, from 55.0% to 36.4% among supporters of other parties, and from 53.2% to 48.6% among the unaffiliated.

Overall, the intention to participate in the referendum is showing a significant downward trend not only among progressives/Democratic Party supporters but also among those in their 40s, moderates, and the unaffiliated. The intention to participate has decreased among those in their 20s from 54.5% to 44.9%, among those in their 30s from 59.7% to 51.3%, and among those in their 40s from 63.8% to 47.1%. There has been no significant change among those in their 50s and above. In terms of ideological orientation, it dropped by approximately 14 percentage points among progressives, from 56.7% to 42.4%, and by nearly 10 percentage points among moderates. It increased to 73.1% among conservatives. In terms of party support, while the intention to participate remained unchanged among Grand National Party supporters, it dropped by nearly 18 percentage points among Democratic Party supporters, from 52.3% to 33.6%. It also fell significantly among supporters of other parties, from 58.5% to 42.2%, and among the unaffiliated, from 60.3% to 49.5%.

[Table 2] Differences in Attitudes Toward the Referendum by Demographic Group (%)

Active Voter Intentions: Only 13.2% of Democratic Party Supporters and 24.5% of Progressives – Likely due to the effects of the referendum boycott campaign.

Looking at the composition of the actively intending to vote segment, the proportion is low among Democratic Party supporters and progressives, who are leading the referendum boycott. By age group, the actively intending to vote segment is 49.5% for those in their 50s and 59.9% for those aged 60 and above. However, it is 22.4% for those in their 20s, 31.1% for those in their 30s, and 32.8% for those in their 40s, falling short of the threshold for the referendum to be valid. In terms of ideological orientation, conservatives show a high rate of 57.5%, while progressives show 24.5% and moderates show 31.5%. Among party supporters, 71.1% of Grand National Party supporters are actively intending to vote, compared to only 13.2% of Democratic Party supporters, 23.0% of supporters of other parties, and 33.1% of the unaffiliated. Unlike the initial stages of the boycott campaign, where opinions were divided among opposition party supporters regarding the boycott, a significant consensus appears to have formed as the referendum approaches. Furthermore, the fact that the proportion of actively intending voters in the 40s, moderates, and the unaffiliated – groups that often serve as a balance in public opinion – falls below the 33.3% minimum threshold for the referendum to be valid, let alone the overall actively intending voter rate of 38.3%, poses a considerable challenge to increasing voter turnout.

Meanwhile, participation in the referendum appears to be primarily driven by Mayor Oh Se-hoon's supporters and voters in the Gangnam region. Among those who believe Mayor Oh Se-hoon is doing a good job, 48.1% responded positively, while 38.9% believe he is doing a poor job, and 13.0% were undecided. Specifically, 53.6% of those who responded that Mayor Oh Se-hoon is doing a good job expressed an active intention to vote. In contrast, only 21.2% of those who believe he is doing a poor job expressed such an intention. Geographically, the Gangnam region, which played a decisive role in Mayor Oh Se-hoon's election, showed a relatively high active voting intention rate of 45.8%. Other regions showed relatively lower rates, ranging from 34.8% to 39.1%.

[Figure 2] Mayor Oh's Approval Rating and Active Voter Intentions by Region (%)

※ Note: Residential regions are categorized as follows:

Central Area: Jongno-gu, Jung-gu, Yongsan-gu

Northeast Area: Seongdong-gu, Gwangjin-gu, Dongdaemun-gu, Jungnang-gu, Seongbuk-gu, Gangbuk-gu, Dobong-gu, Nowon-gu, Gangdong-gu

Northwest Area: Eunpyeong-gu, Seodaemun-gu, Mapo-gu

West Area: Yangcheon-gu, Gangseo-gu, Guro-gu, Geumcheon-gu, Yeongdeungpo-gu, Dongjak-gu, Gwanak-gu

Gangnam Area: Seocho-gu, Gangnam-gu, Songpa-gu

Reasons for Voting and Non-Voting

Among the 276 respondents who stated they would not vote, the most common reason cited was a lack of agreement with the purpose of the referendum (31.4%). Other significant reasons included personal schedules (20.2%) and lack of interest in the referendum (18.6%). Criticisms of the referendum process were cited by 15.9%, and the intention to invalidate the referendum by ensuring low turnout was mentioned by 13.9%. Given these relatively clear political stances, including dissatisfaction with the purpose or procedures and the political choice to invalidate the referendum, it appears difficult to persuade these individuals to vote in a short period.

Conversely, among those who stated they would vote, the primary reasons cited were the importance of the referendum outcome in the welfare debate (42.3%), the belief that voting is a duty in a democratic society (30.8%), the expectation that their preferred option would be adopted (24.2%), and the influence of the referendum on future general elections and presidential elections (2.8%). While a majority cited considerations related to the future welfare debate, policy expectations, and political calculations concerning upcoming elections as reasons for voting, a considerable number also viewed voting as a civic obligation.

[Figure 3] Reasons for Voting and Non-Voting

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3. What Factors Have Led to a Decline in the Intention to Participate in the Referendum?

To theoretically and systematically examine the factors that have weakened the intention to participate in the referendum, this chapter will present Riker and Ordeshook's expected utility/civic duty model of voting and assess the factors that have weakened the intention to participate in the referendum for each factor.

(1) Analytical Framework: Expected Utility and Civic Duty Models

According to rational choice theory, which explains individual voting decisions, voters participate when the utility of voting (PB) exceeds the cost of voting. Generally, the cost of voting exists, while the probability that an individual's single vote can influence the election outcome is very low, making the expected benefit (PB) of voting close to zero. Therefore, a rational voter would logically abstain. However, in most elections, turnout exceeds 0%, leading to the so-called 'paradox of voting.' Consequently, the 'civic duty' model, which explains voting behavior by the satisfaction derived from fulfilling one's civic obligation (D), has been utilized as a fundamental model for explaining individual voting behavior, despite considerable debate. According to this model, individuals vote when the sum of the expected utility (PB) and satisfaction (D) from voting exceeds the cost of voting (C) (Downs 1957, Riker and Ordeshook 1968, Kim Wook 2009; Jo Seong-dae 2009). Applying this theoretical framework, let us evaluate the factors that have influenced the decline in voter turnout in this referendum.

(2) Factors Contributing to Declining Voter Turnout

1. Factors Weakening Expected Benefits (PB)

1) Unrepresented Preferences: Gradual Implementation of Universal Lunches vs. Full Implementation of Selective Lunches

The primary consideration in determining voter participation should be whether the content of the referendum reflects the preferences of all eligible voters. If specific political preferences are fundamentally excluded from the referendum question, it not only undermines the policy's representativeness but also makes it impossible to expect participation from voters whose preferences are not represented. Article 15 of Chapter 2 of the Referendum Act, which stipulates that referendums should be conducted in a format of yes/no or by selecting one of two options, reflects the consideration of policy inclusivity and representativeness. The argument that it is valid to abstain when one's position is not represented in a binary choice format, used by some in the opposition to justify their boycott, is flawed because it implicitly condones the adoption of binary questions that exclude specific political preferences from the outset.

In this context, the referendum question prepared by Mayor Oh and the Committee suffers from issues of policy representativeness. As pointed out in EAI Opinion Briefs No. 98 and No. 100, I have previously highlighted the problems with the policy inclusivity and representativeness of the signature proposal by the 'Committee to Eradicate Welfare Populism.' This is because the final referendum question, which includes key elements such as 'a proposal for gradual implementation targeting the bottom 50% of income earners by 2014' and 'a proposal for full implementation for all students starting in elementary schools in 2011 and middle schools in 2012,' may have issues with policy inclusivity and representativeness. This question actually encompasses two dimensions of the referendum: the scope of benefits (universal vs. selective) and the method of implementation (gradual vs. full).

When measuring attitudes toward the referendum along these two dimensions, there are fundamentally four response types, as shown in [Table 3] below. The very act of structuring this into two binary choice questions (the gray shaded areas in the table) is the fundamental reason for the defect in representativeness. Of course, if the actual preferences of voters were limited to only the 'selective gradual' and 'universal full implementation' options, representativeness issues might not arise. However, the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education stated that its proposal is for gradual implementation until 2014, unlike the proposal passed by the Seoul Metropolitan Council led by the Democratic Party last year. Seoul City counters that the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education has changed its stance. Regardless of the factual accuracy, voters who prefer 'gradual implementation of universal lunches' or 'full implementation of selective lunches' do not have an option in the current referendum question that accurately represents their preferences. If 'gradual implementation of universal lunches' and 'full implementation of selective lunches' represent the two extreme positions, then 'gradual implementation of selective lunches' and 'full implementation of universal lunches' represent compromise positions between the two extremes. By excluding these compromise positions from the referendum question, voters who support the current Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education proposal or those with moderate tendencies who prefer a compromise approach are likely to have lower expected utility from the current referendum question, which would explain the decline in their voter turnout.

Furthermore, unlike the position advocating for universal free lunches for all students, the selective lunch argument allows for various stances depending on the selection criteria, thereby reducing the expected benefits of the Seoul Metropolitan Government's proposal to limit it to the bottom 50% of income earners. For example, even among proponents of selective lunches, some may emphasize cost savings and set the poverty line as the criterion, while others, focusing solely on 'rich people's lunches,' might wish to expand the scope of beneficiaries to the middle class (bottom 70%-80% of income earners), who are not considered wealthy. It is worth recalling that the initial free lunch proposal by the Grand National Party was for the bottom 70% of income earners, excluding the top 30%. For these individuals, the expected benefits of voting would inevitably be lower compared to those who prefer the bottom 50% income criterion, weakening their incentive to vote.

[Table 3] Scope of Inclusivity of Seoul Referendum Question and Attitude Types Regarding Free School Lunches

2) Confrontation of Abstract Welfare Ideologies Weakens Voter Motivation for Stakeholders (Parents)

Although the referendum was framed as a policy vote, the process has effectively become a political confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties over welfare philosophies and ideologies. This can be seen as a major factor contributing to the decline in voter turnout. Unlike public official elections where voters choose candidates, referendums that ask for preferences on specific policies tend to generate greater voter motivation when the scope of policy benefits is broader (i.e., more stakeholders) and the benefits derived from the policy are more concrete and direct.

However, in this referendum, as Mayor Oh Se-hoon and the 'Committee to Eradicate Welfare Populism' themselves stated, the primary objective was to address 'welfare populism,' an abstract goal. While this broadened the range of stakeholders, it inherently limited the ability to concretize the policy benefits that voters would receive. In reality, the process of promoting this referendum focused primarily on the abstract debate between universal and selective welfare, leading to vague concerns about tax increases ('tax bomb' theory) and the stigmatization of beneficiaries. The specific gains and losses for stakeholders were largely sidelined. Concrete information that would allow for the calculation of policy benefits, such as how the bottom 50% income threshold was determined, the estimated budget savings, and how those savings would be utilized, was not highlighted during the main debates. Consequently, the referendum failed to mobilize parents of elementary and middle school students, who are the most direct stakeholders, to participate. In fact, there was no significant difference in voting intention between parents with elementary or middle school children and other voters.

[Figure 4] Voting Intention by Presence of Elementary/Middle School Children (%)

2. Factors Weakening Sense of Civic Duty (Decline in D)

'Full vs. Gradual' Frame Pressure – Appears to have unified the boycott conflict within opposition party supporters/progressives.

Following the referendum proposal, the confrontation between Mayor Oh's side and the opposition parties was primarily a debate over the referendum frame itself, rather than the specific lunch plan. The Seoul Metropolitan Government advocated for the 'full implementation vs. gradual implementation' frame. This is reportedly based on survey results indicating that the 'full vs. gradual' frame yields more favorable outcomes for the Seoul City's position than the 'universal vs. selective' frame. However, it appears to have produced unintended consequences. Specifically, the 'full vs. gradual implementation' frame promoted by Seoul City has served to strengthen the justification for the boycott campaign within the opposition parties.

This controversy emerged shortly after the Democratic Party and four other opposition parties officially announced their intention to boycott the referendum. While criticism of anti-democratic behavior was leveled by the Grand National Party and conservatives, as well as moderates and even some proponents of universal free lunches, opinions were divided between those who believed participation was necessary to block Mayor Oh Se-hoon's selective lunch proposal and those who argued that boycotting the vote was the practical way to achieve this. In other words, the progressive camp was divided based on differing views regarding the 'civic duty' factor (D) in the voting decision model.

However, by setting the nature of the referendum as "a referendum on the scope of free school meals" while adhering to the frame of "full-scale meals versus phased meals" for the referendum proposal, Mayor Oh Se-hoon and the Seoul Metropolitan Government distorted the universal meal provision theory into the full-scale meal theory, which appears to have strengthened the position that boycotting the referendum is justified. In fact, if it were a referendum on the scope of free school meals, the core issue (the main axis) would be the confrontation between universalism and selectivity, with "full-scale versus phased" being of secondary importance in the implementation method. Furthermore, given that the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education itself proposed a phased implementation plan rather than a full-scale one, presenting the "full-scale versus phased meals" frame as the core frame of the referendum was highly problematic. As a result, the rift within the universal meal provision camp, which might have otherwise leaned towards participating in the referendum, rapidly converged towards a boycott position, arguing that the referendum frame used by Mayor Oh Se-hoon distorted the core issues of the referendum and excluded the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education's proposal.

[Figure 5] Frame Confrontation Between the Seoul Metropolitan Government and the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education

<Seoul Metropolitan Government Referendum Official Gazette>

<Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education Free School Meals Data Room http://me2.do/5Vglir>

In reality, examining the changes in the intention to vote by preferred referendum proposal, supporters of the phased implementation for the bottom 50% of income earners showed a slight increase from 71.4% in the survey conducted a month prior to 74.8% in the survey on August 20. However, for supporters of the full-scale implementation for all students, the proportion intending to vote, which was 50% in the survey conducted a month prior (indicating significant internal disagreement), sharply dropped to 27.5% in the survey conducted four days prior. This result suggests a rapid increase in abstention among those who favor the universal meal provision theory.

[Figure 6] Proportion of Respondents Intending to Vote by Preferred Referendum Proposal (%)

(3) Factor C: Weekday Election + Political Burden of Voting

Although efforts have been made to reduce voting costs by providing convenience such as adjusting commuting hours for public officials residing in Seoul, the cost of voting is higher compared to previous public official elections held on holidays, as voting is conducted on weekdays. In the case of this referendum, not only administrative costs but also political and psychological costs must be considered. That is, with the opposition parties announcing a boycott of the vote, going to the polling station can be seen as revealing one's political orientation, thus requiring considerable political partisanship or firm conviction about voting. Considering these factors, the actual voter turnout for this referendum is expected to be lower than predicted.

(4) Other: Election Competitiveness and Ruling Party Mobilization

Another factor that increases voter turnout is party competition; turnout increases when competition and contestation are high. On the other hand, with the opposition party's boycott movement, the actual vote has shifted to a referendum on selective welfare provision, linked to Mayor Oh's tenure. The focus is on the mobilization of Mayor Oh and Grand National Party supporters rather than competition between the supporters of the two parties. However, as can be seen in [Figure 6], supporters of the selective welfare provision argument already have a high level of mobilization for voting, suggesting a limited potential to further increase voter turnout following Mayor Oh's resignation.

4. Political Implications of the Referendum Results: Opposition Loses the Public Opinion Battle, but Wins in the Outcome?

In summary, this election can be seen as having significant factors that would lead to a decrease in voter turnout. Consequently, some opposition parties predict that the voter turnout for this election will remain in the 10% range, and some are even discussing potential candidates for the next Seoul mayoral election, assuming Mayor Oh's resignation as a foregone conclusion. However, examining the entire process of this referendum, there are significant aspects that the opposition parties need to reconsider, even if the referendum is nullified due to low voter turnout.

(1) If Turnout Does Not Exceed 33.3%, the Opposition Will Lead the Political Scene

Negative public opinion regarding Mayor Oh's resignation

After the referendum was initiated, it transformed into a campaign for or against the free school lunch referendum, with voter turnout becoming the benchmark for victory or defeat between the ruling and opposition parties. However, looking ahead to the general election and presidential election campaigns, the calculations of profit and loss between the parties are expected to become considerably complex. The final variable is how much Mayor Oh's resignation will influence the supporters of the Grand National Party and the unaffiliated and centrist voters who are not mobilized by either party. While precise prediction is difficult, as shown in the survey results in [Table 4], Seoul citizens have a high level of opposition to Mayor Oh's resignation. Support for resignation ranges from 14.4% to 25.7%, while opposition ranges from 44.7% to 68.0%, indicating that public opinion is overwhelmingly against resignation. It is unlikely that there will be a significant shift regarding Mayor Oh's resignation. However, it is necessary to monitor the final voter turnout, as it is not impossible that those who support his resignation could lead to high turnout in their segment.

[Table 4] Preferences for School Meal Referendum Proposals and Stance on Linking to Mayor Oh's Resignation in Major Survey Results (%)

If the referendum proceeds, Mayor Oh's proposal will win overwhelmingly

Under the current circumstances, if the voter turnout exceeds the 33.3% threshold and the referendum proceeds as Mayor Oh expects, the results are anticipated to favor the selective implementation for the bottom 50% income group by an overwhelming margin. This is because proponents of universal implementation for all students are expected to abstain from voting. In fact, among all respondents, 56.6% supported the selective implementation for the bottom 50% income group. However, among the 391 respondents who expressed their intention to vote, the support for the selective implementation for the bottom 50% income group rose to 76.0%, while support for universal implementation for all students dropped to 15.6%, indicating a widening gap. However, if the voter turnout does not exceed 33%, the vote count will be suspended, the current system will be maintained, and Mayor Oh will be compelled to resign. While the conflict between the ruling and opposition parties over the nullification of the referendum will intensify, the burden on Mayor Oh and the Grand National Party, who initiated the referendum, will be significantly greater, and Mayor Oh's resignation would lead to an uncertain future for the Seoul mayoral by-election. This would likely result in the opposition parties gaining considerable leverage in the subsequent general and presidential election campaigns.

[Figure 7] Preferred Referendum Proposals Among All Respondents and Those Intending to Vote (%)

(2) Opposition party defeated in agenda competition; selective welfare provision solidified in free school lunch and welfare policy

Public Opinion Warfare and Ideological Disputes Favor the Ruling Party's Victory

Above all, the fundamental issue between the ruling and opposition parties was the confrontation between universal welfare (free meals) and selective welfare (free meals) regarding the method of free school meals and the basic welfare line. As the core variables for the next presidential election agenda are emerging as measures to resolve polarization, welfare, and quality of life, this provides a boon for the opposition parties. According to [Table 3] above, regarding the preference for major free school meal proposals announced over the past month, the majority public opinion is occupied by support for 'the free meal plan for the bottom 50% in 2014 (universal meal plan)' at 53.2%~61.2%, while support for 'the plan to fully implement free meals for all students starting in elementary schools in 2011 and middle schools in 2012 (selective meal plan)' remains a minority opinion at 31.4%~44.3%. This is a painful point for the opposition parties when viewed as an issue for the next general and presidential election agendas. Above all, although the core agenda is led by progressive-friendly agendas, public opinion actually shows higher support for the ruling party's stance on the policy preferences of these agendas.

Compared to the public opinion poll conducted a month ago, it should be noted that throughout the referendum campaign period, public opinion favoring the ruling party's universal welfare approach has solidified, rather than the opposition party's universal welfare approach, in the competition between universal welfare (government provides welfare services such as medical care, childcare, and education equally to all citizens) and selective welfare (government provides welfare services by selecting urgent areas and target groups, considering national finances). In [Figure 8], the empathy rate for the universal welfare approach, which advocates for providing welfare services such as medical care, childcare, and education equally to all citizens, was 65.7%, showing almost no change from 65.6% a month ago. Conversely, support for the selective welfare approach, which argues for selecting the urgent beneficiaries and sectors for these welfare services, has slightly decreased from 85.6% to 82.7%, but still receives more empathy than the universal welfare approach. In other words, this shows that no progress was made in narrowing the gap in public opinion favoring the ruling party's selective welfare approach through the referendum process.

[Figure 8] Changes in Agreement with Universal Welfare vs. Selective Welfare Approaches

The Gap in Veto Opinion Between Universal and Selective Meal Plans Could Not Be Bridged

As can be seen in [Figure 9], regarding the changes in perception of the weaknesses of the free school meal plan, the concern about the so-called stigma effect on students who would receive free meals targeted at the bottom 50% of income earners has decreased from 58.0% at D-30 to 51.4% currently. Similarly, concerns about tax increases among voters regarding the universal meal plan have also decreased from 76.0% in the previous month to 68.5% in the current survey. The consensus on the problems of each plan has simultaneously decreased during the free school meal debate. However, the concern about tax increases for the universal meal plan still remains greater than the concern about the stigma effect of the selective meal plan. This difference in perception can be seen as the reason why the selective meal plan is preferred over the universal meal plan in the preference for meal plans.

[Figure 9] Changes in Agreement with Reasons for Concern by Free School Meal Proposal (%)

Voter Abstention Intentions Spread, But Refusal Campaigns by the Democratic Party and Others Are Met with Indifference

Moreover, it is questionable whether the referendum would be entirely interpreted as a victory for the opposition parties even if it were to fail due to low turnout. Above all, this is because it is difficult to attribute the decline in voter turnout, which was the decisive factor in the low turnout, to the success of the referendum campaigns by the opposition parties, including the Democratic Party. In [Figure 10], when asked about the statement 'The Democratic Party and opposition parties claim that 18 billion won will be spent on the free school meal referendum and that there are procedural flaws, thus urging people not to participate in the referendum,' the response of agreement was 33.4% a month ago and 33.9% currently, while disagreement was 59.7% a month ago and 58.7% this month. As observed earlier, while voter intention to participate is weakening, the opposition parties' boycott movement is evaluated with indifference by a majority, suggesting that voters' intention to abstain is more dependent on their own judgment.

[Figure 10] Changes in Agreement with Reasons for Concern by Free School Meal Proposal (%)

Claims That Mayor Oh's Referendum is a Presidential Strategy and Should Be Linked to the Mayor's Position Are Ignored

Currently, the opposition parties believe their referendum refusal campaign is having a certain effect and base their claims on the argument that the referendum promoted by Mayor Oh is being utilized for his personal political gain, and that he should resign if he fails to achieve results in the referendum. However, the evaluation of these claims by Seoul citizens is rather indifferent. Only 25.7% agreed with the claim that Mayor Oh should stake his mayoral position on the referendum results, while 44.7% disagreed, and the rest withheld their response. According to the survey results, the public opinion opposing the claim that Mayor Oh should link his mayoral position to the referendum results significantly outweighs the opinion in favor.

Meanwhile, 31.6% agreed with the assertion that Mayor Oh is using the referendum as part of his presidential strategy, while 53.5% disagreed. While supporters of the Democratic Party and other opposition parties were critical of Mayor Oh's sincerity at 54.1% and 59.6% respectively, the proportion of supporters of the Grand National Party and unaffiliated voters who agreed was lower at 20.7% and 29.5%.

Ultimately, if the referendum fails due to insufficient turnout, it is true that a politically favorable terrain will be created for the opposition parties, including the Democratic Party, in the short term. However, in terms of voter policy preferences on core agendas for the next presidential election, the solidification of selectivity may make it difficult to seize the initiative in subsequent issue conflicts. The opposition parties should also keep in mind that the failure of the referendum is not a result of the leadership of the Democratic Party and opposition parties, nor of voter support for them.■

[Figure 11] Effect of Political Attacks on Mayor Oh (%)