[EAI Opinion Review] Changes in the Ideological Mood of Korean Society and Their Political Implications

▶ This report is a revised and supplemented version of the author's column "The Era of Pragmatic Moderates: Analysis of Changes in National Ideological Trends... The Political Arena Also Changes Its Colors for 'Conflicting Voters' Such as Pro-American Progressives" (No. 781. 2011.4.12) published in <Donga Weekly>.

Drivers of Changes in Ideological Mood Cycles and Policy Preference Trends

The Phenomenon of Moderate Convergence and the Emergence of Conflicting Voters: Pro-American Progressives and Welfare Conservatives

1. Strategy for the 2012 Power Realignment Period: Major Parties and Future Candidates Adjusting Their Ideological Colors

A Period of Adjustment Before the 2012 Presidential Election: Major Parties and Politicians Adjusting Their Ideological Colors

With one year remaining until the 2012 general and presidential elections, South Korea's major political parties and aspiring candidates are undergoing an unprecedented adjustment of their ideological colors. The reason this repositioning process is attracting political attention is, above all, because the ideological colors that each political force is newly attempting to present are breaking through the conventional progressive-conservative ideological boundaries that have been prevalent in Korean society.

Former Grand National Party leader Park Geun-hye has championed 'Korean-style welfare,' positioning 'welfare'—a progressive-friendly agenda—as a core issue. Conversely, Gyeonggi Province Governor Kim Moon-soo and Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon, who were previously recognized as reformists within the Grand National Party, are leading 'conservative security initiatives' and 'all-out war against universal welfare,' respectively. On the opposition side, moderate Democratic Party leader Sohn Hak-kyu is leading the party's shift to the left by advocating for 'universal welfare,' while Representative Chung Dong-young is promoting 'bold progressivism,' even adopting the 'wealth tax pledge' previously put forth by the Democratic Labor Party. Meanwhile, the new Citizens' Participation Party leader Yoo Si-min, who advocates for the unification of progressive parties, is emphasizing a pragmatic approach to welfare issues.

The fact that the various political forces attempting a transformation are presenting diverse justifications for their ideological shifts is also confusing the public. The widespread nature of these color-adjusting efforts by political forces is fundamentally due to the perceived changes in voters' ideological trends. However, the variations in the direction of transformation and the rationales presented by each political force appear to stem from differing interpretations of the macro-level ideological mood of society and the shifts in public preferences on individual policy issues. The confusing logic behind these transformations can be distilled into two key issues.

2. Direction of Change in Macro-Ideological Mood: Progressivism or Conservatism?

First, there are differing perceptions regarding the direction of change in the overall ideological orientation of the public, i.e., the ideological mood. Within the ruling party alone, some argue for a conservative shift in Korean society based on the cooled-down perception of North Korea following the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong shelling. Others emphasize moderate ideology and policies, citing strong support for the Lee Myung-bak administration's 'pragmatic moderate line' and 'fair society theory.' Conversely, the opposition camp is strengthening its emphasis on a progressive line, citing support for 'free school lunches' expressed in the 2010 local elections, which presupposes a diagnosis that the public's ideological and policy preferences have shifted leftward.

[Figure 1] Trends in Ideological Mood and Polarization in Korean Society Since the Roh Moo-hyun Administration

Data Source: Regular survey data from EAI and Korea Research for 2009 onwards; panel survey data from EAI, SBS, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research for 2007-2008; survey data on political and social consciousness from EAI and Maeil Business Newspaper for 2005-2006; election studies data for 2004; survey data on anti-American sentiment from EAI and JoongAng Ilbo for 2002-2003.

Macro Indicator of Ideological Trends, Direction of Ideological Mood: Convergence Toward the Center

To examine the actual changes in the public's ideological trends, it is necessary to analyze the trend of ideological change in Korean society through the concept of ideological mood. The concept of ideological mood has a long history of theoretical and empirical research in Western academia and serves as an indicator for measuring the trend of voter perceptions at a macro level, alongside 'presidential approval ratings' and 'party identification.' The ideological mood of a society is not fixed; when a conservative government performs poorly, disappointment with the conservative government can lead to a shift in the overall ideological mood towards progressivism. Conversely, even with the emergence of a progressive government, if progressive demands are met while dissatisfaction with the progressive government and demand for conservative policies increase, the overall ideological mood can deviate from progressivism. Such macro-ideological mood cycles are a major explanatory factor for why specific ideological groups cannot maintain long-term rule under democratic governments and lead to changes in administration (Box-Steffensmeir et al. 1998; Erikson et al. 2002).

The simplest method to measure this is to analyze the time-series results of surveys where voters self-assess their ideological orientation. According to survey results measured by the EAI Public Opinion Analysis Center since 2002, with 0 points representing 'very progressive,' 5 points representing 'moderate,' and 10 points representing 'very conservative,' the recent overall ideological atmosphere in Korean society shows a convergence toward the center, rather than a shift towards progressivism or conservatism ([Figure 1]).

Although there was a brief conservative trend in the early Roh Moo-hyun administration, the April 2004 survey, immediately after the impeachment, showed a shift in the public's ideological mood towards progressivism (4.6 points) in reaction to the opposition party's impeachment offensive. However, as the ruling party and government, after the impeachment, focused more on debates about national identity and grand coalitions than on measures for the economic crisis, a gradual conservative trend emerged. In the December 2005 survey, public ideological self-placement was 5.3 points, a shift towards conservatism compared to 4.6 points in April 2004. During the three years of local elections, general elections, and presidential elections from 2006 to 2008, the average ideological score shifted to 5.5 points.

However, even during the Lee Myung-bak administration, following the candlelight vigils after the general election and the death of former President Roh Moo-hyun in 2009, voters' self-ideological assessments gradually moved away from the previous conservative atmosphere, showing an ideological U-turn. The average ideological self-placement score for the entire public shifted leftward, from 5.2 points in the December 2009 survey to 5.0 points in the December 2010 survey. In the February 2011 survey, the ideological mood score remained at a moderate level of 5.1 points.

Summarizing the above results, it is unreasonable to view the current political situation as conservative, given that an ideological U-turn began to appear even in the early stages of the current administration. However, as the opposition claims, this ideological U-turn has not led to a shift in the balance towards progressive ideology. While there is considerable disappointment and dissatisfaction with the current administration due to lingering political distrust of the previous government and the former ruling party, it can be assessed that the situation has not reached a point of disrupting the ideological balance.

Convergence or Polarization? Polarization Immediately After a Change in Administration → Convergence During Mid-Term

The current ideological confusion is also evident in the differing perceptions of whether the ideological gap between progressive and conservative camps is widening due to increased ideological polarization or whether it is a phenomenon of ideological convergence. On one hand, there are arguments that ideological polarization is intensifying in Korean society and public opinion, with the ideological distance between progressives and conservatives widening since democratization. On the other hand, some argue that the conflict between ideological groups at the public level is exaggerated, and that ideological polarization is amplified at the level of political elites, including parties, politicians, and progressive-conservative civic groups (Lee Nae-young, 2010).

Contrary to widespread concerns, [Figure 1] shows that the ideological gap between progressive and conservative segments of the public is not continuously widening. Comparing the Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak administrations, the ideological distance between the progressive and conservative groups expands at the beginning of each administration change, reaching a peak of ideological polarization, and then narrows in the latter half of the term.

Indeed, during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the ideological distance between progressives and conservatives widened significantly around the impeachment period in the second year of his term. During the Lee Myung-bak administration, the candlelight protests and the death of former President Roh Moo-hyun in 2009 also led to a significant widening of this gap. While the ideological assessment of progressives was 2.8 points and that of conservatives was 7.3 points before the December 2002 presidential election, a difference of 4.5 points, during the impeachment period in 2004, progressives' ideological assessment was 2.3 points and conservatives' was 7.8 points, widening the ideological gap to 5.2 points. However, rather than intensifying ideological polarization, a convergence phenomenon occurs where the ideological distance between each ideological group narrows after reaching a peak of ideological conflict.

During the Lee Myung-bak administration, following the period of mourning after the death of former President Roh Moo-hyun in 2009, the ideological distance between progressives and conservatives widened to 2.3 points and 7.8 points, respectively, similar to the impeachment period. However, the ideological distance between progressives and conservatives has since shown a trend of narrowing again. The self-ideological assessment of progressives shifted from 2.3 points in 2009 to 2.6 points in the February 2011 survey (a slight shift to the right), while the ideological mood of conservatives shifted from 7.8 points in 2009 to 7.3 points in the February 2011 survey (a shift to the left), narrowing the ideological gap between the two groups to 4.7 points.

Ultimately, the ideological conflict between progressive and conservative citizens in South Korea does not consistently worsen through polarization, as many fear, nor does it consistently show a trend of convergence. Rather, during periods of heightened political conflict, such as the impeachment under the Roh administration or the period following the death of former President Roh under the Lee Myung-bak administration, ideological polarization reaches a certain level, after which an 'ideological balancing' phenomenon between progressive and conservative groups is observed.

Ideological Conflict in the Political Arena is More Severe Than Among the Public

If this is the case, why do concerns about ideological conflict persist in our society? Above all, it is because political conflict within the political arena overlaps with ideological elements, amplifying ideological conflict. First, while the ideological orientations of supporters of each party are relatively close, there is a much larger gap between the ideological orientations of the members of each party. According to the February 2011 survey results, the ideological assessment scores of supporters of progressive parties such as the Democratic Labor Party and the Creative Korea Party are not significantly different (4.3 points and 4.4 points, respectively) and are close to the moderate score of 5. Furthermore, supporters of the Grand National Party and the Liberty Forward Party also show identical ideological assessment scores of 5.6 points, indicating a conservative orientation, but they are not far from the midpoint of 5.

However, when comparing the average ideological assessments of actual party members, a much larger gap is observed than the ideological gap between party supporters. According to a 2008 JoongAng Ilbo survey, the average ideological score of Democratic Labor Party members was 1.4 points, indicating an extremely progressive orientation, while the average ideological score of Democratic Party members was 4.4 points, the average for Grand National Party members was 6.0 points, and that for Liberty Forward Party members was 6.2 points. In reality, while the gap between supporters of progressive parties and supporters of the Grand National Party at the general public level is only 1.3 points (Grand National Party 5.6 - Democratic Labor Party 4.3), based on party affiliation, the ideological gap between Grand National Party members and Democratic Labor Party members widens to a significant 4.6 points (Liberty Forward Party 6.0 points - Democratic Labor Party 1.4 points).

The distribution of ideological assessment scores also confirms this analysis. As shown in [Figure 2], among Grand National Party supporters, the proportion who rated themselves as conservative (6-10 points) was the highest at 44.0%, but 36.2% also chose the moderate score of 5. As can be seen in the graph, the most frequently chosen response was the moderate score of 5. Only 19.7% of Grand National Party supporters responded that they were progressive. Conversely, 39.7% chose a progressive assessment (0-4 points), and 41.7% chose the moderate score of 5, exceeding the number of progressive respondents. Only 18.6% of Democratic Party supporters identified themselves as conservative. While moderate respondents formed the majority among supporters of both parties, conservative supporters were concentrated among Grand National Party supporters, and progressive respondents were widely distributed among Democratic Party supporters. Both parties are unable to escape the influence of moderate supporters.

In contrast, the distribution of ideological assessments among party members shows a pronounced polarization. Among Grand National Party members, only 20.9% identified themselves as moderate, with 64.7% choosing scores of 6-7 and 5.0% choosing 8-10, indicating that the majority are concentrated in the conservative range, strongly reflecting the party's conservative nature. Conversely, among Democratic Party members, only 20.9% identified themselves as moderate, with 50.0% choosing a score of 4, 13.2% choosing 3, and 1.5% choosing 2. With 63% of Democratic Party members concentrated in the moderately left range (3-4 points), the members' orientation strongly reflects a progressive party.

[Figure 2] Ideological Gap Between Supporters of Each Party and Members of Each Party

Note: In the 18th JoongAng Ilbo survey of National Assembly members, decimal points were dropped.

3. Policy Attitudes by Issue: The Emergence of Conflicting Voters

The Rise of Conflicting Voters

The previous analysis indicates that the macro-ideological mood in Korean society has been converging toward the center since the advent of the Lee Myung-bak administration, rather than leaning unilaterally towards progressivism or conservatism. At the public level, the ideological gap between progressive and conservative segments is narrowing, rather than widening. The political implication of this analysis is that the dichotomous ideological cleavage of the past—'progressive = pro-labor = welfare = pro-North Korea = anti-US' and 'conservative = pro-capital = growth-oriented = anti-North Korea = pro-US'—is weakening, and conflicting attitudes, where values and policy preferences that appear contradictory coexist, are strengthening.

According to mainstream electoral theory, voters who consistently align their policy preferences across various issues with a specific ideological orientation are considered 'smart voters,' while the majority of voters who lack such consistency or clear positions are understood as 'ignorant voters.' Based on this perspective, a conservative individual holding anti-US attitudes or prioritizing welfare policies, or a progressive individual favoring pro-US or growth-oriented policies, would be interpreted as a result of political ignorance. The theory of conflicting voters differs in that it understands the coexistence of values that were previously considered incompatible within a dichotomous framework. The core idea of the theory of conflicting attitudes is that it is possible to maintain a pro-labor stance while also favoring a growth-oriented path, to emphasize growth while opposing the US, or to oppose the US while simultaneously holding a critical stance towards North Korea.

North Korea Issue, Political Freedom vs. Public Order Issue: Traditional Progressive-Conservative Divide Remains

We now aim to confirm the existence of these conflicting voters by examining individual policy preferences on major current issues in Korean society. A survey conducted by EAI and Korea Research in October 2010 investigated public preferences on key ideological issues in Korean society. We compared the average responses of the entire population with the average preferences of each ideological group on issues such as North Korea, the US, growth vs. welfare, expansion and treatment of regular workers, and corporate tax cuts, which are understood as criteria for ideological division in Korean society. Values less than 2.5, closer to 1, indicate a progressive stance, while values exceeding 2.5, closer to 4, indicate a conservative stance.

On traditional ideological issues such as the issue of allowing public officials freedom of political activity, the justification for punishing teachers who joined the Democratic Labor Party, whether to designate North Korea as an enemy, the ROK-US relationship, conscientious objection and the allowance of alternative service, and the ROK-US FTA, there are significant relative differences between the preferences of progressive and conservative groups. Generally, progressive groups tend to be more anti-US and pro-North Korea, prioritize labor rights/political freedom, and favor welfare policies compared to conservative groups. Conversely, conservative groups tend to be more pro-US, anti-North Korea, prioritize public order and safety, and favor growth policies compared to progressive groups. However, on issues such as non-regular worker treatment, increases in real estate holding taxes, corporate income taxes, and the abolition of the death penalty, there is virtually no difference in the relative distance of preferences between ideological groups.

However, what is noteworthy in relation to the rise of conflicting attitudes is that while there are relative differences in policy preferences between progressive and conservative groups, many of the actual policies preferred transcend the traditional boundaries of progressive and conservative. Of course, in issues such as designating North Korea as an enemy or allowing political activity for public sector employees, there are significant differences in the average responses between progressive and conservative groups, and the actual preferred policies are also contradictory, with progressives opposing the designation of North Korea as an enemy and conservatives supporting it. Regarding the designation of North Korea as an enemy, progressives opposed it with an average score of 2.38, while conservatives supported it with an average score of 2.72, showing a clear difference in policy preferences. On the issue of allowing political activity for public sector employees, progressives were positive with an average score of 2.38, while conservatives were strongly negative with an average score of 2.89. Regarding the punishment of teachers who joined the Democratic Labor Party, progressives responded progressively with an average score of 2.06, while conservatives responded conservatively with an average score of 2.68. In general, for issues concerning North Korea and those where the values of political freedom and national security are in conflict, the traditional progressive-conservative divide remains.

[Figure 3] Comparison of Average Policy Preferences by Overall Public and Ideological Groups on Major Current Issues

Note: F is the F-statistic for one-way ANOVA, *: p<0.05, **: p<0.01, ***: p<0.001 level of significant difference between groups.

Growth/Welfare, US Relations Issues: Surge in Conflicting Attitudes

However, even if there is a distance between the preferences of progressive and conservative groups, it is important to note the issues where conflicting attitudes appear in the actual content of preferred policies. Issues such as the ROK-US alliance and the ROK-US FTA, where the positions of progressives and conservatives were sharply opposed, have recently seen conservative policy preferences shift towards majority consensus. Conversely, on issues such as growth-welfare, treatment of non-regular workers, and increases in real estate holding taxes, we can observe the spread of conflicting attitudes where the conservative side accepts progressive policy preferences.

On the question of desirable ROK-US relations, the average response from conservatives was 3.16 points, showing a strong priority for the ROK-US alliance. The average response from progressives was 2.72 points, which is 0.44 points lower than conservatives, indicating that they indeed hold relatively more progressive policy preferences. However, with an average score of 2.72 points, the policy content suggests a strong preference for prioritizing the ROK-US alliance over independent diplomacy. On the ROK-US FTA issue, the average response from conservatives was 3.10 points, and from progressives was 2.81 points. While a gap exists, progressives also show a preference for the prompt implementation of the ROK-US FTA. Conversely, regarding growth and welfare, progressives strongly favored prioritizing welfare with an average score of 2.24, while conservatives scored 2.57, which is close to neutral, indicating significant differences within the conservative camp. On issues related to non-regular workers, opinions are somewhat divided on expanding non-regular employment (progressives 2.46, conservatives 2.54), but there is strong public agreement, even among conservatives, on raising the treatment of non-regular workers to the level of regular workers (progressives 1.44, conservatives 1.63). Regarding increases in real estate holding taxes, progressive support was 2.11 and conservative support was 2.26, with overall support being high.

The Emergence of Progressive Pro-ROK-US Alliance Advocates and Conservative Welfare Advocates

[Figure 4]-(1) shows the actual public opinion changes on two representative issues demonstrating these conflicting stances. It confirms that the relative differences in positions between progressive and conservative groups on perceptions of ROK-US relations and growth-welfare issues are leading to a surge in conflicting attitudes regarding preferred policies. On the question of desirable ROK-US relations, before and after the candlelight vigils commemorating the death of the middle school student in 2002, the proportion favoring independent diplomacy away from the US was 28.1%, compared to 20.4% who favored prioritizing the ROK-US alliance. The rest held moderate policy preferences. However, with the growing threat of North Korea's nuclear development after the Roh Moo-hyun administration took office, the proportion emphasizing the ROK-US alliance increased to 36.9% in 2004, 39.3% in 2006, and 39.3% in 2008. In the November 2010 survey, immediately after the Yeonpyeong shelling incident, the proportion favoring the ROK-US alliance rose to nearly half, at 48.6%. Conversely, the proportion favoring independent diplomacy declined to 18.1% in the 2010 survey.

[Figure 5]-(1) shows that as the value of the ROK-US alliance has significantly expanded due to the strengthening military threat from North Korea, conflicting attitudes within the progressive camp have intensified. Analyzing the responses of progressives regarding ROK-US relations, only 41.1% favored independent diplomacy away from the US in the 2006 survey, but this figure significantly decreased to 26.7% in the November 2011 survey. Conversely, the proportion favoring prioritization of the ROK-US alliance, which was only 30.2% in the 2006 survey, surged to 45.3% in the 2011 survey, similar to the overall average.

Conversely, the growth versus welfare line is an issue where conflicting attitudes have increased among conservatives. First, [Figure 4]-(2) shows the results of asking whether welfare or growth should be prioritized. In early 2003, during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, 55.5% favored prioritizing welfare, while only 42.2% favored prioritizing growth. However, from 2006 onwards, with the deepening economic crisis theory, a preference for growth emerged and persisted until the early Lee Myung-bak administration. The response favoring welfare declined to 45.3% in 2006 and further dropped to 40.4% in the February 2009 survey, early in the Lee Myung-bak administration. Conversely, the response favoring growth exceeded 50% in 2006 at 53.5% and rose to 58.7% in 2009. However, as the global economic crisis deepened and concerns about polarization in Korean society grew in 2010, the responses became nearly equal, with 49.4% favoring growth and 48.5% favoring welfare. In the October survey, the preference for welfare again exceeded 50% at 54.3%, while the preference for growth dropped to 39.2%.

During this process, so-called conservative voters who prefer the welfare line have increased. [Figure 5]-(2) shows that among conservative respondents, the proportion favoring growth was an overwhelming majority at 61.5% in the 2006 survey, but this dropped to 49.1% in the 2010 survey, while the proportion favoring welfare increased from 38.5% to 50.9%. This means that based on the 2010 survey results alone, nearly half of progressives can be considered progressive advocates for the ROK-US alliance, and conversely, a majority of conservatives have become conservative welfare advocates.

[Figure 4] Changes in Public Opinion on Desirable ROK-US Relations and Growth-Welfare Policies (%)

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[Figure 5] Changes in Perceptions of ROK-US Relations Among Progressives and Growth-Welfare Perceptions Among Conservatives (%)

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Source: EAI·Hankook Ilbo Data (December 2006), EAI·Korea Research Public Opinion Barometer Survey (October/November 2010)

4. Political Implications of the Era of Conflicted Voters

Caution against Dogmatic Ideology and Self-Righteousness; Emphasis on Communication is Necessary

Considering the convergence toward the center, which is neither ideological progressivism nor ideological conservatism, political parties and future presidential candidates need to pay attention to the rise of conflicted voters who are driving these changes, rather than focusing on ideological groups with strong ideological leanings. The increasing number of voters who do not adhere to past dichotomous ideological divisions but hold conflicting values and policy preferences depending on the issue and situation offers several important implications for government policy implementation and the activities of political parties and future candidates.

First, there is a need to enhance accountability by responding more sensitively to changes in voter attitudes on major issues, rather than clinging to issues that represent the existing ideological confrontation. Given the rapid shifts in public opinion regarding the ROK-U.S. alliance and the growth-distribution line, policies based on the dogma of 'progressives = self-reliance = welfare vs. conservatives = alliance = growth' are not attractive to conflicted voters. Experiments that transcend the existing boundaries of progressivism and conservatism are fundamentally evaluated as attempts to align with current changes. In reality, the fact that the moderate pragmatism and fair society theories proposed by the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration, despite lingering doubts about their sincerity, have recorded relatively high approval ratings compared to previous administrations, is a result of these policies appealing to the public.

Second, the political choices of voters with conflicted attitudes toward parties and political forces appear to exhibit a strong tendency toward balance voting, checking the concentration of power in either the progressive or conservative camp, rather than consistently empowering one side. Looking at the election results since the previous administration, after President Roh Moo-hyun's election, the 2004 election immediately after his impeachment saw support for the then-ruling party, but from 2006 to 2008, the local elections, presidential election, and general elections saw support shift to the opposing Grand National Party. During the Lee Myung-bak administration, as concerns about autocratic politics grew in the early period of his tenure, votes were concentrated on the opposition party in the 2010 local elections, and subsequently, the ruling party secured victories in by-elections, demonstrating a pattern of balance voting. Considering this tendency, future political behavior characterized by pushing through policies by any political force could become a toxin that leads to the defection of conflicted voters and their distrust.

Finally, the policy attitudes of citizens with conflicted stances may be much more fluid depending on the time and situation than those of voters with consistent attitudes. In other words, to elicit their political support and trust, responsiveness and accountability that are sensitive to public opinion changes will become more important than ideological clarity or strong policy charisma. This means that not only the content of policies but also the willingness and method of communication become important. The public opinion that pointed to the lack of communication as the main reason for the failure of the Lee Myung-bak administration to implement key state projects, such as the revision of the Sejong City plan, despite maintaining relatively high national approval ratings, serves as evidence of this.

Ultimately, escaping dogmatic frameworks and embracing ideological flexibility, harmonious leadership, and communication skills are likely to emerge as the key keywords and core values for the upcoming regime change. It is necessary to focus on these three key keywords when forecasting the results of the current ideological adjustments and political maneuvers by various political forces■.