The ROK-U.S. Alliance: A Response Plan for the Future

The international political landscape has entered a period of profound transformation over the past two decades since the end of the Cold War, marked by events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the recent global economic crisis. The repercussions of the global financial crisis have shaken the standing of the United States as the world's sole superpower, while China is emerging in a more assertive manner. North Korea faces an uncertain future due to instability stemming from the ongoing power transition from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un. These changes pose an unprecedented challenge to peace on the Korean Peninsula and will serve as a test for a new era. It is time to discuss how the ROK-U.S. alliance, which has guaranteed the security of South Korea and the stability of the Northeast Asian region for the past half-century, should respond during this transitional period.

The East Asia Institute (EAI) and the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), with the support of Pyeongtaek City, held the 4th ROK-U.S. Alliance Conference on December 15, 2010. The conference, themed "The ROK-U.S. Alliance: A Response Plan for the Future," brought together scholars, experts, politicians, and media from both South Korea and the United States to engage in in-depth discussions on the future challenges facing the ROK-U.S. alliance and potential responses. The conference was structured into three sessions: 'The ROK-U.S. Alliance in a Changing Strategic Environment,' 'Non-Military Contingency Plans for North Korean Collapse,' and 'The Future of the ROK-U.S. Military Alliance.' Key discussion points and policy recommendations based on the sessions are summarized below.

Part I: The ROK-U.S. Alliance in a Changing Strategic Environment

The Rise of China

- To understand China's future foreign policy, consideration of its domestic political context is necessary.

The Chinese government has recently become more vocal in its foreign policy, particularly towards the United States. This is likely because presenting a strong external image is advantageous for securing dominance in the domestic political arena as the leadership transition in 2012 approaches. Grasping the context of how domestic political logic is projected onto foreign policy is crucial for understanding China's future policy pursuits on the international stage.

- China's coddling of North Korea will ultimately harm its own interests in the long run.

In 2010, North Korea carried out military provocations, including the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. In both incidents, China prioritized the stability of the North Korean regime over investigating the truth of the events, showing support for North Korea's position on the international stage. However, such coddling by China not only makes it difficult for the ROK-U.S. alliance to deter North Korean threats but will also ultimately harm China's own interests in the long run. If China continues to support North Korea despite its military provocations, North Korea may pursue more adventurous policies, which would ultimately undermine the regional peace and stability that the Chinese government has consistently championed as its top policy objective.

- The ROK-U.S. summit is a valuable opportunity to explore joint efforts with China.

Since the cooling of inter-Korean relations, the Chinese government has secured considerable leverage over the North Korean regime through economic aid and diplomatic support, filling the void left by the lack of inter-Korean cooperation. Therefore, cooperation with China is crucial for resolving the North Korean issue. The ROK-U.S. summit scheduled for January 2011 presents a valuable opportunity to share perspectives with China and explore joint efforts for future resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue.

Evolving North Korean Threats

- A strategy is needed to counter North Korea's non-traditional security threats.

The sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island demonstrated North Korea's capability to initiate 'limited conflicts that do not escalate into full-scale war' using not only asymmetric but also conventional forces. Simultaneously, it starkly revealed the extreme vulnerability of the South Korean military to such non-traditional security threats. It is assessed that North Korea has adjusted its strategy towards employing these non-traditional security threats because South Korea holds a decisive advantage in a full-scale war. Therefore, in response to North Korea's strategic shift, it is necessary to establish a security strategy that can deter future non-traditional security threats from North Korea.

- The South Korean government must bridge the gap between its words and actions in its North Korea policy.

The Lee Myung-bak administration's response to North Korea's military provocations faced significant domestic criticism. Particularly after the Yeonpyeong Island shelling incident, the South Korean government struggled to escape criticism for failing to adequately respond to North Korea's direct threats. Consequently, the Lee Myung-bak administration has intensified its rhetoric warning against further North Korean provocations. However, this had already been raised after the Cheonan sinking, and actions that do not align with the intensity of the rhetoric only undermine the credibility of deterrence. Strong words only hold meaning when backed by concrete actions. Therefore, both rhetoric and actions must be consistent and guided by careful strategic consideration.

- International organizations should be utilized to pressure North Korea.

Utilizing international organizations to pressure North Korea can significantly increase the intensity of pressure compared to applying pressure through the ROK-U.S. alliance or ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation, by focusing international attention on the North Korean issue. It is also more effective in securing broad support for the South Korean government within the international community.

Leveraging Soft Power

- While hard power remains important, the significance of soft power should not be overlooked.

As the direct application of hard power, such as military force, incurs excessive costs, soft power, based on attraction, is becoming increasingly important on the international stage. While the ROK-U.S. alliance must primarily ensure sufficient hard power to deter further North Korean provocations following the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong incidents, it should not excessively overlook the importance of soft power.

- Soft power resources can be mobilized to directly influence North Korean society.

South Korea needs to utilize its soft power more wisely to resolve the North Korean issue. South Korea's liberal democracy and economic prosperity pose the greatest threat to the North Korean regime and are significant soft power resources that can exert immense influence on the North Korean populace. The increasing use of mobile phones among North Koreans and their reception of South Korean television and radio broadcasts provide excellent opportunities for South Korea's soft power assets to directly influence North Korean society.

Part II: Non-Military Contingency Plans for North Korean Collapse

Possibility of Contingency

- It is necessary to distinguish between regime 'instability' and regime 'collapse'.

Even after the end of the Cold War in the late 1990s, claims that North Korea's collapse was imminent were prevalent. Similar discussions have recently resurfaced, fueled by Kim Jong-il's deteriorating health and severe internal economic problems. However, to accurately understand the current situation in North Korea, a cautious approach is needed, distinguishing between 'instability' and 'collapse.' While it is true that the North Korean regime is currently facing a period of instability, it is an overstatement to conclude that the regime is on the verge of collapse as long as it maintains political stability through its iron-fisted rule. This distinction must be clear when formulating strategies for North Korea's future.

- Interpreting the failure of the central planned economy as a collapse of the entire North Korean economy is an overstatement.

It is undeniable that North Korea's economy has faced difficulties during the 'Arduous March' in the late 1990s due to the collapse of its planned economy and international economic sanctions imposed in response to the nuclear issue. However, interpreting this as a collapse of the entire North Korean economy is an overstatement. Rather, since the collapse of the rationing system, a key element of the central planned economy, in the late 1990s, the non-planned market sector has developed, and as the market functions, the North Korean economy has, on average, improved. While the North Korean regime attempts to control the extent to which capitalist elements infiltrate North Korean society, the activation of the private economy in the non-planned sector has created opportunities for the North Korean populace to secure their livelihoods.

Establishing Contingency Plans

- Military plans for contingencies must include considerations for civil affairs operations.

While military planning is undoubtedly a crucial element in formulating strategies for post-North Korean regime collapse, civil affairs operations must also be carefully considered. The 2003 Iraq War clearly illustrates the consequences of military operations lacking adequate civil affairs preparation. If a contingency occurs in North Korea leading to the collapse of its regime, it signifies the collapse of the entire social system, including public services. Therefore, it is essential to remember that establishing effective contingency plans to secure broad support from the North Korean people is a core aspect of formulating contingency strategies.

- Existing channels of connection with North Korea must be identified and utilized.

Currently, South Korea and various international organizations maintain certain channels of connection with specific organizations and local entities within North Korean territory. These connections, ranging from the Kaesong Industrial Complex to various aid programs, can significantly contribute to the success of stabilization operations in the event of a contingency in North Korea. Furthermore, they can serve as channels for dialogue with the North Korean populace, contributing to the successful execution of civil affairs operations.

- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a crucial role in establishing contingency plans.

NGOs, with their accumulated experience and expertise, can penetrate areas that governments find difficult to engage with directly, thus playing a vital role in establishing contingency plans. However, since the role of NGOs can only be fully realized after security issues are resolved, governmental leadership will be necessary.

- Consideration must be given to which existing North Korean institutions should be maintained.

Another critical issue that must be addressed following the collapse of the North Korean regime is the extent to which existing North Korean institutions should be maintained. One of the significant mistakes made by the U.S. military in the Iraq War was the dissolution of most Iraqi administrative organizations, including the Iraqi army. The disbandment of the Iraqi army, in particular, led to instability and riots. When formulating strategies for the post-North Korean regime collapse era, deciding which existing North Korean institutions to abolish and which to maintain is a core consideration for the initial response strategy... (continued)

Part I

Moderator 

Lee, Suk-jong

Presenters 

Victor Cha

Choi, Kang

Evan S. Medeiros

Part II

Moderator 

Abraham Denmark

Presenters 

Patrick Cronin

Shin, Beom-chul

Part III

Moderator 

Ha, Young-sun

Presenters 

Abraham Denmark

Cha, Du-hyun

Marcus Galascas