[EAI Opinion Review] Lame Duck Phenomenon in Past Administrations and the Tasks for the Fourth Year of the Lee Myung-bak Administration

▶ The main contents of this report were previously published in the <Weekly Donga> column "The Public Demands Economic Stability and Security Enhancement; MB Focuses on Constitutional Amendment and Re-examination of the Science Belt"

(No. 775, March 1, 2011, pp. 26-29).

Managing Economic and Security Instability is Key. Monopolistic Politics is Unacceptable.

1. The Fourth Year of the Administration: Is Lame Duck Inevitable?

As President Lee Myung-bak approaches his third anniversary in office on February 25th, perspectives on him are dual-natured, attracting both domestic and international attention. Above all, there is significant focus on how the administration will navigate the numerous state affairs pending in its fourth year. Simultaneously, there is growing concern about whether the administration can avoid the dilemma of the lame duck phenomenon, which past administrations have been unable to escape in their fourth year. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, which illustrate changes in approval ratings for past governments, the fourth year of an administration typically witnesses a sharp decline in approval ratings, accompanied by public alienation due to corruption or policy failures.

[Figure 1] Changes in Approval Ratings for the Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung Administrations

Source: Gallup Korea / Note: Red circles indicate events during the Kim Dae-jung administration; blue circles indicate events during the Kim Young-sam administration.

The periods of the Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung administrations show very similar patterns. Although they enjoyed high approval ratings at the beginning of their terms, initial high expectations gradually gave way to public disappointment as political and social conflicts, along with domestic and international security issues, emerged. By the fourth year, various corruption scandals erupted, leading to a rapid loss of administrative control. Despite achieving majority support of 54.4% through the inter-Korean summit in the third year, the administration's approval rating plummeted to the 20% range in its fourth year following the outbreak of the '3 major gates' (Lee Yong-ho, Jeong Hyeon-joon, Jin Seong-ho gates) related to venture businesses.

During President Kim Young-sam's tenure, initial high approval ratings of 70-80% were attributed to the reformist nature of the first civilian government. However, societal class conflicts intensified, and the escalating North Korean nuclear crisis led to a decline in approval ratings by the third year. Nevertheless, from the latter half of 1995, with the full-scale investigation into the May 18th Gwangju Uprising, and even in early 1996, the fourth year of his term, approval ratings recovered to the 40% range through the 'Restoration of Historical Truth' initiative, seemingly overcoming the fourth-year jinx. However, the 'Hanbo Gate' scandal, which triggered a comprehensive crisis for the Kim Young-sam administration in the latter half of the year, led to the lame duck situation.

The Roh Moo-hyun administration was no exception. Launched with high expectations for political reform, it experienced a decline in approval ratings from the outset due to scandals involving close associates and the North Korean funds issue. However, the impeachment in 2004 led to a recovery in approval ratings to a high of 57%. Subsequently, while focusing on diplomacy with Japan and economic diplomacy, approval ratings remained in the 35-40% range. However, an obsession with ideological agendas caused ratings to drop to the 20% range. In 2006, the fourth year of his term, the defeat in the May 31st local elections, coupled with North Korea's nuclear test and soaring real estate prices, caused approval ratings to plummet to 15.3% by December, indicating a severe experience with the lame duck phenomenon.

[Figure 2] Comparison of Approval Ratings for President Roh Moo-hyun and President Lee Myung-bak (%)

Source: Media Research for the first quarter of the first year, second quarter of the third year, and first and third quarters of the fourth year of the Roh Moo-hyun administration; EAI and Korea Research for the remaining surveys of the Roh Moo-hyun administration and all surveys of the Lee Myung-bak administration.

Note: Red circles indicate events during the Roh Moo-hyun administration; blue circles indicate events during the Lee Myung-bak administration.

2. A Tale of Two Presidents: Lee Myung-bak and Roh Moo-hyun Entering Their Fourth Year

President Lee Myung-bak: "Two Years Remaining, It's Not Too Late for Constitutional Amendment."

Roh Moo-hyun: "It's More Important to Finish What We've Started Than to Create Unnecessary Commotion."

Will President Lee Myung-bak's fourth year also be marked by a harsh lame duck period, or will he be the first to break the fourth-year jinx? Attention is focused on this question, as he begins his fourth year with higher approval ratings than any previous president at the same stage. Reflecting this, when asked in a New Year's broadcast interview on February 1st whether he felt it was "already the fourth year" or "still the fourth year," President Lee responded, "There are still two years left." Indeed, he has strongly urged discussions on constitutional amendment and administrative district reorganization, and expressed cautious optimism about achieving 5% economic growth and $100 billion in exports for South Korea in 2011. He also demonstrated strong resolve and confidence regarding contentious issues such as the Korea-US FTA and the re-examination of the Science Belt's location.

This contrasts sharply with the attitude of his predecessor, former President Roh Moo-hyun, when he entered his fourth year. At that time, on February 28th, during a hike with reporters to mark his fourth year in office, President Roh expressed criticism of the problems inherent in the five-year single-term presidency and argued that elections during a president's term do not benefit state affairs. However, while cautious to avoid escalating into calls for constitutional amendment, he stated, "It is more important to finish what we have started than to create unnecessary commotion over things that cannot be done."

President Lee Myung-bak's stance of "still two years left" versus former President Roh Moo-hyun's focus on "finishing what has been started rather than initiating new, unachievable tasks after four years have passed." What explains the divergent choices of these two presidents? The changes in their approval ratings offer a clue. At the end of their third years in office, the approval ratings of former President Roh and President Lee Myung-bak present a stark contrast. In former President Roh's case, his approval rating, which had soared to 57% after the impeachment in his second year (2004), later dropped to the 20% range during the process of pushing for the "4 major reform bills" that provoked fierce resistance from the opposition party, and when he proposed the idea of a grand coalition with the Grand National Party in July 2005. In contrast, President Lee Myung-bak, who experienced a sharp decline in approval ratings due to the candlelight protests early in his term, managed to increase his approval rating by more than 10 percentage points each year, reaching the 40-50% range as his third anniversary approached.

Unlike past administrations where approval ratings generally declined over time, President Lee Myung-bak has successfully boosted his approval ratings by developing state agenda items such as "pragmatic moderateism" and "fair society," leveraging economic recovery to garner public expectations. Therefore, President Lee's confidence as he enters his fourth year has a solid basis. While past presidents were unable to achieve significant policy outcomes in the latter half of their terms due to lame duck issues, President Lee has built the foundational strength to announce ambitious state plans for the remainder of his term.

3. Lessons Learned from the Failures of the Roh Moo-hyun Administration

However, potential instability factors cannot be overlooked. In the 2010 local elections, the ruling party narrowly won in Seoul and Gyeonggi after extremely close contests, and had to be content with retaining Dae-gu/Gyeongbuk/Busan. In fact, the Roh Moo-hyun administration also recorded an approval rating of 57.0% immediately after the impeachment, and hovered above 40% in the early part of its third year. Yet, by the end of its third year, its approval rating had halved. There is no guarantee that the Lee Myung-bak administration will not face a similar fate. It is necessary to take preventive measures by learning from the experiences of the previous administration. So, why did the Roh Moo-hyun administration's approval ratings plummet, and why did it suffer significant defeats against the opposition in the 2006 local elections and the 2007 presidential election?

Firstly, the gap between public expectations and the administration's policy agenda led to public distrust. At the time, objective macroeconomic indicators suggested an unprecedented economic boom, yet public sentiment simultaneously expressed severe economic downturns and employment insecurity. The Roh Moo-hyun administration dismissed these concerns as mere rhetoric from the conservative camp, ignoring the growing public outcry. The public perceived this as "autocratic politics" that disregarded the will of the people.

Secondly, the decline of the Roh Moo-hyun administration, despite its expanded political power after the impeachment, was spent on partisan issues like the "4 major reform bills" that sharply divided political positions between the ruling and opposition parties, and between progressives and conservatives, rather than on unifying a divided public. While public opinion on individual reform bills was relatively favorable, the majority sentiment prioritized issues that could achieve consensus across party lines, such as national unity and economic revitalization, amidst economic stagnation, the impeachment, and candlelight vigils. The administration's insistence on conflict-inducing political issues, however, fostered public weariness with "conflict politics" and strengthened anti-government sentiment.

Thirdly, there was distrust in "engineering politics" aimed at securing a second term for the ruling party. From July 2005 onwards, former President Roh Moo-hyun made an unprecedented proposal for a grand coalition with the Grand National Party, sparking a major political debate. Furthermore, despite his public pledge in February 2005 during his third-year hike not to "create unnecessary commotion over things that cannot be done," he actively fanned the flames of constitutional amendment discussions, advocating for the synchronization of general elections and presidential terms. Although he failed to achieve constitutional amendment during his term, he succeeded in securing an agreement between the ruling and opposition parties in 2007 to pursue constitutional amendment discussions in the 18th National Assembly. However, in the concurrent 4th local elections, the ruling Uri Party won only one out of 16 mayoral and gubernatorial seats, and in the 17th presidential election, the ruling party's candidate, Roh Moo-hyun, lost to Lee Myung-bak by a margin of 22.5 percentage points.

4. The Public's Mandate for 2011

Focus on Resolving Economic and Security Concerns

Given that the Lee Myung-bak administration has succeeded in strengthening its public support base, unlike previous governments, why is there growing concern that it may not be able to avoid the same pitfalls as past administrations and that its fourth year outlook is not entirely optimistic?

Is the perceived economy's double-dip materializing? The pace of improvement has sharply slowed since the second half of 2010.

The reason why the Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak administrations have followed different paths thus far is largely due to the relatively effective management of the perceived economy since the 2008 financial crisis. One factor contributing to the increase in President Lee Myung-bak's approval ratings has been the continuous recovery of the perceived economy, which was at its worst immediately after the economic crisis, and this recovery has served as a pillar supporting the president's rising approval ratings. According to tracking surveys by EAI and Korea Research, the pace of improvement in the perceived economy has recently slowed, raising concerns about a potential double-dip in the perceived economy.

Regarding the perception of the national economy, the proportion of respondents who felt it had worsened was 93.1% in the February 2009 survey, immediately after the global financial crisis in the second half of 2008. However, it dropped to 36.2% one year later in the December 2009 survey and further to 32.6% in the May 2010 survey. Since the second half of 2010, however, the proportion of those who perceive the economy as having worsened has increased to 35.9% in the December survey and 39.0% in the January 2011 survey. Conversely, the perception that the economy has improved, which had increased to 25.8% by December 2010, began to decline in 2011. The same trend is observed in the perceived household economy, which reflects respondents' personal financial situations. In the February 2009 survey, half of the respondents (50.9%) stated that their household finances had worsened since the economic crisis, but this figure decreased to 33.1% in December and 26.1% in May 2010. Since then, there has been no sign of further improvement.

[Figure 3] Changes in Perceived National and Household Economy (January 2009 - January 2011)

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Source: Regular public opinion surveys by EAI and Korea Research (January 2011 survey conducted by Korea Research independently).

Top National Agenda for 2011: Alleviating Economic Polarization and Strengthening Security

Let us examine more directly what the public expects from the Lee Myung-bak administration. According to a survey conducted by EAI and Korea Research at the end of last December, the top national agenda items for 2011 are economic stability and security. 23.2% of respondents cited the mitigation of economic polarization, 14.8% cited the improvement of inter-Korean relations, and 12.0% cited economic growth. National integration (11.7%), security enhancement (11.1%), and quality of life improvement (8.9%) followed. Only 7.4% of respondents selected political reform, encompassing constitutional amendment and administrative district reorganization, as the top priority. In essence, the public is urging the administration to focus on welfare and growth to resolve polarization while prioritizing security. Compared to January 2010, while the emphasis on economic polarization and economic growth has decreased, these remain top agenda items. Concurrently, the Cheonan sinking and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island have significantly heightened public anxiety regarding North Korea and security variables.

[Table 1] Changes in Public Priorities for National Agenda Items (%)

Monopolistic Politics · Concerns over Engineering Politics; 67.9% of the Public Expects Harmonious Leadership

However, the agendas highlighted in the recent presidential broadcast interview—such as constitutional amendment, electoral system reform, and the re-examination of the Science Belt—are political issues or matters that could provoke regional conflict, rather than economic or security concerns. This indicates a significant gap between public sentiment and the administration's policy judgments.

While constitutional amendment and electoral system reform are undoubtedly crucial agendas for South Korea's national development and political reform, the possibility of intensifying inter-party and ruling-opposition conflicts cannot be ruled out. If public anxiety becomes widespread and political issues with clear partisan stances take precedence over economic and security agendas that facilitate broad consensus, it is natural to draw parallels with the participatory government's focus on the "4 major reform bills" and grand coalition, disregarding public calls to prioritize economic recovery. Furthermore, the ruling party's defeat in the June 2nd local elections in 2010, despite maintaining a 50% approval rating, can be seen as a warning sign from the public against unilateral governance.

There is also a gap between the type of leadership the public desires and the leadership currently demonstrated by President Lee Myung-bak. In a public opinion survey conducted by EAI in February 2002, just before the Roh Moo-hyun administration took office, 42.6% of respondents desired a harmonious leadership style, 33.8% preferred a meticulous, practical CEO-type leadership, and 23.7% called for strong leadership. While harmonious leadership was the plurality preference, over half desired strong governance capabilities or charismatic leadership. However, in a panel survey conducted by EAI, SBS, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research in June 2010, immediately after the local elections, a striking 67.9% of respondents desired harmonious leadership. Only 14.2% wanted strong leadership, and 11.7% preferred a CEO-type leader. This likely reflects the public's accumulated weariness and cynicism towards politics due to unproductive political discourse and partisan conflicts since democratization.

Whether the Lee Myung-bak administration succeeds or fails will not be a matter of success or failure for any particular political faction, whether ruling or opposition, progressive or conservative, but rather a matter of success or failure for South Korea and its entire populace. As the fourth year of the administration begins, all eyes are on which direction the Lee Myung-bak administration will take its next steps. The public has significant expectations for a government that wishes to move forward with confidence. However, the president and the ruling party must deeply consider the public's accumulated weariness and cynicism towards politics, stemming from unproductive political discourse and partisan conflicts since democratization.

[Figure 4] Changes in Desired Leadership Styles: Roh Moo-hyun Administration vs. Lee Myung-bak Administration (%)

Source: EAI and JoongAng Ilbo (February 2002), EAI, SBS, JoongAng Ilbo, and Korea Research (June 2010).