[EAI-CISS NASD 2010 Security Briefings Series No.3] Determinants of China's Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula: A Comparative Analysis of Responses to North Korea's Nuclear Tests and the Cheonan Incident

1. Introduction

The Korean Peninsula, bordering China, has been perceived as a strategically vital region for China's security due to geopolitical reasons. The Qing Dynasty waged war to prevent Japan from gaining dominance on the peninsula, and Mao Zedong, upon the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, participated in the Korean War to ensure the security of China's northeastern region (Lieberthal 2004, 89-90). Following the Korean War, China maintained continuous influence over the Korean Peninsula through close relations with North Korea amidst its division. However, with the dissolution of socialist states in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe from the late 1980s to the early 1990s and the subsequent post-Cold War era, China's perception of the Korean Peninsula began to shift. A pivotal event that exemplified this change in China's perception was the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea in August 1992. Reflecting the altered international landscape of the post-Cold War era and prioritizing domestic economic development, China established diplomatic ties with South Korea despite strong opposition from North Korea. Subsequently, China pursued a policy of "equidistance diplomacy," expanding economic ties with South Korea while maintaining political relations with North Korea (Kim Jae-cheol 2003).

(1) Problem Statement

The "equidistance diplomacy," understood as the core tenet of China's policy toward the Korean Peninsula since the post-Cold War era, has raised questions about the primary variables influencing China's policy decisions regarding the Korean Peninsula, particularly due to North Korea's provocative actions in the late 2000s and China's divergent responses.

① North Korea's Nuclear Tests and China's Response

Following the outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear issue and North Korea's two nuclear tests, China broke with its foreign policy principle of non-interference in internal affairs and actively participated in international sanctions against North Korea. China voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1718, adopted in response to North Korea's first nuclear test on October 9, 2006, and also voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1874, adopted in response to the second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. Furthermore, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang expressed support for international sanctions against North Korea's nuclear tests through a statement of condemnation.

"China supports appropriate and balanced measures by the Security Council regarding the North Korean nuclear test and will participate in relevant meetings with a responsible and constructive attitude (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China website)."

② The Cheonan Incident and China's Response

On March 26, 2010, the South Korean naval patrol vessel PCC-772 Cheonan sank off the coast of Baengnyeong Island in the West Sea. In response, the South Korean government formed a joint civilian-military investigation team to examine the circumstances of the sinking. On May 20, the results of the investigation were announced. At the press conference, Joint Investigation Group leader Yoon Duk-yong stated that "the Cheonan sank as a result of an external underwater explosion caused by a North Korean torpedo" (The Chosun Ilbo, 2010/5/21, 1). While the investigation into the Cheonan incident was ongoing, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il visited China from May 3 to 5 and held talks with President Hu Jintao. In response to public criticism in South Korea regarding this visit, the spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed it as "unrelated to the Cheonan incident." Conversely, South Korean experts on China assessed this visit as a sign that Sino-North Korean relations, which had become strained after the nuclear tests, were fully restored (The Hankyoreh, 2010/5/10, 3). Additionally, following the announcement of the joint investigation team's findings, China showed a lukewarm response to follow-up measures against North Korea.

Amid lukewarm responses from China and Russia regarding explicit mention of North Korea, a UN Security Council presidential statement condemning the attack on the Cheonan passed without specifying North Korea as the perpetrator. In response, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang issued the following statement.

"We hope that the relevant parties will maintain composure and restraint and turn the page on the Cheonan incident as soon as possible (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China website)."

The divergent responses from China to the North Korean nuclear tests and the Cheonan incident, both occurring around the same period in the late 2000s, raise questions about the factors influencing China's policy decisions toward the Korean Peninsula. Stemming from these questions, the central research question of this study is: 'Why did China adopt a benign policy toward North Korea in the process of resolving the Cheonan incident, unlike its response to the North Korean nuclear tests?'

(2) Case Selection: The Issue of Analytical Level

Before proceeding with the main discussion, this section aims to clarify why the cases of North Korea's nuclear tests and the Cheonan incident were chosen to examine the determinants of China's policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Regarding the analytical level required for case comparison, there is a difference in the nature of the events: North Korea's nuclear tests are issues addressed within the framework of the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation, while the Cheonan incident is a problem that can be resolved at the Korean Peninsula level. Therefore, a criticism is possible that China's policy considerations might differ in resolving these two incidents.

Despite these limitations, there are two reasons for selecting these two cases. First, both the North Korean nuclear tests and the Cheonan incident are acts of provocation initiated by North Korea within a similar timeframe. By selecting cases that occurred around the same period, external threats influencing the variables can be controlled. Second, and more importantly, in relation to the purpose of this paper, both incidents have influenced the changes in the Northeast Asian security environment. Notably, there have been significant changes in South Korea's perception of China. [Table-1] shows the changes in South Korea's perception of the five surrounding countries in Northeast Asia after the Cheonan incident... (Continued)